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Jaroslav Miller, Editorial

Despite its undisputed intellectual potential and theoretical achievements East-Central European scholarship has long suffered from being encapsulated in self-constraining vernaculars. A notoriously infamous saying: *Bohemica (Hungarica, Polonica, Slovaca) non leguntur* still provokes a surprisingly lukewarm reaction among many East-Central European intellectuals and academics. Two decades after the fall of communism in 1989 have been marked with sweeping changes in scholarship, organization of science and academic life. The persistent language barrier, however, is still of significance as the crushing majority of relevant studies on East-Central European art, culture and history are published in the vernacular and remain linguistically inaccessible to scholars from other countries. At the risk of simplification, one dares to say that the frontier between ‘the explored Europe’ and ‘the unknown Europe’ has not fully disappeared yet.

The idea of an interdisciplinary and comparison-oriented bilingual (English/German) academic journal originated at the Philosophical Faculty of Palacký University, Olomouc several years ago but, due to a variety of reasons, it came true only in 2011. As a newborn child of several university institutions (Philosophy, History, History of Art, Musicology, Theatre, Film and Media Studies) the journal, by encouraging the comparative and interdisciplinary approach to a number of issues, aims at avoiding the danger of “hyperspecialization.” This vision is fully congenial to intellectual open-mindedness and the cosmopolitan profile of the faculty. While studies dealing with other geographical areas are welcome, *The Czech and Slovak Journal of Humanities* highlights the East-Central European dimensions, topics and issues. In our somewhat broadened understanding East-Central Europe would cover the in many ways homogeneous cluster of states and territories that once formed the Habsburg monarchy and Poland with some overlaps with the Balkans. Overall the journal’s three sections Studies, Reviews and Research Information are intended to make the East-Central European scholarly output more accessible to an English-speaking and German-speaking academic readership. To make the content thematically coherent we have decided to dedicate each number to a different discipline in turn, beginning with Philosophy (issue no. 1, Spring 2011) and History (issue no. 2, Autumn 2011).

We very much hope that in the course of time the journal will become one of the flagships of East-Central European humanities. At the same time we ask our readers and patrons for their indulgence while the journal matures.

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Articles submitted for publication may be sent all the year round to one of the editors:

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Submission of a paper will be taken to imply that it is unpublished and is not being considered for publication elsewhere. All submitted articles are reviewed by two independent reviewers. The maximum length of the article should not exceed 8000 words including notes. All articles should be accompanied by an abstract in English. For footnotes, please use the Chicago Manual of Style.

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residents|

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***Corporeal* Form and the Human Soul in Thomas Aquinas' Work**

Abstract | The corporeal form (*forma corporeitatis*) in the thinking at the peak of the Middle Ages has its origin mainly in the effort to categorically define prime matter in Avicenna's work. This effort proved to be problematic. Averroes also noticed it and he attacked the substantial concept of a corporeal form in a way that later on was very close to Thomas Aquinas in his criticism of Ibn Gabirol. Although Thomas Aquinas refused to understand prime matter as blessed with corporeal form, and thus also the pluralism of substantial form, he kept the concept of the corporeal form itself. He however transformed it in a fundamental way. The corporeal form ceased to be substantial form that would establish any ontological level in the order of being. In this sense, the forms of elements stand on the lowest level of Thomas Aquinas' understanding. It however became the essential part of all material forms including the soul of man. This step enabled Thomas Aquinas to include prime matter into the order of creation and thus consider its cognition through form which follows the possibility of defining three dimensions. On the anthropologic level, Aquinas puts the concept of the corporeal form against the eclectic Aristotelianism of the first part of the 13th century which was in its essence anthropological dualism.

Thomas Aquinas holds a prominent place in the history of philosophy in many aspects. This is not only because of the originality of his thinking but also because of several aspects of his philosophy and some of his resolutions of philosophical questions, which in a way round off the movement and development of the philosophical matters of secular tradition. This rounding off is noticeable in particular in his anthropology. His use of Aristotle's concept of the soul as a form of body for ensuring and fulfilling the requirement of a human unity can serve as an illustrative example. Étienne Gilson in his *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* mentions that Christianity is primarily concerned with man and that in this sense, using Aristotle's concept of a soul is completely Christian.¹ It should be however added that the way in which Thomas Aquinas utilizes Aristotle's concept is also very philosophical and consistent. This last feature, that is consistency, was missing in the concepts of Thomas Aquinas' predecessors.² That is why we can even talk about rounding off a certain thinking tradition.

¹ É. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, London 1955, p. 19: "It also helps in understanding the deeply Christian reasons why, in the thirteenth century theologians will deem it advisable to substitute for the Platonist doctrine of the soul its Aristotelean definition as a form of the body. What has often been considered as a pagan invasion of theology has been, on the contrary, the belated fulfilment of one of the deepest aspirations of early Christian faith."

² A characteristic sign of Thomas Aquinas' predecessors which is usually emphasized in the literature is especially the one pointing out their inconsistent understanding of the soul as a form or the first act of the body. Compare with B. C. Bazán, "Pluralisme de formes ou dualisme de substances?", *Revue Philosophique de Louvain* 67 (1969) 31–32.

In this article, I will focus on one of the main questions of the philosophical psychology of Thomas Aquinas. This question is his concept of corporeal form (*forma corporeitatis*), especially in relation to the human soul and form. That is because each of these relations differs in Thomas Aquinas' concept when compared to his predecessors. It changes in a way so that man can still be understood as an authentic unity of the soul and body so that at the same time his soul could endure the death of the body. First I will focus on the origin of the concept of corporeal form. Then I will go into detail regarding the concept and its utilization by some medieval thinkers which will provide us with due perspective for the final analysis of Thomas Aquinas' teaching. The proving thesis here is that Thomas Aquinas extricated the notion of corporeal form from pluralistic context, that the concept enabled itself, and he used it in the construction of his unitary psychology inspired by hylemorphism.

1 Origin of the concept of corporeal form in Aristotle's work

The origin of corporeal form (*forma corporeitatis*) is to be found in some of Aristotle's commentators. The oldest one working with the concept is considered to be Simplicius. This commentator of Aristotle was convinced that in Aristotle's books, a contradictive definition of prime matter can be found. The first one defines prime matter as corporeal and occupying space, the second one on the other hand defines prime matter as non-corporeal and not occupying space. To put these definitions of prime matter in concord, he placed another corporeal form between the form of elements and prime matter.³ This obviously changes the whole scheme of Aristotle, where the basic forms are the forms of elements. This interpretation of Aristotle's teaching had a substantial impact on the further development of the question of the structure of being. For our investigation, more important than the opinions of Simplicius who showed us only approximately what change was happening are the opinions of other thinkers, namely Avicenna, Averroes, and Ibn Gabirol. Before we get acquainted with the postures of these philosophers, we need to go back to Aristotle himself and his teaching on prime matter.⁴

Aristotle's world consists of two spheres: sublunary and superlunary. The first sphere consists on the most basic level of four forms (*stoicheion*) or elements (earth, water, fire and air). Each of these elements is characterized by the means of qualities (drought, humidity, heat and cold). These elements can mutually transform,⁵ which shows on the accidental level by the change of one or two qualities, or compound and thus create more complex beings which are reducible to these elements.⁶ The superlunary sphere consists of a different element, the first element (*to prōton stoicheion*), which however never enters the structure of sublunary beings.⁷

Trying to understand the process of mutual transformation of elements, Aristotle turns to his general theory of change which he outlined in his *Physics*.⁸ According to this theory, change occurs when matter accepts a form and at the same time loses the prior form. Principles (*archai*)

³ Compare with A. Hyman, "Aristotle's 'Prime matter' and Avicenna's and Averroes' 'Corporeal Form'", in S. Lieberman (ed.), *Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume*, 1965, vol. 1, p. 385.

⁴ For Aristotle's theory on prime matter, see: F. Solmsen, "Aristotle and Prime Matter: A Reply to Hugh R. King", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 19 (1958) 243–252; R. Dancy, "On Some of Aristotle's Second Thoughts About Substances: Matter", *The Philosophical Review* 87 (1978) 372–413; Politis, V., *Aristotle and the Metaphysics*, London 2004, p. 55–61; M. Loux, "Aristotle: Metaphysics", in: Ch. Shields (ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Ancient Philosophy*, Blackwell Publishing 2003, p. 168–171.

⁵ Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione* II, 329a24–329b3.

⁶ Aristotle, *De Caelo* III, 306b; *De Generatione et Corruptione* 2, 314b17–26; 315a4–19.

⁷ Aristotle, *De Caelo* III, 298b.

⁸ Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 7, 189b30–191a24.

of change are matter (*hylé*), form (*eidos*) and steresis (*sterésis*).⁹ Aristotle uses an example of a sculptor and a bronze statue to describe the process of change. The piece of bronze is itself a form of bronze. It is a being which consists of a matter and a form on its own. The sculptor's goal is to substitute the form of a piece of bronze into a form of a bronze statue. This example is of course exact only in relation to a change which is originated by a man, a craftsman. It is obvious that the changing base is always bronze which doesn't change in its essence, it only accepts other accident, or to be more precise, other form in the sense of the word we use commonly nowadays. Aristotle is aware of this difference; he uses the example only as an analogy to changes which happen naturally.¹⁰

While the base or the matter for the craftsman was bronze, the base and matter of changes in nature is prime matter. This shows when the model of change is applied to the lowest level of elements. In this situation, Aristotle cannot implement something sensually perceptible, some currently existing being. It would be in conflict with his presupposition of the irreducibility of elements into some simpler parts.¹¹

Aristotle is led to an acknowledgement of the existence of prime matter by two possibilities which arise while explaining the change at the level of elements. The first possibility says it is not a continuous change. It is for sure obvious why this possibility of explaining the change is not acceptable. Such an explanation would be in conflict with the *ex nihilo nihil fit* principle. The second possibility is to consider the mutual change of elements as continuous. That is in analogy to the change leading to the creation of the bronze statue. It even seems there is no other possibility. Under these conditions, it is necessary to acknowledge a passive principle of a change, which in contradiction to bronze is not perceptible by the senses. This essential base for change at the level of elements is in fact prime matter.¹²

Aristotle discusses in many places prime matter, sometimes even in the sense of a perceptible base. We can consider the proof of the transformation of elements to be his clearest expression of what we should understand by prime matter.¹³

The mentioned contemplations thus lead to a definition of prime matter as one of the causes (*aitia*), which allow and start a change. As such, a grasp of prime matter is defined only at the physical level, from the point of its role in the analysis of a change, we need to search and define its nature, i. e. its definition on the metaphysical level. From the point of view of the theme we are investigating, it is this requirement that is very interesting as during the attempts to define a metaphysical definition of prime matter, conditions show which lead the commentators to implementing a corporeal form between prime matter and the other form.

To define the nature of prime matter we thus need to be able to include it in Aristotle's metaphysical framework. This means we must define a method of how the being testifies prime matter.¹⁴ This according to Aristotle testifies in many ways: a) from the point of view of categories, and b) from the point of view of possibility and actuality.¹⁵

The first method of testimony of being is connected to the definition of its category. Prime matter will certainly not belong to the group of accidents. The principle of starting a change on the elementary level cannot be considered an accident. The accident would in that case

⁹ Aristotle, *Physics* I, 7, 190b 29–191a 7.

¹⁰ Aristotle, *Physics* I, 7, 191a 9–10.

¹¹ Aristotle, *De Caelo* III, 302a 15–19, *Metaphysics* VIII, 3, 1014a 31–35.

¹² Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione* I, 3, 317b – 319a.

¹³ Compare with F. Solmsen, "Aristotle and Prime Matter: A Reply to Hugh R. King", p. 243.

¹⁴ For more on Aristotle's motives to defining metaphysical character of individual thing and its principles, see Ch. Shields, *Aristotle*, London 2007, p. 234–237.

¹⁵ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, 1, 1945b 32–35.

precede substance, which is impossible. We are then left with the category of substance (*ousía*). This however does not resolve the problem at the categorical level. By substance we can understand an entity or a form (*to ti ev einai, morfé*), common (*katholou*), gender (*genos*), substratum (*hypokeimenon*).¹⁶ The substance is in the most actual sense that which does not testify about any other.¹⁷ This condition then is not fulfilled by the substratum in the utmost extent. But how should we understand this substratum? As with substance, Aristotle defines it variously. By substratum we can understand matter, form and composition.¹⁸ Is prime matter at the same time the substance, as the form and composition are? The answer is no. It seems that the form and composition are only different aspects of the same thing.¹⁹ They both have distinctness and independence.²⁰ Distinctness however can never belong to prime matter. It seems therefore that in Aristotle's work we won't find an accurate definition of the nature of prime matter without the help of substance analysis.

The second way of testifying of the being seems to be more promising. Everything points to the fact that prime matter needs to be understood as a clear possibility which can turn into anything. This clear possibility is not anything that could be as is found in nature. It is a possible being which is proved based on the analysis of the change of elements.²¹

This is how we could interpret Aristotle's metaphysical opinion on prime matter. We did not find its definition on the categorical level; it cannot be defined in this way what prime matter is and what its nature is. It is not that surprising as searching for nature is always searching for an entity or the form of a thing. Prime matter which we would consider as the base of the most basic change cannot in that case have any form. This fact however would not prevent the commentators from adding the seemingly missing or lost part of Aristotle's legacy on the categorical definition. In the next chapter, we will see how Avicenna and Averroes faced this problem.

2 Avicenna and Averroes on corporeal form

Aristotle's journey to the Latin West was enabled by his wide reception in the Muslim world. Muslim philosophers had a very respectful approach to Aristotle's work, yet still they did not hesitate to enrich it with features of Neo-Platonic tradition in their commentary or philosophical work.²² One of the most prominent thinkers of this cultural circle was Avicenna, who later on had a great influence in the Christian world. As opposed to the younger, less prominent thinker Averroes, he was a different type of a thinker which also had its consequences. This difference is reflected in their cognomens. Avicenna was considered even by himself the Second Aristotle and Averroes was considered Aristotle's Commentator. It cannot be said that Avicenna was despite all of Aristotle's influence an Aristotelian. His philosophy is very original also in the way he incorporates features of Neo-Platonism and religious features rather than simply declare them representatives of this or that philosophical movement.²³ Averroes on the other hand, and we

¹⁶ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, 3; for various concepts on the Aristotle's substance see G. Reale, *Historia filozofii starożytnej*, vol. 1, Lublin 2005, p. 416–421.

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, 3, 1028b 36–1029a 2.

¹⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, 3, 1029a 2–3.

¹⁹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, 3, 1032a 4–6.

²⁰ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, 8, 1017b 23–26.

²¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, 12; compare with the commentary of Thomas Aquinas to this text, see below.

²² On reception of Aristotle's work by Muslim philosophers, see Ch. D'Ancona, "Greek into Arabic Neoplatonism in translation", in: R. C. Taylor – P. Adamson, P. (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, Cambridge 2005, p. 10–31.

²³ See D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*, Leiden 1988, p. 295.

do not want to detract from him, set the goal of interpreting Aristotle and with that also the only true philosophy there is, which in his eyes corresponded to the Aristotelian one.

Avicenna and Averroes²⁴ both approach the problem of prime matter in the way we saw in Aristotle's work. They however thought that they did not possess Aristotle's work in its entirety. This is a reason why they try to consider some of the questions that seemed inexplicable from their point of view based on the available texts, in order to create a coherent whole.²⁵

We have seen that Aristotle does not define prime matter at the substance level. He does not define its nature. Both Avicenna and Averroes therefore thought that the metaphysical view of prime matter is elaborated only partially in Aristotle's work, which is from the point of view of possibility and reality, while the substantial definition was either not elaborated or was included in text that was not available to them. It seemed legitimate to them to decide this question even though the text of *Metaphysics* implies that the definition of the nature of prime matter is impossible.

Avicenna's contemplation is built on the possibility of considering prime matter on the categorical level. Prime matter, as was already mentioned, cannot be an accident. We can then think about it only as a substance. As we saw above, the substance in Aristotle's work also had, among others, the following features: subsistence and definiteness. Avicenna and later also Averroes refused to assign these two features to prime matter as this would lead to the unacceptable consequence in the character of the change of elements. This change is clearly defined by Aristotle as substantial and not only accidental. If prime matter was a substance fulfilling the conditions of subsistence and definiteness, the following change of elements would have to be an accidental change. This consequence was not acceptable for Aristotle's commentators.

Avicenna therefore decided to go the middle way. It seems that prime matter has to be a substance to meet the requirements placed by the dual interpretation of the being but its subsistence and definiteness can belong there only by analogy. This means that subsistence and definiteness belong there in another way than other substances.²⁶

The basic step of this definition of prime matter as a substance is the differentiation of prime matter and possibility. Avicenna like Averroes still claims that prime matter is the possibility but this possibility in their opinion is not the "essence" of prime matter but its feature, its accident.

Avicenna, and then also Averroes in his mold, demonstrates the accidentality of possibility in relation to prime matter from the creation analysis. All that ceases to exist must be preceded by the possibility of creation. This possibility can be either in the subject (accident) or outside the subject (substance). All that is beyond the subject can exist through the relation to something else because the relation is an accident which requires a subject. However the possibility is what testifies on the current subject. The possibility is then the accident in the category of relation. This way prime matter is newly defined and it is not only the clear possibility but a certain type of substance to which the accident of the relation of possibility belongs in the utmost extent.²⁷ In Aristotle's work, the "essence" of prime matter was the possibility, in Avicenna's work, this "essence" has to be defined again. The difference in Aristotle's and Avicenna's approach is obvious. If prime matter was not more than just a possibility which cannot be defined due to the absence

²⁴ Compare with Ch. Genequand, *Ibn Rushd's Metaphysics, A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Book Lām*, Leiden 1986, p. 85–90.

²⁵ Compare with A. Hyman, "Aristotle's 'Prime matter' and Avicenna's and Averroes' 'Corporeal Form'", p. 395.

²⁶ Compare with A. Hyman, "Aristotle's 'Prime matter' and Avicenna's and Averroes' 'Corporeal Form'", p. 397–398; for prime matter in the Avicenna's substance scheme see M. M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, Delhi, p. 420–421.

²⁷ Compare with Avicenna, *Kniha defnic*, def. 6, 8, Praha 1954, p. 68–69.

of form, then this problem is not to be found in Avicenna's concept. Prime matter is not just a clear possibility, in a certain limited sense we can even claim it is a subject.²⁸

This delimitation of the relation of the possibility to prime matter leads to a decision fundamental for our topic. As substance of its kind prime matter must also have some form. This form relating to prime matter is the *corporeal form*.²⁹

Avicenna and Averroes agree in this understanding of prime matter. They however have a different understanding of how to define this corporeal form. Avicenna defines corporeal form as a form which creates the possibility of adopting three dimensions. It is very important to differentiate this corporeal form from the dimensions themselves, which are accidents.³⁰ Averroes on the other hand defined the corporeal form by the aforementioned three dimensions. Each of these definitions has its flaws. Avicenna's definition fulfils to a greater extent the requirement that the corporeal form is not understood as an accidental form. This is what can be objected to in Averroes' definition, which identifies the corporeal form directly with the three dimensions of corporeal beings. Avicenna's definition of corporeality as substantial form of prime matter seems, at least according to Averroes, in conflict with the Aristotle's requirement of one substantial form. As we will see later on, Averroes' opinion is justified.

Further development of this issue shows that Avicenna stands in the background of the teachings of the plurality of forms which was especially spread among the thinkers of the first half of the 13th century.³¹ This teaching is based on the definition of prime matter as being formed by corporeal form (*forma corporeitatis*). The corporeal form is always present in material beings. According to Avicenna, it never stands alone but together with other forms – element, composition, animal. In this way Avicenna meets the requirement of the substantial character of the corporeal form but as opposed to Aristotle, who assigns the form of elements, that is the lowest level of beings, only the potential existence within the framework of more complex beings, he supposes that the corporeal form is currently present in these beings.³² This lays out a theoretical base for the theory of plurality of substantial forms in man.

This concept of corporeal form has also a direct impact on the concept of the human soul. An integrated part of Aristotle's philosophy is a requirement of one substantial form. As a human soul is such a form, it can be the only one in a man. This also means that a human soul, as any other form, relates directly to prime matter and not to the body in the sense of already existing being. Avicenna, due to his effort to define the character of prime matter on the substantial level, surrenders this requirement of one substantial form in a man. According to Avicenna, a man consists of a corporeal form, vegetative soul, sensual soul and then a rational soul. Each

²⁸ Compare with Avicenna, *Kniha definic*, def. 7, p. 69; A. Hyman, Aristotle's "Prime matter" and Avicenna's and Averroes' "Corporeal Form," p. 398.

²⁹ A. Hyman, "Aristotle's 'Prime matter' and Avicenna's and Averroes' 'Corporeal Form'," p. 400.

³⁰ Compare with Avicenna, *Kniha definic*, def. 11, p. 73: "...Rozdíl mezi kvantitou a touto formou jest v tom, že kdykoliv změní částice vody anebo vosku svůj tvar, změní se v ní pouze vymezené prostorové rozměry a ani jeden z nich nezůstane týž, jediný co do počtu. Zůstane však forma, která tyto stavy přijímá. Jest to forma tělesná, jediná počtem, bez jakékoliv změny a proměny. V důsledku toho nemění svou tělesnou formu, i když se sráží nebo roztahuje, nýbrž mění své rozměry. Tak se rozlišuje forma tělesná, která patří do kategorie kvantity, a forma spadající do kategorie substance."

³¹ É. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 195

³² É. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 193; Aristotle thought that in higher substances there are only potentially lower forms. Compare with Aristotle, *De Generatione et Corruptione*, 334a 24; F. Solmsen, "Aristotle and Prime Matter: A Reply to Hugh R. King," p. 251.

successive form relates to the preceding form as its perfection (*perfectio*).³³ Only thanks to this perfection, the concrete being gains everything which is entitled to it in its kind. In case of a man, a living and sensual body has to take on also a rational soul which provides the body with the last perfection.³⁴

Avicenna understands the rational soul of man as a form. These characteristics however require only its function to which it is entitled only if we consider a soul in relation to the body.³⁵ A soul as a spiritual substance is not a form.³⁶ A soul of its own is a spiritual substance independent from the body.³⁷ Man is according to Avicenna rather this rational substance than a composition of a soul and a body. Being perfection (*perfectio*) is then in Avicenna's concept something different than being the first actuality of the body.³⁸ Being perfection in the case of a soul defines a relation to the body. Most of the philosophers of the 13th century adopted this explanation of the relation between the soul and body.

3 Universal hylomorphism – Ibn Gabirol

The treatise *Fons Vitae* of the Jewish philosopher Ibn Gabirol had an appreciable influence on the thinkers of the 13th century, in particular on the thinkers of the Franciscan Order. The basic thesis of Ibn Gabirol states that no being, except from God, is simple. From this it follows that in all beings apart from God we must search for a certain type of composition. Ibn Gabirol however considered only one type of composition of being, namely from matter and form. Considering the fact that he assumed the existence of non-corporeal beings as well, he was obliged to explain what that composition looks like, for example, in the human soul. His answer to this question was the theory of universal hylomorphism.

Universal hylomorphism sets as principles of everything, of course only all that has been created, universal matter and universal form. It is important that universal matter is not necessarily connected with corporeality. Material beings are composed of form and corporeal matter, while spiritual beings, including the human soul, are conversely composed of spiritual matter and form. However, it is not that Ibn Gabirol considered two types of matter, one being spiritual and the other corporeal. As a clear possibility, Ibn Gabirol assumes a universal essence or substance, which is composed from the universal matter and universal form. This universal substance is of course only something existent in possibility, which in reality is always found in some way limited. Corporeal being has therefore corporeal matter only to the extent to which it has corporeal form. Of course the reverse is true for spiritual substances.

³³ For the origin of the term *perfectio* in the commentaries on the Aristotle's *De anima* II., see R. Wisnovski, "Avicenna and the Avicennian Tradition", in: R. C. Taylor – P. Adamson (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy*, Cambridge 2005, p. 99–103.

³⁴ Compare with É. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 199.

³⁵ Avicenna, *Liber De anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, I, 1, p. 15, 79 (ed. S. van Riet, Louvain 1992): "Hoc enim nomen anima non est inditum ei ex sua substantia, sed ex hoc quod regit corpora et refertur ad illa, et idcirco recipitur corpus in sui definitione, exempli gratia, sicut opus accipitur in definitione opificis, quamvis non accipiat in definitione eius secundum quod est homo."

³⁶ Avicenna, *Liber De anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, I, 1, p. 26, 22–23: "Erravit igitur qui putavit hoc sufficere ad eam esse substantiam sicut ad esse formam."

³⁷ Avicenna, *Liber De anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, V, 1, p. 80, 59–60: "... (anima est) substantia solitaria, id est per se."

³⁸ Avicenna, *Liber De anima seu Sextus de naturalibus*, I, 1, p. 20, 30–33: "Et cuiuscumque perfectionis est essentia per se separata, ipsa certe non est forma materiae nec in materia: forma etiam quae est in materia, est forma impressa in illa et existens per illam."

A key moment in the thought of Ibn Gabirol is the connection of the logical and ontological levels. This connection is realized by the translation of logical analysis of the concept in the structure of reality, or also the so-called reification of the Porphyrian Tree.³⁹ The result of this translation is a certain type of understanding of the internal structure of being. This structure is always created by matter as an accepting and individualizing principle and hierarchical set of forms, which corresponds to the logical analysis of the concept of this being. Meanwhile it is valid, that the more complicated the concept, the more forms compose the hierarchy.⁴⁰ In accordance with this, the dependence of Ibn Gabirol on the dialectic analysis of the concept of Platonic origin cannot be ignored.

Even though we have used some of the basic views of Ibn Gabirol on the structure of being to explain the concept of corporeal forms, it is true that this concept in his treatises is likely not to be found. Ibn Gabirol however rather discussed corporeal matter. This fact nonetheless in no way precludes Ibn Gabirol from being considered one of the authors of this concept along with the previously mentioned Avicenna.⁴¹ Both thinkers are however so close to each other in their understanding of corporeal forms and their role in material beings, that it is necessary to place them next to each other as inspirational sources of the 13th century. In connection with this, it must be added that for example Thomas Aquinas viewed Avicenna rather as a proponent of the theory of one substantial form. According to J. Whipple this indicates the use by Aquinas of Avicenna's arguments for supporting the unity of substantial forms.⁴² Therefore it seems, and some of the texts we will mention also indicate, that Ibn Gabirol was for Thomas Aquinas the originator of the error of independent corporeal form.

4 Eclectic Aristotelianism of the first half of the 13th century

The first half of the 13th century is characterized by an attempt to assimilate the legacy of Aristotle. Aristotle, as we mentioned previously, appeared in the West in the accompaniment of his Arab commentators. This was inevitably also reflected in the reception of Aristotle's work itself. We can certainly say, concerning our topic, that until Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle's issue of prime matter and its relation to the soul was imprisoned by Avicenna's paradigm. We demonstrate this fact by several examples, which will go on to serve as a starting point for an analysis of Thomas Aquinas' position regarding corporeal forms.

In European philosophical thinking, inspired by Christianity already from the time of St. Augustine, the conviction reigned that the soul is an immortal spiritual being which only uses its body. In this sense even man is defined as a soul using a body.⁴³ The source of this view of humans and the character of their components is of course of Platonic provenance.⁴⁴ As we have mentioned previously, a typical Christian subject of interest was not however the soul, but the man. Therefore even in the Augustine's concept there is a constant attempt to somehow explain this unity, which is the union of the soul and the body. The partial failure of this attempt must then be sought in the Platonic conceptual schema with which Augustine was equipped.

³⁹ A. De Libera, *Středověká filosofie*, Praha 2001, p. 212.

⁴⁰ Compare with É. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 226, 648.

⁴¹ Compare with É. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, p. 648.

⁴² J. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, Washington 2000, p. 335.

⁴³ Augustin, *De moribus Ecclesiae*, I, 27, 52 (P.L. 32): "Homo igitur, ut homini apparet, anima rationalis est, mortali atque terreno utens corpore."

⁴⁴ Platón, *Alkibiadés*, I, 129e 5–6, 129c 1–14, 131c 1–5, (ed. F. Novotný, Praha 1999); Platón, *Faidros*, 246a 10, (ed. F. Novotný, Praha 2000); Platón, *Kratylos*, 400a 5–400b 3 (ed. F. Novotný, Praha 1994).

Western thought thus within itself preserved two apparently opposed attempts. On one hand it was necessary to understand man as an indivisible whole, and on the other hand maintain the immortality of the soul. Aristotle's limitation of the soul as a form of the body with Avicenna's understanding of this relation as *perfectio* seemed to be an answer to these two obscured needs. The majority of thinkers before Thomas Aquinas actually used Aristotle's limitation of the soul as a form only for the emphasis of a certain type of unity or bond. However this, until Thomas Aquinas, was never essential.

Therefore the recognition of corporeal forms and understanding a soul as a form, that is *perfectio* of the body, is a characteristic sign of the assimilation of Aristotle with the help of Avicenna's understanding. To all thinkers who accepted both of these two components as a part of their interpretation of the unity of man, it is inherent that they do not realize their incompatibility. C. Bazán shows that Thomas Aquinas defines himself as different from these philosophers of the 13th century in his *Quaestiones disputatae de anima*,⁴⁵ that is the work in which it is assumed that in the most philosophical manner, contains the theory of man and his parts.⁴⁶ It is also a reason for which it is important to refer at least to the basic thesis of some of these thinkers.

William of Auvergne is among the first of those who attempted to include Aristotle's definition of a soul as a form into his philosophical system. However in his treatise *De anima*⁴⁷ he shows that he strongly persists in the Platonic-Augustinian tradition. He understands the soul as a form in the sense of *perfectio*⁴⁸, but at the same time also as a substance independent of the body, for which the body serves only as a tool.⁴⁹ This tool is then constituted by its form of corporeality.⁵⁰ William's dualism is even more obvious as he understands the soul as absolutely simple, both in terms of composition of matter and form, as well as in terms of activities all carried out directly without the need of mediation by any power.⁵¹ The attempt of William of Auvergne reveals that the author was not prepared to understand Aristotle's definition of the soul in the proper manner.⁵² For our study, two facts are important. First, the concept of *perfectio*, which William uses, and which refers to the Arab tradition, and also is a form of corporeality constituting the principle of the body. The tradition, in which this concept of the body has its origin, is clear.

⁴⁵ Compare with B. C. Bazán, "The Human Soul: Form and Substance? Thomas Aquinas' Critique of Eclectic Aristotelianism", *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 64 (1997) 95–126.

⁴⁶ Compare with M. J. Sweeney, "Soul as Substance and Method in Thomas Aquinas' Anthropological Writings", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 66 (1999) 43–187.

⁴⁷ William of Auvergne, *De anima*, p. 65–228 (Paris/Orleans, 1674; repr. Frankfurt a. M., 1963).

⁴⁸ William of Auvergne, *De anima*, 65b: "Anima igitur est prout diffinit Aristoteles perfectio corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis;" 118a: "Cum enim dicat iuxta sermonem Aristotelis animam scitum esse ejus potentiae, qua corpus dicitur potentiae vitam habens in ratione vel definitione animae ... actus autem ibi non intelligitur nisi perfectio."

⁴⁹ William of Auvergne, *De anima*, 68a: "Amplius manifestum est nullum instrumentum esse propter se, sed propter operatorem, ad hoc videlicet ut se serviat in operationibus quae fieri habent per ipsum. Cum igitur corpus humanum organicum sit, quod est dicere instrumentale, imo cum sit instrumentum unum ad multas operationes aptum, natum et fabricatum, necesse est operatorem non esse cui naturaliter serviat, quique eo naturaliter uti debeat. Hic autem operator est quam vocamus animam humanam."

⁵⁰ William of Auvergne, *De anima*, 69a.

⁵¹ Compare with R. C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, Leiden 1995, p. 32.

⁵² Compare with R. C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 32: "The result is often a quagmire of apparent contradictions, inexact analogies, unfinished arguments, and a capricious and inconsistent use of such technical terms from the Aristotelian vocabulary as form, matter, potency, substance, agent intellect, and so on."

The unknown author of *Summa Duacensis*⁵³, of which only a few fragments have survived, assigns man with three types of unity.⁵⁴ The soul and body comprise the weakest unity (*unitas minima*). This weakest unity is a *perfectio*⁵⁵ relationship. A stronger type of unity (*unitas minus firma*) in man is that which is between matter and corporeal form. The strongest unity (*unitas firmissima*) can then be found in the soul, which is a composite *quo est a quod est*. The comparison of these three unities, especially between the first and second, clearly shows that the soul and the body cannot produce unity, which we could find in the composite of matter and form. Even the *perfectio* relationship is clearly defined as different from the unity between matter and form. We could also understand it as a sign of a specific difference, which distinguishes the man's soul as a spiritual being from other spiritual beings, such as angels.⁵⁶

Philip the Chancellor, the author of *Summa de bono*, advocates the same model of man as we saw in *Summa Duacensis*.⁵⁷ This work, however has been preserved in its entirety, therefore we have a better idea of the relationship and internal structure of the unity in man. The soul is again a *quod est a quo est* unity. The text however is not entirely clear as to whether it concerns the composition of the principles of immaterial beings, or the composition of spiritual matter and spiritual form.⁵⁸ The body is then beyond all doubt constituted by corporeal form and matter. The relationship of these two entities is a relationship in the sense *perfectio*.⁵⁹ Both the soul and the body are considered as substances, which are understandable with the help of certain characteristics. The soul is simple, incorporeal, and immortal. The body on the other hand lacks all of these qualities. The difference of these three characteristics demonstrates the distance separating them.⁶⁰ Because of this distance (*distantia*) Philip the Chancellor must introduce something in-between. These intermediaries are at least vegetative and sensory forms, which can

⁵³ Anonymous, *La 'Summa Duacensis'*, P. Glorieux (ed.), Paris 1955.

⁵⁴ For the issue of authority, see *Summa Duacensis*, R. C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 25.

⁵⁵ Anonymous, *La 'Summa Duacensis'*, cap. VII, q. 1, p. 60: "Anima duo habet in se: quoniam et est substantia et est perfectio."

⁵⁶ Anonymous, *La 'Summa Duacensis'*, cap. IV, p. 31: "Ad secundum dicimus quod non est simile de angelis et de animabus etsi utraque creatura sit spiritualis. Quod ut planius fiat, premittatur hic una divisio creature spiritualis: alia est ita substantia quod non perfectio; alia est ita perfectio quod non substantia; alia est et perfectio et substantia. Exemplum de prima est angelus qui non est perfectio corporis nec ab aliquo alio dependens vel impendens ut ipsum perficiat, sed est intelligentia separata. Exemplum de secunda creatura spirituali est anima vegetabilis et sensibilis, que re vera substantia non sunt etsi perfectiones sint. Exemplum de tertio accipe animam rationalem que revera substantia est in se et corporis perfectio."

⁵⁷ For similarity, see R. C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 25.

⁵⁸ Compare with R. C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 22.

⁵⁹ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, ed. N. Wicki, Bern 1985, I, p. 231: "Primus actus animae est quod sit 'perfectio corporis naturalis organici' etc. ..."

⁶⁰ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, I, p. 285–286: "Anima enim rationalis tres habet oppositiones ad corpus ipsum; est enim simplex, incorporea et incorruptibilis, corpus vero compositum, corporeum et corruptibile. Propter igitur minimam sui distantiam a corpore non posset anima rationalis corpori coniungi, nisi advenirent dispositiones sive adaptationes aliquae, quae essent media coniungendi haec ad invicem."

be found between corporeal form and a rational soul.⁶¹ The influence of Avicenna's interpretation of Aristotle is again indisputable.⁶²

The ideas of the Franciscan Alexander of Hales have been preserved in *Summa theologiae*, which is the posthumous result of the work of his students. He, like previous thinkers, tried to unite the substantiality of the soul with its new role in corporeal form. However, the assimilation of the Aristotelian concept of the soul as a form is treated with suspicion, which is demonstrated in the clear preference of Augustine's definition of the soul.⁶³ According to Alexander of Hales, the soul is *hoc aliquid*, a substance which we cannot simply say is a form, due to the fact that it contains spiritual matter.⁶⁴ This means that the soul is not an act of matter, but an act of the body, which is already constituted in corporeal form.⁶⁵ According to Alexander, we can consider a dual relationship of the soul to the body. First, we can emphasize its substantiality, and then the soul relates to the body as the mover to the moved. Second, we can understand it as an act of an already organized body, by which this body is given such perfection (*perfectio*) that makes from it the body of man.⁶⁶ While Alexander understands the *perfectio* relationship as direct, it does not prevent the introduction of further intermediate perfection, such as vegetative or sensual forms.⁶⁷

Bonaventure, a key figure of the 13th century, also belongs among the Franciscans. The theologian is very critical in his relationship to Aristotle and thus to his definition of the soul. Already with Alexander of Hales, we noticed great respect for the work of Augustine. With Bonaventure, the stronger that respect is, the lesser the emphasis he places on world wisdom, that is philoso-

⁶¹ Philip the Chancellor, *Summa de bono*, II, p. 284: "Ad hoc respondeo quod anima secundum quid unitur per modum formae, secundum quid per modum substantie;... sunt quedam forme prime, quedam ultime, quedam medie. Prime forme cum prime sint, absque medio materie coniunguntur, ut est corporeitas. Ultime forme per medium coniunguntur, et quia ultime non sunt media neque dispositiones materiales ad aliarum coniunctionem. Ultima autem forma naturalium est anima. Medie autem et per medium coniunguntur quandoque et quandoque sunt media et quasi materiales dispositiones; verbi gratia potentia sensibilis per medium coniungitur suo subiecto, scilicet mediante ut dispositione materiali potentia vegetabili; ... Manifestum est igitur quod, licet sit ut forma, non tamen per se corpori neesse est coniungi."

⁶² See R. C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 20: "He still depends heavily on Muslim interpreters, and his understanding of Aristotle, even when he had the text in front of him, seems to have been conditioned by his knowledge of Avicenna." See Wicki, N., *Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis Summa de bono*, p. 47*: "Le Chancelier connaissait également la philosophie arabe et juive. Avicenne et Averroës ne sont cités qu'une seule fois chacun, mais les deux sont invisiblement présents dans la Somme de Philippe, Avicenne plus qu'Averroës. On a l'impression que c'est Avicenne qui a introduit le Chancelier dans la pensée d'Aristote."

⁶³ Compare with R. C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 28; Bazán, C.; "Pluralisme des formes ou dualisme de substances?"; p. 55–56

⁶⁴ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris Irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis Ordinis Minorum Summa theologica*, Quaracchi, 1924–48, II, p. 398: "Utrum anima sit composita ex materia et forma. Quod videtur per hoc quod dicit Boethius in Libro De Trinitate 'In omni eo quod est citra Primum est hoc et hoc', et loquitur de eis quae sunt substantiae per se, ad differentiam formae et materiae... sed anima humana est talis, quia est per se existens; quod patet ex separatione et motu; ergo habet in se 'hoc et hoc'; sed hoc non erit materia et materia vel forma et forma...; ergo erunt illa duo materia et forma; ergo anima habet materiam et formam."

⁶⁵ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris Irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis Ordinis Minorum Summa theologica*, II, p. 422: "Est enim anima hoc aliquid praeter suam materiam: quod non est dicere in forma simpliciter naturali. Unde non est ibi proprie actus materiae, sed actus naturalis corporis completi in forma naturali, quae forma dicitur forma corporalis."

⁶⁶ Alexander of Hales, *Doctoris Irrefragabilis Alexandri de Hales Ordinis Ordinis Minorum Summa theologica* II, p. 420: "...anima rationalis coniungitur suo corpori ut motor mobili et ut perfectio formalis suo perfectibili. Prout autem est motor habet potentias medias, quibus movetur corpus... Eo autem modo quo est perfectio et corpus perfectibile, licet habeat dispositiones praeambulas, quae dicuntur quodam modo media, non tamen exigitur medium in unione, immo se ipsa unitur anima corporis."

⁶⁷ For details on these mediators, see R. C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 30.

phy. In the eyes of Bonaventure, the only source of true knowledge is the Holy Scriptures, the understanding of which relies on the wisdom of the Fathers, which is contained in their works. And according to Bonaventure, Augustine is the most glorious of them.⁶⁸

According to Bonaventure, in a similar relationship between Aristotle and Augustine, we can view their definitions of the soul, and Augustine's view of course has primacy.⁶⁹ Despite this emphasis on the substantiality of the soul, Bonaventure does not hesitate to identify by using Aristotle's concept of *form*.⁷⁰ Like Alexander of Hales, he then distinguishes two ways in which we can understand the soul. If we see it as *hoc aliquid*, it will then relate to the body as a mover (*motor*). However, if we emphasize its character of form, it will be perfection (*perfectio*) of the body.⁷¹ According to Bonaventure, the soul is formed of its own form and spiritual matter. In this sense, we find in it elements of universal hylomorphism and we can note in the body corporeal form, which is understood by Bonaventure as light. For the body to be a subject of the soul, it must be not only informed by the corporeal form, but also by more perfect forms.⁷² In connection with corporeal form, it must be noted in the case of Bonaventure, that it is not of Avicennan provenance. With Bonaventure, we must look for the origin of this concept among the Stoics and intermediated by Augustine in the concept of *rationes seminales*, in which prime matter is similarly pregnant.⁷³ It is necessary to add that Bonaventure to a certain extent surpasses our choice of examples. This is mainly due to the fact that the definition of the soul as the form is for him relatively secondary.⁷⁴

We will terminate our brief excursion with Albertus Magnus. This thinker was strongly dependent on Avicenna in his understanding of Aristotle's work. His entire interpretation of Aristotle's definition of the soul and its integration into the entirety of his philosophical system is kept according to Avicenna's model. Albertus thus understands the soul both as a substance and at the same time a form. The substantial definition explains the soul as it is within itself. Aristotle's definition however understands the soul only regarding its relationship to the body.⁷⁵ It can even be said that the basic thesis of philosophical anthropology of the Platonic-Augustinian tradition, that is the thesis of the substantiality of the soul, is defended by Albertus with the help of Avicenna's arguments.⁷⁶ Therefore the encounter with corporeal form, which is different from

⁶⁸ On Augustine and Bonaventure, see A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, Toronto 1934, p. 26–29.

⁶⁹ Bonaventure differentiates four definitions of the soul: 1) *hoc aliquid*, 2) *perfectio* in relation to one's life, 3) *perfectio* in relation to the substance of the body, 4) *motor* from the point of view of its forces.

⁷⁰ Bonaventura, *Breviloquium*, Quaracchi 1938, II, 9, 5: "... (anima) non tantum forma est verum etiam hoc aliquid."

⁷¹ Bonaventura, *Breviloquium*, II, 9, 5: "Quoniam autem ut beatificabilis est immortalis; ideo, cum unitur mortali corpori, potest ab eo separari; ac per hoc non tantum forma est verum etiam hoc aliquid; et ideo non tantum unitur corpori ut perfectio, verum etiam ut motor; et sic perficitur per essentiam, quod movet pariter per potentiam."

⁷² Bonaventura, *In II Sent.* d. 17, a. 2, q. 2, ad 6, Quaracchi 1882–1902: "... sed is est ordo, quod forma elementaris unitur animae mediante forma mixtionis, et forma mixtionis disponit ad formam complexionis." B. C. Bazán, *Pluralisme de formes ou dualisme de substances*, p. 62: "Le corps, pour saint Bonaventure, est un être déjà actualisé par la forma lucis (commune à tous les êtres corporels) et par toute une série d'autres formes qui ajoutent de nouveaux degrés de perfection."

⁷³ A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 44.

⁷⁴ A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 53.

⁷⁵ Albert the Great, *Summa Theologica*, E. Borgnet (ed.), Paris 1890–9: P. II, tract. 12, q. 69, ad 1 "Ad aliud dicendum, quod animam considerando secundum se, consentiemus Platoni: considerando autem eam secundum formam animationis, quam dat corpori, consentiemus Aristoteli." Compare with A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 104.

⁷⁶ A. C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 90.

the soul, is not surprising⁷⁷. In the case of Albertus Magnus and his relationship to Avicenna, the source of this concept is more than obvious.

The goal of this section was not to provide an exhaustive overview of all authors, in whose philosophical concept at least two forms play a role – corporeal form and rational soul. We did not mention for example Peter of Spain, Roger Bacon, or many anonymous works of the first half of the 13th century. All of them however share the basic conviction about the character of the body and the soul. The body is always constituted at least by corporeal form and the soul is always a substance or *hoc aliquid*. However it should also be noted that some commentaries propose a change in the understanding of the soul in relationship to the body. For example, with John Blund, we can find the theory of a single soul of man, which is at once of vegetative, sensual and cognitive form.⁷⁸

Therefore it seems that for these philosophers and theologians, Aristotle's definition of the soul as a form (in the sense *perfectio*) of the body was used only to highlight the exceptional-ity of the relationship, which combines both components of man. In no case does it concern the relationship between form and matter in the sense put forth in book VIII of *Metaphysics*.⁷⁹ Against this original understanding of the relationship of form and matter in his application of the understanding and interpretation of Aristotle's definition of the soul from book VIII of *De anima* at the beginning of the 13th century two events were opposed. The first and perhaps philosophically more interesting is the Avicennan elaboration of the understanding of corporeal form and the acceptance of pluralism of substantial forms that arise from it. The second is the traditional understanding of the soul as a substance.⁸⁰ It also demonstrates that these two elements were able to be complemented very successfully for a short period. Avicenna thus provided thinkers, strongly standing in the Platonic-Augustinian dualism of the soul and body, a tool for overcoming those gaps in man.

5 Corporeal form in Thomas Aquinas' concept

The work of Thomas Aquinas developed over time. We can say that this development is directed in most cases only towards a deeper premeditation of the issue within set limits which do not change. Constant are his theories of one substantial form and prime matter as a clear potential which are still present in his thinking.⁸¹ From this contention it is clear that in Thomas Aquinas'

⁷⁷ Albert the Great, *De natura et origine animae*, E. Borgnet (ed.), Paris 1890–9: I, 4., p. 389: "...ipsa non est actus alicujus corporis, nec est forma corporalis, neque visus operans in corpore." Compare with R. C. Dales, *The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, p. 95; C. Bazán, "Pluralisme de formes ou dualisme de substances?" p. 65; Zavalloni, R, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes*, Louvain 1955, p. 410–411; Albert the Great, *In Metaphysicorum*, E. Borgnet (ed.), Paris 1890–9, V. tr. 3, c. 2; *In De caelo et mundo*, E. Borgnet (ed.), Paris 1890–9, III, tr. 2, c. 1; *In De generatione et corruptione*, E. Borgnet (ed.), Paris 1890–9, I, tr. 6, c. 4.

⁷⁸ Compare with John Blund, *Tractatus de anima*, D. A. Callus – R. W. Hunt (eds.), Oxford 1970, c. IV, 24–27: "Pari ratione dicendum est quod in homine non sunt tres anime, immo una sola anima specificata per differentias tres, ut per vegetabile, sensibile, rationale; et ita anima vegetabilis, sensibilis, rationabilis non sunt tres anime in homine, immo una sola anima."

⁷⁹ This is also the reason why R. Zavalloni speaks of hylomorphism in the work of these theologians and philosophers of the first half of the 13th century as about the "conception infra-metaphysique des notions de matière et de forme"; compare with R. Zavalloni, *Richard de Mediavilla et la controverse sur la pluralité des formes*, p. 303–306.

⁸⁰ Compare with B. C. Bazán, "The highest encomium of human body", in: A. Lobato (ed.), *Littera, sensus, sententia*, Milano 1991, p. 100.

⁸¹ Compare with J. F. Wippel, "Metaphysics", in: N. Kretzman – E. Stump (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas*, Cambridge 1993, p. 112.

work we find some original thoughts of Aristotle, at least on this general level. It is also clear that if we again adopt the requirement of one substantial form, we will have to cope with the term of corporeal form.

We can get rid of this term or we can keep it. If we got rid of it, we would not be much different from Aristotle. However if we keep it, we will have to modify it in a way to be in concord with the theory of one substantial form. Thomas Aquinas keeps the term and definition of corporeal form. He therefore has to modify its meaning to be in concord with the requirement of one substantial form. The fact of keeping the term can however also lead to the following question: If adopting the term of corporeal form leads to a differentiation from Aristotle, what does Thomas want to be different in? Before we try to answer this question, we will have to investigate how the term of corporeal form is incorporated in the wider context of Thomas Aquinas' philosophy.

Thomas Aquinas occupies himself with the character of prime matter in this commentary on *Metaphysics*, more precisely on book VIII. He sees its origin unequivocally in Aristotle's analysis of change.⁸² The analysis has already showed us that prime matter has to be something only in the possible. This main feature or a way of capturing is emphasized by Thomas Aquinas in an interesting although already known process. He defines a way of how to say matter is a substance. We saw above that the effort to define prime matter on the substantial level led to establishing the corporeal form. By the new interpretation of how prime matter can be understood as a substance, Thomas Aquinas avoids this necessity.

As we already know, the substance can testify on the matter, form and composition. The method of this testimony can however differ significantly. Thomas in his commentary on *Metaphysics* defines three main features which the substance must have. The first one is intelligibility, the second one is independent existence and the third one is the ability to accept the opposites. The more something has these features, the more it is a substance. Composition fulfills all three conditions. It is recognizable; it can exist on its own and is subject to creation and corruption. Form fulfills only the requirement of intelligibility. It cannot exist on its own in the area of nature. The last one is the matter. It is not recognizable on its own, and it cannot exist separately. The only thing we can say about it is that it is only a possibility. Form, like matter, is the subject of creation and corruption only accidentally, to the extent of how much they are the principles of a composition.⁸³

Let's repeat the important moment in this interpretation. Prime matter is recognizable only in relation to the form which however does not belong to its essence. It does not have any positive content on its own. If it was otherwise, if prime matter did have some corporeal form within

⁸² Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Metaphysicae*, VIII. 1. 1n. 9 (www.corpusthomicum.org): "Ex hac autem Aristotelis ratione apparet, quod generatio et corruptio substantialis sunt principium veniendi in cognitionem materiae primae."

⁸³ Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Metaphysicae*, VIII. 1. 1n. 7: "Sed sciendum est, quod materia aliter dicitur substantia, et aliter forma, et aliter compositum. Materia enim dicitur substantia non quasi ens aliquid actu existens in se considerata, sed quasi in potentia, ut sit aliquid actu, haec dicitur esse hoc aliquid. Forma vero, quae et ratio nominatur, quia ex ipsa sumitur ratio speciei, dicitur substantia quasi ens aliquid actu, et quasi ens separabile secundum rationem a materia, licet non secundum rem. Compositum vero ex his dicitur esse substantia quasi separabile simpliciter, idest separatim per se existere potens in rerum natura; et eius solius est generatio et corruptio. Neque enim forma neque materia generatur aut corrumpitur nisi per accidens. Et licet compositum sit separabile simpliciter, tamen secundum rationem, aliorum quae dicuntur substantiae, quaedam sunt separabilia, et quaedam non. Forma enim est separabilis ratione, quia potest intelligi sine materia sensibili individuante; materia vero non potest intelligi sine intellectu formae, cum non apprehendatur nisi ut ens in potentia ad formam. Vel potest esse sensus quod substantiarum secundum rationem, idest formarum, quaedam sunt ratione separabiles, ut mathematicae, quaedam non, ut formae naturales. Vel iterum quod quaedam sunt formae separatae absque materia existentes, de quibus inferius determinabit."

itself, it would lead to unacceptable consequences. Prime matter would become a certain being in the reality which would always change only accidentally. The possibility of simple creation and corruption would perish.⁸⁴

This argument presupposes a certain interpretation of being and its ontological structure. If we build on the two main principles that constitute the corporeal beings, that is matter and form, it does not have to be obvious right away why it is not possible to consider within one being more substantial form. This fact is supported by the tradition we focused on briefly. Only a more precise definition of the mutual relation of these two principles leads to the recognition of impossibility to pluralize the substantial forms. Thomas Aquinas in his earliest work *De ente et essentia* clearly defines this relation. The form gives being (*esse*) to the matter.⁸⁵ We however need to proceed. The being and the one are interchangeable. It therefore means that there are as many beings as there are substantial forms.⁸⁶

This process is the base of the proof of the unity of the human soul in *Summa theologiae*.⁸⁷ Here Thomas Aquinas disproves the possibility of existence of more souls (vegetative, sensual and rational) in man. From the point of view of our theme, it is not important that only these three possible forms are mentioned here. The argument relates to any unity in which we would consider more than one substantial form,⁸⁸ i. e. even a corporeal form.

Let's try to find the place of this form in the order of substantial forms. In *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Thomas Aquinas provides an interpretation of the hierarchical order of substantial forms

⁸⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *Sententia libri Metaphysicae*, lib. 8l. 1 n. 9: "Et sic, cum superinduceretur alia forma, non simpliciter materia per eam esset, sed fieret hoc vel illud ens. Et sic esset generatio secundum quid et non simpliciter. Unde omnes ponentes primum subiectum esse aliquod corpus, ut aerem et aquam, posuerunt generationem idem esse quod alterationem. Patet autem ex hac ratione qualiter accipiendus sit intellectus materiae primae; quia ita se habet ad omnes formas et privationes, sicut se habet subiectum alterabile ad qualitates contrarias."

⁸⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, c. 3. (www.corpusthomicum.org): "Quaecumque enim ita se habent ad invicem quod unum est causa esse alterius, illud quod habet rationem causae potest habere esse sine altero, sed non convertitur. Talis autem invenitur habitudo materiae et formae, quia forma dat esse materiae. Et ideo impossibile est esse materiam sine aliqua forma." The character of this relation is a constant part of Thomas' philosophy. Compare with *Questiones disputatae De anima*, a. 10, ad 2. (www.corpusthomicum.org): "Ad secundum dicendum quod cum materia sit propter formam, hoc modo forma dat esse et speciem materiae, secundum quod congruit suae operationi." It should be added that it is not a causal relation of cause and effect. This would contradict the presupposition of the unity that is created by the relation of a matter and form. For more details on the relation of a soul and matter, see K. White, "Aquinas on the Immediacy of the Union of the Soul and Body", in: P. Lockey (ed.), *Studies in Thomistic Theology*, Notre Dame 1996, p. 209–280.

⁸⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Questiones Quodlibetales* VI, q. 1 co. (www.corpusthomicum.org): "Respondeo. Dicendum, quod unumquodque in quantum est unum, in tantum est ens; unde ens et unum convertuntur. Est autem unumquodque ens per suam formam, unde et unumquodque per suam formam habet unitatem: et inde est quod quae est comparatio formae ad formam, eadem est comparatio unitatis ad unitatem." Tomáš Akvinský, *Sententia libri Metaphysicae*, XI 1. 8 n. 5.: "Ratio enim est, quia quod per accidens est, non est proprie ens, sed magis non ens, sicut non est per se et proprie unum. Nam unum et ens convertuntur. Omnis autem scientia est de ente;" for more details on the *ens et unum convertuntur* principle, see J. A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals*, Leiden 1996, p. 201–241.

⁸⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 76, a. 3 (www.corpusthomicum.org).

⁸⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 76, a. 3., co.: "Sed si ponamus animam corpori uniri sicut formam, omnino impossibile videtur plures animas per essentiam differentes in uno corpore esse. ... Primo quidem, quia animal non esset simpliciter unum, cuius essent animae plures. Nihil enim est simpliciter unum nisi per formam unam, per quam habet res esse, ab eodem enim habet res quod sit ens et quod sit una; et ideo ea quae denominantur a diversis formis, non sunt unum simpliciter, sicut homo albus."

within nature.⁸⁹ On the lowest level, there are forms of elements which only constitute activities that arise from the potentiality of the matter.⁹⁰ Furthermore there are forms of composed elements whose activities show cooperation of celestial bodies.⁹¹ The higher forms in this hierarchy are the souls of plants and animals. These forms are then the principals of higher activities as alimentation and sensual perception.⁹² On the highest place there is a human soul which is the principle of the rational cognition independent from the matter.⁹³

From this overview, it is obvious that the lowest forms are the forms of elements. Nothing like the corporeal form we encountered in Avicenna's concept is to be found in this hierarchical order. Despite that, the term *corporeitas* has to be taken into account and included in the mentioned hierarchy.

The text from *De ente et essentia* where Thomas Aquinas ponders the meaning of the term body (*corpus*) can help us do so. It can mean two things, substance and accidents. If it means substance, then it is such a substance which has a form and three dimensions that arise from it. These three dimensions are the accidents that are defined with the word body in the other sense.⁹⁴ As we can see it reflects what we encountered in the concepts of the Arabic commentators already. Averroes understood corporeality as these three dimensions. Avicenna on the other hand understood the corporeality as a substantial form which needs to be considered as the base of all accidents. That means that the substantial form has to be understood as non-dimensional. This is where Thomas Aquinas agrees with Avicenna. The text *De ente et essentia*

⁸⁹ For more details on the analysis of the ascendent and descendent order of the human soul in the hierarchy, see J. M. Sweeney, "Soul as Substance and Method in Thomas Aquinas' Anthropological Writings", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 66 (1999) 43–187.

⁹⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 2 cap. 68 n. 8 (www.corpusthomicum.org): "Invenimus enim aliquas infimas formas, quae in nullam operationem possunt nisi ad quam se extendunt qualitates quae sunt dispositiones materiae, ut calidum, frigidum, humidum et siccum, rarum, densum, grave et leve, et his similia: sicut formae elementorum. Unde istae sunt formae omnino materiales, et totaliter immersae materiae."

⁹¹ Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 2 cap. 68 n. 9: "Super has inveniuntur formae mixtorum corporum, quae licet non se extendant ad aliqua operata quae non possunt compleri per qualitates praedictas, interdum tamen operantur illos effectus altiori virtute, quam sortiuntur ex corporibus caelestibus, quae consequitur eorum speciem: sicut adamas trahit ferrum."

⁹² Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 2 cap. 68 n. 10: "Super has iterum inveniuntur aliquae formae quarum operationes extenduntur ad aliqua operata quae excedunt virtutem qualitatum praedictarum, quamvis qualitates praedictae organice ad harum operationes deserviant: sicut sunt animae plantarum, quae etiam assimilantur non solum virtutibus corporum caelestium in excedendo qualitates activas et passivas, sed ipsis motoribus corporum caelestium, in quantum sunt principia motus rebus viventibus, quae movent seipsas. Supra has formas inveniuntur aliae formae similes superioribus substantiis non solum in movendo, sed etiam aliquo modo in cognoscendo; et sic sunt potentes in operationes ad quas nec organice qualitates praedictae deserviant, tamen operationes huiusmodi non complentur nisi mediante organo corporali; sicut sunt animae brutorum animalium. Sentire enim et imaginari non completur calefaciendo et infrigidando: licet haec sint necessaria ad debitam organi dispositionem."

⁹³ Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 2 cap. 68 n. 12: "Super omnes autem has formas invenitur forma similis superioribus substantiis etiam quantum ad genus cognitionis, quod est intelligere: et sic est potens in operationem quae completur absque organo corporali omnino. Et haec est anima intellectiva: nam intelligere non fit per aliquod organum corporale. Unde oportet quod illud principium quo homo intelligit, quod est anima intellectiva, et excedit conditionem materiae corporalis, non sit totaliter comprehensa a materia aut ei immersa, sicut aliae formae materiales. Quod eius operatio intellectualis ostendit, in qua non communicat materia corporalis. Quia tamen ipsum intelligere animae humanae indiget potentiis quae per quaedam organa corporalia operantur, scilicet imaginatione et sensu, ex hoc ipso declaratur quod naturaliter unitur corpori ad complendam speciem humanam."

⁹⁴ Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, c. 3: "Corpus enim, secundum quod est in genere substantiae, dicitur ex eo quod habet talem naturam, ut in eo possint designari tres dimensiones; ipsae enim tres dimensiones designatae sunt corpus, quod est in genere quantitatis."

furthermore however shows that the mentioned substantial concept of the corporeal form is where the similarity ends. According to Thomas Aquinas the term corporeal can furthermore define a form which has the possibility of three dimensions. He also adds at the same time that other perfections can arise from this form which constitutes the possibility of three dimensions. In this sense then in case of man, his soul is not different from the form which constitutes the possibility of defining three dimensions.⁹⁵

The difference in the understanding of corporeal form by Avicenna and Thomas Aquinas is obvious. Avicenna's corporeal form was the same in all material beings as it was always the first form constituting prime matter. The corporeal form which constituted the essence of a man was the same as the corporeal form which constituted the essence of a stone. According to Thomas Aquinas however the corporeal form or the form which constitutes the possibility of differentiating three dimensions is not different from the form of a whole. In this sense, the corporeal form of a man is different from the corporeal form of a stone as well as the soul of a man is different from the form of a stone.⁹⁶ The corporeality testifies analogically about the stone as well as about the human soul.⁹⁷

This again confirms the emphasis on the unity of the substantial form which in this concept cannot be divided. The concept of the substantial form of a man can be analyzed from the point of view of his elements, but it doesn't correspond to it completely from the logical division of the reality. Thomas Aquinas focuses on this issue in chapter 81, of the book IV. of *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Same as in *De ente et essentia*, he differentiates two possibilities of how to understand the corporeality – as three dimensions of the same and as the substantial corporeal form. Nonetheless he explicitly adds that the corporeal form is nothing more than substantial form of such a substance which combines the three dimensions.⁹⁸ This corporeal form has to be understood in a different way than in Avicenna's or Ibn Gabirol's work. In this text however it seems that Thomas in his answer is thinking rather of Ibn Gabirol which is implied by the mentioned form of substance. Thomas Aquinas adds that the existence of various forms within one substance cannot be understood in a way that this being, which is constituted by these forms, belongs to the genus of substance thanks to the substantial form of the substance, to the genus of corporeal beings thanks to the form of corporeality, and to the species of a man or a horse thanks to the form of a man or a horse.⁹⁹ Thomas Aquinas criticizes here a certain known

⁹⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, c. 3. "Potest etiam hoc nomen corpus hoc modo accipi, ut significet rem quandam, quae habet talem formam, ex qua tres dimensiones possunt in ea designari, quaecumque forma sit illa, sive ex ea possit provenire aliqua ulterior perfectio sive non. Et hoc modo corpus erit genus animalis, quia in animali nihil est accipere quod non implicite in corpore continetur. Non enim anima est alia forma ab illa, per quam in re illa poterant designari tres dimensiones; et ideo, cum dicebatur quod corpus est quod habet talem formam, ex qua possunt designari tres dimensiones in eo, intelligebatur: quaecumque forma esset, sive animalitas sive lapideitas sive quaecumque alia."

⁹⁶ Compare with J. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, p. 334–351.

⁹⁷ Compare with Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis*, I. d. 19 q. 5 a. 2 ad 1 (www.corpusthomicum.org): "Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter (...) Vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem; et hoc contingit quando plura parificantur in intentione alicujus a communis, sed illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus, sicut omnia corpora parificantur in intentione corporeitatis."

⁹⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 81: "Et sic corporeitas cuiuscumque corporis nihil aliud est quam forma substantialis eius, secundum quam in genere et specie collocatur, ex qua debetur rei corporali quod habeat tres dimensiones."

⁹⁹ Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles*, IV, c. 81: "Non enim sunt diversae formae substantiales in uno et eodem, per quarum unam collocetur in genere supremo, puta substantiae; et per aliam in genere proximo, puta in genere corporis vel animalis; et per aliam in specie puta hominis aut equi. Quia si prima forma faceret esse substantiam, sequentes formae iam advenirent ei quod est hoc aliquid in actu et subsistens in natura: et sic posteriores formae

method of compositing some forms in beings. Not only is this in conflict with the concept of one substantial form, it also contradicts the due understanding of the mutual relation between the genus and species. This exactly is one of the reproaches addressed to Ibn Gabirol as appears in *De substantiis separatis* VI.¹⁰⁰

The logical-ontological parallelism which can be found in the work of Ibn Gabirol is overcome by Thomas Aquinas by the consistent fulfillment of the requirement of one substantial form and the emphasis on its indivisibility.

The human soul then in a logical way also becomes a form of a body. It is the most inwardly connected with the body or better to say with prime matter. From its nature it is obliged to give being to the matter. It is such a form out of which corporeality arises. Not only with some of its parts but as a whole. In this sense, Thomas Aquinas can claim that the soul is complete in any of its parts.

Understanding the soul as a form of a body has to cope with the principal objection which seemingly kept it from wider acceptance. Each form of a body had to, according to this objection, cease to exist with the death of the body. If the soul is not different from the substantial form of its body, if is not different from the form constituted by the three dimensions, it will have to cease to exist with the death of the body. This was in conflict with the presupposition of the soul's immortality which was of course also acknowledged by Thomas Aquinas. This objection however works only with the traditional concept of the corporeal form. We could say that it utilizes a certain and, on some level, also an equal status of a form in relation to the matter in a way as we find it in Aristotle's concept and at the same time to the concept of corporeal form as we find it at the mentioned thinkers of the first half of the 13th century. Thomas Aquinas however differs with his understanding of these two principles. At first we change the status of these principles in relation to each other and then also in relation to the forms constituting the possibility of three dimensions, that is in relation to the material forms, he establishes the hierarchical order which defines the way of their being.

Regarding the mutual relation of principles of the material beings, its order is based on the presupposition of a form which give being to the matter. For a more precise description of this situation, we can see the text *De substantiis separatis*.¹⁰¹ In this text, Thomas Aquinas analyzes the material being from the point of view of two types of composition. The first type is the composition of essence and being. The second one is the composition of a form and matter. Each substance then participates in being (*actus essendi*) in relation to its being. This is in accordance with the principle which claims that the participated is in the participating way. However the

non facerent hoc aliquid, sed essent in subiecto quod est hoc aliquid sicut formae accidentales. Oportet igitur, quod corporeitas, prout est forma substantialis in homine, non sit aliud quam anima rationalis,...

¹⁰⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis* c. VI. (www.corpusthomicum.org): "Tollit etiam logicae principia, auferens veram rationem generis et speciei et substantialis differentiae dum omnia in modum accidentalis praedicationis convertit." Tamt. c. 8.: "Cum enim dicimus aliquam substantiam corporalem esse vel spiritualementem, non comparamus spiritualitem vel corporeitatem ad substantiam sicut formas ad materiam vel accidentia ad subiectum, sed sicut differentias ad genus; ita quod substantia spiritualis non propter aliquid additum substantiae est spiritualis sed secundum suam substantiam, sicut et substantia corporalis non per aliquid additum substantiae est corporalis sed per suam substantiam."

¹⁰¹ Thomas Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis*, c. 8.: "Unaquaeque autem res adaptatur ad unum determinatum modum essendi secundum modum suae substantiae; modus autem unicuiusque substantiae compositae ex materia et forma est secundum formam per quam pertinet ad determinatam speciem: sic igitur res composita ex materia et forma per suam formam fit participativa ipsius esse a Deo secundum quendam proprium modum. Invenitur igitur in substantia composita ex materia et forma duplex ordo: unus quidem ipsius materiae ad formam, alius autem ipsius rei iam compositae ad esse participatum; non enim est esse rei neque forma eius neque materia ipsius, sed aliquid adveniens rei per formam."

way of participation of the being by this essence is given by the form. The form accepts the being from the first cause and thus the being of the material substance is fully given by the form.¹⁰² This form then shares its being with the matter in a way that it constitutes a substance as a whole. The being of this substance then cannot be only the being of the form but also of matter. If the being of the material substance is given only by the form, it is necessary that this form contains the being definition by which it is connected with the matter. It seems therefore that what decides the material being of the substance is a form constituting the three dimensions, *corporeitas*.

We can find three areas in Thomas Aquinas' concept where the matter meets the form in a way not found in Aristotle's work. The most known is a connection which can be found in the essence and definition of the material beings.¹⁰³ The third area is the corporeal form itself (*corporeitas*), which we have to understand in the given way. It seems that these differences between Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle lead to a certain change in the understanding of prime matter. Although it remains purely potential and it is always unrecognizable as it does not have any corporeal form of its own, it is still recognizable at least by the means of specific forms of the material substances which refer to it. In this way prime matter is included in the creation of God's work.¹⁰⁴ The reason for preserving the concept of corporeal form seems obvious in this context.

The concept of material forms also changes their integration into the hierarchy which then dictates the dignity of the being of the matter as they share the being. With regards to the fact it is always one specific substantial form, it is important also for the concept of the corporeal form as such. This has the most prominent impact on the substantial form of man.¹⁰⁵ It takes the highest place within the material forms and thus it is the being in the highest way which enables it not to be completely immersed (*totaliter immersa*) in the matter. This is pointed out mainly by the ability of rational cognition of a man which is however naturally related to the body.¹⁰⁶ Being of matter is lifted to the highest possible level,¹⁰⁷ even though it can never reach being which is common to the spiritual beings. Despite that, the human body gains the highest nobility within material beings. This narrowest connection between matter or the body and the soul is ensured

¹⁰² Compare with J. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, p. 119.

¹⁰³ Thomas Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, 2,13; For more details on the relation of matter and the definition of the material substances compare with A. A. Maurer, "Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas", *Mediaeval Studies* 13 (1951) 165–176; J. Wippel, *The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas*, p. 331.

¹⁰⁴ Compare with A. A. Maurer, Form and Essence in the Philosophy of St. Thomas, p. 175: "The existence of each being is a gift of God, created out of nothing according to an intelligible pattern which is a divine idea. In the case of material being, matter forms a part of that intelligible pattern, so that even though strictly speaking there is no divine idea of prime matter, for in itself it neither exists nor is knowable, still there is a divine idea of the composite, which includes prime matter. Although unintelligible in itself, prime matter is thus essential to the full intelligibility of the composite and enters in full right into the essence of material being."

¹⁰⁵ Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles* II, 68: "Et hoc esse est in quo subsistit substantia composita, quae est una secundum esse, ex materia et forma constans. Non autem impeditur substantia intellectualis, per hoc quod est subsistens, ut probatum est, esse formale principium essendi materiae, quasi esse suum communicans materiae."

¹⁰⁶ For the development of the relation between the body and the cognition of a man see A. C. Pegis, "The Separated Soul and Its Nature", in: A. Maurer (ed.), *St. Thomas, 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies*, Toronto 1974, p. 131–158.

¹⁰⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles* II, 68: "Est enim materiae corporalis ut recipientis et subiecti ad aliquid altius elevati: substantiae autem intellectualis ut principii, et secundum propriae naturae congruentiam." For this problem, see A. C. Pegis, Nature and Spirit: Some Reflections on the Problem of the End of Man, *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* 23 (1949) 3–20.

by preserving the concept of corporeal form. The concept of form in Thomas Aquinas' work doesn't lead to the fact that this form is a form of some matter.¹⁰⁸

These changes in the understanding of the concept of form and matter as well as the change in the relation to the concept of a corporeal form allow Thomas Aquinas to understand the human soul as a form of a body and substantial entity. Based on the fact there is no common corporeal form that would be completely immersed in matter, the corporeal form which isn't different from the human soul can be found in the so-called transcendental relation to matter. The question of compatibility of the subsistence of the soul and its role as a form of a body is focused on in detail in *Quaestiones disputates De anima* I. We will not engage in this discussion in more detail. It is sufficient to mention the conclusion. Each human soul which is not currently a form of matter is, as far as its existence is concerned, full as it is subsistence but as far as its essence is concerned, it lacks completeness. In this sense we need to understand as *hoc aliquid*, but only in a limited sense. Subsistence of the soul is then not the same as its substantiality. To better understand this relation, we can refer to the text from *De substantiis separatis* which we already focused on earlier. The essence of material substances does not include just one of the principles of the material beings, their being is not just the being of matter or just the being of form but the being of both of these principles. If the human soul is a form which constitutes the differentiation of three dimensions, then a human as a whole participates in the being through it. If this condition is not met, then the substantial soul does not relate to the matter and it is not the being of the body and the soul anymore, that is the being of both parts of the essence, but only a subsistent and imperfect being of the soul. That is why Thomas Aquinas can claim that it is essentially incomplete, although substantial.¹⁰⁹

The mentioned change in the concept of the corporeal form plays a double role here. The soul can be substantial and still essentially refer to the matter. The unity of man and immortality of his soul meet here even though the death of a man and his possible after-life cognition is at the same time placed beyond nature. Such a close connection between the matter and the soul made *horizon et confinium corporeum et incorporeum* from the soul.

6 Conclusion

The concept of corporeal form in Thomas Aquinas' work was shown to us from the metaphysical point of view as well anthropological. It was possible to use this concept on both of these levels in an appropriate way. It was however necessary to avoid the pitfalls of the pluralism of forms. This was achieved by emphasizing the mutual relation between form and matter as reality and possibility.

Thomas Aquinas used in metaphysics the concept of the corporeal form to make prime matter independent from God and allow at least in a mediated way the possibility of its cognition.

On the anthropological level the concept of the corporeal form emphasizes the authentic unity of man which is a unity of the soul as form and the body as prime matter. Here, the refusal of the corporeal form as substantial form of a body was found, like the identification of a corporeal form as a soul of a man. The desire of Christian philosophy to explain the unity of man finds here its climax with the help of the concept we are exploring.

¹⁰⁸ Thomas Aquinas, *De substantiis separatis* c. 7: "Si igitur aliquae formae sint quae sine materia esse non possunt, hoc non convenit eis ex hoc quod sunt formae sed ex hoc, quod sunt tales formae, scilicet imperfectae, quae per se sustentari non possunt sed indigent materiae fundamento."

¹⁰⁹ For the consequences arising from this concept for the understanding of a body, see B. C. Bazán, "The highest encomium of human body", p. 99–116.

A more precise elaboration of the concept of the corporeal form has far-reaching consequences for a deeper understanding of Thomas Aquinas' anthropology. If the soul can be a form with three dimensions, a question of in what relation this concept of a form, which incorporates the reference to the matter in the form itself as opposed to Aristotle's understanding, is to the concept of the essence created from the matter and the form. As essence contains matter, form contains some reference to matter. This with regards to the relation of form and matter that we discussed earlier converges in certain respects form and essence. This problem however exceeds the limits of this article and so it is more than enough just to mention it.

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“...ergo Socrates est species.”

***Marginalia* to the history of one paralogism¹**

Abstract | The paper deals with the analysis of the paralogism “*Homo est species, Socrates est homo; ergo Socrates est species*” as performed by authors selected from within the period between the twelfth and the fourteenth century. The research focuses on two theoretical contexts of medieval logic, namely grammar and semantics of terms in verbal context (i. e., the so-called terminist semantics). The analysis demonstrates how the understanding of this paralogism alters according to the change in the approach to specific grammatical notions and according to the change and the systematical development of the theory of meaning (especially with respect to the so-called theory of *suppositio*).

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Introduction

This paper will make the effort to present several medieval analyses of the following paralogism together with the tentative medieval solutions to it:

(S) *Homo est species, Socrates est homo; ergo Socrates est species.*

The paper was designated as *marginalia* because, first, its goal is merely to provide a basic background for the research of medieval terminist tradition,² and second, this paper only deals with the severely limited corpus of original texts (and hence, any completeness claim would be too hasty). The basic analysed texts will be the anonymous treatises *Glose in Aristotelis Sophisticos elencos* and *Summa sophisticorum elencorum* from the twelfth century, Peter of Spain’s *Summule logicales* and Pseudo-Thomistic *De fallaciis* from the thirteenth century and finally Buridan’s *Summulae de dialectica* from the fourteenth century. The analysis of the first two texts should enable us to focus on the very rise of the discussion in the early-scholastic semantics, the following two texts should present the “realist” solution to the paralogism and finally Buridan’s “nominalist” position offers a confrontation with the “realist” solutions, in particular with the one of Pseudo-Thomas. The choice of these texts is due to the purpose of these *marginalia*, which is a study of medieval analytical epistemology in the works of John Buridan and his contemporaries. In the present context, the effort to solve the maximal rate of relevant questions by means of conceptual analysis of the key semantic terminology is considered to be a main symptom of the analytical approach to the theory of rationality, logic and semantics being formulated as conceptually closed theories, i. e., by the same token, theories separated from both psychology and ontology.

¹ I owe my gratitude to prof. Jan Štěpán for multiple readings of the draft, to David Vichnar for his corrections and to my dear colleagues Ludmila Bartošová, Aleš Dvořák and Roman Kucsa for a creative atmosphere during my lectures which, among others, helped me to write this paper.

² Terminism is, briefly, “a logic of terms considered as functional units in the (verbal) context”, cf. L. M. de Rijk, *Logica Modernorum. A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic. Vol. 2, Part one: The Origin and Early Development of the Theory of Supposition*, Assen 1967, p. 117.

This analytical approach could also be regarded as a symptom of the nominalist paradigm.³ However, due to our focus on semantic issues, we will mostly deal with the different concept of nominalism, namely with the nominalist or realist theories of signification and reference (this distinction being based upon different approaches to certain ontological commitments). Thus, the above mentioned confrontation will be quite transparent in two points: first, in the different analyses of (S) as for the question whether the nominalist or the realist semantics of terms (in particular, the theory of “*suppositio*”) is a context of this analysis, and second, in the different approaches to the conceptual analysis of paralogisms.

The sources of the medieval theory of paralogisms

The thesis that Aristotle’s *Sophistical Refutations* is a basic text for the medieval discussion of paralogisms is by no means surprising. However, (S) itself was not analysed in *Sophistical Refutations* although the analysis of (S) can be found even at the very beginning of medieval discussion, i. e. roughly in the middle of the twelfth century, and was a standard challenge for any medieval logical theory (both for the theory of paralogisms and for general semantics). In particular, every medieval logical theory had to deal with the following dilemma: either it had to analyse (S) in the well-established Aristotelian terms, i. e. the outcome of this analysis had to allow of the application of Aristotelian definitions, or it had to interpret or adapt these definitions in a way allowing of their immediate application on the analysis of (S).

Medieval semantics takes over the basic distinction between the *fallaciae in dictione* and *fallaciae extra dictionem* (or *in locutione* and *extra locutionem*) as well as their further division and the substantiation of its completeness⁴ from the Aristotelian conceptual framework.⁵ The distinction is usually justified via situating the source of paralogisms’ apparent validity, the so-called cause of illusion⁶ either “into” the language or “apart from” the language, regardless of the particular explication of this being situated “in” the language or “apart from” it.⁷ This distinction will also turn out to be one of the questionable aspects of the theory of paralogisms because its

³ For this concept of the late-medieval nominalism in the Middle Ages, cf. D. Perler, *Satztheorien, Texte zur Sprachphilosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie im 14. Jahrhundert*, Darmstadt 1990, pp. 28–30. However, this concept is not meant to be a final thesis, merely a hypothesis and guideline for further research.

⁴ The usual question was whether the classification of *fallaciae in dictione* was complete. It was answered by Galen and his answer was mediated by “Alexander”. The solution (based on one Aristotle’s remark) used the distinction between three kinds of “multiplicity”. Cf. S. Ebbesen, “The Summulae, Tractatus VII, De Fallaciis”, in: J. Pinborg (ed.), *The Logic of John Buridan. Acts of the Third European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics (Copenhagen 16. – 21. 11. 1975)*, Copenhagen 1976, pp. 143–144.

⁵ The framework of the whole discussion is, however, Aristotelian only in the sense that it takes place in the context of the works of ancient commentators, such as Boëthius and “Alexander” (probably a Byzantine logician whose commentary on *Sophistical Refutations* was translated together with the Aristotle’s text by James of Venice). Cf. S. Ebbesen, “Ancient Scholastic Logic as the Source of Medieval Scholastic Logic”, in: N. Kretzmann – J. Pinborg – A. Kenny – E. Stump (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: from the rediscovery of Aristotle to the disintegration of scholasticism, 1100–1600*, Cambridge ²1997, p. 124. For the ancient background of medieval semantics from a more general point of view, cf. S. Ebbesen, “The Traditions of Ancient Logic-cum-Grammar in the Middle Ages – What’s the Problem?”, *Vivarium* 45 (2007), pp. 136–152.

⁶ At this place, we have to distinguish between a cause of illusion (*causa apparentiae*), i. e. the reason of paralogism’s apparent validity (that because of which we believe the paralogism to be a correct inference) and a cause of defectiveness (*causa defectus*), i. e. the reason of its actual invalidity. This distinction is genuinely medieval with certain grounds in *Sophistical Refutations*. Cf. S. Ebbesen, “Ancient Scholastic Logic as the Source of Medieval Scholastic Logic”, p. 124.

⁷ The medieval interpretation is based upon Alexander’s commentary which in turn is an adaptation of the ancient classification of paralogisms, cf. *ibid.*

particular interpretation determines the very semantic analysis of (S) as well as a solution to (S) and other paralogisms. The fact that the analysis of (S) does not appear in *Sophistical Refutations* also implies that this paralogism is not a fixed part of the Aristotelian theoretical framework (unless, of course, Aristotelianism was conceived in a broader way), which encourages the autonomy of medieval logicians. Hence, the very identification of this fallacy is theory-laden; it depends on the particular features of the semantic approach analysing this paralogism. For this reason, this identification becomes a crucial issue of this paper.

Another authoritative source for medieval semantics (and also an accessible one in the Middle Ages) is Augustin's *De magistro* which deals with very similar kinds of paralogisms.⁸ Augustin presents several paralogisms based upon the ambiguity (*ambiguitas*) of our utterances with respect to the question whether the objects signified by the used expressions are extra-linguistic entities or signs (*res, signum*). His examples reformulated as paralogisms analogical to (S) would be as follows:

(A1) *Human is composed of the syllables "hu" and "man", you are not composed of the syllables "hu" and "man"; therefore, you are not a human.*

(A2) *Human is a name, you are a human; therefore, you are a name.*

Furthermore, Augustin mentions the joke about the lion coming out of one's mouth (once again, extra-linguistic and linguistic layer must be distinguished from each other). However, these cases are regarded as mere jokes of jesters. The fact that Augustin was acquainted with these "jokes" is not surprising due to his education. Nonetheless, considering ambiguity to be a cause of these sophisms is quite interesting. The question whether Augustin's *De magistro* had some notable influence on the medieval discussion of paralogisms is complicated and will remain open. To my best knowledge, there is no medieval text (and, for sure, this is the case with the texts analysed here) which would use the term "*ambiguitas*" in these contexts, nor any direct reference to Augustin connected with the analysis of (S).⁹ Hence, despite the fact that (at least some) medieval authors knew *De magistro*, one should not consider this text to be a source of medieval discussion of (S) too carelessly.

Taking the corpus of texts available for medieval logicians and actually used by them into consideration, there is a quite straightforward influence of Boëthius' "major" commentary on *Peri hermeneias* where the specific kind of ambiguity, the so-called "*univocity*",¹⁰ is analysed in the context of the question what could possibly prevent verbal contradictions from being actual logical contradictions.¹¹ The following example demonstrates this problem quite clearly:

(U) *Homo ambulat, homo non ambulat.*

In this statement, two tokens of the same type are used to denote particular human beings (*de quoddam homine*) in the first case and the universal human nature (*de homine speciali*) in the other case. Under the strong influence of Boëthius, this passage became *locus communis* among

⁸ Cf. Aurelianus Augustinus, *De magistro*, in: J.-P. Migne (ed.), *Opera omnia, Patrologiae cursus completus Series latina*, vol. 32, Paris 1865, col. 1207–1209.

⁹ One anonymous author uses this term to designate paralogisms in general, but this is clearly a different meaning, since Augustin seems to use it to designate a particular fallacy. Cf. Anonymus Aurelianus II., *Tractatus de paralogismis* in: S. Ebbesen, *Anonymus Aurelianus II, Aristotle, Alexander, Porphyry and Boethius: Ancient Scholasticism and 12th Century Western Europe, Cahiers de l'institut du moyen-âge grec et latin* 16 (1976), p. 20.

¹⁰ The Boëthian conception of univocity was thoroughly analysed by de Rijk, cf. his *Logica Modernorum. A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic. Vol. 1: On the Twelfth Century Theories of Fallacy*, Assen 1962, pp. 24ff. Only selected parts of this analysis will be mentioned here, namely those concerning Boëthius' commentary on *Peri hermeneias*.

¹¹ Hence, this context also gives rise to the question how the Aristotelian and Boëthian conceptions of paralogisms are related to each other, as well as to the effort to formulate a unified theory involving these two conceptions. Cf. Anonymus Aurelianus II., *Tractatus de paralogismis*, pp. 70–75.

the twelfth century authors such as Peter Abelard or Alberic of Paris. In this later context, the example of univocity which is crucial for the present research appeared: “*homo est species*”.¹²

Finally, there is a noteworthy influence of the unknown Byzantine logician called “Alexander”. This author analysed the functions of equiform expressions (tokens of the same type) in different propositional contexts in his commentary on *Sophistical Refutations* which became known thanks to James of Venice’s translation in the twelfth century. Alexander analysed the inferential relations between the significative and the material use of expressions (in modern terms, between “used” and “mentioned” expressions) in terms of equivocation.¹³ A later anonymous medieval commentator of *Sophistical Refutations* analyses the same examples in terms of univocity with a direct reference to “Alexander”.¹⁴

This broadly Aristotelian tradition had formed the task to analyse these issues and this task turned out to be one of the cornerstones of terminist semantics.

The early-scholastic theory of paralogisms: *Summa sophisticorum elencorum* and *Glose in Aristotelis Sophisticos elencos*

The early-scholastic, twelfth century discussion was actually a result of the interaction of several approaches, that formed separate paradigms in later stages of the development of medieval logic. For instance, at this early stage, it is not quite possible to distinguish terminism from dictism, i. e. the two approaches to the question whether the concept of truth should be defined in terms of the semantic properties of propositional components or in terms of relations between a proposition and a state of affairs.¹⁵ Furthermore, for the present purposes, the mutual connections between twelfth-century grammar and early terminism will turn out to be significant. These connections imply the relevance of both grammar and logic for the theory of paralogisms. For this reason, both the logical and grammatical context of this discussion in the twelfth century will be taken into consideration, as regards the analysis of (S).

The subject matter of (medieval) grammar is the concept of being well-formed or “congruent” (*congruentia*). Medieval grammar distinguishes between two different types of incongruence, the reason being the distinction between the grammatical and the logical structure of a sentence.¹⁶

¹² For Abelard, cf. L. M. de Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* I, pp. 51ff., for Alberic, cf. *ibid*, pp. 614–615.

¹³ Cf. S. Ebbesen (ed.), *Anonymi Aurelianensis I Commentarium in Sophisticos Elencos*, Copenhagen 1979, p. xxx, where the textual evidence is given.

¹⁴ Cf. *Anonymi Aurelianensis I Commentarium in Sophisticos Elencos*, pp. 25–26 [emphasis mine]: “Alexander tamen hic exemplum ponit de illo vilissimo univocationis genere, quando scilicet modo arguitur de nomine per ipsum nomen, modo de re, ut ‘homo est nomen, risibile est homo, ergo quoddam risibile est nomen.’” For further examples and the schematic presentation of his approach and parallels between Alexander, Boëthius and Greek commentators, cf. L. M. de Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* I, pp. 35–38.

¹⁵ Dictism is a semantic theory whose central issue is propositional meaning, while terminism is a semantic theory focusing on the function of propositional components in propositional contexts. Therefore, terminism analyses the meaning of a proposition in terms of the meaning of its components, while dictism in terms of propositional reference. Terminism seems to be a historically later approach (at least in the Middle Ages), but originally it used to appear in the same texts as dictism. For the confrontation of these two traditions, cf. N. Kretzmann, “Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of the Propositio”, *The Journal of Philosophy* 67 (1970), pp. 767–787.

¹⁶ For this problem, cf. L. M. de Rijk, *Logica modernorum* II.1, pp. 216–220.

Peter Helias¹⁷ (who is chosen as an example) distinguished between two types of syntactic congruence (characterized as *congrua dictionum ordinatio*), the verbal and the semantic (*congrua voce*, *congrua sensu*). Verbal or grammatical congruence requires the correct combination of words as regards their “accidental” features (such as gender). Semantic congruence occurs if these words are combined correctly from a grammatical point of view but do not express any cognitive content (in other words, they literally do not make sense).¹⁸ As an example, Peter mentions the composition of the substantive of “first imposition” with the adjective of “second imposition” (the later “first” and “second intentions”), i. e. the composition of semantic and non-semantic terms, which occurs in the statement that Socrates is wearing hypothetical sandals with assertoric straps.¹⁹ The conclusion of (S) could be just another instance of the same phenomenon as long as we considered “*species*” to be a term of second imposition or intention (which is quite probable, although not taken for granted, in medieval semantics). In that case, the parallogism in question would be an instance of the apparently correct reasoning which leads from true premises to a conclusion which is not true and, moreover, not even congruent from a logical point of view, and hence has no truth-value.

As regards the logical context, (S) has been connected with the theory of “*suppositio*” since the middle of the twelfth century (i. e. since the very rise of this theory). According to this theory, two equiform terms can differ in their semantic properties, more exactly, can be taken for different sets of entities that we take into consideration during the process of truth-assignment.²⁰ From this point of view, the semantic analysis of the middle term’s function (i. e. the function of “*homo*”) is crucial. Hence, the exact identification of the problematic features of (S) requires the exact formulation of the theory of “*suppositio*” and the particular parameters of this theory determine the analysis of (S).

¹⁷ The very same problem is also discussed by his contemporaries. Alberic of Paris, an influential twelfth-century master (influential even with respect to the texts analysed in this paper), used the expression “*essentia est dactilica*” as an example of a grammatically congruent but logically incongruent compound expression in the same context. Cf. his commentary on *Peri Hermeneias* (MS Berlin, Lat. Fol. 624, ff. 25vb–26ra), L. M. de Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* II.1, p. 218. The same discussion occurs in John of Salisbury’s *Metalogicon*, cf. Ioannes Saresberiensis, *Metalogicus*, in: J.-P. Migne (ed.), *Opera omnia, Patrologiae cursus completus Series latina*, vol. 199, Paris 1900, I, 15, col. 842–845.

¹⁸ Cf. Petrus Helias, *Summa super Priscianum* (ad XVII,1), MS Paris, Arsenal 711, f. 135; in: L. M. de Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* II.1, p. 217: “*Congrua vero sensu est ordinatio dictionum, quando ex dictionibus predicto modo ordinatis fit ut auditor quid rationabiliter intelligat sive verum sit sive falsum. (...) Quandoque congrua est voce et non sensu dictionum ordinatio quando congrue sibi iunguntur dictiones secundum [et MS] sua accidentia, nullum tamen intellectum significant. (...) Sed ex hiis nichil habet auditor quod rationabiliter intelligere possit.*”

¹⁹ The significance of this discussion can be demonstrated, among others, by the fact that it is mentioned in John of Salisbury’s *Metalogicon*, together with the examples of a patronymic horse, hypothetic sandals (obviously the paradigmatic example), assertoric human, etc. Cf. Ioannes Saresberiensis, *Metalogicus*, I, 15, col. 842–845.

²⁰ This formulation is taken over from the analysis of Buridan’s theory of *suppositio*, but nonetheless fits even these early theories (despite the fact that it fits best the theories which make use of the identity theory of predication). Cf. S. Ebbesen, “The Summulae, Tractatus VII, De Fallaciis”, p. 149. The authors relevant here usually use formulations similar to the following one: *suppositio* is taking of term for something. Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales*, L. M. de Rijk (ed.), Assen 1972, Tract. VI, §3, p. 80, ll. 8–9 and Johannes Buridanus, *Summulae de practica sophismatum*, F. Pironet (ed.), Turnhout 2004, cap. 3, p. 53, ll. 6–8. For the general survey of the selected thirteenth and fourteenth century theories of *suppositio*, cf. L. M. de Rijk, “The Development of Suppositio naturalis in Mediaeval Logic”, *Vivarium* 9 (1971), pp. 71–107 a *Vivarium* 11 (1973), pp. 43–78. For the general functions of the theory of *suppositio* and the summary and critical survey of the modern research, cf. C. Dutilh Novaes, *Formalizing Medieval Theories, Suppositio, Consequentiae and Obligationes*, Dordrecht 2007, pp. 4–46, especially p. 30, where the theory of *suppositio* is interpreted as “a theory of propositional meaning, primarily intended to provide a procedure of analysis for the establishment of what can be asserted by a given proposition”.

The anonymous *Summa sophisticorum Elencorum* (henceforth: SSE) from the second half of the twelfth century²¹ shows the controversial character of this issue by means of discussing several approaches to (S). By the way, this means that the difficulty of this issue was recognized even at the very beginning of this discussion. Another important feature of this treatise is that it contains both the theory of incongruence (i. e. grammar) and the theory of *suppositio* or, to use the accurate terminology, *appellatio* (i. e. logical semantics).²² For this reason, the particular solution to the paralogism (S) is determined by both contexts (which can only be divided analytically from each other in the twelfth century, as has already been mentioned).²³

Two cases of incongruence are distinguished from each other in SSE: either the words can be combined inappropriately (*quod incompetenter coniungantur dictiones*) or the combination of words leads to the loss of sense (*tales dictiones simul iunguntur, quod sensus evanescit*). The author of SSE uses the usual example of assertoric sandals, only with the difference that he considers even the negative statements of this sort (i. e., "sandals are not assertoric") incongruent.²⁴ From a terminological point of view, the incongruence caused by the "accidental features" of noun and pronoun (*soloecismus secundum diversitatem accidentium nominis et pronominis*) is distinguished from the semantic incongruence (*soloecismus secundum significationem*).²⁵ Semantic incongruence occurs if the combination of words is grammatically congruent but meaningless, i. e. if the combination is not permitted by the meaning of these words (*sensus tames repugnat eas coniungi*).²⁶ However, the author of SSE does not offer any precise criteria for semantic congruence, not even those of Peter Helias forbidding the combination of the expressions of different orders. He only suggests that both grammatical and logical incongruence should be treated alike.²⁷ On the other hand, we can reasonably assume that he considers the combination of the semantic and non-semantic terms semantically incongruent, at least, due to the examples he uses.

(S) itself is discussed in two different contexts in SSE, namely in the context of equivocation (*equivocatio*) and in the context of the fallacy of accident (*fallacia accidentis*). In the first case, (S) is conceived as a situation in which one word-type is used both in its original and its metaphoric (*translatione*) meaning.²⁸ For this reason, (S) is analysed in terms of plural signification (*plura significat*), i. e. it is considered similar to "*pratum ridet*" (literally: "the meadow is laughing", which is the metaphoric expression of the fact that it is flowering). From this point of view, the analysis of (S) leads to the following conclusion: in its proper sense, "homo" refers to (*appellat*) all human beings and in its improper, metaphoric sense the human species itself.²⁹ Furthermore, another example is discussed in this context, namely using the term to denote itself instead of the entities which it would denote if it were used according to its proper meaning. This type of metaphoric

²¹ For the general information concerning *Summa sophisticorum elencorum* (MS Paris, B. N., Lat. 15.141, ff. 1ra–46vb), cf. L. M. de Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* I, pp. 88–89.

²² The term "*appellatio*" is an early functional equivalent for the later term "*suppositio*", cf. L. M. de Rijk, *Logica modernorum* II.1, pp. 527–536.

²³ As regards the grammar, de Rijk proved the direct influence of Peter Helias and Alberic of Paris on the theory of paralogisms, cf. L. M. de Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* I, p. 89 and 108–109.

²⁴ Cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, in: L. M. de Rijk, *Logica Modernorum* I, p. 408, l. 25–p. 409, l. 6.

²⁵ Cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, p. 453, ll. 9–17.

²⁶ Cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, p. 455, l. 24–p. 456, l. 5.

²⁷ Cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, p. 456, ll. 4–5.

²⁸ Cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, pp. 289–305.

²⁹ Cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, p. 294, ll. 15–16: "*Sophisma est translationis. Nam 'homo' proprie habet appellare omnes homines, sed transfertur ut appellet illam speciem. Et hoc fit inproprie.*"

use is called “*materiale impositum*”, its example being “*homo est nomen*”.³⁰ Nonetheless, this problem does not affect the analysis of (S) immediately.

In the other context, i.e. in the context of the fallacy of accident, which is a fallacy caused by ascribing every property ascribed to the predicate term also to the subject term or *vice versa*,³¹ the alternative position of “*magister Iacobus*” (probably James of Venice) is discussed. According to James, the fallacy of accident occurs as long as the same entity is conceived first as separate from something and second as connected to something.³² This position is compared to a position ascribed to “*magister Albericus*” (probably Alberic of Paris), that is also accepted by the author of SSE. According to “*Albericus*”, it is necessary to distinguish two different *appellationes* of “*homo*” in (S): in “*Socrates est homo*” it *appellates* particular human beings, while in “*Homo est species*” the human nature.³³ Hence, the fallacious reasoning under scrutiny results from equivocation, i. e. the fallacy which has its source “in” the language.³⁴

The fact that material imposition is not mentioned in the context of analysing (S) suggests that “*species*” is not conceived as a semantic notion in SSE, which in turn suggests that the author of SSE subscribes to the realist conception of universals.³⁵ One consequence of this approach would be that (S) should not be analysed in terms of (semantic) incongruence. On the other hand, the case is the same even with the following paralogism:

(N) *Homo est nomen sed omnis homo est animal; igitur quoddam animal est nomen.*

Despite the fact that “*nomen*” is obviously a term of second intention, (N) is discussed in terms of equivocation just like (S).³⁶

This leads to questioning SSE’s coherence. Its author classifies paralogisms in terms of their primary goal or “*meta*” (refutation, falsehood, implausibility, incongruence, and redundancy). At this point, the distinction between refutation (*redargutio*), which covers the Aristotelian paralogisms, and incongruence (*soloecismus*) is the most important one. This distinction rests on the character of allegedly deduced conclusions: paralogisms of the first kind lead to conclusions which are false, while paralogisms of the second kind to conclusions which are incongruent,

³⁰ Cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, p. 297, ll. 8–12: “*Et hec talis translatio vocatur a quodam sapiente materiale impositum, idest materia que est imposita nostre locutioni, quia cum volumus loqui de aliquo nomine et hoc non possumus facere per aliud nomen, necessitate igitur coacti sumpsimus illud nomen pro materiali imposito et per illud agimus de semetipso.*”

³¹ Cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, p. 356, ll. 3–8: “*Secundum accidens ergo fiunt paralogismi, ut dicit Aristoteles, quando quodlibet similiter fuerit assignatum inesse rei subiecte et accidenti, idest predicato, et econverso, idest quando idem assignatur convenire accidenti sive predicato, quod inest et rei subiecte. ‘Accidens’ enim ibi largo modo accipitur, scilicet pro quolibet predicato, sive accidentale sit sive substantiale.*” Note one interesting feature of this definition: the concept of accident is defined in the non-ontological terms, unlike in Pseudo-Thomas’ approach to this fallacy (see below).

³² Cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, p. 357, ll. 5–8: “*Sciendum tamen est quod Magister Iacobus aliter diffinit paralogismos qui fiunt secundum accidens, dicens sic: ‘tunc fit paralogismus secundum accidens quando aliquod prius accipitur coniunctim, postea divisim.’*”

³³ Cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, p. 357, l. 33 – p. 358, l. 4: “*Similiter dicit de alio paralogismo, scilicet: ‘Socrates est homo sed homo est species ergo Socrates est species’, quod est ibi sophisma secundum equivocationem, quia in prima propositione ‘homo’ appellat homines, sed in secundo appellat illam speciem; ergo cum in utraque propositione diversa appellat, secundum equivocationem est ibi sophisma, et non secundum accidens.*”

³⁴ For this discussion, cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, p. 357, l. 5 – p. 358, l. 4.

³⁵ For distinguishing the nominalist and realist answer to the question whether “*genus*” and “*species*” are terms of first or second intention, cf. Y. Iwakuma, “Nominalia”, *Didascalica. A Journal for Philosophy and Philology from Late Antiquity to the Renaissance* 1 (1998), pp. 68–71. [<http://www.sal.tohoku.ac.jp/phil/DIDASCALIA/contents.html#>]

³⁶ Cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, p. 297, ll. 16–22.

hence neither true nor false.³⁷ Even if we would not, due to the realist approach to universals, consider (S) to be a deduction of incongruent conclusion, (N) should be conceived that way, given SSE’s grammatical assumptions. But the actual state of affairs is different from these expectations and there seems to be no reasonable explanation for it. Granted, we could argue that for the analysis of both (S) and (N), the point of concern is that the semantic features of the middle term differ in both premises, which is more probably a cause of illusion. Hence we could analyse these paralogisms in terms of equivocation, rather than in terms of incongruence. This interpretation does not avoid the incoherence quite conclusively (there is still an open question left, why the possible incongruence is not even mentioned in this context) and it might be suspected of begging the question, but at least it offers a more charitable interpretation of SSE, as regards its focus on merely one context of analysis.

From this point of view, one remark which occurs in the twelfth century *Glose in Aristotelis Sophisticos elencos* (henceforth: *Glose*), is very interesting.³⁸ In this remark, two similar kinds of paralogisms are distinguished from each other: paralogisms *secundum figuram dictionis* and paralogisms *secundum soloecismum*. In both cases, “the change of interpretation” is supposed to occur, but in the first case this interpretation concerns entities, while in the other case words.³⁹ As an example of a paralogism *secundum soloecismum*, two different types of mistakes are mentioned: the misinterpretation of gender or case and the misinterpretation of an expression which could denote both an entity and (metaphorically) a noun. According to the author of *Glose*, this fallacy occurs as a result of “material imposition” (*materiale inpositum*), either grammatical (“*poeta est nomen*”) or logical (“*poeta est accidens*”).⁴⁰ Unfortunately, no example which would enable analysing (S) or (N) in terms of incongruence is explicitly mentioned there, although a similar problem is.⁴¹ On the other hand, the author of *Glose* distinguishes between grammatical and logical incongruence.⁴² He does not use this distinction explicitly in the passage where material imposition is mentioned, but this step would be expectable, since the reference mistakes can hardly be considered to be a grammatical issue. But surely the very fact that *suppositio* mistakes and use/mention distinction are discussed in terms of incongruence is quite ingenious and important, regardless of the rather fragmentary character of this discussion which is due to the genre of *Glose*.

The examples discussed in these early treatises became a cornerstone of the further development of terminist semantics, in particular with respect to analysing the function of terms in verbal or propositional context. For this later development, what mattered was the analysis of

³⁷ Cf. *Summa sophisticorum elencorum*, p. 405, ll. 27–33.

³⁸ Also, SSE and *Glose* use the same authorities, James and Alberic. Cf. *Glose in Aristotelis Sophisticos elencos*, in: L. M. de Rijk, *Logica modernorum I*, p. 206. For the general informations concerning *Glose* cf. *ibid.*, pp. 82–88.

³⁹ Cf. *Glose in Aristotelis Sophisticos elencos*, pp. 212–213, where the fallacy *secundum figuram dictionis* is interpreted as a misidentification (“*non-identical is interpreted as identical*”) or as interpreting the words which do not signify something as if they did (paradigmatic case being category mistakes). For this distinction between the kinds of misinterpretation, cf. *ibid.*, p. 237, ll. 9–27.

⁴⁰ Cf. *Glose in Aristotelis Sophisticos elencos*, p. 237, ll. 9–28 and p. 255, ll. 5–10.

⁴¹ Cf. *Glose in Aristotelis Sophisticos elencos*, p. 243, ll. 15–17. This passage does not suggest any identification of the paralogism in question, however, the context resembles the theory of univocation (i. e. the problem of particularity or universality of the signified entities) and the metaphoric use of an expression is mentioned (*parabola, idest inproprie*).

⁴² The author comments on Aristotle’s definition of incongruence and notes that it only covers one type of incongruence, namely the one which results from the wrong combination of uttered sounds (*secundum incompetentem iuncturam vocum*), but not the other type which results from their cognitive content (*qui fit secundum intellectum*). Cf. *Glose in Aristotelis Sophisticos elencos*, p. 205, ll. 4–16.

suppositio.⁴³ Hence, the medieval theories of *suppositio* and paralogisms were interrelated and mutually supported each other since their very rise in the twelfth century.⁴⁴

Peter of Spain: *Summule logicales*

The thirteenth century terminist Peter of Spain⁴⁵ analyses (S) in terms of the fallacy of accident,⁴⁶ which he characterises as a fallacy caused by the apparent identity of the middle term and the possible aspect distinction (*diversitas secundum rationem*) of this term or the entity which it denotes.⁴⁷ Hence, the fallacy of accident is at variance with the requirement of the middle term's identity that is a necessary validity-condition of syllogisms. Three components of this type of fallacious reasoning can be distinguished: subject-entity (*res subiecta*), the accident of subject-entity and the accident of these two (i. e. both of subject-entity and its accident). The accident of subject is that which is external to or different from the subject-entity with respect to a third entity (*extraneum vel diversum in respectu ad aliquid tertium*), this third entity being that which is an accident of both subject-entity and its accident. This "accident of both" is that which is not necessarily implied in them (*non-necessarium in consequendo*).⁴⁸ In the case of (S), the subject-entity is a human, which is external to the inferior and to the superior (in the sense of Porphyrian

⁴³ Another twelfth century analysis is contained in the text written by Adam of Balsham's pupils, cf. *Fallacie parvipontane*, in: L. M. de Rijk, *Logica modernorum I*, p. 562, ll. 14–26.

⁴⁴ The development of semantics of terms enables a more accurate semantic analysis of paralogisms and *vice versa*. Also, the theory of *suppositio* and the theory of paralogisms share their paradigmatic examples (among others, "*homo est species*"). Cf. C. Dutilh Novaes, *Formalizing Medieval Theories*, p. 31 (and of course the parts I. and II.1 of de Rijk's *Logica modernorum*). On the other hand, these theories are not identical: despite everything they have in common, each has still its own specific issues and goals. For this question in the case of Ockham's logic, cf. C. Dutilh Novaes, "Theory of Supposition vs. Theory of Fallacies in Ockham", *Vivarium* 45 (2007), pp. 343–359.

⁴⁵ His real identity is still a matter of discussion, but answering to this question is not essential here. In particular, there is a question whether "*auctor Summularum*" is identical with the pope John XXI. But for the present purpose, the research will deal with Peter, the "*auctor Summularum*", who supposedly wrote *Summulae* at the beginning of 1230's. Cf. A. d'Ors, "Petrus Hispanus O. P., Auctor Summularum (II): Further Documents and Problems", *Vivarium* 39 (2001), pp. 243–248, where the discussion concerning the identity of "*auctor Summularum*" is summarized.

⁴⁶ For his conception of the fallacy of accident, cf. J. Spruyt, "The Unity of Semantics and Ontology. Wyclif's Treatment of the fallacia accidentis", *Vivarium* 46 (2008) pp. 28–32 (This article also compares Buridan and Wyclif with respect to the nominalist and realist approach to logic. Its conclusions are coherent with the present conclusions, despite the fact that they are based on different textual evidence.)

⁴⁷ Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VII, § 106, str. 148, ll. 14–19: "*Principium ergo motivum accidentis est idemptitas medii secundum partem prout iteratur in premissis. Et dico 'prout iteratur in premissis', ut non intelligatur de illa idemptitate secundum partem que est ipsius medii ad extrema, sed in se, ut iteratum est. Principium autem defectus est diversitas medii iterati secundum rationem.*" The term "*ratio*" can also be conceived as a "mode of being" of certain entity (*ratio rei*), cf. Joke Spruyt, "The Unity of Semantics and Ontology. Wyclif's Treatment of the fallacia accidentis", p. 31. This in turn supports the present interpretation of the fallacy of accident as regards the question whether the identity and non-identity in question is linguistic or ontological.

⁴⁸ Peter notes that a necessary implication as conceived here is not based upon the formal features of propositions (their quality, quantity and ordering of components), but upon the specific relations of terms, the so-called "topical" relations (*habitudines locales*) and causal relations (*a causa vel ab effectu*). From this point of view, the relation between "*homo*" and "*animal*" would be non-accidental due to the *locus a specie sive a parte subiectiva* regimented by the rule "*Quidquid predicatur de specie, et de genere*". E. g. the following inference is valid according to thus rule: "*Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes est animal*". Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. V, § 13, p. 64, ll. 1–7. For the concept of topical relations in the Middle Ages, cf. N. J. Green-Pedersen, *The Tradition of the Topics in the Middle Ages*, München, 1984.

tree), and hence also to Socrates, as long as this subject-entity is subsumed under the predicate “species” (the accident of both).⁴⁹

While analysing (S), Peter can make use of an elaborate theory of *suppositio*. Hence, it is no surprise that he conceives (S) as a step from the simple *suppositio* (i. e. taking the term for the universal entity which it signifies) to the personal (i. e. taking the term for the entities subsumed under it).⁵⁰ According to Peter, this step could possibly lead to the analysis of (S) in terms of the fallacy of figure of words caused by the apparent similarity of the modes of signification.⁵¹ He distinguishes between three types of this fallacy: the first caused by congruence and incongruence, the second caused by category-mistakes and the third caused by signifying a singular entity as a primary substance.⁵² This context is not considered relevant for the analysis of (S), as could be shown by Peter’s analysis of the following paralogism:⁵³

(S2) *Homo est species, iste homo est homo; ergo iste homo est species.*

Needles to say, the middle term “*homo*” has the same *suppositio* in both premises, namely the simple *suppositio*. The step from one type of *suppositio* to another applies to the relation between the middle term to the minor extreme and these terms are not identical, given that “*iste*” is a part of the major premise’s subject, which is the case with Peter’s logic.⁵⁴ The same could be said about (S) because both “*Socrates*” and “*iste homo*” are singular terms. It is not the middle term, whose *suppositio* is changing; it is not even the middle term that matters, unlike in the case of analysis of (S) in terms of equivocation, where the middle term plays a crucial role. The analysis has re-focused on the relation between other terms than one would expect. Analysing (S2) in terms of the fallacy of figure of words would only be possible if “*homo*” were conceived as signifying a primary substance (*hoc aliquid*) instead of a secondary substance (*quale quid*), which is particularly relevant to its use in the major premise “*homo est species*”.⁵⁵

⁴⁹ For Peter’s analysis of the fallacy of accident, cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VII, §§ 102–104, pp. 146–147. The present interpretation assumes that the relations mentioned by Peter in this context are actually the relations of extra-linguistic entities, not of terms. It is justified by the fact that the fallacy in question is *extra dictionem*, and hence its cause of illusion and cause of defectiveness are located on the layer of extra-linguistic entities (*in re*). Needles to say, this interpretation is not without difficulties: Peter does not distinguish between the linguistic and extra-linguistic relations quite clearly, he even admits that the word “*predicatum*” is ambiguous because it might denote both the term and that which is predicated (i. e. some entity). Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. XII, § 6, p. 211, l. 22 – p. 212, l. 15. Nevertheless, this interpretation appears to be consistent and to certain degree justified by textual evidence.

⁵⁰ For Peter’s theory of *suppositio* cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VI, p. 79–88, for the concept of simple *suppositio*, cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VI, §§ 6, 10–11, p. 81–86.

⁵¹ Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VII, § 91, str. 136, ll. 25–27: “*Principium motivum figure dictionis est similitudo unius dictionis cum alia in modo significandi accidentali. Principium defectus est incompletio sive diminutio illius similitudinis.*” A mode of signification is accidental if it is a mode of an expression in its actual use, it is essential if it is habitual; cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VII, §§ 83–86, pp. 131–134.

⁵² Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VII, § 92, p. 136, l. 28 – p. 137, l. 5: “*Modi autem figure dictionis sunt tres. Quia in dictione est quidam modus significandi accidentalis, qui est principium congruitatis et incongruitatis, ut masculinum, femininum, et neutrum. Et est alius modus significandi accidentalis, qui debetur rei significatae, que scilicet res est principium veritatis et falsitatis. Et differt a primo quia primus debetur rei existenti in dictione a parte principiorum congruitatis et incongruitatis, iste autem secundus debetur rei a parte principiorum veritatis et falsitatis; rei dico universalis, ut **quid, quale, quantum** et sic de aliis. Tertius autem modus significandi in dictione est dictionis significantis rem singularem ut **hoc aliquid**. Et secundum hos tres modos significandi vel intelligendi in dictione sunt tres modi figure dictionis.*”

⁵³ Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VII, § 99, p. 144, ll. 25–34.

⁵⁴ Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VI, § 4, p. 80, ll. 19–22.

⁵⁵ Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VII, §§ 97–100, pp. 141–145, esp. § 99, p. 144, ll. 26–34. The particular relevance of the major premise in this case is due to the relations between the inherence theory of

However, there is one important difference in the middle term's *suppositio* in (S), even given that it has a simple *suppositio* in both occurrences. There are actually two different types of simple *suppositio*: first, the simple *suppositio* of a subject term, e. g. in the sentence “*Homo est species*”, and second, the simple *suppositio* of a predicate term, e. g. in the sentence “*Omnis homo est animal*”. This difference is relevant for the fallacious character of (S). The middle term is used in two different ways in the premises of (S): its denotation is conceived as something universal and distinct from that which is subsumed under it when related to “*species*” and as something instantiated and hence connected with the subsumed entities when related to “*Socrates*” (or Socrates). The difference causes what Peter designates as an aspect distinction⁵⁶ and the objective correlates of which are differently conceived common natures.⁵⁷ However, this aspect has a different function as regards its relevance to the occurrence of fallacies than it had in SSE.

Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas: *De fallaciis*

From the texts analysed in this paper, the Pseudo-Thomistic *De fallaciis*⁵⁸ is the most obvious example of the realist approach to logic.⁵⁹ This orientation determines the very distinction between fallacies *in dictione* and *extra dictionem*: the fallacies *in dictione* are supposedly based upon regarding entities corresponding to equiform expressions as actually identical, while the fallacies *extra dictionem* upon regarding entities similar or dissimilar from certain point of view as identical or distinct absolutely.⁶⁰ The thesis that the apparent validity of fallacies *extra dictionem* has its cause in objective reality (*ex parte rei*) is interpreted in ontological terms: their classification is derived from general features of objective entities (*secundum quasdam uniuersales rerum conditiones*), e. g. the fallacy of accident from the distinction between being *per se* and being *per accidens* (which is obviously an ontological distinction) etc.⁶¹

(S) itself is discussed in terms the fallacy of figure of words.⁶² According to Pseudo-Thomas' opinion, what happens in these fallacious arguments is that the expressions with apparently

predication and the validity-conditions of syllogism, as will be explained below. Just a short note in advance: it is the wrong *suppositio* of “*homo*” in the “*homo est species*”, which causes the problems.

⁵⁶ Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VII, § 106, p. 148, ll. 19–30: “*Verbi gratia: 'homo est species, Sortes est homo, ergo Sortes est species'; hic est accidens, quia medium, scilicet 'homo', est idem secundum substantiam in premissis, prout iteratur; non autem est idem secundum rationem, quia 'homo' subicitur in maiori pro ipso communi secundum se, et non prout est in Sorte sive secundum comparationem quam habet ad inferiora – sed in minori propositione predicatur de Sorte secundum istam comparationem, et non secundum illam; et sic est substantia idem, diversum autem in ratione, prout iteratur.*”

⁵⁷ Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VI, § 12, p. 87, ll. 22–28: “*...eadem est humanitas, secundum viam logice, non nature, in quolibet individuo hominis; sicut homo in communi idem est. (...) In via autem nature humanitas mea est per se et alia ab humanitate tua...*” This formulation expresses a rather moderate version of realist paradigm but the same conception of aspect distinction is consistent even with its stronger variants.

⁵⁸ Cf. Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas, *De fallaciis*, in: *Sancti Thomae de Aquino opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita, Tomus XLIII*, Roma 1976, pp. 403–418.

⁵⁹ As a matter of fact, it is realist both as opposed to analytical approach and as opposed to ontological nominalism.

⁶⁰ Cf. Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas, *De fallaciis*, cap. 10, ll. 5–11, p. 411: “*Sicut enim in fallaciis in dictione deceptio prouenit ex eo quod aliquae res, aliquo modo conuenientes secundum uocem, accipiuntur ut eadem secundum rem: ita in fallaciis extra dictionem deceptio prouenit ex eo quod aliquae res, aliquo modo conuenientes uel differentes, accipiuntur ut eadem simpliciter uel diuerse.*”

⁶¹ Cf. Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas, *De fallaciis*, cap. 10, ll. 12–30, p. 411.

⁶² Cf. Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas, *De fallaciis*, cap. 9, pp. 410–411.

identical mode of signification actually differ from each other in this respect.⁶³ Pseudo-Thomas distinguishes three types of this fallacy from each other (this classification is similar to that of Peter): grammatical gender mistakes,⁶⁴ grammatical category mistakes,⁶⁵ and regarding a word as signifying a common nature while it actually signifies a particular substance, which includes *suppositio* mistakes⁶⁶. (S), as an instance of *suppositio* mistakes, is also covered by the third type of figure of words; in particular, the *suppositio* mistake in (S) is caused by the inferential step from simple *suppositio* to discrete *suppositio*, or from *quale quid* (specific or generic common nature) to *hoc aliquid* (particular substance). Unlike Peter of Spain, Pseudo-Thomas does not localize this step explicitly. However, since the only terms that could possibly have discrete *suppositio* are singular,⁶⁷ we can assume that Pseudo-Thomas has the step from the simple *suppositio* of the major premise's middle term "*homo*" to the discrete *suppositio* of "Socrates" in mind. The *quale quid/hoc aliquid* mistake is probably due to the middle term (in particular, with respect to its use in the major premise) which is the only reasonable candidate for this role in (S).

The following group of paralogisms, that are significantly similar to (S), is discussed in terms of the fallacy of accident:⁶⁸

⁶³ Cf. Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas, *De fallaciis*, cap. 9, ll. 5–8, p. 410: "Vnde fallacia figure dictionis est deceptio proueniens ex eo quod aliqua dictio, similis alteri dictioni, uidetur eundem modum significandi habere, cum tamen non habeat..."

⁶⁴ Cf. Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas, *De fallaciis*, cap. 9, ll. 18–28, p. 410: "Primus modus prouenit ex eo quod dictio que significat masculinum assumitur ac si significaret femininum uel neutrum, aut e conuerso; ut patet in hoc paralogismo: Quecumque coloratur albedine est alba, sed Catelina coloratur albedine, ergo Catelina est alba. Non sequitur, quia Catelina cum sit nomen uiri non significat femininum, licet uideatur propter similitudinem cum nominibus femininis; unde non debet sumi sub distributio feminini."

⁶⁵ Cf. Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas, *De fallaciis*, cap. 9, ll. 34–40, p. 410: "Secundus modus prouenit ex eo quod aliqua dictio, que significat per modum unius praedicamenti, uidetur significare per modum alterius; sicut hic: Quicquid heri uidisti hodie uides, album heri uidisti, ergo album hodie uides. Non sequitur, quia hic mutatur quid in quale."

⁶⁶ Cf. Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas, *De fallaciis*, cap. 9, ll. 66–83, p. 411: "Tertius modus prouenit ex eo quod aliqua dictio que significat quale quid, uidetur significare hoc aliquid; et contingit quando quale quid transmutatur in hoc aliquid. Et dicitur significare quale quid, quod significat naturam communem generis uel speciei, secundum quod pertinet ad tertium modum; hoc aliquid uero, quod significat substantiam particularem. (...) Et ad hunc modum reducitur omnis deceptio proueniens ex uariata suppositione terminorum..."

⁶⁷ This is Peter of Spain's (cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VI, § 4, p. 80, ll. 19–22) or his contemporary's, William of Sherwood's conception of discrete *suppositio* (cf. William of Sherwood, *Introductiones circa logicam*, H. Brands – Ch. Kann (eds.), Hamburg 1995, Tr. 5, ll. 49–53, p. 136). Incidentally, the fact that Pseudo-Thomas speaks about discrete rather than (e.g.) personal *suppositio* would support this interpretation, since Peter's classification of *suppositio* distinguishes between discrete and common *suppositio* first, personal *suppositio* being a sub-type of common *suppositio*. Hence, strictly speaking, singular terms cannot have personal *suppositio*, which is a very specific classification in the thirteenth century. (Cf. L. M. de Rijk, "Introduction", in: Petrus Hispanus, *Tractatus called afterwards Summule logicales*, pp. lxxvii–lxxix). On the other hand, Peter himself is not quite conclusive in this respect because he speaks about personal, not discrete *suppositio* in the context of (S). Furthermore, surprising as it may be, Peter's classification does not include material *suppositio* and the use/mention mistakes such as the examples with "*homo est nomen*" are missing both in his and Pseudo-Thomas' theory of paralogisms (e.g. the examples with "*homo est nomen*"). Another evidence for the identity of both systems is that one commentator of Peter's *Summulae* (Antonius de Scarpia of Florence) comments on *De fallaciis* instead of the seventh tract of *Summulae* and notes that even *auctor Summularum* himself has accepted it as a solution to the given problems. Cf. L. M. de Rijk, "Introduction", pp. li–lii. Obviously, these arguments are not completely decisive as regards the question whether both authors use the same theory of *suppositio*. Nevertheless, this will be assumed here for the sake of argument.

⁶⁸ Cf. Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas, *De fallaciis*, cap. 11, ll. 119–135, p. 413. Incidentally, (P) and (S3) are analysed in terms of the fallacy of accident also by Peter of Spain (which is quite natural); cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VII, § 114, p. 153, ll. 21–34. Since they are considered to be instances of the same fallacy as (S) by Peter, this fact has not been mentioned yet.

(G) *Homo est animal, animal est genus, ergo homo est genus.*

(P) *Homo est risibile, sed risibile est proprium, ergo homo est proprium.*

(S3) *Homo est species, sed homo est risibile, ergo risibile est species.*

Pseudo-Thomas' choice of the context of discussion raises the serious question what *suppositio* does the "homo" have in the premise "homo est animal" (or "homo est risibile"), which is actually a question concerning the semantic analysis of definitions. However, this question is not answered in the text. We could suggest that this term has the same, namely simple, *suppositio*, when used in both premises. If this were the case we would be allowed to analyse (S) in the same or at least similar terms, i. e. to consider it to be a fallacy *extra dictionem*, in particular, the fallacy of accident (just as Peter of Spain did). Moreover, Pseudo-Thomas admits that some paralogisms of this type can actually be an instance of two different fallacies, both of figure of words and of accident, depending on whether the actual cause of illusion is a similarity of words or a relation between extra-linguistic entities.⁶⁹ In the case of (G), the fallacy of accident occurs due to the fact that the relation between superior and inferior (in the Porphyrian tree) is from different points of view both substantial (*per se*) and accidental (*per accidens*). Being a species is not predicated about an animal insofar as it is identical with human beings, but insofar as it is distinct from them as a superior from an inferior.⁷⁰ The choice of the context of analysis for (S), as it seems, could be due to the obviously different *suppositio* of proper name "Socrates", which is discrete, not simple, unlike the *suppositio* of analogical terms in (G), (P) and (S3) (assuming the simple *suppositio* of their relevant terms). But, once again, this interpretation cannot be conclusively justified.⁷¹

To sum up: Pseudo-Thomas, despite the identical general-semantic assumptions, focuses on quite different aspect of (S) than Peter of Spain does. Also, the very strong connections between his semantics and ontology can be proved, in particular due to his interpretation and classification of the fallacies *extra dictionem*.

⁶⁹ Cf. Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas, *De fallaciis*, cap. 11, ll. 136–144, p. 413. Strictly speaking, Thomas does not say which paralogisms permit this twofold analysis, but this group suggests itself due to the similarity of its members to (S).

⁷⁰ Cf. Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas, *De fallaciis*, cap. 11, ll. 99–111, p. 412.

⁷¹ Peter of Spain, whose semantics seems to be a theoretical background for Pseudo-Thomas, uses "Homo est species" as a paradigmatic example of subject term's simple *suppositio* and "Homo currit" as an paradigmatic example of subject terms' personal *suppositio* (cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. VI, §§ 6–8, p. 81–82). That the subject term should have simple *suppositio* in a partial definition "Homo est animal" is rather unlikely. Quite to the contrary, Peter claims that "homo" supposits for that which is subsumed under humanity in this proposition. Nevertheless, this example is a bit problematic, because the same is supposedly the case with the predicate term (cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summule logicales*, Tract. XI, § 10, p. 203, ll. 14–17). How to explain this obvious inconsistency is not quite clear. As for Pseudo-Thomas, there are no clues whatsoever.

John Buridan: *Summulae de dialectica*

Buridan discusses (S) in *De fallaciis* which is the seventh tract of his *opus magnum Summulae de dialectica*.⁷² Buridan's *Summulae* are characterized as a commentary on Peter of Spain's treatise in their introductory passage.⁷³ But, as a matter of fact, Buridan is at variance with Peter's opinions and does not always use *Summule logicales*, which is most obvious in the fourth and seventh tracts, i. e. in the theory of *suppositio* and paralogisms.⁷⁴ Ria van der Lecq proposed a hypothesis that the actual author of the text commented upon in the fourth tract of *Summulae de dialectica* is Buridan himself, which would be quite shocking because that would imply that Buridan considered himself to be an authority,⁷⁵ and the same is the case with his *De fallaciis*.⁷⁶ In both tracts, this variance is due to a completely different general semantics, which has also several consequences for the theory of paralogisms (via the general validity-criteria of syllogisms). Even the elementary distinction between the fallacies *in dictione* and *extra dictionem* shows the difference between Buridan and Peter of Spain or Pseudo-Thomas. Buridanian distinction is based upon the criterion of dependence or independence of a fallacy on the arbitrariness of signs: fallacies *in dictione* can supposedly occur only if we use conventionally imposed signs, these being their cause of illusion, while the fallacies *extra dictionem* are due to the entities which are not conventional signs, and hence would occur even if there were no semantic conventions.⁷⁷ This very criterion will be crucial with respect to identifying (S) as an instance of fallacies *in dictione* (namely, of equivocation). Furthermore, “*extra dictionem*” does not entail “*ex parte rei*” in Buridan's approach, as it did by Peter of Spain and Pseudo-Thomas (at least not in the same sense): the cause of illusion of the fallacies *extra dictionem* is supposedly “*objective or intentional*” (*causa apparentiae est ex parte rei seu intentionis significatae*).⁷⁸ This addition is what distinguishes Buridan from both his predecessors and is a foundation of the thesis that fallacies *extra dictionem* (unlike fallacies *in dictione*) can occur even in an unambiguous mental language.⁷⁹ Another essential difference is due to Buridan's concept of *suppositio*. First of all,

⁷² The following analysis will be mostly based upon *De fallaciis*. The complete critical edition of this tract is not yet at the disposal, but we can use the partial critical edition prepared by Johannes Rustenburg (so far four chapters out of six have been edited, and these include the introduction and the theories of fallacies *in dictione* and *extra dictionem*. Strictly speaking, this is still only a working edition, nevertheless the best available, and hence the one to be quoted: Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis*, J. Rustenburg (ed.), [http://www.tatzetwerk.nl/buridan (5. 11. 2008)]. Furthermore, there are two working editions, the first being a complete edition prepared by Hubert Hubien [http://individual.utoronto.ca/pking/resources/buridan/Summulae_de_dialectica.txt (22. 5. 2008)], and the other being a partial edition prepared by Sten Ebbesen, “The Summulae, Tractatus VII, De Fallaciis”, pp. 153–158.

⁷³ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Summulae de propositionibus*, R. van der Lecq (ed.), Turnhout 2006, proem., p. 8, ll. 3–8.

⁷⁴ Furthermore, he uses a different text in the eighth tract concerning epistemological issues, but for different reasons: epistemological discussions are not a part of Peter's *Summule logicales*.

⁷⁵ Cf. R. van der Lecq, “Introduction”, in: Johannes Buridanus, *Summulae de suppositionibus*, R. van der Lecq (ed.), Nijmegen 1998, pp. xvii–xviii. This step would be yet another example of Buridan's approach to traditional authorities. The same approach is demonstrated by Ebbesen's research of *De fallaciis*, where Buridan does not hesitate to reinterpret Aristotle's paradigmatic cases as “mere examples”. Cf. S. Ebbesen, “The Summulae, Tractatus VII, De Fallaciis”, pp. 142–143.

⁷⁶ Cf. R. van der Lecq: “Mental Language: a Key to the Understanding of Buridan's semantics”, [http://www.phil.uu.nl/~lecq/mental%20language.pdf (8. 9. 2005)]

⁷⁷ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Questiones elencorum*, R. van der Lecq, H. A. G. Braakhuis (eds.), Nijmegen 1994, q. 5, co., 5.3.1.3., ll. 65–70, pp. 21–22.

⁷⁸ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.2.1, p. 21, ll. 5–7, 7.4.1., p. 94, ll. 14–17 and 7.4.3., p. 122, ll. 18–21.

⁷⁹ Cf. Ria van der Lecq, “Mental Language: a Key to the Understanding of Buridan's semantics”.

Buridan does not use the concept of simple *suppositio* and analyses the relevant cases (among others also “*Homo est species*”) in terms of material *suppositio*, i.e. in terms of taking a spoken or written term for itself or an equiform term or a concept which it “*immediately signifies*”, as opposed to personal *suppositio* which is taking a term for that which is conceived by a concept expressed (immediately signified) by this term, or for the entities which are “*ultimately signified*” by it.⁸⁰ In the nominalist paradigm (and hence unlike that of Peter and Pseudo-Thomas) these ultimate significates can only be particular substances or accidents, and material *supposita* only tokens (typically mental, spoken or written), which are singular entities as well.

Let us first analyse (S) in terms of *suppositio*, given the premises are true and the conclusion false and (S) is an expression of spoken or written language. In the major premise (“*Homo est species*”), the subject term has material *suppositio* and the predicate term personal (to be more exact, the so-called personal and determinate) *suppositio*, and both terms are for taken for certain linguistic entities. In the minor premise (“*Socrates est homo*”), both terms have personal *suppositio*, in particular, the subject term has discrete and the predicate term determinate *suppositio*. Finally, in the conclusion (“*Socrates est species*”), both terms have personal *suppositio* (again, discrete and determinate).⁸¹

Buridan discusses (S) in several contexts and takes various analyses of (S) into consideration.⁸² All these contexts have already been mentioned: equivocation, “figure of words” and “accident”. Buridan’s opening statement is that (S) in its original formulation is not a valid syllogism for the formal reasons, because two premises with these formal features cannot entail such a conclusion, because the middle term is not distributed in either of them. Also, (S) is a syllogism of first figure, and the major premise of the valid first figure syllogisms cannot be particular or indefinite.⁸³ Hence, (S) could be an instance of the fallacy of accident, which in Buridian logic means that it is a paralogism that is invalid due to the misuse of the middle term *on the mental layer* of reasoning. In particular, premises with conceptually identical expressions having personal *suppositio* lead to the fallacious deduction due to the problematic distribution of terms in these premises. These problems with distribution cause the formal invalidity of syllogism.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Summulae de suppositionibus* 4.3.2., p. 38, ll. 11–18 and p. 39, ll. 13–18. The whole issue is a bit more complicated than this formulation suggests, due to the semantic analysis of accidental terms (i.e. due to the theory of *connotatio*). This formulation only fits the substantial terms. From a general-semantic point of view, this would be a very important question, but it is irrelevant for the present purposes, and hence will be left aside.

⁸¹ Specifying the types of personal *suppositio* in this paralogism is a goal of the theory of *distributio*, which will be not be discussed thoroughly here. However, the present analysis should still be sufficiently accurate and clear even without discussing these technicalities. For the details of this theory, cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Summulae de suppositionibus*, 4.3.2–6., pp. 38–51.

⁸² *De fallaciis* will be used as a textual evidence for the following analysis, because Buridan does not discuss (S) in *Questiones elencorum*. Furthermore, the position of *De fallaciis* is slightly different from that of *Questiones elencorum* and *De fallaciis* will be considered more elaborate.

⁸³ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.4.1., p. 96, ll. 9–19.

⁸⁴ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Questiones elencorum*, q. 14, co., 14.3.1.4., ll. 64–69, p. 70: “*Iuxta hoc dicendum quod fallacia accidentis est deceptio qua propter unionem extremorum in medio credimus extrema inter se uniri, cum tamen non sit ita (et hoc quoad syllogismos affirmativos), vel ex eo quod propter unionem unius extremi cum medio et separationem alterius ab eodem credimus illa extrema separari a se, cum tamen non sit ita (et hoc quantum ad syllogismos negativos).*” This approach is justified by Buridan’s adherence to the identity theory of predication and its conclusions for the syllogistic. The particular consequence of the quoted formulation is a formal invalidity of the paralogisms of accident; for this problem cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.4.1., p. 93, ll. 12–15: “*Causa apparentiae huius fallaciae est similitudo paralogismi ad verum syllogismum, et causa defectus est defectus formae syllogisticae, propter quem non de necessitate sequitur conclusio ex praemissis.*” The fallacy is erroneous as a distribution mistake (or, in the modern terms, of quantification mistake): the cause of defectiveness is a wrong

Obviously, this analysis has very little in common with that of Pseudo-Thomas: the Buridianian definition of the fallacy of accident has virtually nothing to do with the ontological distinction between being *per se* and *per accidens* or with the concepts of superiority or instantiation that only make sense from a realist point of view. Buridan shares with others the traditional view that the fallacy of accident is caused by misapplying the rule “if both extremes are predicated about the middle term then they are also predicated about each other”. However, the misapplication of this rule is not due to the *ontological* distinction between different types of unity (in particular, between substantial and accidental unity), but due to the *semantic* theory of distribution (which is a part of the theory of *suppositio*).⁸⁵ The very term “*accidens*” is conceived in semantic, not in ontological terms: it is supposed to designate a middle term whose character and location in premises does not allow of deducing a conclusion.⁸⁶

Nonetheless, Buridan does not consider the context of the fallacy of accident crucial for the analysis of (S). Together with (S), Buridan discusses the following paralogism:

(D) *Omne animal rationale mortale est homo, animal rationale mortale est definitio; ergo definitio est homo.*

and analyses both (S) and (D) in the same terms. Obviously, (D) is not an instance of the fallacy of accident because its major premise is a universal proposition and hence the middle term is distributed in this premise (as a matter of fact, this syllogism is an apparent instance of *Datisi*). For Buridan, (D) is an instance of the fallacy of amphiboly (basically, the ambiguity of a compound expression). By the same token, analysing (S) in terms of equivocation is justified. Buridan claims that fallacy of accident could only occur in this context if we believed that the middle term has similar *suppositio* (i. e. either personal or material) in both premises.⁸⁷ The change of *suppositio* being considered crucial in this context, neither (D) nor (S) can be analysed primarily in terms of the fallacy of accident.

combination of premises as regards their quality and quantity. To clarify this kind of mistakes, we can pay our attention to Buridan’s analysis of the paralogism “*Omnis homo est animal, asinus est animal; ergo asinus est animal*” (which is an instance of the fallacy of accident), cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.2.1., p. 24, ll. 4–10: “*Sed in secundo paralogismo medium est unum secundum vocem et intentionem: huic enim voci ‘animal’ correspondet eadem intentio in maiori propositione et in minori, etiam prout sunt verae, licet non sint verae pro eisdem rebus pro quibus illa intentio supponit, sed pro aliis et aliis. Ergo, circumscripta consideratione vocum, adhuc in intentionibus remanet unitas medii. Propter quod adhuc illae intentiones apparent esse syllogismus.*” This is a particular application of this theory: the fallacy is caused by the formal features of the premises and conclusion. In particular, the formal features of the premises determine the *suppositio* of terms involved in these premises with the result that both premises could be true with respect to different entities.

⁸⁵ For Buridan’s theory of distribution is discussed in *De suppositionibus* (the fourth tract of his *Summulae*) as a part of the analysis of personal *suppositio* and expressions causing distribution, cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Summulae de suppositionibus*, pp. 49–68. This approach is non-ontological only to certain degree. For instance, the general validity-conditions of syllogisms are based upon considering identity to be a transitive relation. The analysis of the middle term’s distribution is only secondary: its function is to determine the possibility of applying the rule of the transitivity of identity. The question whether the concept of identity should be considered to be an ontological concept (both in the Middle Ages and from a systematical point of view) will remain open. Finally, let us note that Buridan’s approach to the fallacy of accident also covers non-assertoric syllogisms. Therefore, the above-mentioned definition of this fallacy should be either reformulated or conceived in a broader way. However, our analysis of (S) does not require a solution to this difficulty.

⁸⁶ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.4.1., p. 93, ll. 4–10: “*In proposito autem accipitur ‘accidens’ non prout distinguitur contra substantiam, nec prout inter praedicabilia distinguitur contra genus, speciem, differentiam et proprium, nec pro casuali aut fortuito, nec communiter pro propositione contingenti, sed pro medio non sufficienter ordinato ad inferendum de necessitate conclusionem.*”

⁸⁷ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.4.1., p. 96, ll. 15–19. Incidentally, if the middle term’s *suppositio* were similar in both premises then one of the premises would be false and hence, strictly speaking, no paralogism would occur.

Both (D) and (S) are discussed in the context of the fallacy of figure of words which is characterized as a deception caused by believing similar words to have identical signification or consignification.⁸⁸ The immediate consequence of this definition is that neither (S) nor (D) can be considered to be an instance of this fallacy because in both cases the expressions causing illusion are not only *similar* (which is what the fallacy of figure of words requires), but *identical* or *equiform*. If these words are identical or equiform then, since the fallacy of accident has already been excluded, the two arguments in question have to be instances of equivocation or amphiboly.⁸⁹ For this reason, Buridan, quite contrary to both thirteenth-century thinkers, refuses to consider every *suppositio* mistake (such as (S)) to be a cause of the fallacy of figure of words and analyses it in terms of equivocation and amphiboly (in the cases of deducing personal *suppositio* from material) or accident (in the cases of distribution mistakes).⁹⁰ From this point of view, what matters is that the middle term of (S) has material *suppositio* in the major premise and personal *suppositio* in the minor premise. Equivocation is defined as a deception caused by a term's multiple signification or being taken for something.⁹¹ Hence, one particular type of equivocation results from the different *suppositio* of the same term in the premises, in particular of its use according to both material and personal *suppositio*.⁹² Being an instance of equivocation, (S) is a fallacy which cannot be formed in the Buridanian mental language. The subject term of the true sentence's "*Homo est species*" mental correlate does not supposit for the specific concept of human beings (i. e. for the concept by which we conceive human beings as such), but for the concept by which we conceive the specific concept of human beings.⁹³ Obviously, this concept of the concept of human beings does not supposit for itself materially; mental terms cannot even have material *suppositio*, they can only have one function and hence one possible use.⁹⁴ From this point of view, mental language is unambiguous and hence (S) or the similar paralogisms as far as they are fallacious can not be a part of mental language.

From the same point of view, (S), (G), (P) and (S3), that could be regarded as being of different kind in terms of Peter of Spain's or Pseudo-Thomas' logic, are considered identical or at

⁸⁸ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.3.9., p. 66, ll. 15–18: "*Fit ergo haec fallacia credendo propter similitudinem dictionum quod illae sunt similes secundum significationem vel consignificationem, cum non sint.*" To my best knowledge, there is no explicit definition of consignification in Buridan's logical works. In this context, it might be relevant that Buridan uses "*consignificativa*" as a translation of "*syncategorematica*" (cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De propositionibus* 1.2.2., p. 23, ll. 6–7). On this assumption, what Buridan had in mind was that logical constants (in particular, the functional equivalents of quantifiers, the so-called "*distributiva*", such as "*qualisunque*" or "*qualecumque*") are misused; cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.3.10., p. 69, l. 18 – p. 70, l. 6.

⁸⁹ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.3.10, pp. 70–75.

⁹⁰ For this discussion, cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.3.10, pp. 70–75.

⁹¹ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.3.2., p. 38, ll. 4–7: "*Est ergo aequivocatio, prout de ea hic intendimus, eiusdem vocis incomplexae diversae significationes, vel eadem vox incomplexa habens diversas significationes, vel acceptio termini aequivoci pro eius diversis significationibus.*"

⁹² Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.3.4., p. 47, ll. 17–22: "*Quartus autem modus est si terminus nec sumatur multipliciter secundum essentialem significationem nec multipliciter secundum modum significandi, sed sumatur multipliciter secundum modum supponendi; et ita quod haec multiplicitas sumatur ex parte vocis significativae, ut si nomen capiatur in una propositione personaliter sive significative, et in alia materialiter.*"

⁹³ This conception is analysed in terms of the hierarchy of concepts by Sten Ebbesen, cf. S. Ebbesen, "The Summulae, Tractatus VII, De Fallaciis", pp. 148–151. He uses the following passage as a textual evidence (cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.3.4., p. 48, ll. 14–18): "*Unde ego dico quod propositio mentalis correspondens huic propositioni, prout est vera, 'homo est species' non est propositio in qua subicitur conceptus specificus hominum, sed est propositio in qua subicitur conceptus quo concipitur conceptus specificus hominum et ille iam non supponit pro se, sed pro conceptu specifico.*"

⁹⁴ At least according to Buridan's conception of mental language. Obviously, another conception of mental language might permit the occurrence of equivocation even in mental language.

least essentially similar. For instance, (G) is only different from (S) as regards the *suppositio* of the minor premise's subject term; the subject term of “*Homo est animal*” has determinate *suppositio* and the subject term of “*Socrates est homo*” discrete *suppositio*, both of them being a sub-type of personal *suppositio*. Hence, they are closer to each other in Buridan's classification than they are in Peter's.

Buridan's analysis is an obvious shift in comparison with Peter of Spain and Pseudo-Thomas. From a historical point of view, it is a certain form of regression: the twelfth-century cases of univocation⁹⁵ are once again analysed in terms of equivocation.⁹⁶ This shift is enabled by Buridan's semantic framework, which is a theoretical background for this analysis. For this reason, we cannot simply explain his analysis of (S) in terms of his ontological orientation (which is nominalist), but rather in terms of his version of terminist semantics, i. e. the theory of functional relations between propositional components. To give an example: the *suppositio* of categorematic terms is determined by several features of their propositional context: first, by the so-called syncategorematic words (i. e. logical constants)⁹⁷ which could determine their personal *suppositio*,⁹⁸ second by other categorematic terms (i. e. extra-logical constants) which, again, could determine their personal *suppositio*⁹⁹ and third by words causing indirect reference¹⁰⁰ (such as intentional verbs). But, to my best knowledge, Buridan does not discuss any propositional context that would uniquely determine whether a term has material or personal *suppositio*; this is actually a feature of his logical analysis that causes the possibly ambiguous character of terms having material supposition. Contrary to this approach, there is an important group of authors who subscribe to the rule *talia sunt subiecta qualia permissunt praedicata*, to which belongs e. g. William of Sherwood or Albert of Saxony.¹⁰¹ As a consequence of this rule, propositional context is sufficient for determining the terms' *suppositio*. Therefore, their general-semantic theory does not permit analysing (S) in terms of equivocation. Also, from this point of view it is completely irrelevant, whether these authors are nominalists (like Albert) or realists (like William).¹⁰² All the same, the nominalist Buridan and the realist Burley both agree that “*homo*

⁹⁵ Incidentally, Buridan uses the term “univocation” in *Questiones elenchorum* in connection with “*Homo est nomen*”, cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Questiones elenchorum*, q. 7, co., 7.3.2., ll. 64–69, p. 29.

⁹⁶ The same shift can also be found in two Pseudo-Ockhamian treatises, cf. *Guilelmi Ockham tractatus logicae minor*, E. M. Buytaert (ed.), *Franciscan studies* 24 (1964), pp. 82–84 and *Guilelmi Ockham elementarium logicae*, Eligius M. Buytaert (ed.), *Franciscan studies* 26 (1966), pp. 96 and 107.

⁹⁷ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Quaestiones longe super librum Perihermeneias*, R. van der Lecq (ed.), Nijmegen 1983, II, q. 3, co.; p. 64, ll. 1–2: “*Dico tamen quod valde variatur sepe nominis suppositio per sinkathegoremata...*” For the distinction between categorematic and syncategorematic terms, cf. *Summulae de suppositionibus* 4.2.3., p. 18–20.

⁹⁸ There are two main cases: the distribution of terms and the ampliation or restriction of terms (i. e. enlarging or reducing the number of *supposita*). For both problems, cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Summulae de suppositionibus* 4.3.2–6 and 4.6.

⁹⁹ The paradigmatic medieval case would be that in “*Homo albus currit*” the subject term does not supposit for all human beings, but only for the white ones, cf. *Summulae de suppositionibus* 4.6.

¹⁰⁰ The paradigmatic medieval case would be the function of “*hominem*” in “*Cognosco hominem*”. For the concept of the so-called “*appellatio rationis*”, cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Summulae de suppositionibus* 4.5.3., pp. 83–87.

¹⁰¹ Cf. William of Sherwood, *Introductiones in Logicam*, Tr. 5, ll. 165–170, p. 144 and Albert of Saxony, *25 Disputed Questions on Logic*, M. J. Fitzgerald (ed.), Leiden – Boston – Köln 2005, q. 14, co., p. 214, l. 21 – p. 215, l. 2 (no. 265).

¹⁰² Most likely due to assuming this rule, William does not discuss (S) in his *Introductiones* at all and Albert discusses it in terms of the fallacy of accident, cf. Albert of Saxony, *25 Disputed Questions on Logic*, q. 14, co., p. 215, ll. 20–22 (no. 265.4.1.).

est species” is ambiguous.¹⁰³ Another discussion connected with the same problem concerns the question of “primary” meaning or *suppositio*, i. e. of the meaning “according to the force of the phrase” (*de virtute sermonis*); Buridan rejects this possibility explicitly and Burley is at least very cautious to accept it, especially in the context relevant for (S).¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, there is a question whether mental expressions can have different *suppositiones* in different contexts, or not. Given Buridanian definition of equivocation, this is a question of whether mental language can be ambiguous. Last but not least, these questions in turn lead to a general linguistic question whether the phrase “according to the force of the phrase” applies to the human language at all; after all, due to the principle of the arbitrariness of the sign, at least certain linguistic expressions are supposed to owe their meaning to a semantic convention.¹⁰⁵

Another important shift from Peter of Spain to Buridan is a shift from the inherence theory of predication to the identity theory.¹⁰⁶ It has one crucial consequence for the validity-conditions of syllogism.¹⁰⁷ In the context of the inherence theory, the identity of the middle-term’s *suppositio* (or *supposita*) is neither sufficient, nor a necessary condition for the validity of syllogism. For instance, according to Peter, (S) has the same *suppositio* in both premises, but for (S) to be valid, the opposite would have to be the case. In particular, the validity of (S)-like syllogism (i. e. syllogisms of the first figure) requires the inherence of the form signified by the major premise’s predicate term (“*species*”) both to the personal *supposita* of the middle-term (“*homo*”) and to the discrete *suppositum* of “*Socrates*”. Therefore, for (S) to be valid, “*homo*” would have to have personal *suppositio* in the major premise. Buridanian syllogistic is based upon the identity theory and the rule of the transitivity of identity (applied to the *supposita* of terms in syllogism).¹⁰⁸ Hence, the required identity of the type of *suppositio* (as regards the distinction between material and personal *suppositio*) of the middle term is crucial. This shift explains, why the analysis of (S) might focus on different terms or their properties by different authors. The difference between the inherence and the identity theory of predication leads to a different semantic interpretation of the requirement that the middle term should be identical. Peter of Spain and Pseudo-Thomas solve this problem in terms of the actual identity and the aspect identity of certain object, Buridan in terms of the numerical identity or non-identity of certain term’s *supposita*.

¹⁰³ Cf. Walter Burley, *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior With a Revised edition of the Tractatus Brevior*, Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M. (ed.), New York 1955, TL I.1.3., p. 10, ll. 21–27.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Summulae de suppositionibus* 4.3.2., p. 40, l. 25 – p. 42, l. 10 a Walter Burley, *De puritate artis logicae*, TL I.1.3, p. 9, l. 34 – p. 10, l. 34.

¹⁰⁵ In the medieval context, this discussion raises the question whether there are propositions that should be “distinguished”, which is very close to the theory of equivocation. Incidentally, in 1340, the official authorities of the faculty of arts in Paris prohibited the affirmative answer to this question. Buridan himself changed his position several times. Cf. Ria Van der Lecq, Henk A. G. Braakhuis, “Introduction”, in: Johannes Buridanus, *Questiones elencorum*, pp. xix–xxx.

¹⁰⁶ For this problem in general, cf. G. Klima, “The Changing Role of *Entia Rationis* in Mediaeval Semantics and Ontology: A Comparative Study with a Reconstruction”, *Synthese* 96 (1993), pp. 27–40. In a nutshell, according to the inherence theory, a proposition asserts that form signified by its predicate term inheres in the *supposita* of its subject term, and according to the identity theory, a proposition asserts the mutual identity or non-identity of its term’s *supposita*.

¹⁰⁷ For the following passage, cf. G. Klima, “‘Socrates est species’: Logic, Metaphysics and Psychology in St. Thomas Aquinas’ Treatment of a Paralogism”, in: G. Klima, *Ars Artium: Essays in Philosophical Semantics, Mediaeval and Modern*, Budapest 1988, pp. 165–185.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Johannes Buridanus, *Tractatus de consequentiis*, Hubert Hubien (ed.), Louvain 1976, III.4., ll. 3–51, pp. 84–85, and G. Klima, “‘Socrates est species’: Logic, Metaphysics and Psychology in St. Thomas Aquinas’ Treatment of a Paralogism”, pp. 167–168.

Conclusion

All these marginalia show the complexity of the whole discussion in medieval semantics. Rather than detecting “schools” or “traditions”, we have to deal with the autonomous theoretical systems and every shift can be analysed from numerous points of view. Hence, the shifts in the analysis of (S) are determined by usually very subtle changes of these systems. Furthermore, the ontological distinction between nominalism and realism is very often of no use for classifying semantic theories as a whole (unless we identify nominalism with “analytical” approach), although it is possible to analyse parts of these theories (e. g. theory of *suppositio*) in these terms. On the other hand, such classification offers no clues for many questions that could turn out to be relevant in other contexts. At the price of simplification, several inclinations can be observed. The most obvious one is a disappearance of one theoretical context, i. e. of (logical) grammar; in the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century treatises concerning paralogisms, *loci ex quibus soloecismus concluditur* are no longer considered to be fallacies sui generis (they are analysed in terms of figure of words) and the concept of semantic incongruence (*soloecismus secundum significationem*) disappears from these texts completely.¹⁰⁹ Also, the later treatises are significantly reduced in their scope: in fact, their only concern is a theory of fallacies *in dictione* and *extra dictionem*. On the other hand, they are much more coherent as compared to, e. g., SSE’s ambiguity. Also, the elaborate theory of *suppositio* (and, in general, terminist semantics) allows or a more accurate analysis of *suppositio* of terms in (S), although this does not imply a solution to (S) immediately.

Finally, one methodological remark should be added in order to clarify the degree of the present simplifications. If we had actually decided to study historical shifts in the theory of paralogisms it would have been necessary to take the complete theoretical systems into consideration or at least a larger number of their parameters than was actually taken here. General semantics, which is a theoretical background for the theory of paralogisms left aside, at least the following aspects should have been analysed: the distinction between fallacies *in dictione* and *extra dictionem*, the exact definitions of particular fallacies and their paradigmatic examples. The last two aspects are probably the most dynamic: different authors vary in the classification of fallacies, which undermines any possibility of a common framework (we have seen this in the examples of the fallacy of equivocation or figure of words). Here, an effort has been made to observe one rather obvious example, (S), but there can be numerous other examples.

For these reasons, this paper has to be regarded as *marginalia*. Furthermore, it seems that any more extensive research would only complicate the effort to reach theoretical generalizations, since every particular semantic theory is specific. This paradoxical character of our research should show us the beautiful diversity of medieval semantics.

¹⁰⁹ Buridan considers even the “broader” incongruence to be still a grammatical one, cf. Johannes Buridanus, *De fallaciis* 7.1.6., p. 15, ll. 13–15: “*Quinta clausula describit metam soloecismi, capiendo large ‘soloecismus’ pro omni locutione vitiosa secundum grammaticam*”. For the same reason, given the personal *suppositio* of subject term, he claims “*Homo est species*” to be simply congruent, but false (Johannes Buridanus, *Summulae de suppositionibus* 4.3.2., p. 41, ll. 8–9). Peter’s definition of incongruence is as follows (cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summulae logicae*, Tract. VII, § 17, p. 94, ll. 26–28): “*Solecismus est vitium in contextu partium orationis contra regulas artis gramatice factum, ut ‘vir alba’, vel ‘homines currit’*”. And finally, Pseudo-Thomas uses the definition word by word identical to that of Peter, cf. Pseudo-Thomas of Aquinas, *De fallaciis*, cap. 2, ll. 50–52, p. 404.

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The Teachings of Petr Chelčický and Its Reception in the Tradition of Czech Philosophical Thought¹

Abstract | The paper deals with the teachings of the Czech thinker Petr Chelčický. The research focuses on his theologizing philosophy, which was rather neglected in the previous philosophical and historical works dealing with his thought. The author focuses on basic aspects of Chelčický's teachings as his rejection of all forms of violence and the idea of Christocentrism. The main interest of the author is the analysis of the reception, de-iation or re-reception of Chelčický's philosophical and theological thought from the first generation of the Unity of the Brethren to John Amos Comenius. According to the author, Comenius' work can be interpreted as a completion of the triad reception (characteristic of the Czech context up to the mid-nineties of the 15th century) – de-iation (delimitated in fact by the 16th century and the first two decades of the following century) – analogy (being represented by the last bishop of the Unity of the Brethren).

.....

Petr Chelčický is a remarkable thinker of the late Czech Middle Ages.² His ideological concepts, portrayed in a number of extant writings, comprise, in my view, a comprehensive and balanced system in which the philosophical level mingles reciprocally with the theological one as well as with the ideas of political science. Chelčický's intellectual legacy can therefore be seen as a kind of a *theologizing philosophy*.³

Nevertheless, in most of the philosophical and historical works dealing with Petr Chelčický his philosophical teachings are reflected on only to a very small extent. The previous research has been almost exclusively focused on Chelčický as a historical figure, who, with his overall importance as a thinker, does not fall outside the scope of the context of the Husite movement ideology.⁴ Other scholars focusing on Czech religious history accented rather the theological dimension of Petr's teachings.⁵ So far Chelčický has been seen, by some of the modern researchers, as a philosophical thinker who had an influence on the form of the Czech thought after his death; and it was largely in studies that interpret the influence of his teachings only in a very

¹ This study is a revised version of my bachelor's thesis defended at the Department of Philosophy, Palacký University in Olomouc in session 2007/2008. Translated by Martin Lukáš.

² Modern historiography delimitates Petr's life by the years 1380–1460. For more information about the Chelčický's lifespan, see: J. Boubín, *Petr Chelčický. Myslitel a reformátor*, Praha 2005, p. 15.

³ In the specialized literature we do not come across the explicit naming of the philosopher's theoretical work, therefore I use for its general characteristics the above mentioned conceptual construct which is, in my opinion, the closest term.

⁴ Cf., e.g., J. Boubín, *Petr Chelčický. Myslitel a reformátor*, Praha 2005. Although Boubín highlights some aspects of the thinker's teachings, he does not pay much attention to Chelčický's philosophy and theology (or its subsequent reception) in his book at all. Cf. also R. Kalivoda, *Husitská ideologie*, Praha 1961 or A. Míka, *Petr Chelčický*, Praha 1963, who both once again emphasized – according to the Marxist view of history – Chelčický's grounding in the Hussite ideology and his unbreakable affinity with it.

⁵ Cf., e.g., F. O. Navrátil, *Petr Chelčický: národohospodářský sociologický rozbor náboženské osobnosti*, Kdyně 1929.

narrow framework, e. g. in relation to the ideology of the Unity of the Brethren at the time of its origins up to the end of the fifteenth century.⁶ Similarly, for the next decade, in which we can observe and subsequently analyze the degree of reception of the Chelčický's teachings by the Unity of the Brethren, we must inevitably admit a rather lamentable state of actual research, i. e. that there is no study dealing with the complex relation of Jednota Bratří a Sester Zákona Kristova (the Unity of Brethren and Sisters of the Law of Christ) to the ideological legacy of their "spiritual father".⁷ When we focus finally on the theoretical works of John Amos Comenius and his relation to the ideas of the South Bohemian philosopher, we come to find, strangely, that this issue is not *explicitly* discussed in any monograph.⁸

Accordingly, the aim of this study is to present the analysis of to what extent Chelčický's primarily philosophical, but also theological and political teachings were reflected on in the tradition of Czech philosophical thought culminating in the theoretical work of John Amos Comenius.⁹

The fundamental aspects of Chelčický's teachings¹⁰

Perhaps the most characteristic, and in the opinion of many historians also the most important, feature of generally highly original Chelčický's teachings is his almost unconditional rejection of all forms of violence.¹¹ It is not, therefore, accidental that his first book, *O boji duchovním* (*On Spiritual Warfare*), depicts this, in the context of the European philosophical tradition very significant, but not very common issue.¹² In this treatise Petr's arguments rely both on the *Commandments*, forbidding *explicitly* a person to kill (and so consequently to use violence in general) and on particular portions of the *New Testament*, especially some of the letters written by Paul the Apostle (e. g. *Ephesians*).¹³

I consider Chelčický's uncompromising criticism of political-power and financial circumstances, which is characteristic of Czech society in the first half of the fifteenth century, to also

⁶ Cf., e. g., in my view, an epochal, yet too narrowly orientated monograph: J. Goll, *Chelčický a Jednota v XV. století*, Praha 1916.

⁷ There are two key monographs on the Unity of the Brethren that deal with the ideology of the Czech Brethren in detail: J. T. Müller, *Dějiny Jednoty bratrské I*, Praha 1923 and R. Řičan, *Dějiny Jednoty bratrské*, Praha 1957; however, the parts concentrating on the confrontation of their ideology and the teachings of Petr Chelčický are almost negligible.

⁸ Cf., e. g., J. L. Hromádka, "Odkaz Jednoty dnešku", in: F. M. Bartoš – J. L. Hromádka (eds.), *Jednota bratrská 1457–1957. Sborník k pětistému výročí založení*, Praha 1956, p. 288.

⁹ This does not mean that in the period after the death of Comenius Chelčický's thoughts were still not fresh and challenging, nevertheless, the work of John Amos could be, in my opinion, regarded as a last intense reflection on Petr's ideas within the tradition of the Czech theoretical thought. For further development of the reception on Chelčický's ideas, cf. e. g., L. P. Laptěva, "Petr Chelčický v ruské literatuře 19. a na počátku 20. století. Petr Chelčický a Lev Tolstoj", in: J. Pánek (ed.), *Husitství – reformace – renesance : Sborník k 60. narozeninám F. Šmahela. [Sv.] 3.*, Praha 1994, p. 1013–1022.

¹⁰ Given the limited scope of this study I focus in the following sections mainly on those features of Chelčický's theoretical work, which I consider to be the most original and for an overall comparison the most important.

¹¹ Cf. F. O. Navrátil, *Petr Chelčický: národohospodářský sociologický rozbor náboženské osobnosti*, Kdyně 1929, p. 32.: "[Chelčický's, added by J. Č.] 'do not repay evil with evil!' is the alpha and omega of everything and by right attracts attention of all who picks up his work."

¹² More precisely, the latest preserved writing. For more information, see J. Boubín, "Dílo Petra Chelčického a současný stav jeho edičního zpřístupnění.", *Český časopis historický* 2 (2004), p. 276.

¹³ Chelčický's interpretation of the Apostle's words is more than clear: "Apoštol s lidmi veľi pokoj mieti [...], neučí tělesným bojóm, ješto je sami krvaví lidé umějie pro svár vésti a duše lidské v nich hynú na zatracenie. Ale učí těm bojóm, ješto se v nich duše zachovávají v pravdě od zatracenie". Cit. by: P. Chelčický, *O boji duchovním*, in: P. Chelčický, *Drobné spisy*, Praha 1966, p. 31.

be a substantial part of his ideological legacy. In his sharply polemical treatises he pays attention especially to the denial of temporal power, one of the three classes of the contemporary society had: the Church.¹⁴ The South Bohemian philosopher rejects – in the light of his interpretation of the *New Testament* – the unreasonable separating of society into three classes.¹⁵ Petr's undisguised indifference, and in many ways perhaps even opposition to issues relating to “this world” could be, within his work, seen also in his concept of state, law and power at all.¹⁶

I also consider Chelčický's consistent Christocentrism¹⁷ – the fact that the figure of Jesus Christ, *his* words and deeds, is one of the centrepieces of the thinker's work¹⁸ (especially in the ethical contexts) –, along with the thinker's uncompromisingly negative attitude towards violence, a crucial part of his philosophical and theological legacy in the tradition of Czech religious thought.

The early Unity of the Brethren and the reception of Chelčický's theologizing philosophy

In the early period of the existence of the Unity of the Brethren¹⁹ (whose end I trace back to around 1500) the Brethren accepted Chelčický's philosophical, theological and political views almost unlimitedly, as Jaroslav Goll aptly observes: “At first, the Unity was based on Chelčický's doctrine about ‘the power of the world’. No true Brother should have been involved in it: he could not have held any post in higher or lower authorities in the country, in large or small communities, in villages or towns [...] to him, any punishment was a revenge, any death penalty a murder [...] Older Brethren like Chelčický loathed cities, municipalities and places of trades that were not appropriate for Brethren to be engaged in. They were to have earned their living especially by farming, crafts and trades that were not to serve splendour. However, what was the least appropriate for Brothers was military service as a paid profession.”²⁰ Similarly, the Brethren embraced the emphasis – so obvious and so significant for Chelčický – on the moral dimension

¹⁴ P. Chelčický, *O trojím lidu*. in: P. Chelčický, *Traktáty*, Praha 1940, p. 70.: “[...] ono kněžstvo, kteréž ona nevěstka ješto sedí na římské stolici, porodila volně bez bolesti, [...] toť sú synové prokletí.”

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 62. Alluding to the words of St. Paul from 1 Cor. 12, 4–12, Chelčický argues: “Tak apoštol vyčítá tělo Kristovo všecho podlé duchovních věcí, ale o tomto tělu na tré přehnutém zevnitř v tělesných úřadech nečiní zmínky žádné [...] rozdělení na tré lidu křesťanského podlé díl tělesných a podlé moci světské a jiných úřaduov tělesných nemuož v pravdě řečeno býti tělo Kristovo.”

¹⁶ Cf., e.g., the treatise *O trojím lidu*, in: P. Chelčický, *Traktáty*, Praha 1940, p. 48.: “[...] A pro takové nespravedlivé moc světská ustavena jest. [...] A toto dvoje rozdělení, řádu světského skrze moc a Kristova skrze milost, daleké rozdělení, a má srozumíno býti, že spolu nemuož státi ten dvooj řád, jsa podnesen pod jméno jedné víry Kristovy. Nemuož býti spolu řád Kristuov a řád světský, aniž muož býti řád Kristuov řád světský. [...] Moc se věrú nezpravuoje, a víra moci nepotřebuje.”

¹⁷ Regarding the Petr's accent on *imitatio Christi*, especially the moral aspect of it, I here interpret the term christocentrism as being primarily related to the context of teaching.

¹⁸ For more details, cf. the very first sentence of Chelčický's *Postilla* in which the thinker says: “Pan [sic!] gežífs, genž gešť počatek y dokonanie wšfech wiecej [...]” Cit. by: P. Chelčický, *Postilla*. 1. (vyd. E. Smetánka), Praha 1900, p. 1.

¹⁹ The unity, that was formed in the mid-fifties of the 15th century, and is traditionally and *de facto* exclusively seen as a successor of Chelčický's theoretical work. At this point, it is necessary to remind that Petr Chelčický himself was not the founder of the Unity of the Brethren nor had he participated in its establishment in any way. It is, by contrast, Jan Rokycana who took the credits for the Unity and who encouraged his students (namely Řehoř Krajčí who later on became brother and the actual founder of the Unity) to study inter alia the writings of the South Bohemian thinker.

²⁰ J. Goll, *Jednota bratrská v XV. století*, in: J. Goll, *Chelčický a Jednota v XV. století*, Praha 1916, p. 170.

of Christ's life and the resulting pedagogical Christocentrism.²¹ We can also – in addition to the above-mentioned key aspects – find other common features characteristic of both Petr Chelčický and the Unity of the Brethren in the fifteenth century, e. g. their opposition to theoretical education²² and uncompromising biblism.²³

Generally we can say that the Unity of the Brethren, in the *early* period of its existence, almost unreservedly accepted Petr Chelčický's teachings in all its core parts.

The Brethren from the *Výpověď brandýská* to the death of Lukáš Pražský

During the 80's of the 15th century which was characterised by relative peace and minimal active persecution of the Unity, the membership of the new *church* was increased due to the favourable external conditions. This was very important especially in relation to the urban population, whose members at that time began to be admitted to the Unity on a massive scale.²⁴ Social and political conditions of the townsfolk, however, differed significantly from the original – in fact purely rural-oriented or agricultural work-oriented²⁵ – Brethren's ideals. The discrepancies between the current situation and social conditions within the Unity, on one hand, and the requirements for members of their community, on the other, became evident with varying intensity before the late 80's of the 15th century. But it was primarily the questions of the Litomyšl burghers addressed to *Úzká rada Jednoty (The Select Unity Council)* asking for the resolution of the issue of the Brethren's relation to urban institutions and secular authorities in general that brought in a serious reason to deal with the urgent situation.

It is possible to consider the year 1490 as a landmark in the ideological development of the Unity, for in that year the Brethren congress was summoned in Brandýs nad Orlicí. There the groundbreaking *Výpověď brandýská (The Brandýs Notice)* was adopted answering the questions “whether Brother can accept posts in authorities such as municipality, chancellery or others; whether in office he can be involved in judging criminals, especially if a criminal would be compelled to answer by means of torture or would be sentenced to death; whether he can do his military service when he is told to by nobility [...]”²⁶ The Brandýs congress did not explicitly say “yes” to all of these questions, however, the conclusions reached at it pursued as its objective rather similar activities to be allowed for the brethren, without any possible complications for their salvation. For this purpose, the resolution urged the brothers engaged in the same trades to be fair, but these words cannot hide their true character of being a refusal to take personal responsibility and *de facto* the denial of the original ideals of the Unity.

²¹ For more details, cf., e. g., *Spis o ouzké cestě Kristově*: “[...] tudy cesta k spasenie, kudyž pán Ježíš šel i jeho milí apoštolé i mnozí jiní věrní křesťané [...] následující šlépějí jeho na úzké cestě a slyšice hlas jeho měli život věčný.” Cit. by: *Spis o ouzké cestě Kristově*, in: J. Bidlo, *Akty Jednoty bratrské. Svazek I*, Brno 1915, p. 206–210.

²² P. Chelčický, *Sít víry*, Praha 1950, p. 245.: “je viděti, čeho brání učenost mistrů, že jejich učenost chrání nejdůvtipněji čest bludů Antikristových.” For more information, see: R. Urbánek, *Jednota bratrská a vyšší vzdělání až do doby Blahoslavovy*, Brno 1923, p. 11–14, 16–17.

²³ According to Chelčický, Christ's will is “w[š]jem [k]ryta, gedine w gego zakonie gef[t] zgewna.” Cit. dle P. Chelčický, *Postilla. 1.* (vyd. E. Smetánka), Praha 1900, p. 74. Cf. also J. T. Müller, *Dějiny Jednoty bratrské I*, Praha 1923, p. 37.: “We can clearly tell, from a number of Biblical quotes, especially from the New Testament, that they [e. g. Brothers, added by J. Č.] studied Scripture in detail, while on the other hand they did not care much about the Church Fathers or theologians [...] except for the contemporary non-brethren literature.”

²⁴ In this respect, it is interesting to note the paradoxical fact that Chelčický called the urban institution “moci Antikristovou proti Kristu.” Cit. by: P. Chelčický, *Sít víry*, Praha 1950, p. 216.

²⁵ In addition, we may also mention fishing.

²⁶ J. Goll, “Jednota bratrská v XV. Století”, in: J. Goll, *Chelčický a Jednota v XV. století*, Praha 1916, p. 176.

For a short time (approximately several years), after this admittedly landmark event, the original ideals of the Brethren were to a certain extent re-introduced. This period, however, – as I have suggested – did not last long. One can thus see the congresses repeatedly convened to Rychnov in the mid-nineties (namely in 1494 and 1495) as a culmination of the “modernization” process of the ideological background of the Unity. In Rychnov the leading position in the Unity was taken by brother Prokop and for the first time also by Lukáš Pražský (Lucas from Prague), the most outstanding personality among the Brethren in the first three decades of the 16th century (he died in 1528).

At the second Rychnov assembly a resolution showing more than eloquently the deviation from the original Brethren ideological lines was worded and adopted particularly under the influence of these two men. Regarding the Unity’s relation to the teachings of Petr Chelčický it is extremely important that it was here where they stated, inter alia, that “only Holy Scripture should be treated with unquestioning respect, not the treatises that the Unity had published up to then”, and as for the Petr’s writings that for them “their binding character is not only explicitly withdrawn but it is also stated which parts should be avoided”.²⁷ How else can such a statement be understood if not as an actual break with the teachings of Petr Chelčický, at least in its essential parts? The fact that the Unity strayed from the path originally designated by Petr was in the following years accompanied by other changes concerning its intellectual background. The Brethren came to the further relaxation of their original, resolutely disapproving opinions on temporal power. In 1499 a resolution was adopted whereby “podle předešlých úsudkův také jsme potvrdili, že jí [moci světa, added by J. Č.] mezi sebou místo dáváme [...]”,²⁸ which is, in my opinion,²⁹ apparently inconsistent with the original strictly disapproving – against the world and its power in general oriented – position of Petr Chelčický and his successors in the early Unity of the Brethren!³⁰

The subsequent justification of violence and approval of military service led to a complete and unprecedented denial of the ideological legacy of the Unity’s “spiritual father”. Although the *Zpráva na vojnu jdoucím* (*A Message for Draftees*) declares that “Brother can participate only in a just war waged to defence the country and law”³¹, it is now – with regard to the passage quoted above – unquestionably clear that by means of this statement the Brethren renounced one of the most important parts of the intellectual heritage of Petr Chelčický.

Similarly, we can consider the Unity’s change in attitude on the issue of salvation and a possibility of its achievement as a further relaxing of the original ideals. While Chelčický – according to his teaching-oriented Christocentrism – and the early Unity preferred actions to mere faith,³² the Lucasian Brethren already inclined clearly toward the importance of faith before pious activities.³³ Consequently, I consider it necessary to also view the second of the most original

²⁷ J. Goll, *Jednota bratrská v XV. století*, in: J. Goll, *Chelčický a Jednota v XV. století*, Praha 1916, p. 180.

²⁸ *Dekrety Jednoty Bratrské*, A. Gindely (ed.), Praha 1865, p. 87.

²⁹ In his monograph *Sociální učení Českých bratří 1464–1618* Jindřich Halama, on the other hand, states that “the strict separation of secular and religious power, a Chelčický’s principle adopted by the Brethren, is respected by Lukáš and the Unity in his time as well as by Řehoř”. Cit. by: J. Halama, *Sociální učení Českých bratří 1464–1618*, Brno 2003, p. 59.

³⁰ For an further attempt to apologize this transformation, see *Dekrety Jednoty Bratrské*, A. Gindely (ed.), Praha 1865, p. 65.: “[...] a hned za Pána Krista i za apoštolův byli zlí mezi dobrými, bohatí mezi chudými; též v počátku shromáždění našeho ještě v malém počtu lidí; ovšem pak bez toho není ani bude, poněvadž lid se schromáždí, a časově se prodlužují a dlouho býti dobrému, pracné jest.”

³¹ J. T. Müller, *Dějiny Jednoty bratrské I*, Praha 1923, p. 190.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 142.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 328.: “[...] this faith, i. e. the ability and determination to [...] obey in addition to do justice – God looks upon man as if he never sinned –, is a gift of free God’s grace, without any human deeds. They, therefore,

and impressive parts of Chelčický's spiritual heritage, i. e. his uncompromising christocentrism finding expression in obligations of moral behaviour and human action of the Brethren, as significantly marginalized.

At a general level I am now forced to say that in the period of the leadership of Lukáš Pražský there came a noticeable shift away from the Unity's original ideological foundations, based on the theoretical work of the South Bohemian philosopher Petr Chelčický, and therefore it is not possible to use the term *reception* for the Unity's relation to the intellectual legacy of its "spiritual father" at that time. On the contrary, I consider it desirable to indicate the period under review as a period of diversion and *de-viation* from the original philosophical and theological concepts.

Jan Augusta and Jan Blahoslav

However, even after the death of brother Lukáš, who was regarded as the leader of the Unity almost until the end of the thirties of the 16th century, the tendency to revise the initial ideological profile of the Brethren toward a more modest concept of philosophical and theological issues did not cease. This is by the way reflected in the by-election to *Úzká rada* held in Brandýs nad Orlicí in 1532, the result of which was appointing the younger, considerably less conservative generation³⁴ to the key posts in the organization of the Church. In this regard, we are now most interested in the personality of Jan Augusta, the church administrator in Litomyšl, whose promotion to the head of the Unity led in opening up to Lutheran influence and, ultimately, brought in also a greater tolerance (ideological as well as political) to the Czech Neo-utraquists.

When looking at the development of the Brethren's relation to the heritage of Petr Chelčický it is extremely interesting to notice several changes in their dogmatics as well as in their internal administrative organization. Led by Augusta the Unity came to – especially under the strong influence of Luther and his teachings – a new view of its internal social structure: the initial critical approach to the feudal state was significantly mitigated and members of higher classes became very desirable and important for Jednota Bratří a Sester Zákona Kristova.³⁵

Ideological alignment with Lutheranism brought with itself (on account of the origins of the Unity) several downsides in pure practice, too: for looseness of morals became gradually more or less evident and in fact the deviation from the original *christocentric* character of the Church based on the Chelčický's interpretation of the *Scriptures* yet deepened.

The philosophical work of Jan Augusta and its immediate impact on the Brethren in particular were suddenly interrupted by his imprisonment (with short breaks almost exclusively) on Křivoklát (he was released as late as in 1564 after sixteen endless years in prison!). The Unity, forcibly separated from its bishop, warded off the organizational crisis in 1557 when brother Izrael and brother Blahoslav were elected bishops at the synod in Sležany.³⁶

never talk [the Brethren, through the mouth and pen of Lukáš, added by J. Č.] about merit of man, but only about merit of Christ [...]."

³⁴ R. Říčan, *Dějiny Jednoty bratrské*, Praha 1957, p. 134. For more details on the apparently lower intensity of conservatism and traditionalism (I deliberately use the negative definition, for to talk about a "liberal approach" would be in view of the Unity – despite the comparative form – inadequate to say the least), cf. *ibid.*, p. 133.: "And as early as on 28 April 1531 there was an overt change in the Unity religious orientation, especially its priests [...] The synod held that day proclaimed that the priests as members of one Lord want to help each other in the search for the dear truth of human salvation under current conditions making no obstacles for themselves by respecting their predecessors, even despite the truth."

³⁵ For more details, see R. Říčan, *Dějiny Jednoty bratrské*, Praha 1957, p. 141.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

The theoretical work of Jan Blahoslav Přerovský was mainly determined by his desire to justify the need for higher education and defend the fact that it does not contradict pure faith and original principles of the *Church* against the Brethren.³⁷ With this open attitude to higher education – rigorous and intensive rather than new as for the ideas – the Christian humanist Blahoslav built on earlier, yet quite latent tendencies within the Unity: The emphasis on the need for higher education can be traced back to as early as the 30's of the 16th century, e.g. in the work of Vavřinec Krasonický. Similarly, the close relations to the Western Reformation may be attributed a certain degree of influence on the more open Brethren attitude to universal education.³⁸ However, only Jan Blahoslav, his personality and philosophical works, carries these trends (earlier on pursuing rather practical and contemporary “political” objectives³⁹) through and defines theoretically the justification and necessity of higher education.⁴⁰

If we focus on the development of the Unity's relation to education in general, we inevitably find out that it is during *Blahoslav's period* that the Brethren obviously departed from the original ideological line that had been initiated by the theoretical work of Petr Chelčický. He took a sharply negative attitude toward education (apart from his appreciation of elementary knowledge that can be of some benefit, e.g. when such a knowledge enables people to read and thereby comprehend the proper interpretation of the *Scriptures*). So with Jan Přerovský – we may now say – the ideology of the Unity of the Brethren acquired entirely new aspects, though – I stress again – at the expense of the indisputable break with the original ideas of Petr Chelčický.

How seriously and distinctly the young *Czech church* deviated from the original ideological (as well as historical) legacy, taken over from their “spiritual father” in the second half of the 15th century, can also be seen in Blahoslav's historiographical treatise *O původu Jednoty bratrské a řádu v ní* (*On the Origin of the Unity of the Brethren and its Order*) in which Přerovicensis considered Jan Rokycana *de facto* as the very inspirer of the foundation of the Unity while Petr Chelčický and his teachings are mentioned here only in a few very general remarks.⁴¹

On the whole, we may at this point say that during the period when both Jan Augusta and Jan Blahoslav consequently served as bishops there were no significant transformations, concerning all other philosophical and theological issues, in relation to the previous period which was strongly influenced by the life and activities of brother Lukáš.⁴² It can therefore be stated that among the Brethren the tendency to break with Chelčický's teachings virtually continued in all its major aspects. If we consider the Brethren's inclination towards higher education in particular,

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 221

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 147.: “Luther's calls [to the Brethren, added by J. Č.] not to shun higher education made the Brethren to send, as early as in 1530, their *first theologians to study in Wittenberg* and then elsewhere. After their training they were to serve the Unity as professional theologians using refined humanistic Latin and, of course, keeping contacts with foreign co-religionists.”

³⁹ Cf.: J. Janáček, *Jan Blahoslav*, Praha 1966, p. 101., who reflecting on the innovativeness of Blahoslav's vision says: “He was not only to make a few of young Brethren men know German and Latin as well as make these young men, if needed, to pen letters and memorial writings to be sent abroad, but also to make a creative cultural contribution for the Unity that would have procured for it sufficient respect in the whole world.”

⁴⁰ In his theoretical work Blahoslav provided a number of philosophical and theological as well as purely practical arguments in defence of his opinions. He argues, for example, that God created Adam as a learned man, so erudition cannot be therefore considered bad itself. For more details, see: J. Blahoslav, *Filipika proti nepřátelům vyššího vzdělání v Jednotě bratrské*, in: J. Blahoslav, *Vady kazatelů a Filipika proti nepřátelům vyššího vzdělání v Jednotě bratrské*, Praha 1905², p. 107.

⁴¹ J. Blahoslav, *O původu Jednoty bratrské a řádu v ní*, Praha 1928, p. 52 and 58.: “Tyto i jiné mnohé řeči o jetí a zavedení církve od některých kněží, zvláště pak od Mistra Rokycana, Bratr Řehoř nějaký slýchaje [...]”

⁴² J. Halama comes to the same conclusion in his *Sociální učení Českých bratří 1464 – 1618*, Brno 2003, p. 103, 113, 118.

which is characteristic of just this period, then it has to be emphasized that the discussed ideas of Petr Chelčický were denied almost entirely.

Intermezzo

After the death of Jan Blahoslav (in November 1571) there comes a period that can be defined chronologically by the years 1571–1618. Among the members of the Unity of the Brethren at that time there was no personality who could be compared with brother Řehoř, Lukáš Pražský, Jan Blahoslav or John Amos Comenius as for influence (and also the scope and profundity of theoretical work). However, it does not mean that the Brethren did not have a number of prominent leaders during the above mentioned period (e.g. Václav Budovec z Budova, Karel ze Žerotína or Petr Vok z Rožmberka). In my opinion, those are all rather figures of political importance; their influence in shaping the ideological profile of the Unity was not particularly significant.

Moreover, every attempt for a deeper reflection on the intellectual life of the Unity of the Brethren in this period hits a significant snag: all entries in *Dekrety* (*The Decrees*) (a key source for understanding the Brethren's history) end in 1574 and almost twenty years of silence follow, broken by appending the manuscripts from Leszno in Poland, that comes from the nineties of the 16th century, in *Dekrety*.

We may say, by and large, that in the years 1571–1618 the Brethren, even to a greater extent than in the days of brother Lukáš, disagree with the original position, which in the first decades of their activities they took over from the life's work of Petr Chelčický: secular courts are now seen as institutions that are necessary to negotiate security and justice,⁴³ which, compared with an unreservedly negative attitude of Chelčický and the early Unity towards the world and all its affairs renders to what extent the Brethren deviated from their original ideals by the end of the 16th century. Having mentioned Chelčický's uncompromisingly disapproving attitude towards all forms of violence as the most distinctive part of his teachings, we can now observe an interesting comparison: "what is new in this era is that they are ready to defend by force not only their lives or their loved ones (which was a principle already held by the Brethren before), but also the freedom and rights of a human community to join the struggle for a more equitable arrangement of the temporary imperfect human society," as Jindřich Halama argues in his monograph.⁴⁴ The fact that the Brethren became disloyal to one of the most valuable parts of the Chelčický's legacy to Czech thought can be finally and more than eloquently illustrated by the example of the Unity's leaders (e.g. Karel ze Žerotína and Petr Vok) who actively participated in military campaigns.

Despite the above mentioned facts the Unity carries on re-printing their older works, and therefore – according to Halama – "the documents at the turn of the century give us the impression that the Unity social views remain essentially unchanged".⁴⁵ The same author concludes that "the development in the recent years before the Thirty Years War almost marks the major break in the Unity history. Signs indicative of the increasing inclination to take the form of mainstream Reformation church are obvious. I dare say that only this move would have meant a definite break with the principles the Unity had been based on".⁴⁶ At this point, I again have no choice but to disagree with Halama's arguments: in my opinion, the Unity waived off their roots by the time of the leadership of Lukáš Pražský. All the following decades – until the coming of Comenius – can therefore be described as further development and radicalization of the Lucasian positions

⁴³ J. Halama, *Sociální učení Českých bratří 1464–1618*, Brno 2003, p. 163.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

which were almost directly proportional to the marginalization of the theoretical legacy of Petr Chelčický.

Omnia sponte fluant, absit violentia rebus

The restoration of the most significant aspects of the philosophical and theological concepts of Petr Chelčický can be, in my view, traced back to the magnificent works of John Amos Comenius, who comes to – especially in his later writings *Obecná porada o nápravě věcí lidských* (*General Consultation on an Improvement of All Things Human*) and *Clamores Eliae* – the same uncompromisingly disapproving attitude towards all forms of violence as his predecessor Peter Chelčický did.⁴⁷ In the *fourteenth chapter* of his *Panorthosia* the latest bishop of the Unity of the Brethren declares that “*válka žádně blaha nepřináší*” and urges “aby také nebyla příležitost vrátit se k nepřátelství a válkám”, i. e. that “mají být odstraněny zbraně [...] Pušek se má užít proti šelmám, kdežto z děl by se měly slévat zvony ke svolávání lidu nebo hudební nástroje, aby tak všechno sloužilo k velebení Boha.”⁴⁸ Comenius’s wish recorded shortly before his death in *Clamores Eliae* can be, in my opinion, seen as an incontrovertible evidence of the thinker’s decisive tendency towards unparalleled irenism: “Vaše sudy prachu, střely, kanóny, meče, oštěpy nikdy nepřinesou klid, spíše jej naruší – vždy tomu tak dosud bylo. Ze zbrojnic udělejte biblioték – z děl zvonů k muzice.”⁴⁹ F. M. Bartoš believes that thanks to Comenius himself Petr’s idea of non-violence was once again pointed out and extended across all cultural Europe.⁵⁰

If we look closer at the Comenius’s treatise *Unum neccessarium*, we come to the conclusion that a clear and indisputable parallelism can be traced between Petr Chelčický’s ideas and the thoughts of the last senior of the Brethren: according to Rudolf Říčan Comenius sees Christ as the only teacher and places him in the centre of his moral teachings (I have already discussed the analogical pedagogical-oriented Christocentrism of Chelčický above⁵¹) and also – in line with Chelčický – regards *the Scriptures* as a fundament of his theological views.⁵²

We can describe the views of those two great figures of Czech spiritual thought to be very close to one another in terms of the discussed aspects, which are, in my opinion, characteristic and central to the whole of Chelčický’s work. However, using the word *reception* to denote their relationship would probably not be correct: although Comenius’s work is based on the Brethren tradition, he drew on the intellectual base of *the Lukáš’s period*. The restoration of Chelčický’s key ideals represented by the theoretical work of Comenius should be thus better understood as an act of largely unconventional thought (although a certain degree of the South Bohemian thinker’s influence on the nature of Comenius’s theories is undeniable), and we should regard the philosophies of both thinkers as being in the relation of two mutual *analogous* contexts.

On the other hand, it is undisputed that the teachings of John Amos differ in many respects with greater or lesser intensity from Chelčický’s philosophical and theological views. For example,

⁴⁷ For more information about the generation of Comenius’s irenistic believes, cf.: P. Floss, *Poselství J. A. Komenského současné Evropě*, Brno 2005, p. 12.

⁴⁸ J. A. Komenský, *Obecná porada o nápravě věcí lidských. III. svazek*, Praha 1992, p. 406n. The italics are original.

⁴⁹ J. A. Komenský, *Clamores Eliae: Křiky Eliášovy*, Praha 1992, p. 22.

⁵⁰ F. M. Bartoš, *Petr Chelčický, duchovní otec Jednoty Bratrské*, Praha 1958, p. 24.

⁵¹ In view of John Amos, it is possible to talk about Christocentrism in its complete meaning, i. e. including the cosmological context: “Jesus Christ stands in an invisible centre of all things, in God, as his visible embodiment. All creatures are moving around this centre that remains unmoved.” Cit. by: B. Kaňák, “Jan Amos Komenský – duchovní křesťanská osobnost”, in: E. Havlíček (ed.), *Muž bolesti a naděje: sborník prací k 400. výročí narození Jana Amose Komenského*, Praha 1992, p. 56.

⁵² R. Říčan, *Dějiny Jednoty bratrské*, Praha 1957, p. 389.

if one examines the *End of chapter XXIV in Panorthosia*, in which the thinker claims that any state that regulates its system of government according to his proposals “právem si zaslouží nápis: *Zde je království Boží na zemi, polibek spravedlnosti a míru*”,⁵³ we come to realize that this very positive approach is in clear contradiction with the attitude that Chelčický held towards the issue of “this world”.

Conclusion

The aim of this study was to answer the question: To what extent has the Czech tradition of philosophical thought adopted Petr Chelčický’s teachings.

We can *de facto* talk about the almost unconditional *reception* of the thinker’s philosophical and theological legacy in all its aspects only in connection with the first generation of the Brethren that founded the Unity and were represented by brother Řehoř Krajčí.

In the following period, which I have delimited in my work, due to the active work of brother Lukáš Pražský, the Brethren – in my opinion⁵⁴ – apparently departed from all the key features of Petr Chelčický’s teachings, ranging from the adoption of the “power of this world” with all its accompanying phenomena (i. e. primarily the transformation of the Brethren’s originally negative attitudes into justifying violence, death and military service) to the theologically grounded preference of faith at the expense of commendable deeds with regard to the possibilities of human salvation, which *de facto* led the Brethren to abandon the pedagogical Christocentrism that was so characteristic of Chelčický and that I see as one of the most important element of the thinker’s work. When looking at this period in general I found it appropriate to use the term *de-viation*, because, in my opinion, it is in those decades, when a major breakthrough, which would affect the teachings of the Czech Brethren in the next period and which would not be upgraded till the theoretical work of John Amos Comenius appeared.

Indeed, even during the life of brother Jan Augusta, and later Jan Blahoslav Přerovský no significant deviation from the philosophical and theological foundations that were laid just in the time of active work of brother Lukáš cropped out. In these years, the intensity, with which the new *de-viation* propositions were accepted, only deepens: the Unity becomes still more open to the world and “its power” (the nobility are now welcome and essential members of the Brethren Church). The Brethren’s acknowledgement of the usefulness and necessity of profane knowledge, which Chelčický himself resisted with considerable vehemence, can be therefore very well seen also from this point of view. So the deepening process of the Brethren’s *de-viation* from the ideological legacy of their “spiritual father” continues: the Brethren’s aristocracy is now openly involved in military campaigns, secular courts are seen (even from the perspective of the Law of God) as a legitimate factor needed to guarantee fairness, etc. In my view, we can in no way use the term *reception* to denote the relation of the Unity of the Brethren to Petr Chelčický’s teachings during this period of its existence; and therefore I consider it necessary to stick to the term *de-viation* complete with an adjective *deepening*.

The re-inclination of Czech philosophical thought to the philosophical and theological ideas of Petr Chelčický – at least in respect to their determining aspects – occurs finally as late as the philosophical works of John Amos Comenius, especially in his late writings. I have pointed out above that to talk about the *re-reception* would be in the least quite problematic, that is why I chose the term *analogy* to characterize Comenius’s relation to Chelčický’s legacy: indeed, one can see very clear similarities in the concepts of both thinkers, especially when focusing on the

⁵³ J. A. Komenský, *Obecná porada o nápravě věcí lidských. III. svazek*, Praha 1992, p. 418. The italics are original.

⁵⁴ Here I repeat that Jindřich Halama interprets this issue quite differently.

both men's attitudes towards the possible justification of violence or the life and teachings of Jesus and the resulting implications for an individual's moral life. So with John Amos, the most important ideas of Petr Chelčický are brought back to light within the Czech philosophical context.

With some exaggeration Comenius's work can be interpreted as a completion of the triad *reception* (characteristic of the Czech context up to the mid-nineties of the 15th century) – *deviation* (delimited in fact by the 16th century and the first two decades of the following century) – *analogy* (being represented by the last bishop of the Unity of the Brethren).

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On Nihilism Driven by the Magnitude of the Universe

Abstract | The paper analyzes two contemporary arguments for the view that the universe is so vast that human actions and human life generally have no meaning and significance. The first case, rather essayistic and authored by Thomas Nagel, is estimated as logically non-transparent. The second one, more rigorous and authored by Quentin Smith, expands with the help of the assumption that the universe is spatiotemporally infinite on insights similar to those of Nagel, but its inference to the conclusion remains obscure, too. Hence a detailed reconstruction of the latter argument is set forth. We draw attention to the designed premise that the amount of value (positive or negative) of anything is not greater than aleph-null, noticing the dubiousness of this premise and its clash with Smith's metaphysics of points.

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1 The Meaning of "Meaning of Life"

Philosophers commonly discriminate between two different senses of "meaning of life." Human life has an objective meaning if and only if (iff, in short) it is objectively worth living. "Objective" here means independent upon whether conscious organisms believe it is worth living. What about "worth living"? We assume the reader's intuitive, general understanding of this term. But just to suggest some possible specifications: worth living can be taken as overall good – the life in question is overall, globally, good. Another explication could be that a human life is worth living iff it is overall, globally, better that the life was lived than if it was not. This latter phrase, again, we can construe in more than one way. The overall value of the physical universe (i. e., the aggregate of all concrete objects) or the overall value of the world (i. e., the aggregate of all concrete and abstract objects) would be greater if the life took place than if it did not, the concept of *greater* being understood in some ordinal (i. e., qualitative) or even cardinal (i. e., numeric) manner, the latter one involving adding or averaging of units of value, etc., etc. In this article, however, we do not hold to any mentioned definition of "worth living." The intuitive, general understanding of this collocation, we assume, is sufficient for our purposes. To sum up, a human life has an objective meaning if and only if it is objectively worth living.

On the other side, a human life has a subjective meaning when the person who lives it cares about some things or strives for some goals. Subjective meaning may vary from one human life to another, and it seems to be solely a matter of the individual's choice. Absolutely subjectively meaningless life is one in which the person cares about nothing and has no goals.

The focus of our interest in this paper is the alleged nonexistence of any objective meaning of human life, as suggested by Thomas Nagel and Quentin Smith. In contemporary philosophy, Nagel produced the most influential rationale of the thesis that human life has no objective meaning. Smith, in our humble opinion, has produced the most precise defense of the same thesis. From now on, we most times drop the clause "objective," keeping it implicit.

2 Nagel

In his famous essay “The Absurd” (1971) arguing that our life is both absurd and without meaning, Thomas Nagel suggests that any absurd situation, by definition, involves: (i) a discrepancy between (ii) pretension or aspiration and (iii) reality. In other words, something is absurd iff it (in reality) is grossly disproportionate with what it is supposed to be. Nagel avers that there is this kind of disproportionateness in every human life in general: there is (i) a heavy discrepancy between, on the one hand, (ii) the way how we all (or almost all) value our plans and projects (that is the pretension) and on this basis strive to realize them (the aspiration), and, on the other hand, (iii) reality. For our plans and projects (a) have no objective value and/or (b) are all-round (i. e., globally) insignificant. How so? For when we adopt what he calls an “external perspective”, we see that nothing really has a (globally significant) value. Thus we recognize our lives to be *absurd* because we knowingly ascribe to our projects objective or overall serious value – both of which they are lacking, as we know too. As Nagel puts it:

*We see ourselves from outside, and all the contingency and specificity of our aims and pursuits become clear. Yet when we take this view and recognize what we do as arbitrary, it does not disengage us from life, and there lies our absurdity [...]*¹

So, our life is absurd. That is his explicit conclusion. But in addition, and more pertinently to our purposes, it also follows that human life is *meaningless*, without any meaning. Why exactly? As we have indicated, we see two (mutually consistent) ways how to understand Nagel’s claims:

- (a) nothing has value independently upon cognitive acts of conscious organisms;
- (b) no human project is worth pursuing.

As for (a), Nagel, *qua* a philosopher having a soft spot for Kantianism, seems to hold to the following series of entailments. That a life is worth living entails that it is thought of (i. e., apprehended) by some conscious organism as worth living, which in turn entails that it is believed by some conscious organism to be worth living. Thus, it is not true that some life is worth living independently upon whether conscious organisms believe it is worth living: if no conscious organism believed that the life in question is worth living, then it would not be worth living. So, by the definition of meaning of life we suggested above, no human life has meaning. What’s the support for this understanding of Nagel? Why should we think that Nagel holds the view that a life’s being worth living entails that it is thought of by some organism as worth living – why would he maintain that life’s worth living depends on cognitive acts of organism? By the reason that Nagel has been a long-standing proponent of the Kantian approach to ethics. Thence we could expect in his case tendencies to apply transcendental idealism to ethics: values do not exist in the world as it really is, independently of how we conceive it. This expectation is confirmed by the position Nagel embraces in his book *The View from Nowhere*:

*[...] nothing seems to have value of the kind it appears to have from inside, and all we can see is human desires, human striving – human valuing, as an activity or condition.*²

But Kant’s defense of his transcendental idealism – the claim that space and time and, hence, spatiotemporal objects and occurrences depend on cognitive acts of organisms and do not exist

¹ Thomas Nagel, “The Absurd”, in: *The Journal of Philosophy*, 68, 20 (1971), Sixty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association Eastern Division, p. 720. The paper covers pp. 716–727.

² Thomas Nagel, *The View From Nowhere*, Oxford University Press US, New York 1989, p. 209.

in the world independently – is generally considered to be unsound, providing no safe ground for (a) or anything else.

As for (b), this interpretation we can derive from *The View from Nowhere*. Also in this book Nagel says that humans have a special capacity to comprehend the world from various standpoints, either internal or external. The corresponding concepts are degreed. The most internal standpoint would be of a desire of a particular human at a particular time. The most external standpoint would be neutral with respect both to times and persons: it should consider the interests of all sentient beings in all the history and in all places. When we comprehend the world from this external standpoint and imagine the hugeness of the universe, the billions of years and at least billions of beings that are part of the space-time, then our plans, desires, things we value, even all our life as a whole, are at once revealed to be unimportant, of no significant value.³ Note that this view from nowhere markedly reminds us of a current popular thesis that the hugeness and duration of the universe, as compared to our size and puny impact on the world, prove that we are totally insignificant and of no value – both as human individuals and as the whole of humankind. Accordingly, Lawrence M. Krauss, a contemporary physicist, recently commented:

*We are just a bit of pollution [...] If you got rid of us, and all the stars and all the galaxies and all the planets and all the aliens and everybody, then the universe would be largely the same. We are completely irrelevant.*⁴

Indeed, it is indisputable that our lives fill up just a tiny fragment of the cosmic time and that the vastness of the universe is just unimaginable. Still, the way the conclusion is derived is rather obscure. In fact, in “The Absurd” Nagel himself makes the following note:

*Reflection on our minuteness and brevity appears to be intimately connected with the sense that life is meaningless; but it is not clear what that connection is.*⁵

Yet in *The View from Nowhere* we are given no further explication of the argument’s supposed logical skeleton – though, as we have seen, Nagel recycles here the very same argument he doubted in “The Absurd.” But there is a more rigorous attempt at deriving the absence of meaning from the magnitudes in the universe authored by Quentin Smith. In fact and to our knowledge, it is the most precise argument in that direction which has been formulated so far. To this attempt we shall devote the rest of our paper.⁶

3 Smith

In 2003, Quentin Smith published an argument for the paradoxical thesis that global (i. e., unqualified) moral realism in conjunction with aggregative value theory and spatiotemporal infinity of the universe imply moral nihilism. According to moral realism, something has value regardless of whether we believe it. Global moral realism consists in the claim that everything

³ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 215–22.

⁴ Quoted by Richard Panek, “Out There”, in: *The New York Times*, March 11, 2007, available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11dark.t.html?_r=1.

⁵ Nagel, “The Absurd”, p. 717.

⁶ Although Thaddeus Metz, “The Meaning of Life”, in: Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2008 Edition), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/life-meaning>, addresses Nagel, it does not take any note of Smith.

which is concrete (particular, as opposed to abstract) has value in this objective way. Aggregative value theory suggests that there are units of value that can be quantified, by adding, averaging, measuring their distribution, and the like. To keep things simple, Smith confines his argument to adding. Finally, moral nihilism says that for any empirically possible action (i. e., every action consistent with the laws of nature and the initial conditions of the universe), it does not matter morally whether the action is performed or not. The gist of the argument is as follows: The whole universe-history (including past, present and future space-time) contains infinitely many locations (sources, instances) of value; more specifically, there are, at least according to infinitely many equal cubes of space and infinitely many future hours. Given this, and given global moral realism and aggregative values, the overall value in the universe-history is infinite. But an action matters morally, Smith says, if and only if (iff) it makes some difference to the overall value in the whole universe-history whether that action is performed or not. But no empirically possible action makes such a difference. Thus, no empirically possible action matters morally. To acquire a more vivid image of Smith's idea, let us reproduce his own illustration:

*Suppose, for example, that there is an action A that has two units of value and that there is a possible history of a universe that is exactly like our universe except for the fact that action A is not performed at the time t_1 when it is actually performed (and all the future consequences of the nonperformance of this act). Let us suppose the nonperformance of this action at time t_1 implies that no units of value have been added at this location but that two units would have been added at this location if the action were performed. Then, if time begins at t_0 , we have two endless histories of the universe that differ in value at least at time t [i. e., t_1]. "But" [e]ach time has at least one unit of value. Since there are an infinite number of times, say hours, ordered in the order of the positive integers, omega, the A-history and not-A history both have the same number of units of value [...]*⁷

In addition,

[...] space is infinite at each time and each cube of space of any given size has some value. Thus, at time t_p , there are infinitely many equal-sized and non-overlapping cubes of space. Each cube has some value, even if it has the minimal unit of value, one, by virtue of being a cube of empty space [...] Thus at time t_p , there is a difference in value of the cube of space that includes action A and in the (counterfactual) cube of space that does not include action A. Let us call this cube, which is located at a certain region on the planet earth, the cube c_1 . Now at time t_p , the A-universe has cubes of space that extend infinitely in both directions along the dimension of length (as well as other dimensions). Each cube has some value. The cube c_1 that includes the action A has two more units of value, let us say, than does this cube in the merely possible universe that does not include A. [...] Time t_1 includes aleph-zero units of value, since t_1 includes an aleph-zero number of valuable cubes of space of the size c . Thus the correct history of the two universes is represented as:

History of A-universe:

$t_0 \quad t_1 \quad t_2 \quad t_3 \quad t_4$
aleph-zero aleph-zero aleph-zero aleph-zero aleph-zero

The same holds for the not-A universe. Since aleph-zero plus aleph-zero equals aleph-zero, there are aleph-zero units of value throughout the infinite future of both our A-universe and

⁷ Quentin Smith, "Moral Realism and Infinite Spacetime Imply Moral Nihilism", in: Heather Dyke (ed.), *Time and Ethics* Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 2003, p. 45. The paper covers pp. 43–54.

*the not-A universe. The number of units of value in both the A-history and the not-A history is aleph-zero. This number is the number of the union of the units of value at each of the infinitely many times. Further, at each time in the history of each universe, the number of units of value is aleph-zero, since at each time the universe is spatially infinite.*⁸

What's the moral? That there are no moral or immoral actions because:

*[...] I cannot increase the value of the universe at time t_1 by performing action A, since $\aleph_0 + 2 = \aleph_0$. [...] if there are an infinite number of consequences of my acts with positive values, my actions plus their consequences still do not increase the value of the universe. For $\aleph_0 + \aleph_0 = \aleph_0$.*⁹

And even if my act

*[...] has an infinite number of consequences, each with a negative value, this still does not decrease the amount of positive value in the universe. For an \aleph_0 number of integers (e.g. all the negative integers) can be removed from the set of all integers [... -2, -1, 1, 2 ...] and the amount of positive value in this set will remain the same, namely \aleph_0 .*¹⁰

What about the meaning of life? There isn't any because

*[...] the value of all my acts and conscious states, and physical states, does not increase at all the value of the universe. [...] My life is futile if there is nothing at all I can do to increase the total amount of positive value in the universe.*¹¹

Now we are in the position to sum up the argument in brief:

I. Necessarily, everything concrete has some value independently upon whether some conscious organisms believe it has some value (Global Moral Realism). Premise.

II. Necessarily, units of value add up (Additive Value Theory). Premise

III. Necessarily, an action is morally indifferent iff that action neither increases nor decreases the overall amount of value in the whole universe-history (whole space-time). Premise.

IV. Contingently, space-time is infinite temporally – there are \aleph_0 (aleph-zero) non-overlapping future hours –, and spatially – at each time there are \aleph_0 non-overlapping, equal sized cubes of empty space. Premise.

V. Necessarily, any empirically possible action (act, mental state) has at most \aleph_0 units of positive value and at most \aleph_0 units of negative value. Premise.

VI. Necessarily, \aleph_0 plus a number that is at most \aleph_0 is \aleph_0 . Premise.

VI*. Contingently, for every empirically possible action with at most \aleph_0 units of negative value, that action does not alter the overall amount of value of the whole universe-history. Premise.

⁸ Ibid., pp. 45–46. Aleph-zero (also aleph null or \aleph_0) is the cardinal number of the set of all natural numbers (i.e., numbers like 0, 1, 2, 3, ...). It is the smallest infinite cardinal number. A cardinal number is a number of members of a set. Aleph is the first letter of the Hebrew alphabet.

⁹ Ibid., p. 46.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 48.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 47.

Therefore,

VII. Contingently, it does not matter morally what empirically possible action any person performs. From (I)–(VI*).

VIII. Contingently, the life of any person has no meaning. From (I)–(VI*).

The contingency of the premise (VI*) and of the conclusions (VII) and (VIII) is infused by the contingency of the premise (IV). In another possible world, where the universe is finite both in time and space, moral nihilism is false and life has meaning due to some contribution every person could make and which would alter, even if in a very minor way, the overall value of the universe. Or, at least, Smith believes so.

Of course, the summary just stated is quite coarse and, again, tells us little about the employed inferential moves. The reader would not find much of use in terms of a more discriminatory grasp if she tried to consult the original paper. We will aim for compensation for this want in our reconstruction of the argument which is to be found below. In order to complete a general picture of Smith's line of thought, however, we must make set out for an instructive detour into several interesting objections he himself takes into consideration.

The first one is an attempt at a straightforward *reductio ad absurdum*, if the argument is valid, then the obvious fact of the existence of some morally bad acts (say, torturing a child just for fun, to coin here a paradigmatic example) entails falsity of some premise(s). Still, the fact is not obvious to Smith who dismisses the objection as a *petitio principii*. Given that moral epistemology is an unexplored morass for many philosophers, including ourselves, and that Smith is involved in a convoluted, theoretical, philosophical enquiry of a rather tentative kind, we do not wish to judge him too harshly for his reply to the first, and quite natural, objection.

Secondly, as for (II), are there really precise numbers for the values of particulars? Smith responds that he could make do with approximate numbers:

It seems evident that some events or things are more valuable than others, that there is such a thing as the relation "is better than" and "is more valuable than" and once we admit this, we admit items that can be enumerated, even if only approximate, as in the case of most measurements in the sciences. To say that "is more valuable than" is a qualitative and non-quantitative relation, is in fact to say that it is epistemically indeterminate to some degree how much more valuable something is to something else. For example, it may be somewhere between twice as good and ten times as good. If we deal with approximations, which is done uniformly in the physical sciences, then the arguments still go through, but without the exact numbers being known.¹²

Again, we are happy, at least for the sake of the discussion, to accept this reply as promising, intuitive, and reasonable, and even to expand on its allusion to approximate value as we are introducing numeric intervals in our own modification of the argument.

There are technical, consequentialist objections which are aimed primarily at (III), based on the assumption that moral nihilism is false, and trying to restrict the moral and value assessment to finite areas. An illustration of such objections would be the claim that if there is a time t such that for any later time t' the cumulative account of value produced by action A1 up to t' is greater than that produced by action A2 up to t' , then A1 is morally better than, and not morally on a par with, A2, even if in the whole history A1 produces the same amount of value as A2. But, as Smith counters, this conditional claim contradicts the rule that an act's value is determined

¹² Ibid., p. 50.

by the overall amount of value that it produces in the whole history. To beat on the same drum over again, we concede to Smith his point as well-articulated.

Even more, as we side with the classical, scholastic adage *ens et bonum convertuntur* (every being *qua* being is good), we take (I), as well-formed and meaningful, and we actually incline to take it, *pace* Nagel, as true. For instance, we don't take it as obvious that value is only value for someone, at a specific moment, with regard to a specific goal, under specific criteria, etc. As there are concepts of interest-relative vs. context-independent causation, and of *de dicto* vs. *de re* belief (belief *de dicto* being a 2-place relation between a believer and a proposition, belief *de re* being a 3-place relation between a believer, an object, and a property), there could well be a 3-or-more-place concept of value (*X* is valuable for *S* at *t*, etc.) and at the same time a unary concept of value (*X* is valuable, period). In fact, Smith makes a case for a version of (I), confined to extended concrete entities, in his book *Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytic Philosophy of Religion*.¹³ But we can't go here into details of his convoluted argument.

Insomuch that we, at present, find the concept of incommensurable values counterintuitive, and welcome quantification, wherever possible, as an extremely fertile ground for the application of formal methods to traditional philosophical debates, and since we are aware of the vast philosophical and economic literature on aggregative value theory, we have a serious respect for (II) and (III), though we display an inclination to a non-consequentialist approach to ethics.

Frankly speaking, (IV), though, *pace* Smith, seems to us to be far from an established scientific fact. Still, we take it as a useful model for a general problem of infinite values. It is worth noting that given a similar conception of moral indifference (an action is morally indifferent iff the performance of that action neither increases nor decreases the amount of value of all there is), instead of infinite space-time we could make the assumption that God exists, has infinite value, and exists only if moral realism is life or life has meaning. The result, in case the rest of the argument were sound, would be a *reductio* of theism. The issue is relevant for all beliefs embracing infinite values independent upon human beings.

Non-standard arithmetic varies with (VI) and the mathematical rationale (to be explicated thereafter) behind (VI*), as well as with the imperative to use only standard, non-infinitesimal units. But, at least for the sake of the argument, we resort, as Smith does, to the rules of standard arithmetic. In addition, non-standard arithmetic is about the result of operations with the kind of (unbounded) numbers Smith has in mind.¹⁴

Finally, as for the comparison of Smith with Nagel, the reader has noticed that Nagel's Kantian line (a) mentioned in section 2 is arguably in tension with Smith's premise (I). On the other hand, Smith defends Nagel's line (b) mentioned in the same section, and for the same reason: the magnitude of the universe. But Nagel does not assume the universe as spatially or temporally infinite. Let's turn now to our reconstruction of Smith's idea.

¹³ Yale University Press, New Haven and Yale 1997; see esp. chapter 25.

¹⁴ For details cf. Peter Vallentyne and Shelly Kagan, "Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 94, 1 (1997), pp. 5–9. The whole paper covers pp. 5–26.

4 A Reconstruction of Smith's Argument

First, let's leave the modal operators out of the reconstruction because they are unnecessary. Thereafter our reconstruction runs as follows:

1. Any concrete entity has some value (independently of whether conscious organisms believe it has some value). Premise.

Comment: (1) corresponds to (I).

2. Any entity with some value is such that it has some amount of value and such that some (standard finite) units of positive value and some units of negative value express in numeric intervals its amount of positive value, its amount of negative value, and its overall amount of value. Premise.¹⁵

Comment: (2), with (8) and (9) below, correspond to (II).

3. There are some units of positive value and some units of negative value such that they in numeric intervals express the amount of positive value, the amount of negative value, and the overall amount of value of any concrete extended entity. From (1) and (2).

4. At any time, there are \aleph_0 non-overlapping empty m^3 s (i. l., cubic meters) of space (independently upon any human action). Premise.

5. There are \aleph_0 non-overlapping future hours of the existence of empty m^3 s of space (independently upon any human action). Premise.

Comment: (4) and (5) correspond to (IV).

6. There is some unit of positive value U^+ and some of negative value U^- such that any empty m^3 has at least 1 U^+ and 0 U^- . From (3) and the nature of the m^3 s.

Similarly,

7. There is some unit of positive value U^+ and some unit of negative value U^- such that any hour of the existence of empty m^3 s of space has at least 1 U^+ and 0 U^- . From (3) and the nature of the hours.

8. The amount of positive value of the collection of all non-overlapping empty m^3 s of space is \geq the sum of all their amounts of positive value. Premise.

Similarly,

9. The amount of positive value of the collection of all non-overlapping hours of the existence of some empty m^3 s of space is \geq the sum of all their amounts of positive value. Premise.

10. The amount of positive value of the collection of all non-overlapping empty m^3 s of space is $\geq \aleph_0 U^+$. From (4), (6) and (8).

Similarly,

11. The amount of positive value of the collection of all non-overlapping hours of the existence of some empty m^3 s of space is $\geq \aleph_0 U^+$. From (5), (7) and (9).

12. For any entity X with some amount of units of value, *the overall amount of X 's value is some n^* such that $m - m' \geq n^* \geq n - n'$, where the amount of X 's units of positive value $\geq n$, the amount of X 's units of negative value $\geq n'$, the amount of X 's units of positive value $\leq m$, and the amount of X 's units of negative value $\leq m'$. Premise.¹⁶*

13. For any action (or act or state) performed (or counterfactually performed) by a *human* (or by a collection of humans), the overall amount of value of the whole universe-history (the whole space-time) *just without* the performance and the consequences of that action is some n^*

¹⁵ All the numbers in value intervals are standard real or hyperreal numbers, that is, real numbers or hyperreal transfinite numbers. Hyperreal infinitesimal numbers not allowed.

¹⁶ n^* is a number or a set of numbers.

such that that $m - m' \geq n^* \geq n - n'$, where $n \geq \aleph_0$ and $m \geq \aleph_0$. From (3), (4), (10) and (12), and from (3), (5), (11) and (12).

Comment: In comparison, we make logically weaker claims than Smith as far as we talk only about human actions rather than about every empirically possible action.

14. (i) Any action (single or complex) performed by a human has some amount n'' of U^+ (in its performance and consequences), where $n'' \leq \aleph_0$. Also, (ii) any action performed by a human has some amount n''' of U^- , where $n''' \leq \aleph_0$. Premise.

Comment: (14) corresponds to (V).

15. (i) For $n \geq \aleph_0 \geq n''$, $n + n'' = n$. Also, (ii) for $m \geq \aleph_0 \geq n''$, $m + n'' = m$. Premise.

Comment: (15) is embraced by standard transfinite arithmetic and corresponds to (VI).

16. Any action (or act or state) performed by a human *increases by adding U^+ neither the amount n nor the amount m of U^+* in the whole universe-history. From (13), (14.i) and (15).

Now the time has come for a series of musings concerning (VI*). As already stated, its rationale is supposed to be the following: Even if an act has \aleph_0 number of negative consequences, this does not decrease the amount of positive value in the universe because \aleph_0 integers (say, all the negative integers) can be removed from the set of all integers [... -2, -1, 1, 2 ...] and the amount of positive value in this set remains the same: \aleph_0 .

We regard this explication as muddled. Let's have a 4seconds long process with 8 units of positive value and 3 units of negative value, represented by the series: [-2, -1, 3, 5]. What is the overall value? Presumably 5 (cf. (12)). And it does not seem relevant to state that all the negative integers can be removed from this series and the sum of positive value will remain the same. Or are we missing something? Maybe Smith tries to say the following: the overall value equals the sum of positive value minus the sum of negative value; and, yes, $8 - 3 = 5$; but, in comparison to finite cases, in the given infinite case $\aleph_0 - \aleph_0 = \aleph_0$. Anyway, regardless of the (in)correctness of such an interpretation, here comes a promising proposal for deriving a cognate of (VI*) we can think of.

17. (i) Any action performed by a human has some amount n''' of U^- , where $n''' < \aleph_0$, or (ii) some action performed by a human has some amount n''' of U^- , where $n''' = \aleph_0$, and any action performed by a human does not have some amount n''' of U^- , where $n''' > \aleph_0$. From (14.ii).

18. For any action performed by a human, the overall amount of value of the whole universe-history without the performance and the consequences of that action is some n^* such that that $m - m' \geq n^* \geq n - n'$, where:

(i) $n = \aleph_0$ and $n' < \aleph_0$, or

(ii) $n = \aleph_0$ and $n' > \aleph_0$, or

(iii) $n = \aleph_0$ and $n' = \aleph_0$, or

(iv) $n > \aleph_0$ and $n' < \aleph_0$, or

(v) $n > \aleph_0$ and $n' = \aleph_0$, or

$n > \aleph_0$ and $n' > \aleph_0$, which is equivalent to:

(vi) $n > n' > \aleph_0$, or

(vii) $n' > n > \aleph_0$, or

(viii) $n > \aleph_0$, $n' > \aleph_0$, and $n = n'$.

From (13).

19. There are sixteen jointly logically exhaustive and mutually exclusive options: (i) (17.i) and (18.i)–(xvi) (17.ii) and (18.viii). From (17) and (18).

Comment: The sixteen options are the following.

(19.i) (17.i) and (18.i); $n = \aleph_0$, $n' < \aleph_0$ and $n''' < \aleph_0$.

(19.ii) (17.i) and (18.ii); $n = \aleph_0$, $n' > \aleph_0$ and $n''' < \aleph_0$.

(19.iii) (17.i) and (18.iii); $n = n' = \aleph_0 > n'''$.

- (19.iv) (17.i) and (18.iv); $n > \aleph_0$, $n' < \aleph_0$ and $n''' < \aleph_0$.
 (19.v) (17.i) and (18.v); $n > \aleph_0$, $n' = \aleph_0$ and $n''' < \aleph_0$.
 (19.vi) (17.i) and (18.vi); $n > n' > \aleph_0 > n'''$.
 (19.vii) (17.i) and (18.vii); $n' > n > \aleph_0 > n'''$.
 (19.viii) (17.i) and (18.viii); $n = n' > \aleph_0 > n'''$.
 (19.ix) (17.ii) and (18.i) $n = n''' = \aleph_0 > n'$.
 (19.x) (17.ii) and (18.ii); $n = \aleph_0$, $n' > \aleph_0$ and $n''' = \aleph_0$.
 (19.xi) (17.ii) and (18.iii); $n = n' = n''' = \aleph_0$.
 (19.xii) (17.ii) and (18.iv); $n > \aleph_0$, $n' < \aleph_0$ and $n''' = \aleph_0$.
 (19.xiii) (17.ii) and (18.v); $n > \aleph_0$, $n' = \aleph_0$ and $n''' = \aleph_0$.
 (19.xiv) (17.ii) and (18.vi); $n > n' > \aleph_0 = n'''$.
 (19.xv) (17.ii) and (18.vii); $n' > n > \aleph_0 = n'''$.
 (19.xvi) (17.ii) and (18.viii); $n = n' > \aleph_0 = n'''$.

And our reconstruction rolls on,

20. *Any entity does not have more than \aleph_0 units of value (positive or negative).* Premise.

Comment: (20) is a crucial point explored below.

21. Any option in (19), except (19.i), (19.iii), (19.ix), and (19.xi), does not obtain. From (20).

22. The result of any adding or subtracting with a transfinite (cardinal) number higher than any involved remaining number is equal to that number. Premise.

Comment: (22) is embraced by standard transfinite arithmetic.

For sure, in this arithmetic there's an ambiguity in subtracting some transfinite number from the same number. Dissimilarly to subtraction and addition on finite numbers, and dissimilarly to addition of the same transfinite numbers (cf. (15)), the result is not well-defined until we fix more specifically which members are removed (taken away). For instance, a set with \aleph_0 members may have \aleph_0 members removed and still other \aleph_0 members left in. As Peter Suber observes:

A denumerable set may have denumerably many members removed (in certain ways) without reducing the cardinality of the original set. [...] We need only regard the given denumerable set as two denumerable sets interlaced, then 'unlace' them, then discard one of them. If $\{A1, A2, A3, \dots\}$ is the original denumerable set, then we can separate out the set of even-numbered members, $\{A2, A4, A6, \dots\}$, from the set of odd-numbered members, $\{A1, A3, A5, \dots\}$, each of which is denumerable [i. e., the number of its members is \aleph_0]. If we discard one of the resulting sets, the other one has the same cardinality as the original. Note that this theorem only applies to the removal of certain denumerable subsets from a given denumerable set. For if the denumerably many members we subtracted happened to comprise the entire membership of the original denumerable set, then clearly the result would not be a denumerable set. So we cannot conclude in general that $\aleph_0 - \aleph_0 = \aleph_0$.¹⁷

In sum, the rationale for the ambiguity in subtracting a transfinite number from the same transfinite number is illustrated by the following removals of different members from the same set with \aleph_0 members.

$\{A1, A2, A3, \dots\} - \{A1, A2, A3, \dots\} = \{\}$; the result is a set with 0 members.

$\{A1, A2, A3, \dots\} - \{A2, A3, A4, \dots\} = \{A1\}$; the result is a set with 1 member.

¹⁷ Peter Suber, "Infinite Reflections", in: *St. John's Review*, XLIV, 2 (1998), Appendix, Theorem 8. The paper covers pp. 1–59.

$\{A1, A2, A3, \dots\} - \{A3, A4, A5, \dots\} = \{A1, A2\}$; the result is a set with 2 members.
 $\{A1, A2, A3, \dots\} - \{A2, A4, A6, \dots\} = \{A1, A3, A5, \dots\}$; the result is a set with \aleph_0 members.
 But after specifying the way of removal, the result is well-defined, not ambiguous.

23. In the option (19.i), any action performed by a human does not decrease by adding U^- the lower bound $(n - n')$ of the overall amount n^* of value in the whole universe-history, and the lower bound $(n - n')$ remains equal to \aleph_0 . From (19) and (22).

Comment: $n - n'$, for $n = \aleph_0$ and $n' < \aleph_0 = n - (n' + n''')$, for $n = \aleph_0$, $n' < \aleph_0$ and $n''' < \aleph_0 = n - \aleph_0$.

24. The result of any such a subtracting from a transfinite number that (i) any involved remaining number is not higher than that number, and that (ii) the resulting set (after all the members being removed) still has that transfinite number of member, is the very same transfinite number. Premise.

25. In the options (19.iii), (19.ix), and (19.xi), there is such a subtracting from a transfinite number that (i) any involved remaining number is not higher than that number, and that (ii) the resulting set still has that transfinite number of member. *From (4) and from (5).*

Comment: Because of (4) or (5), there are always \aleph_0 empty m^3 's or there are \aleph_0 hours of the existence of empty m^3 's. No human action, and nothing at all, will change this; the change would be in conflict with (4) or (5). So, in the given circumstances,

(19.iii) $n - n'$, for $n = n' = \aleph_0 = n - (n' + n''')$, for $n = n' = \aleph_0 > n''' = n - \aleph_0$.

(19.ix) $n - n'$, for $n = \aleph_0 > n' = n - (n' + n''')$, for $n = n''' = \aleph_0 > n' = n - \aleph_0$.

(19.xi) $n - n'$, for $n = n' = \aleph_0 = n - (n' + n''')$, for $n = n' = n''' = \aleph_0 = n - \aleph_0$.

Maybe we could also say that the following. The option (19.iii) is relevantly similar to deleting (removing) \aleph_0 cubes from a set of \aleph_0 cubes, but in such a way that other \aleph_0 cubes are not deleted, and then deleting less than \aleph_0 cubes. (19.ix) is similar to deleting less than \aleph_0 cubes from a set of \aleph_0 cubes, and then deleting \aleph_0 cubes, but in such a way that other \aleph_0 cubes are not deleted. (19.xi) is similar to deleting \aleph_0 cubes from a set of \aleph_0 cubes, but in such a way that other \aleph_0 cubes are not deleted, and then deleting \aleph_0 cubes once more, but again in such a way that other \aleph_0 cubes are not deleted. In all these three options, the cardinality of the original set equals the cardinality of the resulting set.

26. In the options (19.iii), (19.ix), and (19.xi), any action performed by a human does not decrease by adding U^- the lower bound $(n - n')$ of the overall amount n^* of value in the whole universe-history, and the lower bound $(n - n')$ remains equal to \aleph_0 . From (25).

27. Any action performed by a human does not decrease by adding U^- the *lower bound* $(n - n')$ of the overall amount n^* of value in the whole universe-history, and the lower bound $(n - n')$ remains equal to \aleph_0 . From (19), (21), (23) and (26).

28. Any action performed by a human does not decrease by adding U^- the *upper bound* $(m - m')$ of the overall amount n^* of value in the whole universe-history, and the upper bound $(m - m')$ remains equal to \aleph_0 . *Mutatis mutandi* from (18)–(27).¹⁸

29. Any action (or act or state) performed by a human does *not decrease by adding U^- the overall amount n^* of value in the whole universe-history which remains equal to \aleph_0* . From (27) and (28).

Comment: (27)–(29) correspond to (VI*).

30. For any action performed by a human, the action is morally indifferent iff (i) it is not true that the human ought to perform the action and (ii) it is not true that the human ought not to perform the action. Premise (by nominal definition).

¹⁸ Put m instead of n , and m' instead of n' .

31. *If* (16) and (29), then any action performed by a human is morally indifferent. Premise.

Comment: (31) corresponds to (III). Instead of “iff”, we insert the weaker “if”.

32. Any action performed by a human is morally indifferent. From (16), (29) and (31).

33. Any action performed by a human is such that (i) it is not true that the human ought to perform the action and (ii) it is not true that the human ought not to perform the action! From (30) and (32).

Comment: (33) corresponds to the conclusion (VII).

34. *If* (16), then any life of a human does not have meaning. Premise.

35. Any life of a human does not have meaning! From (16) and (34).

Comment: (35) corresponds to the conclusion (VIII).

5 \aleph_0 Limit for Values and Its Conflict with Smith’s Ontology of Points

The premise (20) states that no entity does have more than \aleph_0 units of value (whether negative or positive). First, we want to highlight the fact that (20) is of fundamental importance for the proposed reconstruction of Smith’s argument. Let us explain.

Without (20) the option (19.viii), $n = n' > \aleph_0 > n''$, is not ruled out.

Given (19.viii), there are several inner alternatives:

$n - n'$, for $n = n' > \aleph_0$, =

(a) $n'''' > \aleph_0$, or

(b) $-n''''$ for $n'''' > \aleph_0$, or

(c) $n'''' = \aleph_0$, or

(d) $-n''''$ for $n'''' = \aleph_0$, or

(e) $n'''' < \aleph_0$ or

(f) $-n''''$ for $n'''' < \aleph_0$.¹⁹

But if (e), then $n - (n' + n'')$, for $n = n' = \aleph_0 > n''$, =

$n'''' - n''$, for $n'''' < \aleph_0$ and $n'' < \aleph_0$, = $n'''' < \aleph_0$.

And if (f), then $n - (n' + n'')$, for $n = n' = \aleph_0 > n''$, =

$-n'''' - n''$, for $n'''' < \aleph_0$ and $n'' < \aleph_0$, = $-n''''$ for $n'''' < \aleph_0$.

So, here we have two scenarios when human action could make some difference in the lower bound of the overall amount of value in the whole universe-history. Similarly for the upper bound. For example, in case (e) holds and $(n - n') = n'''' = (m - m') = 1\,000\,000$ and $n'' = 100\,000$, the steps (27)–(29) are not true. On the top of it, essentially identical objection comes from the option (19.xvi).

Secondly, we must ask: is (20) obviously true? Wait a minute, we have to ponder this. Well, hum, ... nope, it is not; not to us, not at the present time. Thereunto, the fishiness of (20) is underscored by its tension with respect to Smith’s own conception of points. In his opinion, published in 2002, there are abstract points of abstract topological space, and there are *concrete* spatial and mass points in the (physical) universe:

[...] *there are abstract points, e. g., the points in the abstract topological space postulated by point-set topology. [... But] all the [...] spatial points and mass points that belong to our universe [... are] concrete [...].*²⁰

¹⁹ The alternatives (e) and (f) are not generally logically exclusive since n'''' could equal 0.

²⁰ Quentin Smith, “Time Was Created by a Timeless Point”, in: Gregory E. Ganssle & David M. Woodruff (eds.), *God and Time*, Oxford University Press, New York 2002, p. 105 (the whole paper covers pp. 98–128). This is in conflict with Smith’s earlier *Ethical and Religious thought in Analytic Philosophy of Religion* (1997), chapter 25,

But then, by a case analogical to (1)–(10), the amount of positive value of the collection of all concrete points in all non-overlapping empty m^3 s of space is uncountable, that is, *greater than* \aleph_0 , because the number of these points is uncountable.²¹

Smith himself claims in the 2003 paper that there are concrete (particular) space-points, all of them having some finite amount of value:

*Each location has a finite amount of value. A location can be a person, any other animal, a plant, a particular of matter or energy, a point of space or time, or some larger complex of particulars of these kinds, for example, a forest, an orchestra or an hour of time.*²²

Note also that paradoxically, then, the collection of all concrete points in just *one* empty m^3 of space would have the same and uncountable amount of positive value as the collection of all concrete points in *all* non-overlapping empty m^3 s of space because the number of points in one cubic meter is the same as the number of points in infinite, 3-dimensional space. In fact, for similar reasons, the collection of all concrete points in just *one finite line* segment of empty space would have the same uncountable amount of positive value as the collection of all concrete points in all non-overlapping empty m^3 s of space, and even the same amount of positive value as the collection of all concrete points in \aleph_0 -dimensional space.²³

On the same account Suber says:

*Measured in meters, we are tiny specks compared to the universe at large. But measured in dimensionless points, we are as large as the universe: a proper subset, but one with the same cardinality as the whole. Similarly, measured in meters, we may be off in a corner of the universe. But measured in points, the distance is equally great in all directions, whether universe is finite or infinite; that puts us in the center, wherever we are. Measured in days, our lives are insignificant hiccups in the expanse of past and future time. But measured in points of time, our lives are as long as universe is old. We are as small as we seem, but simultaneously, by a most reasonable measure, co-extensive with the totality of being in both space and time.*²⁴

Whatever the worth of measuring size or value is in terms of points, the premise (20) is arguably debatable, and also in conflict with Smith's ontology of point-like objects. To attain mere coherence, if not reasonableness, any advocate of our reconstruction should be reluctant to embrace this ontology. And since, we dare to avow, (20) seems essential for setting Smith's argument in motion, he is well-advised to justify (20), and also to retouch his view of points. As for the latter hint, he can draw off the underlying idea that points are the building blocks of the universe, or renounce their concreteness, or confine (1) or (2) to (some) extended concrete entities.²⁵ As for the former suggestion, a good argument for (20), if any, remains to be seen.

where we are said that all physical objects are spatiotemporally extended and have mass (i. e., some weight in a gravitational field).

²¹ Cf. Suber, *ibid.*, Appendix, Theorems 12ff.

²² Smith, "Moral Realism and Infinite Spacetime Imply Moral Nihilism", p. 44.

²³ Again, cf. Suber, "Infinite Reflections", Appendix, Theorems 12ff.

²⁴ Suber, *ibid.*, section "The Sublimity of the Infinite".

²⁵ As he does in his earlier *Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytic Philosophy of Language* (1997), chapter 25, where we are said that all spatiotemporally extended entities with mass have some objective value.

6 Conclusion

We have seen that the most influential philosophical contemporary defense of the popular thesis that human life has no objective meaning, authored by Thomas Nagel, fails because of the problematic premise that nothing has value independently upon our cognitive acts, and for its rather opaque elicitation of the absence of objective meaning from the magnitude of the universe. On the other side, Quentin Smith's attempt at making a more transparent case for the same thesis from this magnitude fails, too, if only for the contentious assumption that nothing has greater than \aleph_0 value, which assumption is at the same time unsupported and incoherent with Smith's own view of points. Although failures of philosophical arguing have been causes of much frustration or even despair, these two are rather happy.²⁶

²⁶ The research underlying this paper was supported by The Czech Science Foundation GAČR, project no. P401/11/0906. After this paper was completed and following some interaction with one of its authors, Michael J. Almeida published a different and independent critique of Smith's argument for moral nihilism: "Two Challenges to Moral Nihilism", *The Monist*, 93, 1 (2010), pp. 96–105.

guests|

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Plato's *Sophist* and the Aristotelian being¹

Abstract | In the chapter M 4 of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle criticizes the dialectics practiced by Socrates. Aristotle attributes to Socrates the lack of “dialectical power”. In the same way, in N 2, Aristotle criticizes the dialectics practiced by “the dialecticians” imputing the archaic way in which the problem about being is posed. There are many signs that make us think that Aristotle refers to Plato and the Platonics with the term “dialecticians”, to whom he attributes the “dialectical power”. Therefore, Aristotle is aware of the merits and shortcomings of Platonic dialectics, more specifically of the dialectics practiced by Plato in the *Sophist*. In the development of his own conception of the being (to on), in the middle books of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle bears in mind the contents of this dialogue and makes the attempt to overcome the difficulties stated in the Eleatist, such as the deficiencies of the Platonic way of understanding the being.

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1 The merits of the Platonic dialectics: the “dialectical power” in the *Sophist*

In chapter M 4 of *Metaphysics*, Aristotle explains his own point of view about the origin of the Platonic doctrine of the Ideas, which he attributes to the influence of Heraclite's reasoning about the continuous flowing of the elements of the sensible world and the Socratic quest of universals in ethics. He later on develops a series of criticism of the mentioned doctrine which repeat almost literally what is exposed in A 9². In this context, just in between the two theme developments, this chapter may be divided, Aristotle makes a brief and isolated reference to the dialectics practiced by Socrates. The Stagirites makes the following statements:

“Socrates should be seeking the *what-is* (*to ti estin*), for he was seeking to syllogize (*sylogizesthai*), and ‘*what a thing is*’ is the starting-point of syllogisms; for there was as yet none of the *dialectical power* (*dialektike ischys*) which enables people even without knowledge of the essence (*choris tou ti esti*) to speculate about contraries (*tanantia episkopein*) and inquire whether the same science deals with contraries; for two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates-inductive arguments (*tous epaktikous logous*) and universal definition (*to horizesthai katholou*), both of which are concerned with the starting-point of science” (M 4, 1078b23-30).

According to that stated by Aristotle in this passage, Socrates' aim was to achieve scientific knowledge by establishing the what-is, this is, the essence of things, in order to afterwards be able to develop syllogistic arguments starting off from those essences. During the process of the constitution of science, Socrates' merits would have been developing inductive arguments and finding the universal definition of things. However, due to the lack of dialectical power, Socrates

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² The passages M 4, 1078b34-1079b3 and 5, 1079b12-1080^a8 respite almost literally the Aristotle's' critics to the Platonic doctrine of the Ideas exposed in A 9, 990b2-991b9.

was not capable of investigating contraries apart from the essences -without taking into account what the essence of contrary notions consists of- neither was Socrates capable of deciding either the investigation of the contraries belongs to one same science or not. From what is stated by Aristotle in the passage, it could be added that dialectics provided with the power -not involved in the one practised by Socrates- would be able to investigate the contraries independently of their essence, and would be able to establish if a science of contraries exists or not. If the dialectics practised by Socrates is not capable of obtaining such achievements, one might ask himself what dialectics is the Stagirite attributing such ability to. There are various signs that make us think that when he talks about dialectical power, Aristotle has the Platonic dialectics in mind, in particular, he is thinking of the dialectics practised by Plato in the *Sophist*³.

This reference made to the *Sophist* is clearer – as Rossitto has suggested⁴ – when the passage from M 4 is read with the help of two passages from *Metaphysics* the appendix of the fifth aporia from B 1 about contrary notions and the long passage from Γ 2 (1003b33-1004b26) where Aristotle gives an answer to the matters raised in the aforementioned appendix. B 1 and Γ 2, certainly refer to the *dialecticians* (*hoi dialektikoi*)⁵ and also deal with the contrary notions of which they make reference in the remark of M 4. That makes us think that the passages from B 1 – Γ 2 and M 4 are connected with each other. Let's have a closer look.

What is it that Aristotle proposes in the fifth aphorism in B 1? The central issue suggested by Aristotle in this aporia is whether the purpose of the inquired science -this is, the knowledge or first philosophy- is made up just with the substances or also is made up with its accidents. In a way of an appendix, the philosopher adds some secondary issues to the main problem. This is the way he poses them:

“<we must inquire>, with regard to the *same* and *other* and *like* and *unlike* and *contrariety*, and with regard to *prior* and *posterior* and all other such terms about which the dialecticians (*hoi dialektikoi*) try to inquire, starting their investigation from probable premises (*endoxa*) only,-whose business is it to inquire into all these? Further, we must discuss the essential attributes (*symbebekota kath' auta*)⁶ of these themselves; and we must ask not only what each of these is, but also whether one thing always has one contrary” (B 1, 995b20–27).

³ Rossitto and Berti have seen in M 4 a direct reference to the supreme genus research developed by Plato in this dialogue. See C. Rossitto, “La dialettica platonica in Aristotele, *Metafisica* A 6 e M 4”, *Atti dell'Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti*, XC (1977–78), p. 75–87; C. Rossitto, “La dialettica e il suo ruolo nella *Metafisica* di Aristotele”, *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica* LIIIV, Milán (1993) and E. Berti, “Differenza tra la dialettica socratica e quella platonica secondo Aristotele, *Met.* M 4”, in: A. Jannone (ed.), *Energieia. Études aristotéliennes offertes à Mgr. Antonio Jannone*, Paris 1986, p. 50–65. The examples can, nevertheless, be found in other dialogues. That way Schwegler and Reale have seen an example of the dialectical power described in M 4, in *Menon's* passage (86 C ss.). Here the contrary propositions “the virtue is teachable” and “the virtue is not teachable” are examined without previously defining what virtue is. See A. Schwegler, *Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, Berlin 1960, p. 308–309 and G. Reale, Aristotele, *La Metafisica*, Milano 1968, p. 362–363. Ross has picked the passage from *Parmenides* where the consequences of the contrary hypothesis “they are one” and “they are many” without previously defining what one and many are. See D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, Oxford 1924, p. 422.

⁴ C. Rossitto, “La dialettica platonica in Aristotele, *Metafisica* A 6 e M 4”, *Atti dell'Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti*, XC (1977–78), pp. 84.

⁵ The expression “the dialecticians” appears in B 1, 996b23, Γ 2, 1004b17 y 19.

⁶ The contrary notions which the aporias described in B1 make reference to are described as accidents per se (*symbebekota kath' auta*). Throughout the *Metaphysics* they are described as species of the one and the entity (*eide tou henos kai tou ontos*, Γ 2, 1003b33-4), affections (*pathe*, Γ 2, 1004b6), attributes (*hyparchonta*, Γ 3, 1005a14) y contrarieties of the entity (*enantioseis tou ontos*, K 3, 1061b5).

These secondary matters posed in the fifth aporia in B 1 are not developed later on in the parallel passing in B 2 neither in K 1. Nevertheless, they are indeed widely dealt with in Γ 2, Δ 9–11 and throughout I 3–10, which shows the great importance that Aristotle grants to such matters. As a resolution to the aphorism, Aristotle establishes in Γ 2 that it belongs to one same and only science -the science about what is being qua being- to know the sorts of the coexisting notions of *being (to on)* and the *one (to hen)*. This is, to know about the essence of the *same*, the *like* and the rest of this type of notions, as well as the essence of *different, unlike* and the rest of the opposite notions (1003b33-1004^a21)⁷. In this context, Aristotle adds that the knowledge of the essence of all those notions takes place to 1) distinguish the many senses in which every one of them is said (1004^a22-24), 2) establish the relationship between each of these senses with the first way of saying them (1004^a22-24), and 3) ultimately assume that the first way of saying them corresponds to the substance (1004b7-10). According to what is exposed by Aristotle, the dialecticians -the same referred to in B 1 and Γ 2- had not reached to talk about the substance and, as a result, did not reach to know the essence of contrary notions. According to explanation of Aristotle, the dialecticians of B 1 and Γ 2 did not speak about substance and, consequently, they were not able to know contrary notions. So, M 4 and Γ 2 point out the merits with regard to the Socratic method, and the deficiencies with regard to the Aristotelic method of the dialecticians' way of dealing with the contrary notions. But, we can attribute, more specifically, those merits and deficiencies to the Platonic way of dealing with the supreme genre in the *Sophist*⁸.

In 253 B-E, the Foreigner from Elea had illustrated the dialectics sciences' task this way:

“And as classes are admitted by us in such a manner to be some of them capable and others incapable of intermixture, must not he who would rightly show what kinds will unite and what will not, proceed by the help of science in the path of argument? And will he not ask if the connecting links are universal, and so capable of intermixture with all things; and again, in divisions, whether there are not other universal classes, which make them possible? (...). Should we not say that is not the business of the dialectical science?”

This passage from the *Sophist* seems to clear up the Aristotelic remark about the limits of the Socratic dialectics in M 4, he remarks about the merits of the *dialecticians*, in opposition to the dialectics practised by Socrates. In fact, a consequence of the aim of the dialectical power mentioned in M 4 was to find out if either the study of the contraries belonged to one only science or not. This issue was not approached by the Socratic dialectics. However, Plato gives a satisfactory answer to the issue, when he attributes the tasks of searching the nature of each of the supreme genres and the ability of mutual communication in between mentioned genres to one science, the *dialectical science*, which is identified with philosophy. These tasks are in a satisfactory way taken into account in the dialogue: during 254 B-258 C the Foreigner from Elea, with the help of Teeteto, establishes the existence of five supreme genres; *being, rest, movement, identical* and *different*, and the identification of this last genre with the not-being, a relative not-being that allows one to refute the absolutist approach expressed by Parmenides in the verse: “*Keep your*

⁷ In Γ 2, 1004a1 Aristotle makes reference to a book named *Selection of Contraries*, where the Philosopher deals with the study of the *same* and the *other*, the *like* and *unlike*, the *contrary* and other similar opposite notions (gathered by the expression *peri panton* from b25) which the aphorisms make reference to. In I 3, 1054^a30 the Philosopher makes reference to the book *Division of the Contraries*. In both cases it seems that it refers to the lost book *About the Contraries*, quoted by Diogenes Laercio in *Lives of the Philosophers*, X 11.

⁸ In his commentary to *Metaphysics*, Siriano (5, 27ss) sees the narrow relationship between fifth aporia of *Beta* and Plato's research in *Sophist* and *Parmenide*.

*mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that not-being is*⁹. After establishing the existence and nature of each of the supreme genres, the Foreigner moves on to investigate the way in which they are susceptible of getting mixed up with each other, once he has previously refused (253 a) the hypothesis that all of them can mix up with each other or that all of them reject each other. On the other hand, facing the dialectics practised by Socrates, one of the merits attributed by Aristotle to the dialecticians consisted in researching the contraries without looking for their essence. In this sense, it seems right to think that the dialectical value of the platonic practise developed in the *Sophist* consists of its ability to determine when opposite notions are contradictory.

Therefore, if we use B1 and Γ 2 as a support for the interpretation of passage M 4, we can conclude the following points: 1) that the dialectical power Aristotle speaks about refers to the dialectical practice established and developed by Plato in the *Sophist* about the supreme genres; 2) that such power entitles one to investigate the supreme genres without taking into account their essence; and 3) that the power in Plato's dialectics is contrary to the restrictions present in the dialectics practiced by Socrates, based on the understanding of the essences¹⁰.

2 The deficiencies of Platonic dialectics: the "archaic way" in the *Sophist*

However, we have seen that Aristotle does not just point out the merits attributable to Plato's and the Platonists' dialectical practice, he also tackles its shortcomings. The Aristotelic critic of the Platonic dialectics is briefly summed up in N 2, 1088b35-9a5¹¹. The philosopher states the following:

“There are many causes which led <Plato and Platonists> off into these explanations <about the *One* and the indefinite dyad>, and especially the fact that they framed the difficulty in an obsolete form (*aporesai archaikos*). For they thought that *all things that are would be one* (viz. *Being itself*) (*pant' esesthai hen ta onta, auto to on*), if one did not join issue with and refute the saying of Parmenides: *For never will this he proved, that things that are not are*. They thought it necessary to prove *that which is not is* (*to me on... hoti estin*).

The fragment includes Parmenides verse quoted twice by Plato in the *Sophist*, which makes us think that the aim of the Aristotelic critic is made of the way of reasoning contained in this dialogue. The philosophical context in the fragment from N 2 is made of the extensive exposition and Aristotelic critic to the dualist conception of Plato's principles. This conception is embodied in the esoteric doctrine of the One and the indefinite Dyad¹². Aristotle tries to explain

⁹ PARM. fr 7, 1–2, Diels-Kranz: *Ou gar me pote touto damei, einai me onta, alla su tesd' aph' hodou dizeios eirge noema*. In the *Sophist* the verse comes out twice, in 237 A8 y 258 Γ 5, and is quoted by Aristotle in N 2, 1089a3-4.

¹⁰ The excellent analysis of passage M 4 made by Rossitto shares the suspicion that Aristotle could be ironizing over the dialectical power of the Platonic dialects. See C. Rossitto, “La dialettica platonica in Aristotele, *Metafisica* A 6 e M 4”, *Atti dell'Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti*, XC (1977–78), p. 85. Berti, who does share the general interpretation made by Rossitto, however, does not agree with the hypothesis that states that Aristotle could have an ironic character. See E. Berti, “Differenza tra la dialettica socratica e quella platonica secondo Aristotele, *Met.* M 4”, in: *Energeia. Études aristotéliennes offertes à Mgr. Antonio Jannone*, Paris 1986, p. 56.

¹¹ A more precise analysis of the passage can be found in C. Rossitto, “La dialettica nella dottrina platonica dei principi secondo *Metafisica* M 8 e N 2”, in: AA. VV., *Aristotele nel 23° Centenario*, “Verifiche”, VII, Trento (1978), p. 447–472.

¹² The explanation and critic of Plato's doctrine of One and Dyad are in N 2, 1088b35-1090a2.

in the analyzed passage the last origin of the mistake regarding the dualism of principles: in the Stagirites' opinion, the mistake of establishing two supreme principles of reality is due to the way Plato confronts Parmenides' reasoning in his defence of the univocal concept of being. As is well known, the absolutist concept of being lead Parmenides to the exclusion of the not-being and, moreover, to the exclusion of all diversity, generation and change into reality. Plato, on the other hand, faced the challenge posed by Parmenides establishing in the *Sophist* the reality of *not-being*. After criticizing the position of the philosopher of Elea, Plato had found the statement of *not-being*, a none absolute not-being, this is, relative. Finally he would understand them as *otherness* or *different-from*, and from here on it was possible to break up the aporia posed by Parmenides. Therefore, the Stranger of Elea expresses himself like this at the end of his extensive reasoning in the *Sophist*:

“And has not this <not-being> as real an existence as any other class? May I not say with confidence that not-being has an assured existence, and a nature of its own (*to me on... esti ten hautou physin echon*)? just as the great was found to be great (...) and the not-great not-great, (...) in the same manner not-being has been found to be and is not-being, and is to be reckoned one among the many classes of being (*to me on kata tauton en te kai esti me on*)” (258 B-C).

What the Stranger of Elea says makes us think that, without a doubt, Plato had believed it necessary to demonstrate a certain kind of existence of what is not, so that all things could be deduced from being and not-being, and this way allows the existence of variety, generation and change into reality. And indeed, immediately after the Parmenides' verses quote in 258 D, the Stranger of Elea sums up the results of his research stating that “*we have not only proved that things which are not are, but we have shown what form of being not-being is*”¹³. Aristotle just describes in N 2 that stated by the Stranger of Elea in those fragments from the *Sophist*, in reference to his research about not-being. According to what is stated by Aristotle in N 2, it is obvious that Plato, in order to overcome the Parmenidian aporia, had to introduce two principles, the One and the indefinite Dyad, principles that Plato understood could turn into being and not-being respectively. All this leads us to the conclusion that the passage N2 has the content from the *Sophist* present and, specifically the long reasoning about the reality of *not-being* carried out by the Stranger in 256 D-259 D. It is precisely in this long reasoning where the critique made by Aristotle of the Platonic dialectics must be placed.

Why does Aristotle criticize the dialectics practiced by Plato? Why does he describe it like *aporesai archaikos*? As we have seen up to now the dialectics developed in the *Sophist* deal with inquiries about the existence of *not-being*. Secondly, it tries to clear up what the nature of each of the supreme genres is. Finally, it investigates the communication in between them. The criticism of Plato from Aristotle is directed against the way Plato treats the problem, because it starts out with the need of demonstrating the existence of *not-being* and understands the problem wrongly. The Stagirite considers that Plato does not realize that *being* and *not-being*, *per se* constitutes an irreducible diversity and that, once known that *being* is said in many ways, the search of *not-being* becomes unnecessary, unfruitful. That is what the Stagirite criticizes from Plato. After calling it archaic, Aristotle exposes the difficulties that the dialectical practice developed by Plato in the *Sophist* sets forth:

¹³ *Hemeis de ge ou monon ta me onta hos estin apedeixamen, alla kai to eidos d' tynchanei on tou me ontos apephenametha.*

“If ‘being’ has many senses (...), what sort of ‘one’, then, are all the things that are, if non-being is to be supposed not to be? Is it the substances that are one, or the affections and similarly the other categories as well, or all together-so that the ‘this’ and the ‘such’ and the ‘so much’ and the other categories that indicate each some one class of being will all be one? But it is strange, or rather impossible that the coming into play of a single thing should bring it about that part of that which is a ‘this’, part a ‘such’, part a ‘so much’, part a ‘here’. Further, of what sort of non-being and being do the things that are consist? For ‘nonbeing’ also has many senses, since ‘being’ has; (...) and the false is said not to be, and so is the potential” (N 2, 1089^a7-28).

The Aristotelic critique is clear: understood in only one way, *being* can not explain in any case the plurality expressed in the categories. It is not enough to introduce *not-being*, if this is understood unanimously. On the other hand, *being* and *not-being* must be understood like a plurality of meanings that identify themselves with the plurality of categories, with the truth and the false, and with the potential and the act¹⁴, all of these are ways of being, moreover, irreducible ways of being.

Why has Plato not been able to recognize the primary diversity of being? Aristotle’s words expressly point out that his criticism of Plato is due to the fact that Plato has understood the One and the Dyad as supreme principles of reality. In Plato’s ontology the One and the Dyad appear as universals with univocal meaning. That is why, as Aristotle states in N 2, having established the One and the Dyad, the consequence is that of having dealt with the problem in an archaic way. This is, having dealt with the issue about not-being the Eleatic way. The solution to the parmenidian aporia is not about just stating the existence of *not-being*, like Plato had done, but recognizing previously the irreducible diversity of the meanings of *being* and *not being*, which is the solution posed by Aristotle in his *Metaphysics*¹⁵.

3 The Sophist and the new Aristotelic concept of being

Concerning the thematic developed by both works, there is a close link between Plato’s *Sophist* and Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*¹⁶. We can point out the following as common elements: the universalism of the object of the supreme science (*Soph.* 253 A-D, *Met.* Γ 1–2, E 1), the opposition to the false universalism of the sophist (*Soph.* 231 A, 232 B, 233 B, *Met.* Γ 2), or the link between the not-being and the falseness (*Soph.* 239 B-240 E, 259 D-261 A, *Met.* E 4, Δ 7, Θ 10). We can also mention the controversy about Eleatism and, consequently, the reflection on the issue of being, purposes that both texts share and which have different ways of investigation: the first track initially deals with the opposition between monism and pluralism, to afterwards raise the possible existence of substances apart from the sensitive experience (*Soph.* 242 C-246 C, *Met.* Z 2, 1028b8-31); the second research track investigates the opposite notions, this is, the supreme genres (in Plato) or the *species of the one* and of *being* (en Aristotle) (*Soph.* 254 B-258 C, *Met.* Γ 2, 1004^a9-28, Δ 9–11, I 3–10). This second track is the one that connects directly with

¹⁴ Aristotle, in fact, distinguishes three areas of the meanings of “being” and “not-being”: the area of categories, the area of being like true and not-being like false, and the area of being and not-being like potential and act. More about the variety of the meanings of being, see Δ 7 y Z 1.

¹⁵ See Rossitto’s conclusions about this. C. Rossitto, “La dialettica nella doctrina platonica dei principi secondo *Metafisica* M 8 e N 2”, in: AA. VV., *Aristotele nel 23° Centenario*, “Verifiche”, VII, Trento (1978), p. 470–472.

¹⁶ E. De Strycker, “Notes sur les relations entre la problématique du *Sophiste* de Platon et celle de la *Métaphysique* d’Aristote”, in: P. Aubenque (ed.), *Études sur la Métaphysique d’Aristote. Actes du VI Symposium aristotelicum*, Paris 1979, p. 49–67 can be checked.

the Parmenidian thesis against diversity and movement¹⁷. It is also there that the deep differences between the solution proposed by the *Sophist* and the *Metaphysics* become clear. We have seen what the Platonic solution to the Eleatic aporias is about and what difficulties it causes. Aristotle is completely conscious of the historical importance of this issue¹⁸ and, therefore, the enormous conceptual and doctrinal effort made by the Stagirite in *Metaphysics* aims no just to exceed the difficulties raised by the Eleats, but to exceed the deficiencies of the dialectic practice displayed by Plato in the *Sophist*. A big part of the investigation about *being* that is developed in *Metaphysics* in fact reminds us of that developed in the mentioned dialogue, as if this was always present in the thought of Stagirite in the moment he deals with the investigation about *being* and its' determinations.

What way does Aristotle propose in order to get over the Eleatic aporias and the deficiencies in the Platonic dialectics? Aristotle raises a new metaphysics of being. Throughout *Metaphysics*, the nature of being and the One is widely dealt with, which indicates the transcendental importance that the Stagirite puts on this issue. The attempt of the Aristotelic solution to the aphorism about the nature of being and the One includes four fundamental principles: 1) *being* and *one* are not substances¹⁹, but transgeneric and coexistence notions²⁰; 2) *being* and *one* can be said in different ways; 3) the substance understood as shape is the first way of being and being one; 4) *being* and *unity* are the same and are one thing²¹.

Once the principles of the new science of being were being established by Aristotle throughout the *Metaphysics* have come to terms with, the new way the Philosopher deals with the opposite notions in Γ 2 becomes clear. Indeed, this new way, superior to the Eleatic and Platonic ones, has the following stages: 1) distinguishing the many meanings used for saying being and the rest of notions related with being, as well as the contrary notions (Γ 2, 1004^a22-24); 2) establishing the relationship of each of those meanings with the first way of saying it (1004^a25-30); and 3) assuming that the first way of saying it matches with the substance (1004b7-10). This is the way Aristotle overcomes the Parmenidian monism and Platos' deficiencies too²². In fact,

¹⁷ The Aristotelical critic to the Parmenidian thesis had been previously exposed *in extenso* in *Physics*. M. Boeri, "Aristóteles contra Parménides: el problema del cambio y la posibilidad de una ciencia física", *Tópicos* 30 bis (2006), p. 45-68 can be checked about this.

¹⁸ In Z 1 1028b2-7, Aristotle states that: "the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance? For it is this that some assert to be one, others more than one, and that some assert to be limited in number, others unlimited. And so we also must consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense".

¹⁹ In I 2, 1053b15-20 and Z 16, 1040b17 fragments, the Stagirite refuses explicitly that the universal could be substance, and Aristotle spreads the impossibility to the one too: "If (...) no universal can be a substance (...), clearly unity also cannot be a substance; for being and unity are the most universal of all predicates (I 2, 1053b15-20). Since the term 'unity' is used like the term 'being', (...), evidently neither unity nor being can be the substance of things" (Z 16, 1040b17).

²⁰ With regard to this passage, Calvo Martínez discusses accurately: "In this paragraph the principal ontological thesis about *tò ón* ("something that is") and *tò hén* ("one"), and its relationship with the categories are stated: a) those notions are not genres, they are transgeneric (transcendental), being the categories the supreme genres of reality; b) the categories *lack materia*; the lack, in fact, genre, due to the fact that they are the supreme genres, which means that "something that is" and "one" are divided *at once* (*euthýs*) on the multiplicity of categories, so each of these are *immediately* (*euthýs*) something that is and one; c) the transgeneric character of these notions does not suppose (...) that they are given as separate singular realities". See T. Calvo Martínez, *Aristóteles. La Metafísica*, Madrid 1994, p. 360, n. 38.

²¹ Cf. 2, 1003b22-24: "being and unity are the same and are one thing (...) for 'one man' and 'man' are the same thing, and so are 'existent man' and 'man'" (1003b22-24).

²² Plato does not seem to develop any doctrine about the multivoicity of being, nevertheless, a passage from the *Sophist* clearly indicates that the Philosopher is aware of the problem and supposes the unity and hierarchy

Plato had estimated that the diversity of determined present in a sensitive reality could easily be explained by a participation of the combinable Shapes between each other (Parm. 129 A-D); for instance, with the participation between the Rest and the Movement in the Being and the Other. But as Plato is interested preferably in the relationship between Shapes, he had left the relationship that joins a subject with the Shape it participates in apart. Aristotle, on the contrary, is interested preferably in the unity between the subject and its' determinations in the material reality, and concludes that it is necessarily a first reference, a reference that identifies with the substantial shape and that is the real principle of unity (Γ 2, 1004b7-10). Indeed, the substance of each thing, understood as its shape or essence, is the one responsible of the being and the unity of each reality, this is, in charge of making each reality a unified reality, determined and real, and not a mere addition of indeterminate and potential material. That is why the Stagirite criticizes the dialecticians in Γ 2 stating: "And those who study these [opposite] properties err not by leaving the sphere of philosophy, but by forgetting that substance, of which they have no correct idea, is prior to these other things" (Γ 2, 1004b7-19).

In fact, with the development of an extensive investigation about being, the one and the opposite notions under the permanent presence of the priority of the substance, Aristotle has been able to, against Parmenides, assure the variety, the generation and the movement of sensitive reality. And against Plato, has been able to guarantee the structural unity of sensitive reality. The presence of the Platonic *Sophist* has been fundamental, motivating and unavoidable in both processes.

of the Shapes in the sensible reality: "we speak of man, for example, under many names-that we attribute to him colours and forms and magnitudes and virtues and vices, (...) and in the same way anything else which we originally supposed to be one is described by us as many, and under many names" (251 A-C). The influence of this passage of the *Sophist* in the Aristotelic treatment of multivoicicity of *being* and the unifying character of the substance seems obvious.

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Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and the Christian Kabbalah¹

Abstract | This paper deals with Mirandola's concept of the Christian Kabbalah. As I said in the introduction, Pico is mostly perceived as a leading representative of the Florence Academy or as a possible initiator of a newly emerging scientific paradigm (Thorndike, Yates) in the 17th century. Besides, there is another important point. I think that Pico should be considered as a creator of the Renaissance Christian mysticism, where he followed the apologetic-missionary concept of Raymundus Lullus and eschatological Trinitary visions of Joachim da Fiore. However, Pico enriched his concept with motifs coming from medieval Jewish mysticism, which he enriched with motifs coming from medieval Jewish mysticism. Unfortunately, Pico did not master Hebrew well and so he was too dependant on his translators. Still we cannot deny two facts. First, he was the first to transform the originally Jewish doctrine into Christian cabbala, which he also connected with Neoplatonic-Pythagorean and Aristotelian philosophy. Second, he influenced directly or indirectly Renaissance intellectuals in the 16th and 17th centuries, such as Gilliaume Postel, Francesco Zorzi, Athanasius Kircher, Kaspar Knittel, etc.

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Introduction

Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, *princeps concordiae*² is famous for his *Oratio*³ and he is known as a protagonist of the Platonic Academy in Florence⁴. This Renaissance scholar, however, could

¹ This article is gratefully dedicated to my brother Radim and his wife Jana. The research was sponsored by the Research Program CTS MSM 0021620845.

² Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494), studied philosophy, theology and languages at Ferrara, Padua, Paris and Florence. In 1486 Pico planned the Roman debate of his *900 Theses* in the standard academic disputation of his day (*stilo Parisiensi*) with prominent scholars of all the world, but this disputation never took place. Pico was accused of heresy and pope Innocent VIII. established a comission to review the ortodoxy of the *Theses*. Thirteen of the *Theses* were condemned: “*Nulla est scientia quae nos magis certificet de divinitate Christi quam magia et cabala.*” Mirandola wrote *Apologia* (1487) and the pope condemned *Theses* as a whole. In 1493 pope Alexander VI. de Borgis absolve him from accusation. Until his death Pico lived mainly in Florence. From his works: *Conclusiones* (1486), *Apologia* (1487), *Commento* (1486), *Heptaplus* (1489), *De ente et uno* (1492), posthumously *Disputationes in astrologiam*. See G. F. Pico, *Životopis Giovanni Pica della Mirandola*, in: J. Herúfek, (ed.), *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Kníže svornosti či sváru?*, trans. L. Kysučan (in progress). P. O. Kristeller, *Osm filosofů italské renesance*, pp. 63–78, T. Nejeschleba, “*Kníže svornosti*” *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola a jeho filosofické úsilí*, in: G. Pico, *O lidské důstojnosti / De hominis dignitate*, Praha 2005, pp. 7–50, M. V. Dougherty, *Three Precursors to Pico della Mirandola's Roman Disputation and the Question of Human Nature in the Oratio*, in: *Pico della Mirandola: New Essays*, ed. M. V. Dougherty (Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 114–151.

³ Compare with: A. Field, *The Platonic Academy of Florence*, in: M. J. B. Allen a V. Rees (eds.), *Marsilio Ficino: his Theology, his Philosophy, his Legacy*, Leiden–Boston–Köln 2002, pp. 359–376. J. Hankins, “The Myth of Platonic Academy”, in: *Humanism and Platonism in the Italian Renaissance*, Roma 2004, pp. 187–272.

also be considered as a creator of the Renaissance Christian Kabbalah. We can say that Pico developed a very considerable and complex concept of Christian Kabbalah, stemming from the original Jewish mysticism.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse Pico's concept of natural science. I begin with Pico's opinion on the relationship between natural magic – necromancy on the one hand and natural magic and Kabbalah on the other. We should say that not only G. Scholem and Ch. Wirszubski, but also G. Busi, M. Idel and F. Lelli consider Pico's concept of Kabbalah to be important.⁵ Therefore I would like to examine the role of the Christian Kabbalah in Pico's philosophical system. I am going to base my study on his prohibited thesis: "*Nulla est scientia quae nos magis certificet de divinitate Christi quam magia et cabala.*"⁶ Pico further defends this thesis in the fifth part of *Apologia*. Next *Princeps concordiae* returns to the topic of Kabbalah in his work *Heptaplus*.

1 Natural Magic and Necromancy

First we consider Mirandola's definition of natural magic. In his *Conclusiones, Oratio* and *Apologia*, Pico distinguishes between two types of magic: natural magic and necromancy. The former is true natural science: "*altera nihil est aliud, cum bene exploratur, quam naturalis philosophiae consumatio*";⁷ the latter is permitted and not prohibited (by the Catholic Church): "*Tota Magia quae in usu est apud modernos, et quam merito exterminante ecclesia, nullam habet firmitatem, nullum fundamentum, nullam veritatem, quia pendet ex manu hostium primae veritatis, potestatum harum tenebrarum, quia tenebras falsitatis male dispositis intellectibus obfundunt.*"⁸

In *Apologia*, Marsilio Ficino also disclaims prohibited magic, but not natural magic, which he regards as useful for helping celestial powers, by the medium of world-spirit (*spiritus mundi*), to flow into the terrestrial realm to save the human body and soul.⁹ Therefore this magic can be

⁴ For example see: E. Cassierer, *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola*, in: P. O. Kristeller and P. P. Wiener, *Renaissance Essays*, Rochester 1992–1993, pp. 41–52. B. P. Copenhaver, "Magic and the Dignity of Man: De-Kanting Pico's *Oratio*," in: J. Allen, J. Grieco etc. (eds.), *The Italian Renaissance in the Twentieth Century*, Firenze 2002, pp. 295–320. W. Craven, *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Symbol of his Age. Modern Interpretations of a Renaissance Philosopher*, Genève 1981, pp. 21–45. E. Garin, *G. Pico della Mirandola: Vita e dottrina*, Firenze 1937, pp. 194–205. T. Nejšchleba, "Kníže svornosti" *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola a jeho filosofické úsilí*, pp. 20–29. Ch. Trinkaus, *The scope of Renaissance Humanism*, 1983, pp. 267–268, 358–361. C. Vasoli, *Le filosofie del Rinascimento*, Milano 2002, pp. 238–239.

⁵ For more information see: J. Blau, *The Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in the Renaissance*, New York 1944. M. Idel, *Kabala. Nové pohledy*, Praha 2004. M. Idel, "The Magical and Neoplatonic Interpretations of the Kabbalah in the Renaissance", in: *Essential papers on Jewish Culture in Renaissance and Baroque Italy*, D. B. Ruderman (ed.), New York and London 1992. G. Scholem, "The beginnings of Christian Kabbala", in: J. Dan (ed.), *The Christian Kabbalah: Jewish Mystical Books and their Christian Interpreters*, Cambridge (Mass.) 1997. F. Lelli, "Un collaboratore ebreo di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Yohanan Alemanno", in: *Vivens Homo*, 1994, pp. 401–430. F. Lelli, "Yohanan Alemanno, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola e la cultura ebraica italiana del XV secolo", in: *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola: Convegno internazionale di studi nel cinquecentesimo anniversario della morte (1494–1994)*, Mirandola, 4–8 ottobre 1994, G. C. Garfagnini (ed.), Firenze 1997, vol. II. pp. 303–325. F. Secret, *I Cabalisti Cristiani del Rinascimento* (orig. *Les Kabbalistes Chrétiens de la Renaissance*, Milano 1985), Roma 2001. Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, Cambridge (Mass.) and London 1989.

⁶ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 9, in: *Opera omnia*, Hildesheim, Zuerich and New York 2005, p. 105.

⁷ Compare with: G. Pico, *Apologia*, in: *Opera omnia*, p. 239: "*Scientia illa, quae merito dicit esse practica naturalis philosophiae, et quae a Guilielmo Parisiensi, et a Bachone, et a Graecis omnibus authoribus, dicitur Magia naturalis, nihil continet in se, quod catholicae et orthodoxae fidei repugnet.*"

⁸ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 1, p. 104.

⁹ M. Ficino, *Apologia*, in: *Three books on Life*, 398 [574].

characterised as astral-medical magic: “*At quoniam medicina sine favore coelesti, quod et Hippocrates Galienusque confitentur et nos experti sumus, saepius est inanis, saepe etiam noxia, nimirum ad eandem sacerdotis caritatem astronomia pertinet, ad quam attinere diximus medicinam.*”¹⁰ On the contrary, in his *Disputationes adversus astrologiam divinatricem*, Pico refuses Ficino’s concept of astral-medical magic claiming that: “*Hinc statim emensa magia, quae non est aliud quam complexus idolatriae, astrologiae, superstitiosaeque medicinae, quae sicut alias quoque superstitiones in libris de vera fide adversum septem hostes singulatim confutavimus.*”¹¹ Though, he did not repute all the magic and astrology, merely the type of divinatory astrology predicting the future events with the aid of the stars. According to Mirandola’s our image is just Christ, consequently the images of the stars are not: “*Quare neque stellarum imagines in metallis, sed illius, id est Verbi Dei imaginem in nostris animis reformemus; neque a caelis aut corporis aut fortunae, quae nec dabunt, sed a Domino caeli, Domino bonorum omnium, cui data omnis potestas in caelo et in terra...*”¹² We can say that Pico’s magical system differs from Ficino’s connected with Kabbalah,¹³ as expressed in his *Apologia*: “*illa pars cabalae quae est de virtutibus corporum coelestium, et illa pars scientiae naturalis quam ego voco magiam naturalem.*”¹⁴ So there are two types of natural magic: natural science and pure practical Kabbalah, presented by Pico not as prohibited, but rather as scientific and the most veridical, and which helps us get to know Christ’s Divinity.

Pico supports his concept of magic by quoting many Christian medieval thinkers who devoted their lives to this science. Consequently for him there are no suspicious aspects to natural magic. Pico drew upon Al-Kindi, William of Auvergne, Albert of Great, and Roger Bacon.¹⁵ Not even does the word “magus” involve anything sinister. Persians had their sages, and Greeks their philosophers.¹⁶ That’s why magic is wisdom, defined as a practical part of natural science,

¹⁰ Ibid., 396 [573].

¹¹ G. Pico, *Disputationes adversus astrologiam*, XII, 1, in: *Opere complete*, CD, Roma 2000, F. Bausi (ed.).

¹² G. Pico, *Heptaplus*, in: *De hominis dignitate, Heptaplus, De ente et uno e scripti vari*, E. Garin (ed.), Firenze 1942, p. 244.

¹³ G. Pico, *Apologia*, pp. 180–181. See: V. P. Compagni, *Pico sulla magia: problemi di causalità*, in: M. Bertozzi, *Nello specchio del cielo: Giovanni Pico della Mirandola e le Disputationes contro l’astrologia divinatoria: atti del convegno di studi, Mirandola, 16 aprile 2004, Ferrara, 17 aprile 2004*, Firenze 2008, pp. 97–100, D. Rutkin, *Magia, cabala, vera astrologia: Le prime considerazioni sull’astrologia di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola*, pp. 31–41, in: *ibid.*

¹⁴ G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 168.

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 169: “*De hac, ut dixi, tractat Guilielmus Parisiensis in suo De universo corporali et spirituali; et dicit quod illa magia prohibita maxime abundavit in Egipto, quia ibi vigeat cultus demonum, ista autem naturalis in Etiopia et India, quia ibi est maxima copia herbarum et aliarum rerum naturalium habentium efficaciam in ista naturali magia.*” G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 169. Compare to: V. of Auvergne, *De universo* I, III, *Secundae*, chap. XX–XXII, in: *Opera omnia*, Paris 1674, I. p. 1058: “*magi quasi magna agentes, licet quidam male interpretati fuerunt magos quasi malos seu male agentes.*” P. Kibre, *The Library of Pico della Mirandola*, p. 93, p. 202 (no. 620). “*Hanc naturalem Magiam non erubescit vir catholicus, et sanctissimus Albertus Magnus dicere se fuisse secutum.*” (G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 169). “*Ex iunioribus autem, qui eam offerunt tres reperio, Alchindum Arabem, Rogerium Baconem et Guilielmum Parisiensem.*” (Pseudo R. Bacon, *Epistola de secretis operibus artis et naturae*, in: R. Bacon, *Opera quaedam hactenus inedita*, ed. by J. S. Brewer, Wiesbaden 1965, p. 523; G. Pico, *De dignitate hominis* p. 104; P. Kibre, *The Library of Pico della Mirandola*, p. 94, p. 176 /no. 422/; R. Kieckhefer, “*Did Magic Have a Renaissance?*”, in: *Magic and the Classical Tradition*, eds. Ch. Burnett and W. F. Ryan, The Warburg Institute – Nino Aragno Editore, London – Turin 2006, pp. 204–210; L. Thorndike, *The Place of Magic in the Intellectual History of Europe*, pp. 18–26).

¹⁶ “*Vocabulum enim hoc Magus, nec Latinum, nec Graecum, sed Persicum, et idem lingua Persica significat, quod apud nos sapiens. Sapientes autem apud Persas idem sunt, qui apud Graecos philosophi dicunt, sic vocari a Pythagora, qui prius dicebantur sapientes.*” (G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 169.)

which proposes: “*exactam et absolutam cognitionem omnium rerum naturalium, quasi apicem et fastigium totius philosophie peculiari ...*”¹⁷

1.1 Two Types of Natural Magic: Natural Philosophy and Practical Kabbalah

Further Pico describes natural science as a natural philosophy: “*Scientia illa quae merito dicitur esse practica naturalis philosophie, et quae a Guilelmo Parisiensi et a Bacone et a Graecis omnibus auctoribus dicitur magia naturalis, nihil continet in se quod catholicae et orthodoxae fidei repugnet.*”¹⁸ Oratio contains a clear definition of this science: “*per moralem scientiam affectuum impetus cohercentes, per dialecticam rationis caliginem discutientes ... Tum bene compositam ac expiatam animam naturalis philosophiae lumine perfundamus, ut postremo divinarum rerum eam cognitione perficiamus.*”¹⁹ Moral philosophy and dialectic clean us, natural philosophy illuminates and prepares us for a mystical ascent to the union with God (theology). Accordingly natural philosophy can be presented as the noblest part of natural science.

According to E. Garin the aim of the noblest science was to prepare and man help to control and transform the world. Furthermore, in F. Yates’s opinion: “(Pico) was [he] who first boldly formulated a new position for European man as Magus using both Magia and Cabala to act upon the world, to control his destiny by science.”²⁰ S. A. Farmer rejects this concept of magic, but believes there are many other types. If we consider for example ‘medical magic’, we can assume that this kind of magic assists with restoration to health. But Pico’s natural magic was more likely contemplative, *involving esoteric means of reading texts* with the help of the mystical technique of *gematria*.²¹ Yates’s attitude towards scientific revolution began to be valid in the late Renaissance: *magic as [a] way for man to “control his destiny through science”,* as can be seen for example in Giovanni della Porta’s concept of magic.²²

What is the function, of this kind of natural magic? How can a magus attain knowledge of Christ’s Divinity? In *Apologia* Pico regards science (magic and Kabbalah) that does not base its sources or conclusion in revelation, particularly in revealed theology. This science can be characterized as being developed and acquired by argumentation: *a priori* rather than *a posteriori*. This means that this science only works with natural powers, not with supernatural ones.²³ Magic also provides knowledge of the forces and activities of natural agents, ergo: “*mirabilia artis magice non sunt nisi per unionem et actuacionem eorum, quae seminaliter et separate sunt in natura.*” Further: “*Nulla est virtus in caelo aut in terra seminanliter et separate quam et actuare et unire magus non possit.*”²⁴ Moreover, magic only knows the limits of natural forces: “*non potuerunt opera Christi vel per viam magiae vel per viam cabale fieri*”²⁵ Jesus performed his miracles by his

¹⁷ G. Pico, *Apologia*, pp. 168–170. Compare with Pico’s, *Conclusiones* 3 and 4, p. 104: “*Magia est pars practica scientiae naturalis. Ex ista conclusione et conclusione paradoxa dogmatizante 47, sequitur, quod Magia sit nobilissima pars scientiae naturalis.*”

¹⁸ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 22, in: *Apologia*, p. 239.

¹⁹ G. Pico, *O lidské důstojnosti / De dignitate hominis*, p. 66.

²⁰ F. Yates, *Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic tradition*, p. 116.

²¹ Gematria – one of the kabalistic mystical techniques (*notarikon, themurah*), where the letters of Hebrew alphabet are represented as numbers: “*the sum of the numerical equivalents of the letters of two or more words was the same, the words might be considered identical and used interchangeably.*” J. Blau, *The Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in the Renaissance*, New York 1944, pp. 8–9.

²² S. Farmer, *Syncretism in the West*, p. 131.

²³ G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 168.

²⁴ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 11, p. 105

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 5, p. 104.

true divinity, or supernatural force, something magic and cabala cannot achieve. We know only indirectly from the Scripture, that miracles were performed.²⁶ Nevertheless unrevealed science helps to assure us of Christ's Divinity more if this science is connected with pure practical Kabbalah in some aspects: "*Nulla potest esse operatio magica alicuius efficacie, nisi annexu habeat opus cabale explicatum, vel implicatum.*"²⁷

As it stands from the reason of the first thesis that Pico distinguishes, between bad or demonic magic (necromancy) and good or natural magic connected with its supreme part i. e. pure practical Kabbalah. *Apologia* offers another distinction between pure practical Kabbalah and demonic Kabbalah. While practical Kabbalah is the supreme part of natural magic: "*aliam quae est de virtutibus rerum superiorum quae sunt supra lunam, et est pars magie naturalis suprema*",²⁸ demonic Kabbalah as necromancy, practised by Jews, is forbidden by the Church because: "*necromantes deinde et diabolici viri sapientis sibi falso nomen vendicantes magos se vocaverunt, ita et quidam apud Hebreos res divinas falsis et vanis superstitionibus polluentes, immo in rei veritate quasi nihil a necromantibus differentes, dixerunt se habere secreta Dei nomina ut virtutes quibus demones ligarent et miracula facerent, et Christum non alia via fecisse miracula.*"²⁹

Magic and practical Kabbalah work only with natural forces, so magic operates with characteres et figurae: "*Ex secretioris philosophiae principii necesse est confiteri plus posse characteres et figurae in opere Magico, quam posit quaecunque qualitas materialis.*" Numbers also have a role in Kabbalah: "*Sicut characteres sunt proprii operi magico, ita numeri sunt proprii operi cabalae, medio existente inter utrosque ut appropriabili per declinationem ad extrema usu litterarum.*"³⁰ Why does Mirandola speak about characters, names and numbers within natural magic and practical Kabbalah? In *Apologia*, where he mentions characters and numbers, he emphasised their natural rather than demonic activity.³¹ Those activities also have names, words and voices if they are formed by God's voice: "*Ideo voces et verba in magico opera efficaciam habent, quia illud in quo primum magicam exercet natura, vox est dei.*" Further: "*Quaelibet vox virtutem habet in magia, in quantum dei voce formatur.*" Names have power if they are derived from Hebrew: "*Nulla nomina ut significativa, et in quantum nomina sunt singula et per se sumpta, in magico opere virtutem habere possunt, nisi sint hebraica, vel inde proxime derivata.*"³²

Characters and numbers have their true and natural activities, which Pico attributes to Pythagorean philosophy claiming that "*sicut mathematica sunt formaliora phisicis, ita etiam actualiora, et sicut in suo esse minus dependent, ita etiam in suo operari.*"³³ Mathematics is not a true science. If happiness exists in a speculative perfection, mathematics does not lead to happiness.

²⁶ G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 167.

²⁷ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 15, p. 105.

²⁸ G. Pico, *Apologia*, pp. 180–181.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 181.

³⁰ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 24, 25, p.105. Compare with: "*Secunda pars est scientia magni nominis per viam viginti duarum litterarum a quibus... composita sunt nomina et characteres seu sigilla que nomina invocata sunt que locuntur cum prophetis in somniis et per hurim et tummim, et per spiritum sanctum et per prophetias.*" A. Abulafia, *We-zot li – Jehuda*, Cod. Vat. Ebr. 190, ff. 121v–122v, in: S. Campanini, *Talmud, Philosophy, and Kabbalah*, p. 442.

³¹ G. Pico, *Apologia*, p.176.

³² G. Pico, *Conclusiones*, 19–20, 22, p. 105. Compare with Reuchlin's *De arte cabalistica*, in: *Op. omn.* p. 849: "*Non significativae voces plus possunt in magia quam significativa, quaelibet enim vox virtutem habet in magia in quantum Dei voce formatur, quia illud in quo primum magicam exercet natura vox es dei, haec Pico.*" Compare with: G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 175: "*Origenes autem de Hebraicis hoc sentit, et ideo dicit quod quedam nomina Hebraica in sacris Litteris, sicut 'ossana', 'sabaoth', 'alleluia' et similia, fuerunt sic reservata et non mutata in aliquam linguam, in qua non retinuisent suam naturalem significationem et consequenter virtutem.*" See: L. Valcke, *Néo-platonisme et orphisme*, pp. 188–189.

³³ G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 172

And so mathematics would rather serve other sciences. Peripatetic and medieval scholars (Bradwardine, Oresme, Swineshead) were mistaken if they accepted mathematics as a true science materially (*materialiter*) and they rejected it formally (*formaliter*): “*Sicut dictum Aristotelis de antiquis, dicentis quod ideo errarunt in physica contemplatione, quia mathematice res physicas tractarunt, veram essent si illi materialiter mathematica non formaliter accepissent, ita est verissimum modernos, qui de naturalibus mathematice disputant, naturalis philosophiae fundamenta destruere.*”³⁴

Secret philosophy known as Pythagorean philosophy is less well-known and less useful. Pythagoreans respected mathematics as a formal science in comparison with the Peripatetic statement. This formal arithmetic shows us the optimal way to natural prophecy, which Joachim da Fiore knew as well.³⁵ According to Pico Pythagoras understood that the formal number is a principle of all numbers. He said that: “...*inter omnia mathematica numeros, ut formaliores, ita etiam esse actualiores, et inter numeros impares ternarium (quia sit primus impar, et primum in uno quoque genere est perfectissimum in illo genere), et inter numeros pares denarium, qui est omnis numerus, ut patet (ab eo enim ultra numeramus per replicationem).*”³⁶ The numbers three and ten are formal numbers; in magical arithmetic they are the ‘numbers of numbers’: “*Quilibet numerus praeter ternarium et denarium sunt materiales in magia; isti formales sunt, et in magica arithmetica sunt numeri numerorum.*”³⁷ Pico attempted to find a relation between the Pythagorean concept of numbers, and Kabbalah. In *Oratio* Pico declares that reading the books of Kabbalah he seemed to hear Plato and Pythagoras.³⁸

We shall now turn our attention back to two particular aspects of Mirandola’s concept of Kabbalah. The first tends to defend Christian religion against Jews and prove the fundamental Catholic dogma of the Holy Trinity. The other, mystical and contemplative aspect, also finds its expression in Mirandola’s concept of Kabbalah.

2 The Christian Kabbalah

2.1 Pico’s Christian Predecessors and Jewish Teachers

It is possible to say that Pico was the first to explicitly transform Jewish Kabbalah into a Christian form.³⁹ The word “explicitly” is important, because Pico had many predecessors in Christian history who tried to prove *implicitly* the dominance of the Christian belief at the expense of the Jewish belief. Those defenders of the faith, predominantly converted Jews, often fought very furiously. Fr. Petrus Alfonsi (12th century), *is best known as the first author to attack the Talmud for its failure to conform to reason and therefore its inferiority to Christianity.*⁴⁰ Alfonsi wrote

³⁴ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 5, pp. 100 – 101.

³⁵ See: “*Per Arithmetiam non materialem sed formalem, habetur optima via ad prophetiam naturalem. Ioachim in prophetiis suis alia via non procesit, quam per numeros formales.*” G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 9–10, p. 101.

³⁶ G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 172.

³⁷ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 23, p. 105.

³⁸ G. Pico, *O lidské důstojnosti / De dignitate hominis*, p. 112, *Apologia*, p. 172. G. Pico, *Apologia. L’Autodifesa di Pico di fronte al tribunale dell’inquisizione*, a cura di P. E. Fornaciari, Firenze 2010, pp. 398–399. See: J. Reuchlin, *De arte Cabalistica*, in: *Op. omn.*, pp. 862 – 863. See: Ch. Wiszubski, *Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, p. 187.

³⁹ G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 180.

⁴⁰ B. McGinn, B. “Cabalists and Christian: Reflections on Cabala in Medieval and Renaissance Thought”, in: Richard H. Popkin and Gordon M. Weiner (eds.), *Jewish Christians and Christian Jews: From the Renaissance to the Enlightenment*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 1994, p. 12. I. M. Resnick, *Introduction*, in: P. Alfonsi, *Dialogue against the Jews*, Washington, D. C. 2006, pp. 12–36.

Dialogi contra Judaeos (1110), in which he defended two kinds of Christian teaching – creation and Trinity – by means of the *auctoritas* of Scripture. Joachim da Fiore incorporated Alfonsi's concept of the Trinity into his famous theology of the Trinity's action in history, which is found in his works *Expositio in Apocalypsim* and *Liber figurarum*.⁴¹

Many other Christian thinkers attempted to uphold the doctrine of the Trinity with the aid of Jewish 'weapons', specifically by a Christian interpretation of rabbinic texts, notably Midrash or Talmud (but not Kabbalah). For example Arnaldo de Villanova and his *Allocutio super Tetragrammaton* (1292), which was devoted to the mystery of the Trinity; Alfons de Valladolid (Abner de Burgos, 14th century), a converted Jew. He was the first to quote the word "Kabbalah", meditating about the Incarnation; the *Zelus Christi* of Petro de la Cavalleria; and the *Ensis Pauli* of Paulus de Heredia, which dealt with mariological questions.⁴²

Now we will concentrate on the Jewish or converted intellectuals who further inspired and formulated Pico's Kabalistic attitudes, expressed in his *Oratio*, *Apologia*, *Conclusiones*, *Heptaplus* and *Commento sopra una Canzona de Amore da Girolamo Benivieni*. First a few words about his Renaissance contemporaries: Elia del Medigo, Flavius Mithridates and Jochannan Alemanno. Elia del Medigo, with whom Pico had some contacts at Padua in 1480, initiated him into Averroistic philosophy. Although de Medigo refused to accept Kabalistic doctrine connected with Platonic philosophy, he did not dismiss Jewish Kabbalah altogether. Nevertheless he insisted that this doctrine should be combined with "its origins", first of all with Averroistic philosophy. In his letter to Mirandola he outlined the great mystery (God, *Eiyn Sof*, *Sefirot*, etc.) contained in his Hebrew work *De substantia orbis*, which is not translated into Latin.⁴³ Del Medigo made a translation of some philosophical and Kabalistic works for *princeps concordiae*. We can mention for example: *Sefer Zohar*, *Sefer Yetzirah* and Gikatilla's *Sha'are Orah* (*Porta lucis*).⁴⁴

Flavius Mithridates was a more crucial figure for Pico. Not only was he known as a teacher of oriental languages and a translator from Greek, Arabic and Hebrew,⁴⁵ but from 1485 to 1486 he was also employed by Pico to translate Kabalistic works that included many Christianizing interpolations. As Wirszubski's study has shown: "he was in a sense Pico's forerunner as regards the latter's notion that the esoteric tradition of the Jews confirmed Christianity."⁴⁶ Mithridates acquainted Pico with great medieval Kabalistic scholars and their works, such as Abulafia's *De*

⁴¹ Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, s. 161–169.

⁴² G. Scholem, *The beginnings of the Christian Kabbalah*, pp. 26–27, 45, Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, pp. 185–186.

⁴³ Compare with del Medigo's opinion: *I do not admonish you, my lord* [Pico della Mirandola] *who are as an angel, but remind, that since you are investigating these things, you must not follow those scholars, who make reason the root and interpret the words of Cabala in a manner conforming to speculation, rather, you must make Cabala the root, and try to make reason conform it.* Elia del Medigo, *De Substantia Orbis*, in: A. M. Lesley, *The Place of the Dialoghi d' amore in Contemporaneous Jewish Thought*, in: Rudermann (ed.), *Essential papers*, p. 176.

⁴⁴ G. dell'Acqua-L. Münster, "I rapporti di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola con alcuni filosofi ebrei", in: *L'opera e il pensiero di G. Pico della Mirandola*, I, pp. 149–157. L. Valcke, *Le periple intellectuel de Jean Pic de la Mirandole*, Sainte-Foy 1994, pp. 42–43.

⁴⁵ Compare with these Latin texts: "scito me post multam asiiduis indefessisque lucubrationibus navatam operam Hebraicam linguam Chaldaicamque didicisse, et ad Arabicae evincendas difficultates nunc quoque manus applicuisse [...]" G. Pico, *Epistulae* ((P36 Ad A. Corneo), in: *Opere complete* (CD), F. Bausi (ed.). "Petisti a me Illustrissime Princeps ut Alcoranum Mahometi de Arabico in latinum sermonem traducerem... Quod petisti igitur de Arabico in latinum sermonem converti. Deinde in hebraicum et postea in chaldeum et syrum. Est autem sermo chaldeus et Syrus unicus, characteres diversi; quemadmodum et Syrus, qui cum Arabico convenit in characteribus, et sermo quidem diversus est. Denique unusquisque sermo in sua columna collocabitur." (In: Flavius Mithridates, *Sermo de passione domini*, Ch. Wirszubski (ed.), Jerusalem 1963, p. 50.

⁴⁶ G. Gorazzol, *Menahem Recanati Commentary on the daily prayers*, Torino 2008, pp. 104–117.

secretis legibus (*Sitrey Torah*), and his letter to his disciple, *Summa brevis cabale que intitatur Rabi Jeude*, where he criticizes the doctrine of *Sefirot* and prefers the doctrine of *Semot*. Mithridates also translated Azriel of Gerona's *Quaestiones*, Gikatilla's *Portae Iustitiae* (*Sha'are Tzedeq*), *Sefer Bahir*, *Liber de Radicibus seu Terminis Cabalae*, and *Sefer Zohar*; Avraham Axelrada's *Corona nominis boni* (*Keter Shem tov*); M' nach Recanati's *Liber de secretis orationum et benedictionum cabale*, *Commento al Pentateuco* (*Be'ur 'al ha-Tora*), which Mirandola made use of in his *Concusiones cabalistae secundum opinionem propriam*, and in *Heptaplus*.⁴⁷

Another no less considerable scholar was Jochanan Alemanno. Idel, according to Wirszubski, assumes that Pico met Alemanno in 1486, not in 1488 as supposed by B. C. Novak.⁴⁸ Alemanno was a highly educated Renaissance thinker who knew both the Jewish tradition and Christian teaching, and kept in touch with notable humanists of his time such as Agostino Nifo, Alberto Pio and Paride de Ceresara.⁴⁹ Rabbi Alemanno was a teacher, translator and tutor of Kabbalah until Mirandola's death in 1494. Notable among Alemanno's writings is the Introduction to *Cantico dei Cantici*, which relates to Pico's *Commento alla canzona d'amore*. The commentary on *Ene ha-edah* or *Supercommentario* of Moses Narboni to ibn Tufayl's *Hayy ibn Yaqzân* has some parallels to *Heptaplus*. Alemanno's tract *Hay ha-Olamim* (*L'Immortalità*) was also of importance.⁵⁰

2.2 Pico's definition of Christian Kabbalah

Kabbalah⁵¹ is Jewish mystical teaching, which emerged in Europe in the half of 13th century in France (Provence) and then in the 13th century in Spain. Kabbalah can be characterized as the reception of tradition by oral transmission, involving two main parts. The first one is speculative, which is dominated by the doctrine of *Sefirot*, the other younger is practical Kabbalah with the doctrine of names (*Semot*) and angelology. The *Sefirot* – (from *safar* – calculate) as lower worlds are founded and united by *En-Sof* (Infinity). There are ten *Sefirot*, represented by number ten. When Pico created the concept of *Sefirot*, he was inspired by Mithridates's translations, as follows:

“Et scias quod omne opus geneseos et secretum decem numerationum sigillatum est cum nomine elohim a principio et usque ad finem... Et hoc est principium omnibus cognominibus coniunctis cum deo benedicto. et quando memorabis apud nomen et secretum decem

⁴⁷ G. Busi, *From Languedoc to Florence. The itinerary of an enigmatic booklet*, in: S. Campanini, *The book of Bahir. Flavius Mithridates' Latin translation, the hebrew text, and an english version*, Torino 2005, pp. 43–85. Y. Gikatilla, *The Book of Punctuation. Flavius Mithridates' Latin Translation, the Hebrew Text, and an English Version*, Torino 2010, pp. 168–196. M. Idel, *La cabbalà in Italia*, pp. 135–170. F. Lelli, “Umanesimo Laurenziano nell' opera di Alemanno”, in: D. L. Bemporad a I. Zattelli, *La cultura ebraica all' epoca di Lorenzo il Magnifico*, Firenze 1998, s. 53–54. Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, s. 53–65. F. Lelli, *Pico tra filosofia ebraica e "qabbala"*, pp. 206–220, G. Tamani, “I libri ebraici di Pico della Mirandola”, in: G. C. Garfagnini, *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Convegno internazionale di studi nel cinquecentesimo anniversario della morte (1494–1994)*, I–II, Firenze 1997, s. 515–518, P. O. Kristeller, “Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and His Sources”, in: *L' opera e il pensiero di Giovanni Pico della Mirandola nella storia dell' Umanesimo*. Firenze 1965, vol. I, s. 70–74, Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, 51–74.

⁴⁸ B. C. Novak, *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and Jochanan Alemanno*. Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, London 1989, s. 257.


⁴⁹ A. M. Lesley, *The place of the Dialoghi d'amore*, p. 178, F. Lelli, “Pico tra filosofia ebraica e 'Qabbala'”, pp. 216–217.

⁵⁰ F. Lelli, *Introduzione*, in: Y. Alemanno, *Hay ha- 'olamin* (*L'immortale*), F. Lelli. (ed.), s. 7–10, 19, F. Lelli, *Pico tra filosofia ebraica e "Qabbala"*, pp. 214–218.

⁵¹ For more information see: G. Busi. *La Qabbalah*. Roma – Bari, 2006; Vl. Sadek. *Židovská mystika*. Praha: 2003; G. Scholem. *Kabbalah*. New York: 1978.

graduum ad numerationes quia scilicet decem verba quibus mundus creatus est inveniens doudecim ab his usque ad decem (Domine Pice non possum non facere... etiam corrigam tibi librum hebraicum. vide quomodo scribitur in hebraico... et est secundum quod transtuli supra. Sed magnus error est quia debet dicere quia decem verba quibud mundus creatus est inveniens continere הדיה he, iod, mem, que sunt secretum 10 numerationum est 55. nam aleph 1. beth 2. gimel 3 daleth 4 he 5. vau 6. zain 7. heth octo teth 9. iod decem. collige illa et grunt 55. numera autem litera he que est 5. et iod 10 et mem 40. sunt 55.”⁵²

Pico's structure of Sefirot:



As we have seen, Pico distinguishes on the one hand between natural magic and ‘bad’ magic (necromantia), on the other hand between practical Kabbalah and ‘bad’ Kabbalah: *Hec est prima et vera cabala, de qua credo me primum apud Latinos explicitam fecisse mentionem, et est illa qua ego utor in meis conclusionibus, quas, cum expresse ponam contra Hebreos ad confirmationem fidei nostre, nescio quo modo isti magistri habere potuerunt pro suspectis in fide. Verum quia iste modus tradendi per successionem, qui dicitur cabalisticus, videtur convenire unicuique rei secreta et mystice, hoc est quod usurparunt Hebrei ut unamquamque scientiam quae apud eos habeatur pro secreta et abscondita, cabalam vocent, et unumquodque scibile quod per viam occultam alicunde habeatur, dicatur haberi viam cabale.”⁵³ Practical Kabbalah can be comprehended in two different ways: “*aliam quae est de virtutibus rerum superiorum quae sunt supra lunam, et est pars magie naturalis suprema.”⁵⁴ Another division of Kabbalah is found in Pico’s *Conclusiones*: “*Quidquid***

⁵² J. Gicatilla, *Portae Iustitiae (Sha'are Tzedeq)*, in: Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola's Encounter*, pp. 73–74.

⁵³ G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 180

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 180–181.

*dicant ceteri Cabaliste, ego prima divisione scienciam Cabale in scienciam Sephiroth et Semot, tanquam in practicam et speculativam distinguerem.*⁵⁵ Further practical Kabbalah practises formal metaphysic and inferior theology: “*Scientia quae est pars practica cabalae practicat totam metaphysicam formalem et theologiam inferiorem.*” In Pico’s division of Kabbalah the source of Lower Theology is the same as that one in Pseudo-Dionysius’s tract *De divinis nominibus*, where he shows two ways of knowing God: the affirmative one (lower, Cataphatic Theology) and the negative (superior, Apophatic Theology).⁵⁶

Similarly Alemanno regards the Kabbalah in two parts: speculative (*pars speculativa*) and practical Kabbalah (*pars practica*) The first part implies the doctrine of three worlds, higher, middle and lower, connected with the structure of *Sefirot*, which are separate intellects. The doctrine of names (*Semot*), i. e. the second part, is to attain the powers of higher things through the recitation of divine or sacred names.⁵⁷ Thus Kabbalah is divided into the speculative Kabbalah with the doctrine of *Semot* and practical Kabbalah including the doctrine of *Sefirot*. Pico’s second Kabbalistic thesis further defines speculative Kabbalah as: “*Quidquid dicant alii cabaliste, ego partem speculativam cabalae quadruplicem dividerem, correspondenter quadruplici partioni philosophiae quam ego solitus sum affere. Prima est scientia quam ego voco alphabetariae revolutionis, corespondentem parti philosophiae quam ego philosophiam catholicam voco. Secunda, tertia, et quarta pars est triplex merchiava, corespondentes triplici philosophiae particularis, de divinis, de mediis, et sensibilibus naturis.*”⁵⁸ The ‘revolution of the alphabet’ (*alphabetariae revolutio*) is the same as Abulafia’s *ars combinandi*, which means that “it contains the revolving of law or the sphere of the law (*revolutionem legis seu sphaeram legis*) by which all its secrets in the Torah can be understood; this is proved by the fact that their numbers correspond (*gematria*). *Ars combinandi* is, also similar, but not equal to art of Ramon Lull,⁵⁹ how Pico clarifies in his *Apologia*: “*idest ars combinandi, et est modus quidam procedendi in scientiis, et est simile quod apud nostros dicitur ars Raymundi*”. Because Kabbalists proceed in the different ways. Consequently Abulafia further explains his art leading us to reach the knowledge of the prophecy and to perceive the Divine Names, if we use the seventh exegetic method in his epistle *Shewa’ Netivot ha-Torah*: “*which includes all the other methods. It is the holiest of the holy, appropriate only for the prophets. It is the sphere that encompasses every thing, and with the apprehension of it, the speech [dibbur] that issues from the agency of the Active Intellect by the power of speech will be perceived. For it is effluence that issues from the Blessed Name through the meditation of the Active Intellect upon the power of speech, as the Master [i. e., Maimonides] stated in the Guide of the Perplexed II, 36.*”⁶⁰

⁵⁵ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 1, pp. 107–108.

⁵⁶ Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, p. 254. Compare with: M. Koudelka, *Nauka o pozitivní a negativní teologii v Dionysiových listech a mystické teologii*, in: Dionysios Areopagita, *Listy, O mystické teologii*, Praha 2005, pp. 10–16.

⁵⁷ “*The speculative pars of the Kabbalah concerns knowledge of the interconnection of the three worlds by means of the ten Sefirot, and the allusions and secrets of the Torah and the hierarchy of these three worlds and their area of influence.*” M. Idel, *The magical and neoplatonical* p. 118.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 2, p. 108. Compare with Alemanno’s concept of Kabbalah: “*The speculative pars of the Kabbalah concerns knowledge of the interconnection of the three worlds by means of the ten Sefirot, and the allusions and secrets of the Torah and the hierarchy of these three worlds and their area of influence.*” In: M. Idel, *The magical and neoplatonical* p. 118.

⁵⁹ For more information about Lull’s concept see: M. D. Johnston, *The Spiritual Logic of Ramon Llull*, Oxford 1987. H. J. Hames, *The Art of Conversion Christianity and Kabbalah in the Thirteenth Century*, Leden–Boston–Köln 2000, pp. 118–189. J. N. Hillgarth, *Ramon Lull and lullism in fourteenth-century France*, Oxford 1971, pp. 1–134. M. Idel, *Dignitates and Kavod: two Theologic Concepts in Catalan Mysticism*, in: *Studia Lulliana* 36 (1996), pp. 69–78. P. Zambelli, *L’apprendista stregone*, pp. 60–64.

⁶⁰ A. Abulafia, *Sleva Netivot Ha-Torah*, Italy 2007, p. 8.

The ultimate goal of human activity is higher, because it aims to unite the human passive intellect with divine active intellect (Metatron), which Abulafia discusses in his work *Hayyê ha Olam ha-Ba*: “The benefit of the knowledge of the name of [God] is in its being the cause of man’s attainment of the actual intellection of the Active Intellect and the benefit of the intellection of the Active Intellect is in the ultimate aim of the life of the intellectual soul... The intention is that his name shall be like the name of his master, Šadday, which I have called Metatron, Prince of the Presence.”⁶¹ In an anonymous epistle *Sha’rey Zedek* one of his disciples assimilates the process of uniting by conjunction of lower man and superior man (Metatron)⁶², sitting on the throne: “In order to understand, you should think about the world as a ladder that is placed in the lowest essence and rises to the supreme essence; the head of the ladder is called a throne.” According to Abulafia’s attitude an inferior man is microcosm and a superior man is macrocosm.⁶³

In *Apologia* Pico respects Abulafia’s concept of Kabbalistic exegesis (*gematria*) connecting it with the Christian exegetical method of *anagogia*: “*dicitur cabala, et hoc quia illa expositio, que dicitur ore Dei tradita Moysi et accepta per successionem modo predicto, quasi sensum sequitur anagogicum. Qui etiam inter omnes est sublimior et divinior, sursum nos ducens a terrenis ad celestia, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia, a temporalibus ad eterna, ab infimis ad suprema, ab humanis ad divina, a corporalibus ad spiritulia.*”⁶⁴ Simultaneously we can not disclaim Alemanno’s Kabbalistic exegesis penetrating into the secrets of the Torah. According to this Jewish scholar we may also reveal its mystery with the aid of other sciences as are astrology, alchemy and magic, to be sure that ancient Israelites, more precisely sage Moses, owned all the ancient wisdom (*prisca theologia*). Therefore we can say that in Alemanno’s point of view neoplatonic and pythagorean doctrines are merely its new imitation. Nevertheless this mystery is just not well known to Jews, but it is also addressed to heathens, who are able to read the mystery of Torah with the help of Platonic and Aristotelic philosophy in the Kabbalistic way. There is only one condition, the magus must clean his body and his soul. Then he will understand all the secrets of the Torah, as it appears in Alemanno’s work *Collectanea*: “After the external cleansing of the body and an inner change and spiritual purification from all taint, one becomes as clear and pure as the heavens. Once one has divested oneself of all material thoughts, let him read only the Torah and the divine names written there. There shall be revealed awesome secrets and such divine vision as may be emanated upon pure clear souls, who are prepared to receive them.”⁶⁵

In conformity with Alemanno magus can activate this sefirotic world by his will and attain his power to do wonders: “Moses knew how to direct his thoughts and prayers so as to improve the divine influx... By means of that influx, he created anything he wished, just as God created the world by means of various emanations. Whenever he wished to perform signs and wonders. Moses would pray and utter divine names, words and meditations, until he had intensified those emanations.”⁶⁶ Alemanno’s influence is obvious in Pico’s sixth thesis: “*Quodcunque fiat opus mirabile, sive sit magicum sive cabalisticum, sive cuiuscunque alterius generis, principalissime referendum est in deum gloriosum et benedictum, cuius gratia supercaelestes mirabilium virtutum aquas super contemplativos homines bonae voluntatis quotidie pluit liberaliter.*”⁶⁷ Here just God’s grace can purify the magus and give him the great power for his magical and Kabbalistic action in the

⁶¹ A. Abulafia, *Hayyê ha Olam ha-Ba*, MS. Oxford 1582, fol. 12a, (trans. M. Idel, p. 127).

⁶² Henoah was transformed to the angel *Metatron*. For instance see: G. Scholem, *Kabbalah*, New York 1978, pp. 377–381.

⁶³ A. Abulafia, *Sitrei Torah. Secrets of the Torah*, p. 41.

⁶⁴ G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 178.

⁶⁵ J. Alemanno, *Collectanea*, in: M. Idel, *The Magical and Neoplatonic Interpretations of the Kabbalah*, p. 119.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 225.

⁶⁷ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 6, pp. 104–105.

Scripture. In his *Oratio* Pico explains the process of the purification, inspired by Dionysios's three stages of human soul: *purificatio*, *illuminatio* and *perfectio*.⁶⁸ The reading of the Scripture enables the magus to reach divine names and mysteries written therein.

In *Apologia princeps concordiae* suggests three schools within Judaism: Talmudic, philosophical and Kabbalistic too: "*Est enim omnis scuola Hebreorum in tres sectas divisas, in philosophos, in cabalistas et in Talmuticos...*".⁶⁹ The first two schools introduce scholars into learning and interpretation of the Torah, which God gave to Moses on Mount Sinai in the form of stone tables. The third school represents the climax of their search, because it opens the mysteries hidden in the Torah. Moses received it but he could not write it down. He was only allowed to hand the Torah over orally to seventy wise men and their followers: The second law, i. e. secret mystery, is called Kabbalah.

Therefore Pico, following Abulafia, thought that the term Kabbalah should be translated into Latin as the reception (*receptio*) of the tradition: "*Ex quo modo tradendi istam per succesivam scilicet receptionem unius ab altero, dicta est ista scientia 'scientia cabale', quod idem est quod 'scientia receptionis', quia idem significant cabala apud Hebreos quod nos 'receptio'*".⁷⁰ In another of Pico's work *Commento* we can find the same definition of Kabbalah: "*This principle [that is, secrecy] was very religiously observed among the ancient Hebrews, and for this reason, their secret doctrine, which contains an explication of the abstruse mysteries of the law, is called Cabala, which means Receiving, because they receive it from each other, not through writings, but by oral transmission. It is a doctrine which is clearly divine, and worthy of being shared with only a few; it is a very important foundation of our faith.*"⁷¹

In the end Kabbalah was recorded at the time of Ezdras.⁷² Then not only Jewish wise men, after reaching forty years, can read in the mysteries written in the Torah, but also Christians can. He finds out that nearly all the Kabbalistic truths agree with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, the Incarnation and the original sin: *Ibi Trinitatis mysterium, ibi Verbi incarnatio, ibi Messiae divinitas, ibi de peccato originali, de illius per Christum expiatione, de caelesti Hierusalem de casu demonum, de ordinibus angelorum, de purgatoriis, de inferorum paenis, eadem legi quae apud Paulum et Dyonisium /139r/ apud Hieronymum et Augustinum quotidie legimus.*⁷³ For this reason Pico got for Kabbalistic books and had them translated for a large sum of money to be able to study them.⁷⁴

Jews, however, did not comprehend the secret mystery fully enough.: "*Et hinc est quod validissima inde argumenta habentur contra Iudeos, quia discordia quae inter eos et nos, ut maxime patet ex epistolis Pauli, hinc tota precipue dependet, quod ipsi sequuntur litteram occidentem, nos autem spiritum vivificantem...*"⁷⁵ The Jews interpreted the captivity of Jerusalem literally (*pesat – littera*

⁶⁸ G. Pico, *De dign. hom.*, p. 70.

⁶⁹ "*Talmuticos allegari ab antiquis doctoribus nostris non est credendum, tum quia Clemens et multi alii qui Hebreos allegant fuerint ante compositionem ipsius Talmut, quae fuit post Christi mortem plus quam per CL annos, tum quia doctrina Talmutica est totaliter contra nos conficta ab ipsis Hebraeis iam contra Christianos pugnantibus; quare illi doctrine talem honorem non detulissent nostri, ut tunc maxime aliquid dictum ab eis firmum putarent, cum Iudeorum testimonio corroboratur. Philosophos pariter certum est non allegare, quia et isti, qui scilicet secundum philosophiam exponere ceperunt Bibliam, ceperunt a Morici tempore. Primus fuit rabi Moyses de Egypto, quo adhuc vivente floruit Averrois Cordubensis... Relinquit ergo ut hec Hebreorum doctrina cui doctores catholici ex Hieronymi testimonio tantum deferunt et quam adeo aprobant.*" G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 180.

⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p. 176.

⁷¹ G. Pico, *Commento*, trans. Bernard McGinn, *Cabalists and Christians*, p. 19.

⁷² G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 177.

⁷³ G. Pico, *De dign. hom.*, p. 112.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*.

⁷⁵ G. Pico, *Apologia*, pp. 178–179.

occidens).⁷⁶ They did not understand all the Kabbalistic messages about the victory of the true Messiah, the Son of God, as the Christians did. According to Pico this Kabbalah should confirm the Christian doctrine. So he had to turn his attention to Christian writers, such as Apostle Paul, Hilarius, Origen and, primarily, the Gospels.⁷⁷ The Christian interpretation of the Scripture via Kabbalah (*spiritus vivificans*) is now presented by Pico as the noblest spiritual wisdom, because it conducts us away from: “*sursum nos ducens a terrenis coelestia, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia, a temporalibus ad aeterna.*”⁷⁸

Similarly, we can see the same strategy in works of one of Pico’s followers Johannes Reuchlin, who also wants to defend the fundamental catholic dogma. He is convinced that Kabbalah is a good instrument for this goal as well. He strictly rejects Christian belief that Kabbalah is a man⁷⁹ whose heretical ideas came from the devil and that all Kabbalists are heretics.⁸⁰ On the contrary Reuchlin regards Kabbalah as divine science, because it was revealed to Moses by God on the mountain Sinai. Therefore Kabbalah is a matter of divine revelation handed down to further contemplation of the various Forms of God, contemplation bringing salvation; Kabbalah is the receiving of this through symbols.⁸¹ Talmudists did not understand all message of God and they remained only in the sensible world (*mundus sensibilis*): “*Talmudista vero in mundo sensibili permanent, ac animam universi huius mundi non transcendit, quod si quandoque licenter ad Deum et beatos spiritus pergat, non tamen Deum ipsum immanentem et absolutum accedit.*”⁸² They read the Bible materially (*littera occidens*), meanwhile the Christian Kabbalists deepen in the higher intellectual world (*mundus intellectualis*) so they can contemplate about the divine things, such as an angels and finally God. We should say that Kabbalah is not only heretical and some philosophical discipline, but as Greece sages think the true wisdom: “*Cabalistae illam legis expositionem sequentes, quae per quaedam symbola mentis elevationem ad superos et ad rem divinam quammaxime propellit, hanc appellant Graeci vestri anagogicam institutionem, quae non modo philosophia, sed et sophia ipsa, hoc est sapientia.*”⁸³

In Pico’s opinion Kabbalah represents a tool for proving the uniqueness of Christianity once and for ever: “*Sunt autem maxime digni Christiani hac scientia, quia sicut ipsa est lex spiritualis, non carnalis, ita nos spirituales sumus Israelite, non carnales. Pertinet autem lex spiritualis ad eum qui, iuxta Paulum, in abscondito videns est, non ad eum qui in manifesto.*” Pico already tries

⁷⁶ “*Sicut enim apud nos est quadruplex modus exponendi Bibliam, litteralis, mysticus sive allegoricus, tropologicus et anagogicus, ita est apud Hebraeos: litteralis apud eos dicitur Pesat, quem modum temeny apud eos rabi Salomon Chemoy et similes; allegoricus midas, unde sepe apud eos audies Midras Ruth, Midrasthillym, Midras Coeleth, idest expositio per Midras, idest mistica, super Ruth, super psalmos, super Ecclesiastem, et sic de aliis (et istum mosum sequuntur maxime doctores Talmutici); tropologicus dicitur Sechel, quem sequuntur Abraham Abnazara, ubi litteraliter non exponant, et Levi Bengerson et multi alii, et ante omnes rabi Moyses Egyptius; anagogicus dicitur cabala, et hoc quia illa expositio, que dicitur ore Dei tradita Moysi et accepta per successionem modo predicto, quasi semper sensum sequitur anagogicum.*” G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 178. Compare with: S. Campanini, *Talmud, Philosophy, and Kabbalah*, pp. 432–433; Rom 3:29.

⁷⁷ G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 176.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 178

⁷⁹ Compare with Pico’s description of pseudo-Kabbalah in his *Apologia*: “*Horrendum est istis patribus videtur hoc nomen et ex ipso pene sono timendum, ita ut forte sint ex Isis qui cabalistas non homines, sed hircocervos potius, vel centaurum, vel omnino monstrorum aliquid esse suspicentur. Quinimmo audi rem ridiculam: cum semel quidam ex eis interrogaretur quid esse ista cabala, respondit ille fuisse perfidiam quandam dominem et diabolicum, qui dictus est Cabala.*” G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 175.

⁸⁰ J. Reuchlin, *De arte cabalistica*, p. 747.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 746.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 762.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 763.

to prove that in his inner polemic with Abulafia's concept of Kabbalah. That is why he divides Kabbalah into a practical part, which is dominated by the doctrine of *Sefirot*, and a speculative-theoretical part connected with the doctrine of *Semot* (see: "*Quidquid dicant ceteri Cabaliste*").

If we take into account Mithridates's translation and interpretation activities, offering Mithridates's own concept of Christian Kabbalah, we have to state that the result of these various influences is relatively complicated and not always clear in Pico's concept of Kabbalah. Still we can emphasize two aspects of his Christian Kabbalah, developed not only in *Apologia*, but also in *Heptaplus*. The first aspect is apologetic-missionary and the other is mystical-contemplative. The former one is to help the magus to prove the uniqueness and orthodoxy of Christianity at the expense of Judaism. While this aspect concentrates on the subjects of Christian theology (Trinity etc.), the other is to direct the magus towards cognition and his unity with God. We can say that in these aspects Pico combines Jewish and Christian sources with the doctrine of "ancient theology" (*prisca teologia*) and with the elements of Neoplatonic-Pythagorean and Aristotelian philosophy, among which are to confirm the superiority of Christian religion.⁸⁴

2.3 Apologetic – missionary aspect: the Holy Trinity

We will now attend to Mirandola's purpose in explaining the Christian Trinity via kabbalistic-alegoric techniques. According to *Sefer Yetzira*, influenced by the Pythagorean doctrine, which was familiar to Pico, God created the world by thirty- two paths of divine wisdom. The first part is called the *Sefirot* (ten) and the other responds to twenty-two letters of Hebrew alphabet.⁸⁵ As we have seen (Thesis 23) the numbers three and ten are 'formal numbers' and in magical arithmetic are the 'numbers of numbers.'⁸⁶ Besides playing a more important role in practical Kabbalah, they also reveal the mystery of the Trinity (by adding Pythagorean philosophy),⁸⁷ as suggested in the sixth thesis: "*Tria magna dei nomina quaternia, quae sunt in secretis cabalistarum, per mirabilem appropriationem tribus personis trinitatis ita debere attribuit, ut nomen Ehyeh sit patris, nomen YHWH sit filii, nomen Adonai sit spiritus sancti, intelligere potest, qui in scientia cabalae fuerit profundus.*"⁸⁸ By combining the Pythagorean tetraktys ($1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10$) with the Kabbalistic technique of *gematria* we have: *Ehyeh* (*pater*) – 1(aleph) + 5(he) + 10(yod) + 5(he) = 21, *Adonai* (*spiritus sanctus*) – 1(aleph) + 4(daleth) + 50(nun) + 10(yod), *filius* – 10(jod) + 5(he) + 6(waw) + 5(he) = 26, 26 + 86 is equivalent of Elohim(86) + YHWH(26).⁸⁹ Using this technique we further come to the *nomen ineffabile*: "*Qui sciverit explicare quaternarium in denarium habebit modum, si sit peritus Cabalae, deducendi ex nomine ineffabili nomen .Ixxii. litterarum.*"⁹⁰ ($11 > 56/542$).

⁸⁴ Ch. B. Schimdt, "Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 27 (1966), pp. 505–531, *Prisca theologia e philosophia perennis: due temi del Rinascimento italiano e la loro fortuna*, p. 220; L. Valcke, R. Galibois, *Le périple intellectuel de Jean Pic de la Mirandole*, pp. 119–121; Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, pp. 166–200.

⁸⁵ G. Scholem, *Kabbalah*, pp. 23–28.

⁸⁶ Compare with Reuchlin's *De arte cabalistica*, in: *Op. omn.*, p. 849: "*In hanc utilitatem clementes angeli saepe figuras, characteres formas et voces invenerunt, proposueruntque nobis mortalibus et ignotas et stupendas, nullius rei iuxta consuetum linguae usum significativae.*"

⁸⁷ Compare with Reuchlin's *De arte cabalistica*, p. 835: "*mox in ipsa propria sentimus Cabalam aliud nihil esse nisi, ut Pythagorece loquar, symbolicam theologiam, in qua non modo litterae nomina sunt rerum signa, verum res etiam rerum.*"

⁸⁸ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 6, p. 108.

⁸⁹ B. Copenhaver, *L'occulto in Pico*, pp. 219–220, Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola*, p. 197.

⁹⁰ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 56, p. 112.

The name of the seventy-two letters is the divine name: 72: 10 (y) + 15 (h+y) + 21 (w+h+y) + 26(h + w + h + y).

We can also apply the Kabbalistic mystical technique to Mirandola's Orphic thesis: "*Tantus est numerus pythagorici, quantus est numerus cum quo deus creavit saeculum, sub quaternarii pythagorici forma numeratus.*"⁹¹ According to Wirszubski's statement, the phrase "*Deus triplex creavit saeculum*" could, consequently, be related to the Trinity. Farmer, however, thinks that this phrase refers to the triadic emanation creative principle of the world. If Farmer's hypothesis is correct, we can then see in *Heptaplus* how Mirandola links the creative activity of God with the mystery of the Trinity. In his thesis: "*Idem est bresith, id est in principio creavit, ac si dixisset in sapientia creavit.*"⁹² Pico adds, inspired by *Recanati*,⁹³ 'at the beginning created' (Bresith, dictum from Gn. 1, 1) connects with the wisdom, the second *Sefirot Chochmah*, which in Pico's view expresses, via *gematria*, the name of Jesus.

Heptaplus further explains this dictum: "*Dictio illa apud Hebreos hoc modo scribitur berescith. Ex hac igitur, si tertiam litteram primae coniungamus, fit diction ab, idest ab. Si geminatae primae secundus addamus fit, bebar, idest bebar. Si praeter primam omnes legamus, fit resith, idest resith. Si quartam primae et ultimate connectamus, fit sciabat, id est sciabat. Si tres primas quo iacent ordine statimus, fit bara, idest bara. Si prima ommissa, tres sequentes, fit rosc, idest rosc. Si omissis prima et secunda duas sequentes, fit est, id est est.*"⁹⁴ *Ab* denotes father, *bebar* – son, *resith* the beginning, *sabath* – rest and goal. *Bara* – created, *rosc* – head and *es* – fire. In opposition to Farmer's view I believe that the phrase *Deus triplex creavit* can be interpreted as the unity of three persons, i. e. the Son or the wisdom, who is at the beginning with the Father and the Holy Spirit.

Similarly, Mirandola considers the mystery of creation in his theses: "*Rectius foret illud Becadmin, quod ponit glosa chaldaica super dictione Bresit, exponere de sapientialibus ideis, quam de trigintaduabus viis, ut dicunt alii Cabalistae; utrunque tamen est rectum in Cabala*" and "*Quod dixit Chaldaeus becadmin, id est cum eternis vel pre eterna, triginta duas vias sapientie intellexit.*"⁹⁵ God created the world through thirty two ways, i. e. twenty two Hebrew letters and ten *Sefirot*. By combining the first letter of Bereshit (Beth), with the first letter Alêf, the meditating sage can gain the word 'Father'. By adding the middle letter (Nûn, denoting the Son), and finally the last two letters, Sîn and Tâw, one can attain the word 'šabbat', as seen in thesis: "*Qui profunde consideravit quadruplicem rerum statum: Primo unionis et stabilitate mansionis, Secundo processionis, Tertio reversionis, Quarto beatificae reunionis, videbit litteram Beth cum prima littera primum, cum media medium, cum ultimis ultima, operari.*"⁹⁶ The unity of God and the Son or the Wisdom can be seen in thesis: "*Per eandem conclusionem sciri potest, quod idem filius, qui est sapientia patris, est qui omnia unit in patre, et per quem omnia facta sunt, et a quo omnia convertuntur, et in quo demum sabbitazant omnia.*"⁹⁷

⁹¹ Ibid., 5, p. 106.

⁹² Ibid., 25, p. 82.

⁹³ "*And our Masters also said in the book Bahir [§ ed. Scholem] that rešit [beginning] is in fact hochman [wisdom]. It is for this reason that in the Targum Yerušalmi the word berešit [in the beginning] is rendered behokmeta [with (or by, or in) wisdom]... Also Onqelos translated beqadmin alluding to thirty-two paths of wisdom, and it is for this reason that he did not translacere beqadmita.*" In: Ch. Wirszubski, *ibid.*, p. 41.

⁹⁴ G. Pico, *Heptaplus*, p. 378 (Garin).

⁹⁵ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 26, 58, p. 82, 112.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 59, p. 112.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 61.

The letter Sin is used by Pico to represent the second person of the Trinity:⁹⁸ “*Per hanc dictionem <vya>, quae scribitur per Aleph, Iod et Scin, et significat Virum, quae Deo attribuitur cum dicitur Vir belli, de trinitatis mysterio per viam cabalae perfectissime admonemur.*”⁹⁹ The man of war is Christ. Two of Mirandola’s cabalistic sources are the book of *Bahir* and Recanati’s *De Secretis Orationum et Benedictionum Cabale*. In the book of *Bahir* the letter Aleph corresponds to the word “Father”, the letter Beth does not denote the Son (therefore mirroring Pico’s view), but rather the Mother or the Daughter. The letter Sin refers to the Wisdom of Torah. In Recanati’s version the letter Aleph corresponds to *principium* or the head.¹⁰⁰

Reuchlin also applies the letter Sin dividing the Holy Name in three words: Hu, Ehieh and Esh corresponding to three *Sefirot*: *Keter*, *Hochmah* and *Binah*. The powerful Name of God is situated, in Reuchlin’s opinion, in the middle of the Tetragrammaton YHWH as the Hebrew letter Scin, i. e. YHSHWH (Pentagrammaton). According to M. Idel Reuchlin invokes to an anonymous text of the circle of ecstatic Kabbalists: “*and this is the secret of the king Messiah, who will come swiftly, in our days. All his action [its] beginning [is] with WH, and also YH, which is the secret of the seventh day, and this is the name, the complete name, and the whole work will be completed by its means.*”¹⁰¹

⁹⁸ Compare with Abulafia’s *Sitrei Torah / Secrets of the Torah*, vol. 1, Providence University Inc. 2009, p. 35: “*For the word Shem (name) is derived from the words Shamama (desolation) and destruction, and the word Ben is derived from the words Bina (Understanding) and Binyan (structure, building).*”

⁹⁹ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 33, p. 110. Compare with Reuchlin’s, *De arte cabalistica*, in: *Op. omn.*, p. 752: “*tunc expectatus est [...] per Sin literam, quae in arte Cabalistica idem quod [...] id est, in miserationibus, et Mem litera per Notaricon designat מתרן [Metatron] id est; de medio scilicet quattor istarum literarum i.h.u.h.*”

¹⁰⁰ “*Dominus vir belli secundum quod exposuerunt sapientes nostri in libro Sepher Abahir [S 18 ed. Scholem] quod dictio his ו״א indicat tria encia prima et sic dicunt ibi Aleph que est prima lictera que scribitur in dictione his est principium sive caput. Iod secunda ab eo hies idest ens continet totum mundum quod scribitur de eo Tessua. At vero secundum quod sapientes nostri dicunt in libro sepher azohar sic indicat fundamentum seculi*” E. R. Wolfson, *Along the Path. Studies in Kabbalistic Myth, Symbolism and Hermeneutics*. State University of New York 1995, p. 74. In: Ch. Wirszubski, *ibid.* pp. 177–178. *Vir belli viz Ex 15,3: “Hospodin je bojovný rek; Hospodin je jeho jméno.” „Dixit rabi Emorai quid est quod scribitur dominus vir belli? Dixit ei Mor Rahamai filius Bibi ne petas a me rem simplicem. Audi mihi consulam tibi. Paradigmaticos rex habebat edes pluchras et unicuique imposuit nomen, et omnes in se erant una pulchrior altera. Dixit dabo filio meo hanc edem que vocatur aleph. Etiam hanc que melior es tet vocatur jod, etiam hanc que bona es tet vocatur scim. Quid nam fecit, congregavit omne tres simul et fecit ex eis unam domum et ex omnibus fecit unum nomen. Dixerunt ei quo usaje verba tua clauseris? Dixit eis filii mei aleph principium est jod secundum ab eo, xin continet totum mundum, quia scribitur in dictione (תשׁוׁבא), idest reiterationis.” Bahir 26/18. In: Saverio Campanini. *The Book of Bahir*. Flavius Mithridates’s translation, the Hebrew Text, and an English Translation. Torino: 2005.*

¹⁰¹ J. Reuchlin, *De arte cabalistica*, p. 752: “*tunc expectatus est [...] per Sin literam, quae in arte Cabalistica idem quod [...] id est, in miserationibus, et Mem litera per Notaricon designat מתרן [Metatron] id est; de medio scilicet quattor istarum literarum i.h.u.h.*” Compare with: M. Idel, *Introduction to the Bison Book Edition*, in: J. Reuchlin, *On the Art of Kabbalah / De arte cabalistica.*, p. XIX.

2.4 Mystical – contemplative aspect: (mors osculi)

We will briefly consider the mystical aspect of Pico's concept of Kabbalah. There are two types of 'the kiss of death' (binsica, *mors osculi*).¹⁰² The first one is described in the thesis¹⁰³: "*Modus quo rationales animae per archangelum deo sacrificantur, qui a Cabalistic non exprimitur, non est nisi per separationem animae a corpore, non corporis ab anima nisi per accidens, ut contingit in morte osculi de quo scribitur: praeciosa in conspectu domini mors sanctorum.*"¹⁰⁴ The soul will be mystical and sacred to God by prayer, allowing man to attain the space of desire or knowledge. It is necessary to concentrate in prayers. Cabbalists use the term *kavanna*¹⁰⁵ (concentration) to describe the mind's ascent to the world of *Sefirot* through prayer. Kavanna is connected to the doctrine of Names, which is based on the enunciation of the letters of the Tetragram (YHWH). By this technique the magus can attain the knowledge of *Sefirot* and further achieve the terrible mystery of the presence of the Lord.

For that reason Mirandola distinguishes two types of *felicitates* in *Heptaplus* which is the only completed work of Pico's and besides, it is one of the most important. In this work we can see Alemanno's affinity of body's purification, mind's illumination and human uniting with God as well. Like Kabbalists, the Renaissance scholar is engaged in the exegesis of the Book of Genesis, so that he can introduce his aspect of magic and Kabbalah again. In six days of creation (the first felicity) the prophet Moses becomes a symbolic guide, who helps the magus to approach the cognition of God in a way consisting of three pseudo-Dionysian stages: purification (*purgatio* – moral philosophy), enlightenment (*illuminatio* – natural philosophy). But the purpose of the second type of *felicitas* (*perfectio* – theology: seventh day) is to attain perfect 'god', particularly the unity of God: "*Vera autem et consummata felicitas ad dei faciem contuendam, quae est omne bonum, ut ipse dixit, et ad perfectam cum eo principio a quo emanavimus unionem nos revehi et adducit... Haec est vera felicitas, ut unus cum Deo spiritus simus, ut apud Deum non apud nos Deum possideamus, cognoscentes sicut sumus. Ille enim nos, non per nos, sed per se ipsum cognovit. Ita et nos cognoscemus illum per et non per nos. Haec est tota merces, haec est vita aeterna, haec est sapientia quam sapientes saeculi non cognoverunt, ut ab omni multitudinis imperfectione redigamur in unitatem per copulam indissolubilem cum eo qui est ipsum unum. Pro hac felicitate*

¹⁰² *Mors osculi* see: (Song of Songs 1:2). "Another interpretation: 'Let him kiss with the kisses of his mouth.' Compare with the Zohar: What did King Solomon mean by introducing words of love between the upper world (sefira Tiferet) and the lower world (sefira Malkut), and by beginning the praise of love, which he has introduced between them, with 'let him kiss me'? They have already given an explanation for this, and it is that inseparable love of spirit for spirit can be [expressed] only by a kiss, and a kiss is with the mouth, for that is the source and outlet of the spirit. And when they kiss one another, the spirits cling to each other, and they are one, and then love is one." *The Wisdom of the Zohar*, Vol. I., ed. I. Tishby, Oxford (English transl. David Goldstein), Oxford 1989, pp. 364–365.

¹⁰³ Pico's sources were: "*Et Michael est archangelus maior qui stat in hierarchia Divinitatis a latere dextro et procedit a pietate et ideo quaerit clemenciam pro Israel et est sacerdos Dei altissimi nihil enim est inferius qui [sic] non habeat suum simile superius et hoc secretum manifestum in partikula factum est die octava ubi dicitur [Lev. 9:4] quod hodie dominus apparet fobie heb[raice] אֱלִיכִם נִרְאֶה nam litere nâtah indicat hunc numerum 50.200.1.5 et tot indicat litere אהרן id est Aaron, scilicet 1.5.200.50. similiter dictio אֱלִיכִם indicat numerum hunc 1.30.10.20.40. et totidem indicat litere מִיכָאֵל [Michael] scilicet 40.10.20.1.30. et hi duo Aaron et Michael docent merita: And from whom do I ask a sacrifice? From Israel. You knot already [Recanati goes on to say] that Michael is the High Priest above, because his power is from [the sefirah called] Charity, and it is said in the Midrash that the sacrifices the souls of the just like continual burnt offerings." *Expositio Decem Numerationum*, Cod. Vat. Ebr. 191, f. 78v (in: Ch. Wirzsubski, *Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, p. 21, 22).*

¹⁰⁴ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 11, pp. 108–109.

¹⁰⁵ *Kavvanah* – defined as nomian technique, using as it does the common prayers as a vehicle for accomplishing mystical and theurgical aims. M. Idel, *Kabbalah: New Perspectives*, p. 103.

Christus orabat ad Patrem hoc modo: 'Pater fac quemadmodum ego et tu unum sumus, ita et hi nobiscum unum sint'"¹⁰⁶

The first felicity can acquire to magus the power to manipulate and control the world (Yates), but his goal is rather to be the minister of the world (Farmer). Therefore in Pico's view the power of magus comes from God, who decides to hear or not to hear prayers offered up in his name, as we read in Pico's theses: "*Ideo voces et verba in magico opera efficaciam habent. Quia illud in primum magicam excercet natura, vox est dei*" and "*Quaelibet vox virtutem habet in magia, in quantum dei voce formatur.*"¹⁰⁷ The purpose of the second type of *felicitas* is to attain (reach) perfect 'god', particularly the uniting with God (*d' vekut*), who is the greatest prize of his contemplative life.: "*Vera autem et consummate felicitas ad dei faciem contuendam, quae est omne bonum, ut ipse dixit, et ad perfectam cum eo principio a quo emanavimus unionem nos revehi et adducit.*"¹⁰⁸

However the Magus is affected by the inherited sin – he must be justified by God's grace. The grace is powerful enough to liberate the magus from the darkness of evil, to clean him from sins, and to usher him into new life: "*Verum sicut omnes in primo Adam, qui oboedivit Sathanae magia quam Deo cuius filii secundum carnem, deformati ab homine degeneramus ad brutum, it in Adam novissimo Iesu Christo qui voluntatem Patris implevit et suo sanguine debellavit nequitias spirituales, cuius filii omnes secundum spiritum reformati per gratiam regeneramur ab homine in adoptione filiorum Dei.*"¹⁰⁹ If Pico regarded the grace as a good instrument for reaching God, Alemanno, on the contrary, found another assistant, i. e. the divine Love, to gain to the supernatural felicity: "*[The ultimate] wisdom, considered as a separate image, is not be attained by rational knowledge, nor can man attain it by himself... since the Divin eis perceivable only by means of God's help, that is ... by virtue of God's love.*"¹¹⁰ Alemanno based his attitudes on Ibn Tufayl¹¹¹ and al-Batalyawsi's concept of uniting the passive intellect with the active intellect connecting them with the Jewish mystical symbol of Jacob's ladder through a sage can ascend to the God's throne. In Alemanno's opinion human intellect must be first purged via natural sciences such as mathematics, logic, astronomy, medicine, methaphysics and rhetoric to reach to the natural felicity; and then, on the higher stage, man gets the knowledge of magic and Kabbalah needed for uniting with the active intellect (supernatural felicity = the kiss of the death): "*One who is complete cleave to the Active Intellect, receiving a supernal light of divine nature, which is called Active Intellect.*"¹¹² Though Alemanno argued for the Jewish religion and refused Pico's Christian interpretation (Incarnation, Christ's grace), nevertheless he rendered his works *Hešeq Shelomoh*, *Hay ha-olamin* and their medieval sources to *princeps concordiae*.

¹⁰⁶ G. Pico, *Heptaplus*, p. 324–326, 336 (Garin). Compare with: *Felicitas ultima hominis est cum continuatur intellectus agens possibili ut forma; quam continuationem et latini alii quos legi et maxime Johannes de Ganda? perverse et erronee intellexerit, qui non solum in hoc, sed ... in omnibus quaesitis Philosophiae, doctrinam Averrois corruptit omnino et depravavit.* G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 3, pp. 67–68.

¹⁰⁷ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 19–20, p. 105.

¹⁰⁸ G. Pico, *Heptaplus*, pp. 324–326. (Garin). Compare with: *Felicitas ultima hominis est cum continuatur intellectus agens possibili ut forma; quam continuationem et latini alii quos legi et maxime Ioannes de Gandavo perverse et erronee intellexerit, qui non solum in hoc, sed ... in omnibus quaesitis Philosophiae, doctrinam Averrois corruptit omnino et depravavit.* *Conclusiones* 3, pp. 67–68.

¹⁰⁹ G. Pico, *Heptaplus*, p. 286.

¹¹⁰ Alemanno, *Hay ha-Olamin*, (trans. F. Lelli, *Prisca Philosophia and Docta Religio*. The Boundaries of Rational Knowledge in Jewish and Christian Humanist Thought, p. 67).

¹¹¹ Compare with ibn Tufayl: "*[According to Ibn Tufayl, The Active Intellect] extense as far as the world of existence and corruption that is all contained within the spere of the moon. And it appears as an essence purified from matter... The meaning of this passage is that [the Active Intellect] is the form noviny this hollow space...*" Ibid. p. 69.

¹¹² Ibid.

The kiss of the death (*mors osculi*: the second felicity) is depicted in Pico's other work *Commento* as well, where magus rises on Jacob's ladder via the seven stages of perfection to obtain the true beauty, which is first liberated from its corporeal form. On the fourth stage there is the perfection of beauty by talking away its ideal form. Next the pilgrim (soul) meets the celestial Venus (beauty), finally on the last, seventh, stage the soul reveals the true beauty, called the active intellect.¹¹³ Pico partly utilizes Greek sources: Plato's *Symposion* and Plotinos's *Enneades* combining them with Arabic and Jewish sources mediated by Alemanno.¹¹⁴ We can see here Gersonides's allegorical interpretation of *mors osculi*: "*Deus benedictus de obsculis oris suis, scilicet quod coniungeretur cum eo secundum posse; obsculum enim significat coniunctionem et applicationem, et hoc est dictum cabalistarum de Moysse, Aarone et Maria, quod mortui sunt per osculum, id est quod quando mortui sunt, coniuncti erant cum ipso Deo.*"¹¹⁵ which item inspired Pico's dictum in *Commento*: "*e perche é sapienti cabalisti vogliono molti degli antiqui padri in tale ratto a' intelletto essere morti, troverai appresso di loro essere morti di binsica, che in lingua nostra significa morte di bacio, il che Divino di Abraam, Isaac, Iacob, Moysse, Aaron, Maria e di qualcuno nostro.*"¹¹⁶ As another source Pico uses Maimonides's *More nevuchim*: "*The result is that when a perfect man is stricken with years and approaches death, this apprehension increases very powerfully, joy over this apprehension and a great love for the object of apprehension become stronger, until the soul is separated from the body at the moment in this state of pleasure. Because of this the Sages have indicated with reference to the deaths of Moses, Aaron, and Miriam that the three of them died by a kiss.*"¹¹⁷

Yet it is very dangerous: when man is still morally and intellectually unpurified, he will not unite with God, but he will be devoured by Azazel:¹¹⁸ "*Qui operator in Cabala sine admixtione extranei, si diu erit in opera, morietur ex binsica; et si errabit in opera aut non purificatus ac-ceserit, devorabitur ab Azazele per proprietatem iudicii.*"¹¹⁹ This thesis defines the real physical death, when the human body is separated from the soul. Azazel, (other name is Samael) called Devil, is characterized in *Sefer Zohar* as the angel thrown down into the darkness by God: "*So he is called 'fallen down': he fell from heaven, and then he fell again into the depth of darkness. Azazel is the one 'with opened eyes', because darkness was not scattered over him, because he did not protest or rage against Heaven like the one [mentioned] above.*"¹²⁰ This fallen angel represents the fifth sefira *Din* (judgment), finding his position in the northern part of the sefirotic system: "*Qui sciet proprietatem Aquilonis in cabala, sciet cur sathan Christo promisit regna mundi, si cadens eum adorasset.*"¹²¹ First of all he mischievously operates at night: "*Qui sciet proprietatem quae est secretum tenebrarum, sciet cur mali daemones plus in nocte quem in die nocent.*"¹²² Here Pico derives his attitude from Recanati's work: "*The proper time for union of man with his wife is*

¹¹³ "*Di poi da sé all' intelletto proprio ascendendo è nel quinto grado, ove la celeste Venere in propria forma e non immaginaria, ma non pero con totale plenitudine della sua beltà, che in intelletto particolare non cape... Al quale pervenendo, grado in ordine sesto, termina el suo cammino, nè gli è licito nel settimo grado... ma quivi debbe come in un suo fine a lato del primo Padre, fonte della bellezza, felicemente riposarsi.*" G. Pico, *Commento*, p. 569 (Garin).

¹¹⁴ M. Idel, *The Antropology of Yohanan Alemanno*, p. 207, B. C. Nowak, *Jochanan Alemanno*, p. 142.

¹¹⁵ Gersonide, *Commento al Cantico dei Cantici nella traduzione ebraico-latino di Flavio Mithridate*, M. Andreato (ed.), Firenze 2009, pp. 122–123.

¹¹⁶ G. Pico, *Commento*, p. 557 (Garin).

¹¹⁷ Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, (trans. S. Pines), Chicago 1963, III., chap. 51, pp. 627–628.

¹¹⁸ Azazel (צַזְאֵל) – (צַזְאֵל). Lev 16:8: "*O obou kozlech bude Áron losovat: jeden los je pro Hospodina, druhý pro Azázela.*" (J. Heller, *Výkladový slovník biblických jmen*, Praha 2003, p. 342). Azázel = *Din*.

¹¹⁹ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 13, p. 109.

¹²⁰ *The Wisdom of the Zohar*, Vol. II., p. 652.

¹²¹ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 47, p. 111. Compare with: Mat 4: 8–9.

¹²² G. Pico, *Conclusiones*, 21, p. 81.

midnight, as our Masters say in the treatise[i. 10] with begard to 'Imma Šalom', the wife of Rabbi Eliezer [who, beány asked why all her children were beatiful, replied], 'he [Rabbi Eliezer] does not consort with me excerpt at midnight.' According to the plain meaning, the reason is that then the heat generated by the food has cooled, and man begets a clean seed. However, according to the truht [the Kabbala], the reason is that then the Holy Blessed be He[conventionally identified with Tiferet] unites with his Shekinnah, etc."¹²³

On the oposite side there is *Metatron*, sometimes entitled the Son of God. If Pico claimed that in the ineffable Name he had really discovered the name of Metatron,¹²⁴ Reuchlin gets on more circumspectly. And he believes that we can just develop the Metatron symbolically, referring to the Book of Creation, where this Name is derived from the word Atbash by changing of the letters yod in mem, he in sade and wav in pe. As a result we obtain the name Maspas Adonay YHWH. Accordingly both scholars see the true Messiah in *Metatron*, who they called Jesus, the Son of God.¹²⁵ In Mirandola's version is Christ (*Metatron*)¹²⁶ victorious over the death and puts down Satan.¹²⁷

We can describe the process of uniting as the Great Jubilee, or more precisly the great Sabbath:¹²⁸ "*Qui noverit in Cabala mysterium portarum intelligentiae, cognoscet mysterium magni Iobei. Qui sciverit quid sit denarius in arithmetica formali et cognoverit naturam primi sphaerici*

¹²³ M' nachem Recanati, trans.: Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola*, p. 36.

¹²⁴ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 9, p. 108.

¹²⁵ J. Reuchlin, *De arte cabalistica*, pp. 884–899.

¹²⁶ "El moto e la operazione è segno di vita, la privazione di questi è segno di morte. Dunaje quando nell' uomo niuna umana operazione appare è veramente morto quanto all' essere intelletuale, è per tale morte di uomo in angelo trasformato; nè altrimenti el detto si drbne intendere de' sapienti cabbalisti quando o Epoch in Matatron, angelo della divinità." G. Pico, *Commento* 554 (Garin).

¹²⁷ *Adsit Ille nobis et laqueum conterat, qui et contrivit Sathanam sub nostris pedibus, Iesue Christus primogenitus omnis creaturae ...sublimita est natura humana, ut homo Christus, que homo est, si credimus Dionysio, angelos doceat, illuminet, et perficiat, tanto, ut inquit Paulus melior angelis effectus ...sed et nos omnes, quibus data potestas filios Dei fieri per gratiam cuius dator est Christus supra angelicam dignitatem evehi possumus.*" G. Pico, *Heptaplus III*, p. 266 (Garin).

¹²⁸ "*Haec est vera felicitas, ut unus cum Deo spiritus simus, ut apud Deum non apud nos Deum possideamus, cognoscentes sicut et dohniti sumus. Ille enim nos, non per nos, sed per se ipsum cognovit. Ita et nos cognoscemus illum per upsuj et non per nos. Haec est tota merces, haec est vita aeterna, haec est sapientia quam sapientes saeculi non cognoverunt, ut ab omni multitudinis imperfectione redigamur in unitatem per copulam indissolubilem cum eo qui est ipsum unum. Pro hac felicitate Christus orabat ad Patrem hoc modo: 'Pater fac quemadmodum ego et tu unum sumus, ita et hi nobiscum unum sint' Heptaplus*", p. 336 (Garin). Compare with Gersonides: "*Manifestum per se est secundum theologos nostros theologizantes in lege et prophetis dras [i. e. derash] aut cabala [an interpolation], nec non et secundum philosophos speculativos, quod sumkám bonum, et perfekta felicitatis hominis est in eo quod cognoscat et sciat deum quo ad eius possibilitatem et ad hunc finem perveniet cum intellexerit ea que sunt et ordinuj entium et rectitudinem, et modum sapientie ipsius dei que disposuit ea in eo modo in quo sunt et esse habentur, et /hoc quia ista intelligibilia dirigent ad cognitionem ipsius dei quodammodo.*" In: B. Crofton, *Pico's Heptaplus and Biblical Hermeneutics*, Leden-Boston 2006, pp. 206–207. "... Et rursus quod in sapientia mathematica est directio quedam ad sapientiam naturalem, et sapientiam divinam sicut probatum est in primo almagesti [I.1]. Et sapeintia naturalis est necessario prior sapientia que est post physica quia scientia methaphysica sequitur eam via perfectionis et finis." "ideo prohibetur hec sapientia, ne quis student in ea, nisi hauerit intellectum firmu met quietum ac roboratum in opinionibus versi tam legalibus quam speculativis." in: B. Crofton, *ibid.*, p. 209. Compare with Alemanno: "*One who is complete will cleave to the Active Intellect, receiving a supernal light of divine nature, which is called Active Intellect... than the man and the Active Intellect will be indistinguishable from each other.*" In: F. Lelli, 'Prisca Philosophia and Docta Religio: The Boundaries of Rational Knowledge in Jewish and Christian Humanist Thought, Compare with ibn Tufayl: "[According to Ibn Tufayl, The Active Intellect] extense as far as the world of existence and corruption that is all contained within the spere of the moon. And it appears as an essence purified from matter... The meaning of this passage is that [the Active Intellect] is the form noviny this hollow space..." *Ibid.*, p. 69.

*sciet illud quod ego adhuc aliquem cabaliam non legi, et est quod sit fundamentum secreti magni Iobelei in Cabala.*¹²⁹ Pico again returns to pythagorean symbolism, which he connects with the Jewish source, i. e. Gersonides' *Portae Iustitiae*: "*numero est quinquaginta et est secretum quinquaginta portarum intelligentiae et locus hic vocatur Geulla idest redemptio...; si vero intellexeris secretum iobelei et secretum quinquaginta portarum intelligentie intelliges hoc misterium intellectu perfecto; et... /... qui intelliget hec secreta intelliget illud quod dicit textus redemptio erit ei et in iobeleo exibit; et scias quod haec numeratio vocatur iobeleus et sic textus dicit iobeleus est anus quinquagesimi ani erit vobis equidem quinquagesima quod est secretum quinquaginta portarum intelligentie.*"¹³⁰

Princeps concordiae becomes involved into the eschalogical Trinitary concept of Joachim da Fiore, contemplating three stages of age: the first one, the Old Testament is symbolized by Father, the second one: The New Testament corresponds to the Son of God and third one: the Eternal Age represents the rule of the Holy Spirit.¹³¹ In Pico's view the world ends, because the fifty gates are related to number fifty, whose value he ascribes to the Holy Spirit, as follows from Mirandola's *Apologia*: "*Et his per omnia multum concordant misteria cabalistarum, qui quinquagenarium numerum attribuunt Spiritui Sancto, qui Spiritus Sanctus apud eos etiam per ignem significatur, in qua forma et in quo numero dierum descendit super apostolos. Estque et apud eos Spiritus Sanctus tertia persona, sive propria in divinis procedens a prima et a secunda, quae dicitur sapientia et procedit a prima, et differt ab utraque solum ratione processionis, sicut scilicet id quod procedit differt ab utraque his a quibus procedit, cum sit tamen per substantiam et essentiam idem cum illis.*"¹³²

If the magus wants to open the fifty gates and to enter the mystery of the great Jubilee, first he must understand why the Law of God begins from the word Beth: "*Ex precedenti conclusione potest contemplativus homo intelligere, cur lex Dei à Beth litera incipit, de qua scribitur, quod est immaculata, quod erat cum eo cuncta componens, quod est convertens animas, quod facit dare fructum in tempore suo.*"¹³³ The word Beth is associated with the second Divinity person, Jesus (*sefira Binah*), who is only the one able to reveal these gates. The Son of God is also symbolized by the number ten, with which, another number five creates and closes the Name of God: YHWH: "*Et hic mundus creatus est cum litera he, que est quinquarius, et iam indicavimus secretum denarii ideo indicatur nunc secretum quinarium quia cum denario et quinario dominus formavit secula, quod sic patet per dictionem sur וַיְרַבְּ cuius litera vau conjungitur cum denario et quinario et sic est denarius quinquarius et senarius qui est deus triagramaton וַיְרַבְּ qui formavit secula, scilicet duo, hoc et venturum. Itaque ex hoc scies quo modo seculum venturum creatum est cum denario et seculum hoc creatum est cum quinario...*"¹³⁴

¹²⁹ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 68, p. 113. Compare with J. Reuchlin's *De arte cabalistica*, p. 840: "*Eo itaque sphaerico numero per decem multiplicato, nascentur quinquaginta sive portae intelligentiae, seu anni Iobelei, cuius proportio dupla, quae est Arithmetica formalitas, in se multiplicata, millesimam generationem procreabit, quod si perpetuo sic facies, apparebit infinitudo, quae est regnum omnium seculorum, a Cabalists Ensoph nominatum, et est deitas ipsa sine indumento.*"

¹³⁰ Gersonides, *Portae Iustitiae*, in: Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, p. 32.

¹³¹ M. Eliade, *Dějiny náboženského myšlení III.*, Praha 1997, s. 111–114. B. McGinn, "Apocalyptic Tradition and Spiritual Identity in Thirteenth-Century Religious Life", in: *The Roots of the Modern Christian Tradition*, E. R. Elder, Kalamazoo 1984, s. 1–26, 293–300. B. McGinn, *The Calabrian Abbot: Joachim of Fiore in the History of Western Thought*, New York 1985, s. 161–200.

¹³² G. Pico, *Apologia*, p. 173.

¹³³ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 60, p. 112. Compare with: *The book of Bahir* 3, 3–7: "*Quare incipit cum litera beth? Velut qui incipit benedictionem, et unde habetur quod lex vocetur benedictio? Ex eo quod scribitur et plenum est benedictione domini mare. Mare quidem non est nisi lex ut scribitur et latior est quam mare.*"

¹³⁴ *Comentum Sepher Isire*, trans.: Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola*, p. 36.

Jesus not only cleanses *homo contemplativus* from sins, and saves him from *peccatum originale*,¹³⁵ but also unites his own, great world, with the small world of man. The Son of God can be described as the light illuminating all the darkness by his grace too: “*Cum fieri lucem nihil sit aliud quam participare lucem, conveniens est valde illa cabalistarum expositio ut in ly fiat lux, per lucem, speculum lucens, intelligamus, et in ly facta est lux, speculum non lucens.*”¹³⁶ *Speculum lucens* symbolizes Jesus (*Tiferet*). *Speculum non lucens* is *sefira Malkut*. Finally comes the Good King from the House of David. Jesus (the new Adam) promised to people to be the sons of God and through his grace to elevate human dignity over angelic sublimity.¹³⁷ *Homo* meets with the Divinity (*Shekhinah*): “*Cum anima comprehenderit quidquid poterit comprehendere, et coniungetur animae superiori, expoliabit indumentum terrenum a se, et extirpatur de loco suo, et coniungetur cum divinitate.*”¹³⁸ There comes the last stage of human efforts, which is uniting the inferior man and the superior man, who sits on the throne according to Abulafia. The superior man (macrocosm) is Jesus, the new Adam.¹³⁹ Wirszubski chose Recanati’s work *Commentary on the Pentateuch* as a direct source,¹⁴⁰ which Lelli and Novak repulsed using as the source work *Hešeq Shelomoh* of Jochanan Alemanno.¹⁴¹ Here the Jewish scholar thinks of *ultima felicitas* as God’s connection with man through the *sefira Tiferet*: “*Salomon se mit donc en quête de cette expérience béatique (...) le jeune roi aspirant à révélation venant de Tiferet, sefira symbolisme par le Tétragramme. L’union accomplie, objet de son désir, n’est accessible, le roi sage s’en rendait parfaitement compte, qu’à la passion d’amour.*”¹⁴² We can see this possible parallelism in Pico’s other thesis, where the *sefira Tiferet* stands for the mystical union of a man with his wife: “*Ubi cumque in scriptura fit mentio amor maris et foeminae nobis mystice designat coniunctio Tipheret et Chienseth Israel, vel Beth et Tipheret.*”¹⁴³ The letter Beth constitutes the third *sefira Binah* (Intelligence) expressing the mystical union with the *sefira Tipheret*. *Kenest Israel* signifies the tenth *sefira Malkut*, where dwells *Shekinah*.

If man was created as *imago Dei*, certainly he was not terrestrial creature (*animal terrestiale*), but celestial creature (*animal coelistum*). Who, however, wants to enter the house of God and to be the Son of God, first and foremost must be baptized. Since Christ will come with the water of baptism and the Holy Spirit with fire to judge to the world: “*Scitur in Cabala cur Dei filius cum aqua baptismi venerit et spiritus sanctus cum igne.*”¹⁴⁴ According to *Sefer Bahir*, which was the

¹³⁵ Compare with Pico’s thesis: “*Quilibet Cabalista habet concedere ex dictis doctorum huius scientie hoc manifeste dicentium, quod Peccatum originale in adventu Messiae expiabitur.*” G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 26, p. 110.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.* 53, p. 112. Compare with Pico’s sources: “*Our Masters say [Bab. Talmud, Yebamot, fol. 49v]: ‘All the prophets prophesied from a mirror that does not shine whereas Moses prophesied from a shining mirror.’ You ought to know that all the ten sefirot are called mirrors, and the tenth is called the mirror that does not shine ... All the prophets except Moses received their prophecy from the last [sefirah Malkut], which is called the property of Night, except Moses, who received from the property of Compassion, which is called Day.*” M. Recanati, in: Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, pp. 37–38.

¹³⁷ G. Pico, *Heptaplus*, p. 266 (Garin).

¹³⁸ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 44, p. 83.

¹³⁹ “*Vera autem et consummata felicitas ad Dei faciem contuendam, quae est omne bonum ut ipse dixit, et ad perfectam cum eo principio a quo emanavimus unionem nos revehit et adducit. Ad hanc angeli attolli quidem possunt, sed non possunt ascendere. Quare peccavit Lucifer dicens: Ascendam in caelum. Ad hanc ire homo non potest, trahi potest; unde Christus de se, qui est ipsa felicitas.*” G. Pico, *Heptaplus*, p. 332 (Garin).

¹⁴⁰ Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola’s Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, p. 50.

¹⁴¹ J. B. Nowak, *Jochanan Alemanno*, p. 145, F. Lelli, *Un collaboratore ebreo di G. Pico della Mirandola: Y. Alemanno*, p. 427.

¹⁴² G. Vajda, *L’amour de Dieu*, p. 284.

¹⁴³ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 17, p. 81.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.* 45, p. 111.

source for this Pico's thesis, the second person of God is representable as the heaven (shamaim): "Quid est celi? Hoc scilicet quod docet cepisse Deum sanctum et benedictum ignem et aquam et agglutonnasse ea simul et fecisse ex eis principium verbi tui veritatis, et hoc est quod scribitur xamaim, idest celi..."¹⁴⁵ In Pico's view the Holy Spirit attributed fire corresponds with the third sefira *Binah* and the Son of God relates to the second sefira *Hochmah*: "Per dictum Cabalistarum quod Caeli sunt ex igne et aqua, simul et veritatem Theologicam de istis sephirot nobis manifestant, et philosophica, veritatem quod elementa in caelo sint tantum secundum activam virtutem."¹⁴⁶ *Princeps concordiae* comes back to the two medieval Kabbalistic works, translated by Mithridates. First is *Liber de Radicibus seu Terminus Cabalae*: "שמים sine he idest celi indicat Tipheret. cum he vero quandoque ipsam Tipheret. et significat hassamaim ly cel." Second is *Liber de Secretis Legis*: "... per hanc dictionem que dicitur בראשית Brexit id est in principio... Et addidit super utrisque duas licteras equales in caractere et conformes in pronuntiatione et in interpretatione quando hec omnia dixit in primo textu Beth principium creavit deus celo set terram."¹⁴⁷ We can add Alemanno's work *Hay ha-olamin* identifying *Bereshit* with the second sefira *Hochman* in the *mors osculi* as well: "Mi baci con i baci della sua bocca, che mostra il fine dell' unione mistica e della morte per baccio; e nel mostrare il mezzo che é una composizione di inizio e di fine come 'All' inizio creò' [ma anche 'Per mezzo del principio, cioè della sefirah Hokmah, creò'], che mostra che esiste un inizio di tute le cose create e che è conveniente intenderlo per mezzo di esse poiché è inizio e fine della conoscenza di Dio."¹⁴⁸

We could say that Christ has the true active virtue, when purifying us with the water of baptism: "Hoc habent inevitabiliter concedere Cabaliste, quod verus messias per aquam homines purgabit."¹⁴⁹ The people are now regenerated and they will sabbatize in the Son of God: So the dictum "Faciamus hominem ad imaginem nostram just repeats that the people are heirs of Christ (*coheredes Christi*): Si igitur sumus ad imaginem Dei, sumus et Filii. /Si filii et heredes Dei, coheredes Christi. Sed qui sunt filii? Scriptum a Paulo est, clamare nos abba (pater), in Spiritu Sancto: ii destinati aeternae hereditati, quam mercedes et fidei et bene acta vitae in caelesti Hierusalem feliciter possidebunt."¹⁵⁰

Conclusion

Pico's concept of the Christian Kabbalah presents a very complex system. In the first part of *Apologia* Pico distinguishes two types of natural magic. The first one is called natural philosophy and is characterized as the practical part of natural science, that is concentrated on activation of the rational part of the human soul. The other one, higher, pure or practical part of Kabbalah, is opposed to natural philosophy, involves the intellectual part of this soul. This type of magic is permitted, on the opposite there is "necromantia", which is prohibited, because it has no firmness, no foundation or truth and by church is justly exterminated (thesis 1). Pico was the first to explicitly transform originally Jewish Kabbalah into the Christian form. There are two aspects of this Kabbalah. The first one is directed to defend the Christian religion and prove the fundamental Catholic dogma of the Holy Trinity. The mystical and contemplative aspect also finds an

¹⁴⁵ *The book of Bahir*, 59/150.

¹⁴⁶ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 67, p. 113.

¹⁴⁷ *Liber de Radicibus seu Terminus Cabalae*, in: Ch. Wirszubski, *Pico della Mirandola's Encounter with Jewish Mysticism*, p. 181

¹⁴⁸ J. Alemanno, *Hayy ha-'olamin*, c. 13r (trans. F. Lelli, p. 427).

¹⁴⁹ G. Pico, *Conclusiones* 40, p. 111.

¹⁵⁰ G. Pico, *Heptaplus*, p. 372 (Garin).

expression in Pico's concept of Kabbalah. That means that the magus strives for cognition and contemplation of God and consequently for unification with Him (*mors osculi*).

Pico is mostly perceived as a leading representative of the Florence Academy or as a possible initiator of a newly emerging scientific paradigm (Thorndike, Yates) in the 17th century. Besides, there is another important point. I think that Pico should be considered as a creator of Renaissance Christian mysticism, where he followed the apologetic-missionary concept of Raymondus Lullus and eschatological Trinitary visions of Joachim da Fiore. However, Pico enriched his concept with motifs coming from medieval Jewish mysticism. Unfortunately, Pico did not master Hebrew well and so he was too dependant on his translators. Still, we cannot deny two facts. First, he was the first to transform the originally Jewish doctrine into Christian Kabbalah, which he also connected with Neoplatonic-Pythagorean and Aristotelian philosophy. Second, he influenced directly or indirectly Renaissance intellectuals in the 16th and 17th centuries, such as Gilliaume Postel, Francesco Zorzi, Athanasius Kircher, Kaspar Knittel, etc.¹⁵¹

¹⁵¹ For example see: A. P. Coudert, *Leibniz and Kabbalah*, Dordrecht 1995; A. P. Coudert, *The Impact of the Kabbalah in the Seventeenth Century*, Leiden 1999; J. Herúfek, *Johannes Reuchlin and the Christian Kabbalah*, in: *Studia comeniana et historica* 40 (2010), n. 83–84, pp. 6–20; J. Matula, *Florentine Platonists in the Works of Caspar Knittel*, in: *Florentine Platonism and Central Europe*, (ed.) J. Matula, Olomouc 2001, pp. 191–199; F. Secret, *I Cabbalisti Christiani del Rinascimento*, Milano 1985 (orig. *Les Kabbalistes chretiens de la Renaissance*, Paris 1964); D. Stolzenberg, “Four Trees, Some Amulets, and the Seventy-two Names of God”, in: *Athanasius Kircher: The Last Man Who Knew Everything*, (ed.) P. Findlen, New York – London 2004, p. 149–169; Ch. Wirszubski, “Francesco Giorgio's Commentary on Giovanni Pico's Kabbalistic Theses”, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, Vol. 37 (1974), pp. 145–156; M. Žemla, *Pico a Paracelsus: malé přiblížení*, in: J. Herúfek (ed.), *Giovanni Pico della Mirandola. Kníže svornosti či sváru?* (in progress).

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Kepler as a Theorist of Music. His Geometrical Presentation of Basic Intervals – Explained in the Perspective of Onto-Harmonical Integrality

Abstract | This article aims at a better understanding of what tonality is. It focuses on Kepler's contribution to a deeper elucidation of this problem, especially his selection of musically sensual proportions by means of geometrical demonstrations, continuously controlled by monochord-experiments. In this way Kepler detected the so-called senarius (the series of proportions contained in the first six numbers); thereby he was able to eliminate the "weak" points in the exoteric scale-building of the ancient Pythagoreans. By substituting the Ditonus (64:81) through the natural third (64:80 = 4:5) he opened the way to the polyphonic compositions of the Baroque era.

.....

Kepler was inspired by the idea that the old Orphic theorem of the "harmony of the world" could be "verified" by an empirically founded "exact" way of thinking. To this aim he dedicated all his investigations (especially from his early *Mysterium cosmographicum* [1596] up to *Harmonice mundi* [1619]). The evaluation of Kepler's central concern reveals, however, a remarkable mixture of admiration and distance. There is, in other words, an odd ambiguity in the "key-words" 'harmony' and 'music'. Later on we shall observe that discrepancy by dealing with some specialized studies on these topics. The general aim of this paper is to clarify the research situation in the following six problematic fields:

1 The tetraktýs as base of ancient (exoteric) Pythagoreism

Kepler's thinking is, without doubt, deeply rooted in the Pythagorean tradition. In his *Excursus de tetracty pythagorico* (VI, 91.35–101.8)¹, however, he vehemently rejects this tradition on account of its exclusion of the 'Quinarius' (the number Five). As Kepler reports, in Pythagorean tradition the number Four, the tetraktýs (τετρακτύς)² – presented in the form of a Greek Delta

¹ Here and in the following citations I use the *Roman* numerals as an abbreviation of the corresponding volume of "J. Kepler, *Gesammelte Werke*", edited since 1938 (a survey of this edition in: V. Bialas, *Johannes Kepler*, München 2004, p. 176–179); the *Arabic* numbers indicate, attached behind a comma, the pages; the other, attached behind a point, the lines. – This paper was presented, in a strongly shortened version, at the international conference "Kepler 2008: From Tübingen to Sagan", organized by the Institute for the History of Science (Polish Academy of Sciences / Warsaw), at the University of Zielona Góra from 22nd to 26th of June 2008.

² For this tetraktýs cf. the paragraphs 82, 150 und 162 in: Jamblich, [Περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορείου βίου.] *Pythagoras: Legende – Lehre – Lebensgestaltung*. Eingel., übers. und mit interpretierenden Essays von M. Albrecht, John

(Δ) with the base of 4 points and, over them, 3, 2 and 1 points – was celebrated as ‘*Fons Naturae*’ (VI, 97.25), as ‘*Fons Animarum*’ (VI, 98.30) or, because it contains altogether 10 points (the Decade), as ‘*mater omnium*’ (VI, 98.12). In this context Kepler also mentions the numeric series of “6, 8, 9, 12” (VI, 97.7), which was “canonized” by the so-called ‘Helikon’ (Ἑλικών)³ and which in ancient Pythagoreism represents the basic intervals for scale-building⁴. In the harmonical aspect the ratios 1:2:3:4 and 6:8:9:12 contain the same intervals: the *Octave* (6:12 = 2:4 = 1:2), the *Fifth* (6:9 = 8:12 = 2:3), the *Fourth* (6:8 = 9:12 = 3:4) and the *Whole Tone* (τόνος or διάζευξις; 8:9)⁵, which separates two Tetrachords 6:8 (=3:4) and 9:12 (=3:4) and which, simultaneously, is “enveloped” by the two Fifths 6:9 (=2:3) and 8:12 (=2:3)⁶.

The explained tetraktys was commonly used as a systematic base in ancient musicology⁷. But it represents (what we shall see later on) only an “exoteric” Pythagorean tradition. As it seems, Kepler was not conscious of this fact; he criticizes that tradition generally in a rather aggressive manner. Disregarding the fact that in ancient Pythagoreism existed a significant methodological dispute between ἀκουσματικοί (which followed the sensitive ear) and μαθηματικοί (which followed the abstract reason)⁸, Kepler characterizes the mentioned tradition exclusively as the last one. He finds fault with Pythagorean contempt of the judgement of the ears (*iudicium aurium*; VI, 99.13)⁹. On account of this contempt, as he further explains, a doctrinaire tyranny was practiced (*tyrannis*; VI, 99.17) within musical theory up to Ptolemy. Primarily by this Alexandrian astronomer, he concedes, a certain progress was brought, in so far as this scholar tried to introduce the Quinarius – missed in the tetraktys-system – into the harmonical deliberations¹⁰. Kepler registers with satisfaction that Ptolemy has mentioned the two Thirds together with the two corresponding Sixths (the proportions “4:5 and 5:6, 3:5 and 5:8”; cf. VI, 99.33). But he criticizes that Ptolemy denies – *against* the aural impression – the consonant character of these intervals (VI, 99.32–34), whereas he – also *against* the aural impression – declares the Whole Tone (8:9) as a consonance (VI, 98.18 f.).

Dillon, Martin George, Michael Lurje and David S. du Toit, Darmstadt 2002, p. 84, 132 and 141, and W. Schulze, “Tetraktys – ein vergessenes Wort der Philosophie”, in: P. Kampits [et alii] (eds.), *Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit. Festgabe für Leo Gabriel zum 80. Geb.*, Berlin 1983, p. 125–154; see scheme Nr. 1.

³ Cf. the figure of this tuning-instrument in: I. Düring, *Ptolemaios und Porphyrios über die Musik*, Göteborg 1935 (repr. Hildesheim 1987), p. 61, and [Ptolemaios], *Die Harmonielehre des Klaudios Ptolemaios*. Ed. by I. Düring (Diss. Göteborg), CVI, Göteborg 1930, p. 46; see scheme Nr. 2.

⁴ Cf. the paragraphs 118 and 119 in: Jamblich, [Περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορείου βίου.] *Pythagoras: Legende – Lehre – Lebensgestaltung*; note 2), p. 110–113.

⁵ Cf. B. Münxelhaus, *Pythagoras musicus. Zur Rezeption der pythagoreischen Musiktheorie als quadrivaler Wissenschaft im lateinischen Mittelalter*, Bonn-Bad Godesberg 1976, p. 21.

⁶ In Raffael’s famous painting “The School of Athens” (aprox. 1510) – on the left side, below – a table is held before Pythagoras, on which this constellation is pleasingly represented. Cf. B. Münxelhaus, *Pythagoras musicus* (note 5), the figures 28 and 29.

⁷ Cf. especially H. Koller, “Harmonie und Tetraktys”, *Museum helveticum* 16 (1959), p. 238–248.

⁸ Cf. Jamblich’s report in: Z. Ritoók, *Griechische Musikästhetik. Quellen zur antiken griechischen Musikästhetik*. Aus dem Griechischen übers. von Hadwig Helms, Frankfurt/M. etc. 2004, p. 72 f.; K. von Fritz, *Mathematiker und Akusmatiker bei den Pythagoreern* (Bayer. Akademie der Wiss. Philosoph.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungsberichte 1960, H. 11), München 1960.

⁹ From Pythagoras is, however, handed down the rule that the harmonical education of men has to start through sensation (δι’ αἰσθήσεως): by contemplating beautiful forms and shapes and by hearing beautiful rhythms and melodies; cf. the paragraph 64 in: Jamblich, [Περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορείου βίου.] *Pythagoras: Legende – Lehre – Lebensgestaltung*; note 2), p. 70 f.

¹⁰ Ptolemy, indeed, censures the lack of the Quinarius in the Pythagorean theory (cf. I. Düring, *Ptolemaios und Porphyrios über die Musik*, p. 31). But he still remains in the “old” system correlating the powers of soul (thinking, feeling, living) with Octave, Fifth and Fourth (ibid., p. 118).

At the end of the *Excursus* (following the foreword of the third book of *Harmonice mundi*) Kepler explains the aim and the methodological principle of his criticism of the old Pythagoreism (cf. VI, 100.21–101.8): For twenty years he searched for causes of the harmonical theory, which, on the one hand, satisfy the judgement of the ears, and, on the other hand, provide a clear insight into the difference between numbers that form consonant musical intervals, and those, that are unsuitable for that, because they are dissonant¹¹. Since the temporally conditioned inwardness of the human mind by itself is not able to guarantee the distinct *wholeness* of the sought after principle of cognition, it has to find, by transcending itself, a vivid contact to the eternally creating archetype¹². According to this method a specifically differentiated connection becomes transparent, a connection, which exists between the given *sensual word* (conditioned by space and time), the actively reflecting *human mind* (conditioned by time) and the *divine archetype* (which, as an entirely unlimited actuality, is beyond space and time).

In the following explications we have to answer the questions: How did Kepler realize the holistic programme that leads him from the world, through the human mind, up to the Opifex aeternus? (VI, 101.1) Has Kepler thus really separated himself from Pythagoreism? Or did he rather correct the weak point of its harmonical system? First of all, however, we have to clear up why and with what intention Kepler postulates so resolutely the “civic rights” (the *ius civitatis*; VI, 100.14) for the Quinarius among the other musical intervals.

2 The pentagon-construction as “esoteric” science

By emancipating the Quinarius within the Pythagorean scale Kepler is able to substitute the “Ditonus”¹³ 64:81 by the so-called “Natural Third” 64:80 = 4:5. This correction seems to be tiny and insignificant, but it includes a remarkable “break” with the 2,000 year-old tradition of scale-building and, at the same time, a constructive completion of it: The “crux” of the ancient scale lies, indeed, in the mentioned Ditonus, which was hardly practicable, which hindered the development of a polyphonic music style, and which – within the scale-building – implied the correctly calculated, but totally vexed residual proportion 243:256 located between the third and fourth and the seventh and eighth step of the scale¹⁴.

The proportion 243:256 is explicitly mentioned in Plato’s cosmological dialogue *Timaios* (36 b). Kepler reconstructs this proportion by observing that Plato subtracted here a Ditonus

¹¹ Kepler follows here evidently a neo-platonic conception of onto-aesthetics. Plotinus, for example, explains (*Enneads* I 6, 3.31–33): “It’s characteristic for sensual harmonies that they are measured, not, however, by any arbitrary proportion, but only by that, which is serviceable for producing ideal forms”.

¹² Cf. in this context St. Augustine (*De musica* VI, 12,34–13,39), where it is discussed, whether original harmony is to be found “in ipsa animâ” or “supra animam”.

¹³ Kepler receives this notion from Galilei (VI, 156.24 f.).

¹⁴ Cf. the reconstruction of the scale used by ancient Pythagoreans in: W. Dupont, *Geschichte der musikalischen Temperatur* (Diss. Univ. Erlangen), Nördlingen 1935, p. 3 f. – This scale is exclusively built by the above mentioned tetraktys-intervals: Within the Octave (C-c; 1:2) are already fixed the fourths tone (F; 3:4) and the fifth tone (G; 2:3). Between F and G is to be found the above mentioned whole tone (or διάεϋξις), by which the inferior tetrachord (C-F) and the superior tetrachord (G-c) are simultaneously separated and conjoined. The ratio of this whole tone (8/9) results in the difference between Fifth and Fourth (2/3 : 3/4 = 8/9). Exactly this ratio is used as the determination of the second tone of the inferior tetrachord (D; 8:9). By “adding” to this tone the same ratio, the third tone, the so-called Ditonus, arises (E; 64:81; 8/9 · 8/9 = 64/81). From all of this results the highly complicated difference between E and F: 64/81 · x = 3/4; → x = 3/4 · 81/64 = 243/256. The same procedure is repeated in the superior tetrachord: for its second tone (A; 16:27; 2/3 · 8/9 = 16/27) and for its third tone (H [in English: B]; 128:243; 16/27 · 8/9 = 128/243). The remaining difference to the octave-tone is here also the same as in the inferior tetrachord: 128/243 · x = 1/2; → x = 1/2 · 243/128 = 243/256.

from the Fourth ($x = \frac{3}{4} : \frac{64}{81} = \frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{81}{64} = \frac{243}{256}$). His commentary to this is laconic: “I do not need such a subtraction” (“Mihi non opus est hac subtractione”; VI, 157.18 f.). Kepler will say, in other words: ‘I have a conception of scale-building that is better than Plato’s. This self-assessment becomes understandable when we (below, in point 4) enter into Kepler’s geometrical demonstration of consonant intervals in which the Quinarius – outlawed both in the old tetraktýs-system and in Plato’s description of the scale of the world-soul¹⁵ – is “rehabilitated”.

In this context we can even formulate: Through the theoretical rehabilitation of the Quinarius, Kepler opened by himself and for himself a door to the “esoteric” science of the old Pythagorean school, which, as known, was organized as a secret society: As a member of it was only admitted who, after hearing for *five years* the lessons of a teacher hidden behind a curtain, then, in an exam, was assessed as a dignified candidate¹⁶. Hereby the further scientific communication among the ἑσωτερικοί (the “initiates”) was performed only in an oral way. Plato, however, didn’t belong to the initiated members of the Pythagorean school. It is reported that, during a journey through Sicily, he bought in Syracuse from the surviving dependents of the deceased Pythagorean Philolaos a manuscript on harmonical problems. He used this manuscript tacitly in elaborating the harmonical passages of his *Timaios*, which brought against him even the reproach of plagiarism¹⁷.

For the development of musical theory the after-effects of Plato’s harmonical speculations have to be marked as “catastrophic” ones: Plato presented his harmonical concepts in the form of mere “aprioristic” construction which contains, nevertheless, no more than the tetraktýs-proportions (including the above mentioned ratio 243:256)¹⁸. Since Plato, as a philosopher, enjoyed the reputation of an infallible authority for 2000 years – through Antiquity and Middle Ages until to the threshold of Modernity – scarcely any theorist of music was encouraged enough to attack or, at least, to doubt, what the “divine” Plato¹⁹ has said. For breaking the paralysing ban of conventional scholarship a thinker of the ingenuity of Kepler was needed. Kepler, without doubt a better geometer than Plato, was able to enter by himself into the “esoteric” doctrine of ancient Pythagoreism, which was kept back in Plato’s “exoteric” demonstrations of harmony. As we have seen above, Kepler criticizes with an astonishing certainty the elements of the “exoteric” scale as insufficient ones. The reason for his sovereign behaviour is that he had “in petto” a precise knowledge of the constructibility of the regular pentagon, which belongs to the problematic field of that number Five and the “golden section”, and by which the “exoteric” scale is to be characterized as an antiquated standpoint.

That the regular pentagon (which Kepler constructs in accordance with Euclid [VI, 42.38 f.; VI, 43.1]) was, indeed, a central and substantial matter of the “secret” science of the old Pythagorean

¹⁵ Cf. B. Kytzler, “Die Weltseele und der musikalische Raum (Platon, *Timaios* 35 a ff.)”. *Hermes. Zeitschr. für klass. Philologie* 87 (1959), p. 393–414.

¹⁶ Cf. the paragraph 72 in: Jamblich, [Περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορείου βίου.] *Pythagoras: Legende – Lehre – Lebensgestaltung*; note 2), p. 78 f.

¹⁷ Cf. Ch. Riedweg, *Pythagoras. Leben, Lehre, Nachwirkung*, München 2002, p. 154; see also the paragraph 199 in: Jamblich, [Περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορείου βίου.] *Pythagoras: Legende – Lehre – Lebensgestaltung*; note 2), p. 162–165.

¹⁸ For the details see B. Kytzler, “Die Weltseele und der musikalische Raum (Platon, *Timaios* 35 a ff.)” (note 15) and Z. Ritoók, *Griechische Musikästhetik. Quellen zur antiken griechischen Musikästhetik* (note 8), p. 356 f.

¹⁹ Plotinus, for example, speaks of the θεῖος Πλάτων (*Enneads* IV 8, 1.23; *Enneads* III 5, 1.6). This high estimation can be traced still until the end of 16th Century: Francesco Ziletti, a Venetian publisher, writes in his Preface to: Raymundus de Sabunde: *Theologia naturalis* (Venetiis 1581): “Fit etiam, ut maximus ille Plato, qui omnium inter summos illos philosophos unus utramque hanc praeclare conjunxit philosophiae partem [sc. scientiam humanarum et divinarum rerum], hâc potissimum de causâ inde a priscis illis temporibus divini nomen merito sit consecutus” (printed in: Johann Amos Comenius, *Antisozinianische Schriften*. Ed. by E. Schadel, Hildesheim 1983, p. 407).

school, we can learn from the short message that Hippasos, a Pythagorean mathematician, drowned in the ocean as an ἀσεβής, as a traitor of holy mysteries, because he, motivated by the fame of becoming the first inventor, had published in a written form a description of the Pentagon-Dodecaeder²⁰.

3 The intended transition from tetraktys to senarius in Early Modernity

Kepler's criticism of the Ditonus by introduction of the Quinarius is not singular in the epoch of Humanism and Renaissance; the problem lies, so to speak, "in the air". As a first forerunner of this new conception of music the Italian philosopher Marsilio Ficino should be mentioned, who in his commentary on Plato's *Timaios* (of 1484), expressed his dissatisfaction with the tetraktys-system. In the same year, he wrote the (posthumously published) treatise *De rationibus musicae*, in which he demanded the reception of the "sesquiquarta" [i. e. the ratio 4:5] "ex qua vocis tertiae lenis nascitur harmonia"²¹. The theoretically most important transition from tetraktys (constitutive for the old Pythagorean scale) to *senario* (the numerical base of modern scale) was performed by Gioseffo Zarlino (a band leader at San Marco in Venice) in his *Istitutioni Harmoniche* (first published in 1558)²². Zarlino still retains the traditional denotation 'ditono', but he explains it with the ratio 4:5²³. Seven years before Kepler's *Harmonice mundi* came out Johannes Lippius (a protestant theologian in Strasbourg) published his *Synopsis Musicae Novae* (Argentorati 1612), in which the considerations of the musical essence are focused in Zarlino's *senario*²⁴. Sethus Calvisius (a Thomaskantor of Leipzig)²⁵ declared (in a letter, Sept. 28th, 1607) that for him Kepler's geometrical explications of harmonical intervals were merely "Bohemian villages" ("pagi Bohemici"; XVI, 56.19 f.). 15 months later (in a letter, Jan. 2nd, 1609) the same Calvisius recommended to Kepler the reception of (Zarlino's) *senario*; he writes to Kepler: "Mea sententia est formas consonantiarum contineri in partibus Senarii" (XVI, 217.28 f.). Our questions are here: Had Kepler at his disposal a detailed knowledge of the mentioned "modern" authors? Was

²⁰ Cf. the paragraphs 88 and 247 in: Jamblich, [Περὶ τοῦ Πυθαγορείου βίου.] *Pythagoras: Legende – Lehre – Lebensgestaltung*; note 2), p. 90 f. and 194 f.

²¹ For details see E. Schadel, "Zur Musik-Konzeption des Marsilio Ficino", in: J. Matula (ed.), *Tradition of Florentine Platonism in Central Europe*, [Conference, 9th–10th Nov. 1999, Palacký-Univ. Olomouc], Olomouc 2001, p. 107–178, here especially p. 151, footnote 176.

²² Cf. the chapter "Vom Quaternarius zum Senarius" in: B. Münxelhaus, *Pythagoras musicus* (note 5), p. 107–109. The specific difference between the scale, built through the Tetraktys, and the scale, built through the Senarius, is demonstrated in E. Schröder, *Mathematik im Reich der Töne*, Frankfurt/M. 1985, p. 51 und 55.

²³ See the figure Nr. 4 in: E. Schadel, "Zur Musik-Konzeption des Marsilio Ficino" (note 21), p. 178; see in the appendix scheme 3.

²⁴ See the scheme in: J. Lippius, *Synopsis Musicae Novae omnino Verae atque Methodicae Universae, in omnis sophiae praegustum*, Argentorati 1612, p.):(1 –):(8; A 1 – I 8) (present in: Staatliche Bibliothek / Regensburg), here p. F 7: The proportion 4:5:6 is called here the "radix" of music; see the scheme 4. (The corresponding division of the entire chord into 120 units: 30:20:20 is to be corrected here as 30:24:20.) As his 'astipulantes' Lippius mentions (among many others) Mestlinus und Keplerus (p.):(5). He also refers Josephus Zarlino (p.):(3 and C 3 [verso]), and he names Sethus Calvisius (p.):(4), with whom Kepler corresponded. Lippius' list of the 'consonantiae simplices' (p. E 6) contains the same consonances as in the list presented by Kepler in his *Harmonice mundi* III, 2 [VI, 118.30–40]. (Lippius only does not explicitly mention the Minor and Major Sixth, the complementary intervals of Major und Minor Third.) Lippius, as well as Kepler, used the monochord as an instrument for finding out, in the sensual field, the elementary consonances. He was the first to use the term 'trias harmonica' (p.):(3 [verso]); and he declares: "Veritas confirmari potest in Monochordo" (p. E 8 [verso]).

²⁵ Cf. for this the informative studies: C. Dahlhaus, "Musiktheoretisches aus dem Nachlass des Sethus Calvisius", *Die Musikforschung* 9 (1956), p. 129–139, and G. Pietzsch, "Seth Calvisius und Johannes Kepler. Ein Beitrag zur Musikanschauung in Deutschland um 1600", *Die Musikpflege* 1 (1930), p. 388–396.

he acquainted with their theories of music? Or are these tacitly integrated into his own explications? Because Zarlino is in *Harmonice mundi* only incidentally mentioned in one place, together with the “authorities” Ptolemy and Galilei (VI, 139.26 f.), we suppose that Kepler by himself was convinced that his new method of geometrical demonstration of basic intervals is self-sufficient²⁶. We will consider this in the next passage.

4 Kepler’s geometrical demonstration of basic intervals as a systematic prolongation of monochord-experiments

The astronomer Kepler understands himself as a “priest of the highest God before the book of nature”²⁷. His geometrical explanations of the first two books of *Harmonice mundi* are for him a medium, through which he intends to realize his service to the glory of God. That means, generally speaking, that Kepler’s geometrical efforts are, all together, focused upon the attempt to transcend, in an evident manner, all spacio-temporal being towards its all-embracing absolute origin. In a neo-platonic view he therefore interprets the soul as a “bond between [absolute] spirit and [contingent] matter” (“vinculum Mentis et Corporis”; VI, 95.30 f.). Especially the immaterial human soul is for him the prominent “place”, in which the “exemplaria geometrica” (VI, 271.19) – primarily subsisting in divine reality²⁸ and, from there, secondarily illuminating the receptive human soul – find, by reasoning of this soul, their theoretical distinctness. Or said in other words: A human soul that reflects in itself the eternal harmony of geometrical proportions, becomes, through this act, able to identify the traces of this harmony found in sensual world.

In the summary of his doctoral thesis Atteln formulates: “Die Art wie ... [Kepler] die Entstehung und Bildung der Intervalle erklärte, ist in der Geschichte der Musiktheorie einmalig”²⁹. But Atteln does not answer the urgent questions of whether this “uniqueness” of Kepler’s geometrical explication of basic intervals is to be judged as a wrong way of musicology or, on the contrary, a necessary and fertile contribution to it. As an important advantage of this geometrical method, we can certainly observe, that by the hereby allowed instruments, the compass and the ruler, it is guaranteed, that human reasoning moves itself beyond the contingent mutability of sensual world – in the dimension of pure necessity, i. e. of the presubjective self-forming of unconditioned spiritual forces. An evident and generally valid approach to the original region and its intradifferenciated wholeness can thus be opened by geometry.

We have, however, further to observe that Kepler, searching for the basic proportions, does not intend an abstract constructivism (which he, as seen above, vehemently criticizes in ancient Pythagoreism [VI, 91.12–14]). In the sense of the Augustinian “a corporeis ad incorporea transeamus”³⁰ his investigation begins with sensual experiences, especially with monochord-

²⁶ Kepler’s self-assessment is condensed in the sentence: “Primus ego, nisi fallor, exactissime proferam [causas intervallorum]” (VI, 94.15 f.). But in the inserted “nisi fallor” we can observe here also a remarkable sceptical distance to his own explications.

²⁷ Cf. Kepler’s letter to Herwart von Hohenburg (March 26th, 1598; XIII, 193.182–184): “Ego vero sic censeo, cum Astromi, sacerdotes dei altissimi ex parte libri naturae simus: decere non ingenii laudem, sed Creatoris praecipue gloriam spectare”.

²⁸ Kepler participates here in the rich tradition of the θεός ἀὲ γεωμετρῆι; cf. F. Ohly, “Deus Geometra. Skizzen zur Geschichte einer Vorstellung von Gott”, in: N. Kamp – J. Wollasch (eds.), *Tradition als historische Kraft. Interdisziplinäre Forschungen zur Geschichte des frühen Mittelalters*, Berlin-New York 1982, p. 1–42.

²⁹ Cf. H. Atteln, *Das Verhältnis Musik-Mathematik bei Johannes Kepler. Ein Beitrag zur Musiktheorie des frühen 17. Jahrhunderts* (Diss. Univ. Erlangen), Erlangen 1970, p. 124.

³⁰ Cf. Augustinus, *De musica* VI, 2, 2.

experiments³¹. A chord, expended over a sounding-board, is here subdivided in 2, 3, 4 etc. equal parts. Kepler at this declares: “The subdivisions of the chord I firstly found by a hint of the ear” (“sectiones chordae ... primum auditu indice inveni”; VI, 119.1).

Kepler knows: “There are endless possibilities of consonances, because there are endless construable figures” (VI, 102.35). By trying to dam the arbitrariness of such a conception, he sees himself confronted with the problem of the “selection of [musically senseful] concordances” (“delectus concordantiarum”, VI, 103.12). Regarding the monochord-experiments, he therefore formulates a rule of harmonical division: “The whole chord is to be subdivided in such parts that these are consonant both one to each other and to the whole chord” (VI, 114.20 f.). For systematizing his elucidation of the basic intervals of the searched ‘harmonia archetypalis’ Kepler curves the expended chord to the ideal form of a circle and asks himself, which regular figures or polygons could be inscribed into it (cf. VI, 102.27–33). (Thus we can say: Kepler’s geometrical demonstration of basic intervals is nothing more than a systematically arranged prolongation of his monochord-experiments.)

The result of Kepler’s methodically restricted geometrical deliberations is lucidly presented by Bialas³²: The halving of the circle through the diameter delivers the ratio 1 : 2 as the essential structure of the *Octave*. The regular triangle indicates that the 3 (in the ratio 2 : 3) makes possible the *Fifth*. The *Fourth* (3 : 4) gains its legitimacy through the square. The *Double Third* (4 : 5 / 5 : 6) implies a reference to the regular pentagon. The hexagon is a mere doubling of the regular triangle. All these geometrical considerations are grounded in aprioristic evidences; and they are always controlled by empirical monochord-experiments. (That is why Kepler rigorously repulsed the arbitrarily constructed “world monochord” of Robert Fludd, rooted yet in the old pythagoreen calculations.³³)

The impossibility to construct a regular heptagon is for Kepler the reason why God did not apply this polygon (and similar ones) “ad ornatum mundi” (VI, 47.31)³⁴. From this remark can one gather that, according to Kepler, by presenting the senaric proportions the (above mentioned) process of “selection of concordances” is completed; and we can declare: By means of senaric intervals, which as such are applied “ad ornatum mundi”, Kepler strives after a cognition of God or, ontologically said, an inspection into the working of the creating cause of all spacio-temporal phenomena (or better: akoumena).

The results of these geometrical considerations coincide – by emancipating the Quinarius and by elaborating the senaric wholeness – with those of Ficino, Lippius and Calvisius. But, in contrast to these authors, Kepler’s reasoning is specified by getting an “aprioristic” distinctness and certainty. The performed “selection of concordances” implies furthermore, that Kepler develops a critical consciousness in using numbers and proportions. In a similar sense as Plotinus stresses that not any arbitrary number “is serviceable for producing ideal forms”³⁵, Kepler underlines that his numerical investigations do not refer “to the mercantile calculations, but to the

³¹ Cf. for this: S. Wantzloeben, *Das Monochord als Instrument und als System, entwicklungsgeschichtlich dargestellt* (Diss. Univ. Halle), Halle 1911; J. van der Maas, *Das Monochord als Instrument des Harmonikers*, Bern 1985; F. Näf, *Das Monochord, Versuchsinstrumente zur quantitativen Erklärung von Tonsystemen*, Bern etc. 1999.

³² See V. Bialas, “Keplers Vorarbeiten zu einer Weltharmonik”, in: F. Pichler (ed.), *Der Harmoniegedanke gestern und heute*. Peuerbach-Symposium 2002, Linz 2003, p. 1–13, especially p. 2–4.

³³ For an understanding of Kepler’s self-assessment is instructive G. Nádor, “Die heuristische Rolle des Harmoniebegriffs bei Kepler”, *Studium generale* 19 (1966), p. 555–558.

³⁴ Kepler tried to find arguments for the impossibility of the heptagon-construction; but (according to K. Mainzer, *Symmetrien der Natur. Ein Handbuch zur Natur- und Wissenschaftsphilosophie*, Berlin-New York 1988, p. 33) the mathematically exact proof of it was firstly given at the end of 18th century by the young Carl Friedrich Gauß.

³⁵ See above the footnote 11.

explanation of the causes of things” (VI, 19. 3 f.). This distinction has for harmonical studies such an importance, that these studies, by neglecting that distinction, have to fall into a chaotic ambiguity. To avoid this, it seems to be most useful to respect and to receive the Plotinian suggestion of a clear discrimination between the “*essential number*” (ἀριθμὸς οὐσιώδης), that refers to the being (τὸ εἶναι) of things, and the “*quantitative number*” (ἀριθμὸς τοῦ ποσοῦ), that only refers to the “how much” (τὸ ποσὸν) of these things³⁶.

In the next passage we will elaborate on, in which way Kepler observes this discrimination on the field of musical scale-building.

5 The actual scientific status and the “problematicity” of Kepler’s theory of music

According to Bialas, Kepler’s philosophy “until today is not yet entirely fathomed”³⁷. This scientific status has various causes and conditions; I’ll point out only three aspects:

- a) The “leitmotiv” of Kepler’s reasoning is to be found in an intellectual approach to the supernatural and eternal dimension of the divine harmonic archetype. The inner movement of this is, however, in comparison to all spacio-temporal being, entirely unlimited.³⁸ Its essence consists, so to speak, in its actual inexhaustibility. Therefore, the non-analogous attempt to “exhaust” this essence by human conceptions implies an absurdity.
- b) Kepler’s idea to interpret the absolute being within the context of harmonical tradition in a geometrical manner by means of musical intervals is, without doubt, an innovative one; and it demands interdisciplinary collaboration. It’s regrettable therefore, that Kepler’s investigations are yet “scarcely appreciated” in musicological literature³⁹. It’s to fear certainly, too, that, *if* this happens more intensively, on account of a fixed historical and mere descriptive method, the desired appreciation shall be furthermore denied. For not in a historical aspect, but, as it seems, only in an *ontological* elucidation can the irritating problem be solved, that Kepler, by introducing the Quinarius, belongs to the “progressive” Pythagorean thinkers, although, as we shall see, he remains, with regard to the scale-building handicapped, by the old tradition.
- c) Walker and Dickreiter are occupied especially with Kepler’s concept of music. Both present many valuable details, but, in a general viewpoint, they manifest a certain brokenness and ambivalence. *Walker* summarizes in a resignative manner: “That music alone could have a precise and profound meaning, was, I think, in Kepler’s time an entirely novel idea. It is an idea we all come to accept, and, although we may find Kepler’s explanation of it inconvincing, we cannot claim to have found a better one”⁴⁰. This statement sounds, as if we should discover a better “alternative” to Kepler’s conceptions. But it is rather, I think, necessary to find a distinct-coherent reality, in which the consonant intervals, presented by Kepler “more geometrico”, can be seen conjoined as constitutive moments within the eternal source of harmony. – *Dickreiter* characterizes Kepler’s contribution to music theory in a strange tortuosity; he summarizes: “Kepler hat keine vollständige Musiktheorie verfasst. Dazu wäre er

³⁶ Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads* V 5, 4.18 f.; especially also his entire *Enneads* VI 6 (“On numbers”).

³⁷ Cf. V. Bialas, *Vom Himmelsmythos zum Weltgesetz*, Wien 1998, p. 289.

³⁸ Cf. Boethius’ famous definition of eternity (*Trost der Philosophie* [lat.-germ.]. Ed. by Ernst Neitzke, Frankfurt-Leipzig 1997, p. 310): “Aeternitas ... est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio”.

³⁹ Cf. V. Bialas, *Johannes Kepler*, München 2004, p. 130 f.

⁴⁰ Cf. D. P. Walker, “Kepler’s celestial music”, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* 30 (1967), p. 228–250, here p. 250.

auch nicht imstande gewesen. Der Beitrag, den er geliefert hat, ist aber nicht als Fragment zu bezeichnen. Vielmehr behandelt er systematisch alle Gegenstände, die zur zahlenhaften Gesetzmäßigkeit der Intervalle in Beziehung stehen⁴¹. As a desideratum, therefore, it is left to be explained in an *onto-harmonical* aspect the “systematicity” (i. e. the process of immanent self-development) of the singular musical intervals offered by Kepler as the basic ones.

After the preparatory geometrical studies, Kepler proceeds to establish “the most beautiful building of the harmonical system or the musical scale”. The constitution of all this, he furthermore explains, is neither somewhat arbitrary nor a mere human invention; it’s rather most reasonable and natural, because the creating God [Deus ipse Creator] is its efficient cause (VI, 114.9–15).

In a letter (Graz, August 19th/29th, 1599) directed toward Michael Mästlin Kepler explains to his teacher in Tübingen his special reduction of the complexity of the λόγοι (of the musical intervals or proportions) in the following way: “The number of proportions is endless ... It must be demonstrated, however, that there are some few rendered prominent ... As such proportions our sensation puts out in music $\frac{1}{1}$ $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{2}{3}$ $\frac{3}{4}$ $\frac{4}{5}$ $\frac{5}{6}$ $\frac{3}{5}$ $\frac{5}{8}$ and their completions. These proportions are the world-forming proportions [λόγοι κοσμοποιητικοί]” (XIV, 46.150–154). Exactly the same proportions are arranged as a “genealogical tree” of intervals in *Harmonice mundi* (VI, 118.30–40): From the “ratio” $\frac{1}{1}$ starts a bifurcated series of ratios, which stops as soon as the sum of the numerator and the denominator has reached one of the extra-senaric numbers (7, 9, 11, 13).

As it seems, Kepler is focusing here on only a formalizing way of thinking. For the primordial element of the other senaric intervals is, in its reality, manifested through the internally differentiated Octave-Relation (1:2); and exactly this Relation is – in the sense of the *essential* number – the number “one”. But the ratio $\frac{1}{1}$, introduced by Kepler as the first, does not refer to what music “is”, what harmony “is”. It’s a mere abstract invention.

By the two elaborated scales (one “*in cantu molli*”, the other “*in cantu duro*”), offered in *Harmonice mundi* (VI, 140), are documented, at the same time, a progress and a standstill in harmonical philosophy: Kepler discovers here, what is for the further musicological development most important⁴², that the Major and Minor Thirds radically determine the tuning of these scales. And by inserting the ratios of Major and Minor Third, he carefully avoids the above mentioned crucial Ditonus 64:81⁴³. But Kepler’s musical concept exhibits here also a retrograde feature: He presents his new scale-calculations by means of the *old* scheme of two “stratified” tetrachords within the Octave joined together by the whole tone (8:9).

This method of tetrachord-stratifying arose in the context of the tetraktýs-calculation (and it develops a certain attraction on account of symmetric form)⁴⁴. The question is, however: Is this method also adequate for senarius-calculations? Or must we say: As long as Kepler (as innumerable theorists before and after him) supposes that tetrachord-stratifying is the one and only method of scale-building, a complete development of the basic intervals, which Kepler desires to be an immanent process, is hindered and pushed away? For tetrachord-stratifying contains in an onto-harmonical perspective the weighty disadvantage, that it arranges the singular senaric intervals only in an external or even superficial manner. A consistent theory of music, on the

⁴¹ Cf. M. Dickreiter, *Der Musiktheoretiker Johannes Kepler*, Bern-München 1973, p. 147.

⁴² Cf. C. Dahlhaus, “Die Termini Dur und Moll”, *Archiv für Musikwissenschaft* 12 (1955), p. 280–296; for the mentioned two scales (“*in cantu molli*” and “*in cantu duro*”) see in the appendix the scheme 5 and the ‘special explanation’ of it.

⁴³ See above the note 14.

⁴⁴ See above the note 6.

contrary, demands that the self-development of the archetypical cause of music proceeds – from the inside (from the cause in itself) towards the outlying elements (the singular tones of the scale) – in a continuously organic way.

Since the organic self-development of the searched harmonical archetype is not judiciously expressed in the two scales proposed by Kepler (VI, 140), we have to observe: The fascinating impulse of Kepler's thinking – his reduction of the complexity of possible intervals – stops, so to speak, in a step next to the last. As it seems, Kepler was in such a manner involved in the problem of an aprioristic geometrical derivation of basic intervals, that the specific ontological aspect of his explications is somewhat under-accented.

In order to obtain a genuine ontological perspective of the inner movement of the senarius, we want, preliminarily, to pay attention to the peculiarities of its structure: The senarius includes three Octaves (1:2, 2:4, 3:6) and two Fifths (2:3 and 4:6). These are *mathematically* the same. (The Second Fifth 4:6 can be shortened into the First Fifth 2:3.) But *harmonically* – what merits a special observance! – the two Fifths are *not* the same. The Second Fifth (and *not* the First) contains the Double Third (4:5 und 5:6) and the Quinarius, for the reception of which Kepler has fought.

In the next and last passage I'll finally try to explicate the senaric intervals with regard to the signified peculiarities as an organic wholeness. In the sense of an *unabridged senarius-interpretation* I intend to answer the urgent question for the principle structure that internally shapes the series of the seven ratios $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{2}{3}$ $\frac{3}{4}$ $\frac{4}{5}$ $\frac{5}{6}$ $\frac{3}{5}$ $\frac{5}{8}$, proposed by Kepler (cf. the scheme in VI, 118.30–40). Thus, perhaps, it becomes possible to develop the impulse for integrality, from which Kepler's harmonical investigations were motivated, in the horizon of its concrete distinctness.

6 The in-ec-con-sistential rhythm of the senarius as a solving perspective

In a letter to the Scottish nobleman Edmund Bruce (July 18th, 1599) it is documented that Kepler (twenty years before the publication of *Harmonice mundi*) had cleared up the “circle” of the consonant senaric intervals of 1:2, 2:3, 3:4, 4:5, 5:6, 3:5 and 5:8 (XIV, 7.29–35). Kepler comments: “These proportions are not therefore excellent and beautiful, because they are, on account of their sound, approved by the judgement of the ears. It's vice versa so, that therefore, because these proportions are naturally most beautiful and because they are expressed in sounds, they produce the true and genuine harmonies. The measure of harmonies [mensura harmoniarum] is not the human ear, but the nature” (XIV, 7.30–8.2).

By means of the apostrophed ‘nature’ we search here for the causal and principle dimension that performs itself in itself. Applying a neo-platonic triad (that, later on, is expressed through an *in-ec-con-sistential* act) we can say: ‘Nature’ is – “before” it becomes visible or audible in space and time – a transcendent and, simultaneously, immanent process which creatively *remaining* in itself, *proceeds* out of itself, in order to find, *returning* to itself, the concordance with itself. Thus the resulting task of harmonical analysis becomes clear: It is the complete elucidation of that “transcendent” nature, i. e. the immanent actuality and activeness of it, by including and qualifying the above mentioned seven ratios as unconfused singular moments within the internally differentiated one wholeness of that, which partially appears in sensual music and sensual world.

As a theologian Kepler is, without doubt, mentally open for such an investigation of the “transcendent” cause. Because he over-stresses, however, the geometrical method⁴⁵, he hinders himself from entering intensively into the plentiful sources of ontological or even ontotheological argu-

⁴⁵ Cf. XIV, 8.38 f.: “Cur autem sunt pulcherrimae hae proportiones? Id nemo rectius dixerit quam geometrae”; ibid. 9.94 f.: “Causam dixi figuras geometricas regulares”.

mentations. With regard to the urgent task of an unabridged explanation of senaric proportions, Kepler is as similarly reserved and reluctant as other modern theorists of music⁴⁶.

What follows therefore, is an attempt to fully outline a senarius-interpretation in order to “bring together” what in Kepler’s writings is contained in valuable singular aspects and considerations⁴⁷: I understand the senaric proportions as an ascendent movement, i. e. of ratios of different *frequencies* and not of different *lengths* of vibrating chords. Thus the ratio **1 : 2** can be identified with the Octave as the primary and *in-sistent* dimension of musical self-development. Referring to monochord-experiments, Kepler describes that “the tone of the whole chord and the tone of the half chord, although they are different ones, by the ear they are held, so to speak, as one and the same relative to the other concordances” (VI, 109.39–41)⁴⁸. By this observation and by denoting the Octave as the “*radix caeterarum omnium [proportionum]*” (XIV, 8.49), Kepler reveals his interest for a genuinely ontological analysis of basic intervals. He observes that the paradoxical character of the Octave consists in the property that its two reference-poles are *neither* separated *nor* confused. That means, however: Through the “autogenous” potentiation of the octave-proportion are implied *both* a fine difference (audible for the trained ear in “unisono”-singing) *and* a perceptible concordance (that effects that “unisono”-singing is experienced as a ‘monodic’ one). *Both* moments, the difference as well as the concordance, are produced in the two other phases of the intrasenaric process: the difference in the First Fifth (2:3) and the concordance in the Second Fifth (4:6), which is filled by the Double Third (4:5, 5:6). Under this aspect it can, indeed, be declared that Octave is the “*radix omnium*”⁴⁹.

The archetypal rhythm of *in-sistent* remaining, *ec-sistent* differentiation and *con-sistent* self-accordance is, however, not only performed within the senarius, but also (what was explicitly demonstrated in the time *after* Kepler) in the field of scale-building: 1. in that of the so-called diatonic scale through *in-sistent* Tonic, *ec-sistent* Dominant and *consistent* Subdominant; 2. in that of the so-called chromatic scale, which, as such, is based in the *in-sistent* Senarius, gets its specific form in *ec-sistent* Diatonics and results from both as a *con-sistent* scale of 12 tempered half-tones, which – every single one of these – can be used as basic tone for a complete 12-tone-scale.

By this digression it should be, in a few strokes, demonstrated that the “thread of analogy” (the “*filum analogiae*”; VI, 366.21) that Kepler leads through the labyrinth of the mysteries of nature, is also applicable to the labyrinth of the various essays to elucidate the wholeness of the archetypal structure of harmonic tonality. Here the apostrophed analogous method even wins, as seen by analysing the octave-proportion, the distinct profile of an *in-ec-con-sistent* inte-

⁴⁶ Joannes Lippius, for example, focuses on the ratios **4:5:6** (cf. note 24), René Descartes the ratios **2, 3 and 5**, Peter Singer and Othmar Steinbauer the ratios **1, 3 and 5**, Henry Harington the ratios **3, 4 and 5** (in which the “Pythagorean” Triangle is represented); cf. E. Schadel, “Grundlinien einer harmonikalen Wirklichkeitsauffassung. Überlegungen im Ausgang von Johannes Kepler”, in: F. Pichler (ed.), *Der Harmoniegedanke gestern und heute. Peuerbach-Symposium 2002*, Linz 2003, p. 69–79, here p. 72.

⁴⁷ For more detailed explications see the paragraphs 28 to 50 in E. Schadel, *Musik als Trinitätssymbol. Einführung in die harmonikale Metaphysik*, Frankfurt/M etc. 1995; cf. also E. Schadel, “Princip harmonie. Hudebněteoretické názory u J. A. Komenského a jejich systematické rozvedení v ontotrinitární koncepci tonality”, *Studia comeniana et historica* 33 (č. 69–71, 2003), p. 22–48.

⁴⁸ What is said here becomes perceptible in “unisono”-singing, that is, when men and women are singing one and the same melody in octave-parallels.

⁴⁹ In ancient musical theories the octave was, therefore, signified as the harmony (ἀρμονία) par excellence; cf. B. Meyer, *APMONIA. Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes von Homer bis Aristoteles*, Zürich 1932, p. 34.

grality⁵⁰, which within specifically differentiated fields keeps its identity. For confirming this in a concrete case, we want to continue and accomplish now the explanation of the senaric intervals:

Out of the in-sistent base of Octave proceeds – immediately and in a continuous relationship to the Octave, but also in a sensibly distinct manner – the *ec-sistent* First Fifth 2 : 3. This Fifth represents a *total* self-differentiation of the essential “content” of Octave. As a secondary supplement of the First Fifth proceeds, within the superior Octave 2 : 4, the Fourth 3 : 4, which, as the so called upbeat, does not have a proper musical character. (Descartes refers to this in his *Musicae compendium* calling the Fourth the “shadow of the Fifth” [“umbra quintae”]⁵¹.) On the “background” of this Fourth is constituted, as an *octaviated* First Fifth, the Second Fifth 4 : 6, which, subdivided through the number 5, acts as the final *con-sistent* phase of the toticipative⁵² self-accordance of the harmonic archetype: It results, as the communicative interpenetration, the complementarity, missed in Kepler’s two scales (VI, 140) of the Major Third 4 : 5 and the Minor Third 5 : 6. Analogously to the secondary proceeding of the Fourth out of the First Fifth, we can distinguish here also a secondary proceeding both of the Minor Sixth 5 : 8 out of the Major Third 4 : 5, and of the Major Sixth 3 : 5 out of the Minor Third 5 : 6. [$\frac{4}{5} \cdot \frac{5}{8} = \frac{1}{2}$; $\frac{5}{6} \cdot \frac{3}{5} = \frac{1}{2}$.] Thereby, Kepler’s seven intervals are now all reduced to three prevailing ones, the *Octave*, the *First Fifth*, and the *Double Third*.⁵³ These three subsist through their interrelationship as the one and only process of the *harmonia archetypalis* intensively investigated by Kepler. They subsist in a non-contingent “apriority” not only as a possible, but rather as an *actual* principle-reality, according to which the “contingent” multiplicity of harmonical constellations (found in various fields of reality, in nature, in architecture, in symphonical songs, and so on) can be “radically” elucidated and identified. Kepler declares that the contingent proportions do not exist “in ESSE, sed in FIERI” (VI, 105.16 f.)⁵⁴. Hence we say: All harmonical “phenomena” (and “akoumena”) of the sensual cosmos are to be understood as finite and partially deficient expressions of the infinite and indeficient eternally subsisting ESSE of the harmonical archetype. In this sense Kepler formulates: “Vivunt omnia durantibus Hamonijs, torpescunt iisdem disturbatis” (VI, 105.32 f.)⁵⁵. As explicated above, that eternal ESSE is “from the inside” entirely determined by an

⁵⁰ See for that the laconic definition of the young Augustine in: *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, qu. 18: “Omne quod est, aliud est quo constat, aliud quod discernitur, aliud quo congruit”. In a modified version of the neo-platonic doctrine of the three hypostáseis Augustine presents here a rhythmically analysing formula, by which Kepler’s intuition: “Omne trinum [est] perfectum” (VI, 336.10) becomes understandable.

⁵¹ Cf. R. Descartes, *Musicae Compendium / Leitfaden der Musik*, Ed. by J. Brock, Darmstadt 1978, p. 24; Marin Mersenne, who reveals himself in his writings to be manifoldly influenced by Kepler, calls the Fourth an “illegitimate daughter” (of the Octave), “une fille bastarde” (de l’octave); cf. H. Ludwig, *Marin Mersenne and seine Musiklehre*, Halle-Berlin 1935 [repr. Hildesheim-New York 1971], p. 61.

⁵² The term ‘toticipatio’ is not usual in Classical Latin, but it is understandable as an analogous form of ‘participatio’. As a neologism ‘toticipatio’ is to be found at Thomas Campanella (*Metaphysica*, Parisiis 1638, II, 10, 2., art. 2); here is said about the ‘primalitates’ (potentia, sapientia, amor): “Communicantur invicem per toticipationem”. The term toticipatio should be introduced into the philosophical talk, because it implies a clear and essential discrimination between the absolute divine being and the contingent being appearing in space and time. The apostrophed discrimination is an important antidote against that indifferentism, by which the mainstream of modern consciousness is constitutionally “undermined”.

⁵³ Cf. scheme 6 (‘Qualification of Senarius-Proportions’).

⁵⁴ We can observe here an allusion to Plato’s distinction between “the being that never *becomes*, and the becoming that [in its spacio-temporal mutability] never *is*” (*Timaios* 27 d).

⁵⁵ A similar dictum is handed down from Adam of Fulda (15th century): “Harmoniã durante vivit homo, ruptã vero ejus propotione moritur”; cf. H. Hüschen, “Der Harmoniebegriff im Mittelalter”, *Studium generale* 16 (1966), p. 548–554, here p. 550, J. Lippius, *Synopsis Musicae Novae omnino Verae atque Methodicae Universae, in omnis sophiae praegustum*, Argentorati 1612, p.):(2, declares in this sense: “Omnia stant harmoniã. Anarmoniã cadunt omnia”.

in-ec-con-sistent rhythm, in which the Octave, the First Fifth and the Double Third represent, to use a Keplerian term, the λόγοι κοσμοποιητικοί (XIV, 46.154).

By means of these ‘world-forming proportions’ it becomes manifest that the universal cause of being – Kepler’s “*Creator superessentialis*”⁵⁶ [VI, 330. 13 f.], who, by his transcendent plenitude, guarantees the axiom of “*nihil sine causa*” [VI, 342.41]) – demands an ontoharmonic interpretation. In accordance with this we can answer Kepler’s question: “*Why* the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 etc. form musical intervals, whereas the numbers 7, 11, 13 and the similar do not form [such intervals]?”⁵⁷. The reason for this discrimination of ‘emmelic’ and ‘ecmelic’ proportions is: By *in-sistent* Octave (1:2), *ec-sistent* First Fifth (2:3) and *con-sistent* Double Third (4:5, 5:6) a distinct-compositive wholeness is performed, that as *toticipative* interpenetration of these consonances represents the ‘sufficient cause’ of all *participating* musical intervals, in which the analogously structured texture of tonality consists⁵⁸.

These explications suggest an analogous reference to that what Kepler as a theologian calls the “adoranda Trinitas” (VI, 123.3 f.) or the “sacrosanctum Trinitatis mysterium” (VI, 211.14 f.). Since he, however, within the geometrically deduced *seven* proportions (cf. VI, 118 below) does *not* diagnose the *in-ec-con-sistent* wholeness of the *three* prevailing proportions, he has problems realizing this reference: Kepler is conscious that the “numerus numerans” (VI, 123.9 f.), the mere *quantitative* number, does not contain any form-giving meaning. Every such number, as well as the number three, is for him a “secondary entity of reason” (“ens rationis secundarium”; VI, 123.22). The *essential* number, by which the senaric intervals are internally arranged, he explains only in an *indirect* way: he declares that the quantitative number *is not* the *efficient, formal, final* and *material* cause of being (VI, 123.17–21). Kepler neither comments on nor explains this enumeration of the four famous Aristotelian kinds of causes. But they are generally and in the harmonical field thoroughly understandable in the sense that the sound-*material* of the senaric ratios is the medium, in which is clearly expressed the subsistent relationship of *causa efficiens* (through *in-sistent* Octave), of *causa formalis* (through *ec-sistent* First Fifth), and of *causa finalis* (through *con-sistent* Double Third).

Such an arrangement of Aristotle’s principal causes is to be found in Thomas Aquinas, in his considerations of a trinitarian concept of creation. He declares: “Deus ... [est] *causa efficiens, exemplaris et finalis* omnium rerum”⁵⁹. We discover this, too, in the circle-symbolism of Nicholas of Cusa⁶⁰: Applying the senaric intervals (unknown to this author) to this integral concept of principle reality, the *in-sistent* Octave is therein signified by the efficient *centre*, the *ec-sistent* First

⁵⁶ The term ‘superessentialis’ is typical for (late) Neoplatonism; cf., for example, Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, *De mystica theologia* I, 1: Τριὰς ὑπερούσιε..., ἴθυνον ἡμῆς. The prefix ὑπερ- or super- is evidently occasioned by Plato, who (*Politeia* 509 b) explains that the universal cause of all being (symbolized by the sun) is “beyond being” (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας). Idealistic or dialectic philosophers concluded from this, that the universal cause “is” an indifferent nothingness. But this interpretation mutilates Plato’s text, in which is said, that the apostrophed cause “subsists” [relative to spacio-temporal being] “excellently through its dignity and power”. This excellency consists, in other words, in the *toticipative* self-performance of that universal cause, relatively to which all spacio-temporal being is characterized by a deficient *participation* on this toticipative act. The same ontical relation is observable “in musicis” between the *toticipative* act of the senaric triad and the *participating* tones of the diatonic and chromatic scale. (For the term toticipatio see note 52.)

⁵⁷ Cf. VI, 100.8 f.: “Cur hi numeri 1.2.3.4.5.6. etc ad intervalla musica concurrant, at 7.11.13. et similes non concurrant?”

⁵⁸ For this see the more detailed explications (in the paragraphs 28–70) in: E. Schadel, *Musik als Trinitätssymbol. Einführung in die harmonikale Metaphysik*, Frankfurt/M. etc. 1995.

⁵⁹ Cf. T. Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, qu. 44, a. 4. ad 4; cf. also E. Bailleux, “La création, œuvre de la Trinité selon saint Thomas”, *Revue thomiste* 62 (1962), p. 27–50.

⁶⁰ Cf. N. Cusanus, *De docta ignorantia* I, 21, 64.

Fifth by the formal *radius*, and the consistent Double Third by the final *circumference*. Kepler speaks, in the context of this symbolism, of the absolute “divine” sphere and the contingent “human” circle (VI, 224.10–39) and especially of the “effluence of the centre” (“*egressus centri*”) as an imitation of the eternal generation of the Logos-Son (VI, 224.16 f.)

This ‘effluence’ signifies, in the ontoharmonic aspect, the immediate proceeding of the First Fifth out of the primordial Octave. It is the *first* intra-trinitarian proceeding which is accomplished by a mediated *second* one, i. e. the spirative communication within the Double Third, which as such is produced by the octaviated First Fifth⁶¹. Kepler did not undertake this step to explain these connections in a distinct manner. But, as I suppose, exactly in this step lies the last intention and the coronation of all his harmonic investigations⁶².

APPENDICES

1. Special explanation of the scheme 5

DE PROPORTIONIBUS HARMONICIS

SYSTEMA OCTAVAE

In cantu molli

VIII		VII		VI		V		IV		III		II		I
	$\frac{8}{9}$		$\frac{9}{10}$		$\frac{15}{16}$		$\frac{8}{9}$		$\frac{9}{10}$		$\frac{15}{16}$		$\frac{8}{9}$	
Quarta superior	$\frac{8}{9}$		$\frac{9}{10}$		$\frac{15}{16}$		–		–		–		–	
Quarta media	–		–		$\frac{15}{16}$		$\frac{8}{9}$		$\frac{9}{10}$		–		–	
Quarta ima	–		–		–		–		$\frac{9}{10}$		$\frac{15}{16}$		$\frac{8}{9}$	

In cantu duro

VIII		VII		VI		V		IV		III		II		I
	$\frac{8}{9}$		$\frac{15}{16}$		$\frac{9}{10}$		$\frac{8}{9}$		$\frac{15}{16}$		$\frac{9}{10}$		$\frac{8}{9}$	
Quarta superior	$\frac{8}{9}$		$\frac{15}{16}$		$\frac{9}{10}$		–		–		–		–	
Quarta media	–		–		$\frac{9}{10}$		$\frac{8}{9}$		$\frac{15}{16}$		–		–	
Quarta ima	–		–		–		–		$\frac{15}{16}$		$\frac{9}{10}$		$\frac{8}{9}$	

Concerning the “systema octavae” (presented in VI, 140) we have to consider as an “innovation” that Kepler calculates the ratios of frequencies, in which a tetrachord (for ex. C-F) is constituted, not any longer as $[8:9] \cdot [8:9] \cdot [243:256] = 3:4$, but as $[8:9] \cdot [9:10] \cdot [15:16] = 3:4$. These very three ratios are still used in the modern diatonic scale (cf. the paragraph 63 in Schadel, *Musik als Trinitätssymbol*, 1995); these ratios are, however, arranged by Kepler in a (partially) other manner: Kepler’s intention is to demonstrate that the minor and the major

⁶¹ Thus Thomas Aquinas clearly distinguished between the ‘*processio per modum intellectus, quae est processio Verbi*’ and the ‘*processio per modum voluntatis, quae est processio Amoris*’ (*Summa theologiae* I, qu. 37, a. 1, resp.) According to his theorem “Processiones personarum [in Trinitate] sunt rationes productionis creaturarum” (ibid., qu. 45, a. 6, resp.) are observable in human mind two “effects” of these processiones: firstly, an ‘*illuminatio intellectus*’ and, secondly, an ‘*inflammatio affectus*’ (ibid., qu. 43, a. 5, ad 3). Analogously to this in the senaric base of harmonic tonality, the first ‘processio’ is to be considered relative to the First Fifth, the second relative to the Double Third.

⁶² Cf., in comparison with the notes 59 and 61, the summarizing scheme 7 (‘The onto-antropological meaning of the Senarus-Proportions’).

scale – in their “juxtaposition” (which lets unanswered the question of their connection) – appear entirely “equivalent”. The two scales are built by *three* overlapping fourths or tetrachords. The minor scale has “above” the major third 4:5, characterized by the ratios 8:9:10, and “below” the minor third 5:6, signed by 15:16:18 (= 15:16 und 8:9). The major scale has – vice versa – “above” the minor third 5:6, marked by 40:45:48 (= 8:9 and 15:16), and “below” the major third 4:5, to which the ratios 36:40:45 (= 9:10 and 8:9) are attached. In *both* scales the whole tone 8:9 is to be found between the IVth and Vth step.

In the above presented two “auxiliary” schemes (drawn by myself) are pointed out the ratios of frequencies characterizing Kepler’s two scales (in: VI, 140). In order to obtain an *ascending series* of scale-tones we have to calculate *not* in the ratios of frequencis, but in the reciprocal ratios of the lengths (of the vibrating chords of the monochord); for these ratios generate the scale-tones. From all this result the following calculations:

1. for die *minor scale*: C (= **1:1**), D (= $1 \cdot [9:8] = \mathbf{9:8}$), E^b (= $[9:8] \cdot [16:15] = \mathbf{6:5}$), F (= $[6:5] \cdot [10:9] = \mathbf{4:3}$), G (= $[4:3] \cdot [9:8] = \mathbf{3:2}$). A^b (= $[3:2] \cdot [16:15] = \mathbf{8:5}$), B* (= $[8:5] \cdot [10:9] = \mathbf{16:9}$), C' (= $[16:9] \cdot [9:8] = \mathbf{2:1}$). (The minor third is here C–E^b, the major third A^b–C'. – The proportions of the inferior part [step I–V; = C–G] coincide with the ratios of the modern diatonic scale; the superior tetrachord [G–C'] difers from this.)
2. for the *major scale*: C (= **1:1**), D (= $1 \cdot [9:8] = \mathbf{9:8}$), E (= $[9:8] \cdot [10:9] = \mathbf{5:4}$), F (= $[5:4] \cdot [16:15] = \mathbf{4:3}$), G (= $[4:3] \cdot [9:8] = \mathbf{3:2}$), A (= $[3:2] \cdot [10:9] = \mathbf{5:3}$), B* (= $[5:3] \cdot [16:15] = \mathbf{16:9}$), C' (= $[16:9] \cdot [9:8] = \mathbf{2:1}$). (The major third is here C–E, the minor third A–C'. – The proportions of the inferior part [step I–V; = C–G] coincide with the ratios of the modern diatonic scale; the superior tetrachord [G–C'] difers from this.)


By establishing of his two scales, Kepler demonstrates an astonishing skill for formalizing “aprioristic” structures. His aim is (as mentioned) to prove a balanced relationship between the minor and major scale. But he did not regard a concrete monochord-experience: The whole chord produces a “deep” tone, the halved chord a “high” one. That means: In the tonal “genesis” an *ascending* impulse is perceptible. Kepler expresses this impulse in the first five steps of his major scale; what is disregarded here is the final remaining phase of the senarius focused on by Kepler in other contexts. And we can say: By establishing of his two scales, Kepler did not yet have any cognition of so-called “Cadence” of Tonic, Dominant and Subdominant discovered by Jean-Philippe Rameau [1683–1764]. Thus he did not yet have any insight into the harmonical dynamics of the mentioned Cadence, which corresponds analogously with the intra-senaric movement of the in-sistent Octave, the ec-sistent First Fifth and the con-sistent Double Third. That’s why he calculates B*, the Seventh of his scales, as **16:9** and *not* as **15:8**, calculated as the Third of the Dominant. The ratio $1\frac{5}{8}$ is a little bit higher and sounds “sharper” as Kepler’s ratio $1\frac{6}{9}$; it acts as the so-called “*leading tone*” (missed in Kepler’s scales) and “leads” – irresistibly – to the octave-tone which, as Fifth of the Subdominant, initiates the “returning phase” within the scale-building. This phase corresponds with the “proceeding phase” of the Dominant; it represents its complement necessary for the wholeness of harmonical structures.

Summarizing we can say: The little differences in the superior parts of his scales (as well as the unsolved problem of a mere “juxtaposition” of his two scales) result from a certain lack of an “organic” conception of tonality. As it seems, Kepler did not, in a due manner, consider that – within the senaric intervals – the two Thirds (the major and the minor one) appear firstly in the octaviated Second Fifth (4:6) as 4:5 and 5:6. Here (and *not* in two different scales) they make “audible”, indeed, the searched integrality and equilibrium. We can show it by a concrete example: When the basic tone of the senaric structure sounds with 60 Hz, the octave of it has 120 Hz. Thus we can identify, as the “essence” of the octave-interval, the “bridged” 60 Hz. Exactly these

60 Hz are – within the Second Fifth – given by the Major Third from below the middle (the ratio 240:300 Hz bridges 60 Hz) and by the Minor Third from above to the middle (the ratio 360:300 Hz bridges 60 Hz, too). The number 5 acts in this context as the point in which the two Thirds “meet” one another. It’s noteworthy that in the minor triad such a “meeting-point” is excluded. (We have here the proportions 240:288:360 Hz.) From this observation results, however, that Kepler’s conception of the equivalance of major and minor scale demands a modification. The last one is a *possible* arrangement in the further development of the primordial harmonical elements, but it does not show the same priority as the major scale. This is based in the ascending movement of the senaric intervals and was – subsequently – confirmed in the 18th Century by the discovery of the (ascending) overtone-series.

2. Some schemes of harmonical metaphysics


Scheme 1:



‘tetraktýs’ (τετρακτύς)

CHRISTOPH RIEDWEG, *Pythagoras. Leben, Lehre, Nachwirkung*, München 2002, p. 115.

Scheme 2:




$$A\Gamma = 12, \Theta K = 9, HM = 8, Z\Delta = 6$$

‘Helikon’ (Ἑλικῶν)


PTOLEMAIOS, *Harmonika* II, 2 (ed. I. Düring, Göteborg 1930, p. 46).

Scheme 3:



GIOSEFFO ZARLINO, *Theorie des Tonsystems. Das erste und zweite Buch der ‘Institutioni harmoniche’* (1573). Übers. u. hrsg. v. Michael Fend, Frank./M.–Bern–New York–Paris 1989, page 87 (*Institutioni harmoniche* were first published in 1558).

Scheme 4:



Johannes Lippius, Synopsis Musicae Novae, Argentorati 1612, p. F 7. Cf. ibid., p. E 8 [verso]: “Veritas confirmari potest in Monochordo”.
(For the explication of this scheme see above the footnote 24.)

Scheme 5:

SYSTEMA OCTAVAE

In cantu molli.

Voces seu Loca.	In Notis.	Longitudo chordarum.	Superior.	Quartae.	
VIII.		72. 360.	24.	Media naturaliter divisa.	
VII.		81. 405.	27.		
VI.		90. 450.	30.	30. 15.	
V.		96. 480.	32.	32. 16.	Ima.
IV.		108. 540.		36. 18.	27.
III.		120. 600.		40. 20.	30.
II.		128. 640.			32.
I.		144. 720.			36. ¹

In cantu duro.

Voces seu Loca.	In Notis.	Longitudo chordarum.	Superior.	Quartae.	
VIII.		360.	120.	Media naturaliter divisa.	
VII.		405.	135.		
VI.		432.	144.	36.	
V.		480.	160.	40.	Ima.
IV.		540.		45.	135.
III.		576.		48.	144.
II.		640.			160.
I.		720.			180.

Scheme 6: Qualification of Senarius-Proportions

Prevailing intervals	Secondary proceedings
1. <i>in-sistent</i> Octave 1 : 2	
2. <i>ec-sistent First</i> Fifth 2 : 3	Fourth 3 : 4
3. <i>con-sistent</i> Second Fifth 4 : 6 as Major Third 4 : 5, and Minor Third 5 : 6	Minor Sixth 5 : 8, Major Sixth 3 : 5


$$\frac{2}{3} \cdot \frac{3}{4} = \frac{1}{2};$$

$$\frac{4}{5} \cdot \frac{5}{8} = \frac{1}{2};$$

$$\frac{4}{5} \cdot \frac{5}{6} = \frac{4}{6};$$

$$\frac{5}{6} \cdot \frac{3}{5} = \frac{1}{2}.$$

Scheme 7: The onto-anthropological meaning of the Senarius-Proportions



causa efficiens	causa exemplaris	causa finalis
[substantia subsistens]	‘processio per modum intellectûs, quae est processio Verbi’	‘processio per modum voluntatis, quae est processio Amoris’
[anima rationalis]	‘illuminatio intellectûs’	‘inflammatio affectûs’

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Cambridge Platonists and their reaction to Thomas Hobbes

Abstract | The aim of the article is to show the differing attitudes of the relatively unknown religious platonist philosophers in Cambridge, especially Ralph Cudworth and Henry More, and Thomas Hobbes who is regarded to be one of the most prominent philosophers of the 17th century. The topics in focus are the existence of the spiritual world, man and his free-will, and the character of morality. All these are connected to religion, political philosophy and study of society. Although Cambridge Platonists cannot be regarded primarily as political philosophers, their teachings show certain reactions to contemporary events. In the article the author shows that Cambridge philosophers objected strongly to Hobbes' ethical relativism, against which they postulated the thesis that abstract entities or concepts, such as justice, do not only exist but furthermore their existence is more real than the existence of material things. They, however, do not think of the natural world as a sense illusion, but what gives the world its intelligibility and beauty, is the mind. The article gives a basic insight into the teachings of Cambridge Platonists as compared to Thomas Hobbes.

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was one of the most prominent philosophers of the 17th century and Cambridge Platonists, a group of religious philosophers¹ surrounded around Benjamin Whichcote (1609–1683) in Cambridge, responded to his teaching as it stood on the opposite side of the imaginary scale. According to Cambridge Platonists, Hobbes' philosophy destroyed all religious thinking. Their worlds diverged in any possible point – Hobbes was an exponent of materialism, nominalism, and determinism, he supported ethical relativism and egoistic psychology; the Cambridge Platonists, on the other hand, believed in the spiritual world, in absolute ideas, free-will, absolute and eternal morality, in psychology based on the teachings about the innate ideas of goodness and unselfishness.² Their primary interest lay in man and his nature, therefore they could not miss reacting to the teachings of Hobbes who, in their eyes, was a proclamer of great mistakes of antiquity (especially atomism), i. e. of the atheistic view of the universe and materialistic view of man.

Materialism is the foundation of Hobbes' atheism. While Descartes preserved immaterial in his conception, Hobbes reduced everything to material substance, immaterial substance has no place in his system. For Ralph Cudworth this kind of materialism subverts also the concept of good – it makes man dependant on materia and destroys his moral life and responsibility.³

¹ In this article I will pay attention especially to Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688) and Henry More (1614–1687).

² S. I. Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, Cambridge 1970, p. 81.

³ "It is certain, that the source of all atheism is generally a dull and earthy disbelief of the existence of things beyond the reach of sense; and it cannot be denied but that there is something of immorality in the temper of all

Spiritual acts of man become, in Hobbes' concept, egoistic and brutal reactions of a corporeal mechanism towards strictly material surroundings. This atheistic amorality of Hobbes' thinking again and again provoked Cudworth to try to prove the existence of God. He wanted to show that the world is guided by God and not by some amoral mechanism. He names the evidence of a universal idea of God in the history of thinking as one of the proofs in favor of the existence of God. He, however, gives a proof of God also on the basis of logic. His argumentation lies in the assessment of first cause: there has to be a first cause, or a first principle, and this cause cannot be material, as the materialists say, but has to be immaterial and it is identical with God. In antiquity this argument was formulated as the axiom *de nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti*.⁴ According to Cudworth, many thinkers take this axiom literally and derive that no new substance can emerge, that there are only various modes of the preexisting substance. This, however, would mean that there is more than one thing/being since eternity. God would be in this case limited to creating preexisting matter and there would be two principles acting in the universe – active and passive, i. e. God and matter. This would mean, however, that one of them or even both would be without a cause.⁵ But Cudworth is clear in this – following Plato and the ancient neoplatonic philosophers, he declares that in the whole universe there can be only one being that is uncreated. This entity has to be self-creating, otherwise it would be created out of nothing. Therefore, it has to be the first cause which originates in itself and is the source of everything else. It has to be the cause of itself and sufficient cause (*causa sufficiens*) of all other created entities. Therefore, there is only one cause and one creation.⁶

Although the Cambridge Platonists were not much interested in political philosophy nor politics, the publication of Hobbes' *Leviathan* in 1651 roused them to strong reaction because in Hobbes' materialistic philosophy and its atheistic consequences they saw the greatest intellectual threat of their times. Hobbes' materialism denied the existence of a spiritual soul and of free-will and proclaimed that it is the state authority and power that is the source of moral duties. Hobbes' declarations about the identity of thinking and feeling, about the non-existence of immaterial spirit and about the death of the soul which comes together with the death of the body were absolutely unacceptable for the Cambridge Platonists.⁷

Cudworth's inquiry into political philosophy is therefore a certain reaction to a specific philosophical system and political theory. In *A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality* (1731) he rejects the subjectivistic ethics of the atheists and in many places he attacks Hobbes. As has been already stated, Ralph Cudworth cannot be regarded as a political philosopher, therefore his argumentation dealing with this topic is grounded on areas that are much closer to him – specifically on epistemology and ethics. The basic Cudworth's argument lies in the assumption that we cannot rely on knowledge based on senses. Sensual cognition is passive, it is caused by

Atheists, as all atheistic doctrine tends to immorality." R. Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, 3 vols, G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Bristol 1995, Vol. I, p. 277.

⁴ "... nothing can be made out of nothing, or come from nothing, viz. causally, that nothing, which before was not, could afterward be made without a cause, and a sufficient cause." Ibid., Vol. III, p. 107.

⁵ "...if no substance or real entity could ever be brought out of non-existence into being, or be caused by any thing else, then must all human souls and personalities, as well as matter and atoms, have existed not only from eternity, without beginning, but also of themselves independently upon any other thing." Ibid., Vol. III, p. 96.

⁶ D. B. Sailor, *Ralph Cudworth: Forlorn Hope of Humanism in the Seventeenth Century*, PhD. dissertation, University of Illinois 1955, p. 205–209.

⁷ G. A. Panichas, "The Greek Spirit and the Mysticism of Henry More", *The Greek Orthodox Theological Review* 2 (1956), p. 58.

atoms when they interact with the bodily organs.⁸ True cognition, however, is an active energy of the soul. The subject of cognition is eternal truth, wherefore the process of cognition cannot be temporary itself, i. e. it cannot exist only through passive sense perception but through something eternal, therefore through the soul. This concept of epistemology is connected with ethics as well, that is why moral philosophy deals with the immutable, eternal nature of justice and not with something that is arbitrary.⁹ The main target of Cudworth's argumentation is Hobbes' subordination of morality and liberty of conscience to state authority which is based on power. Cudworth's reflections go much further into the nature of society and its organization and to highlighting common good in contrast to individual egoistic interests.¹⁰ Cudworth's reaction to Hobbes' theory springs out of the rationalistic view that reason acknowledges us with moral duties which are included in the natural order of the universe and which are independent of God's will as well as of any social contract or political authority.¹¹

Against Hobbes' ethical concept Cudworth also fights with his understanding of nature as intellectual reality. Against Hobbes' ethics based on habit and tradition he places ethics which has its foundation in the morality of nature, which means in the Divine Order. According to Cudworth the principles of morality are included in the order of nature itself. The followers of the "ethics based on habit" could argue that Cudworth's understanding of nature is a pure mental construct; Cudworth, however, was aware that this objection might appear, and therefore he denied it in advance by stating that intellectuality and morality cannot be mental fictions. As Sarah Hutton points out, Cudworth does not understand the outside world as sense illusion although it is basically only a mass of atoms. What gives the world its intelligibility and beauty, is the mind, not the senses or the world itself.¹²

Cudworth fights against the ethical relativism of Thomas Hobbes by the thesis that abstract entities or concepts, such as justice, do not only exist but furthermore their existence is more real than the existence of material things.¹³ Cudworth's God is the highest perfection and even though the human mind is not able to grasp wholly the idea of perfection, it has at least a certain idea about it. The idea of perfection can be demonstrated, according to Cudworth, on the basis of its counterpart – imperfection which is only the absence of perfection. There are visible degrees of imperfection and this must be valid on the other side as well – there must be degrees of perfection. Therefore, there must be an ascendant order of more and more perfect perfection

⁸ "Sensations formally considered are certain Passions or Affections in the Soul fatally connected with some Local Motions in the Body, whereby the Soul Perceiveth something else besides those immediate Corporeal Motions in the Nerves, Spirits or Brain." See Ralph Cudworth: *A Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality with A Treatise of Freewill*, S. Hutton (ed.), Cambridge 1996, p. 82.

⁹ G. A. J. Rogers, "The Other-worldly Philosophers and the Real World: the Cambridge Platonists, Theology and Politics", in: G. A. J. Rogers – J. M. Vienne – Y. C. Zarka (eds.), *The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context. Politics, Metaphysics and Religion*, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1997, p. 9–10.

¹⁰ J. H. Muirhead, *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*, London/New York 1931, p. 42.

¹¹ *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, T. Honderich (ed.), Oxford 1995, p. 588.

¹² S. Hutton, "Ralph Cudworth, God, Mind and Nature", in: R. Crocker (ed.), *Religion, Reason and Nature in Early Modern Europe*, Dordrecht/Boston/London 2001, p. 71.

¹³ "Moreover, nothing can be more evident than this, that mind and understanding hath a higher degree of entity or perfection in it, and is a greater reality in nature, than mere senseless matter or bulky extension. And consequently, the things, which belong to souls and minds, to rational and intellectual beings as such, must not have less, but more reality in them, than the things which belong to inanimate bodies. Wherefore, the differences of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, are greater realities in nature, than the differences of hard and soft, hot and cold, moist and dry... There is unquestionably a scale or ladder of nature, and degrees of perfection and entity one above another, as of life, sense, and cogitation, above dead, senseless, and unthinking matter; of reason and understanding above sense..." R. Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, Vol. III, p. 434.

towards the absolute perfection.¹⁴ Cudworth uses deduction to persuade the reader that we have a certain idea of perfection although absolute perfection is beyond our understanding. In this way he poses an ontological explanation of imperfection as defection from perfection.¹⁵

In *The True Intellectual System of the Universe* (1678) Cudworth turns to Hobbes' followers who, according to him, at first instance spatter human nature and make man a demon¹⁶ and then continue in the same style when they talk about justice and rulers whom they consider dishonest and corrupted allies of fear or lesser evil. People then conform to this to prevent themselves from bigger evil, from the war among all which would rise due to human natural foolishness.¹⁷ Cudworth continues by pointing out the fundamental inconsistency of the contract theory of social justice: "Here, therefore, do our atheistic politicians plainly dance round in a circle; they first deriving the obligation of civil laws, from that of covenants, and then that of covenants

¹⁴ "Wherefore there being plainly a scale or ladder of entity, the order of things was unquestionably, in way of descent, from higher perfection downward to lower; it being as impossible for a greater perfection to be produced from a lesser, as for something to be caused by nothing. Neither are the steps or degrees of this ladder (either upward or downward) infinite; but as the foot, bottom, or lowest round thereof is stupid and senseless matter, devoid of all life and understanding, so is the head, top, and summity of it a perfect omnipotent Being, comprehending itself, and all possibilities of things. A perfect understanding Being is the beginning and head of the scale of entity; from whence things gradually descend downward, lower and lower, till they end in senseless matter." *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 435.

¹⁵ S. Hutton, "Cudworth, Boethius and the Scale of Nature", in: G. A. J. Rogers – J. M. Vienne – Y. C. Zarka (eds.), *The Cambridge Platonists in Philosophical Context. Politics, Metaphysics and Religion*, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1997, p. 97–98.

¹⁶ Although Cudworth denies that Hobbes is a calvinist, he shows some similarities of both the systems. They both, although they derive from different presuppositions, come to a very similar concept of man and society – they undermine the moral responsibility of man: "Hobbes speaks sometimes of Divine Decrees as whereby the frame of things in Nature was set and determined and would draw an argument for the necessity of all things from Divine Prescience ... nay he sometimes cites St. Paul and Calvin and Perkins, too..." R. Cudworth, Additional Manuscript 4982, f. 60, British Museum, London. Quotation overtaken from, D. B. Sailor, *Ralph Cudworth: Forlorn Hope of Humanism in the Seventeenth Century*, p. 252–253.

¹⁷ "...we must here briefly unravel the atheistic ethics and politics. The foundation whereof is first laid in the villanizing of human nature; as that, which has not so much as any the least seeds, either of politicalness or ethicalness at all in it; nothing of equity and philanthropy (there being no other charity or benevolence any where, according to them, save what resulteth from fear, imbecility, and indigency); nothing of public and common concern, but all private and selfish; appetite and utility, or the desires of sensual pleasure, and honour, dominion, and precellency before others, being the only measures of good in nature. So that there can be nothing naturally just or unjust, nothing in itself sinful or unlawful, but every man by nature hath jus ad omnia, 'a right to every thing,' whatsoever his appetite inclineth him unto, or himself judgeth profitable; even to other men's bodies and lives. Si occidere cupis, jus habes, 'if thou desirest to kill, thou hast then naturally a right thereunto;' that is, a liberty to kill without any sin or injustice. For jus and lex, or justitia, 'right' and 'law,' or 'justice,' in the language of these atheistic politicians, are directly contrary to one another; their right being a belluine liberty, not made, or left by justice, but such as is founded in a supposition of its absolute non-existence ... these atheistic politicians further add, that though this their state of nature, which is a liberty from all justice and obligation, and a lawless, loose, or belluine right to every thing, be in itself absolutely the best; yet nevertheless by reason of men's imbecility, and the equality of their strengths, and inconsistency of their appetites, it proves by accident the worst; this war with every one making men's right or liberty to every thing indeed a right or liberty to nothing; they having no security of their lives, much less of the comfortable enjoyment of them ... Here therefore these atheistic politicians, as they first of all slander human nature, and make a villain of it; so do they, in the next place, reproach justice and civil sovereignty also, making it to be nothing but an ignoble and bastardly brat of fear; or else a lesser evil, submitted to merely out of necessity, for the avoiding of a greater evil, that of war with every one, by reason of men's natural imbecility. So that according to this hypothesis, justice and civil government are plainly things not good in themselves, nor desirable (they being a hindrance of liberty, and nothing but shackles and fetters), but by accident only, as necessary evils..." R. Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, Vol. III, p. 496–497.

from the laws of nature; and lastly, the obligation both of these laws of nature, and of covenants themselves, again, from the law, command, and sanction of the civil sovereign; without which neither of them would at all oblige. And thus is it manifest, how vain the attempts of these politicians are, to make justice artificially, when there is no such thing naturally (which is indeed no less than to make something out of nothing); and by art to consociate into bodies politic those, whom nature had dissociated from one another; a thing as impossible as to tie knots in the wind or water; or to build up a stately palace or castle out of sand. Indeed the ligaments, by which these politicians would tie the members of their huge Leviathan, or artificial man together, are not so good as cobwebs; they being really nothing but mere will and words: for if authority and sovereignty be made only by will and words, then is it plain, that by will and words they may be unmade again at pleasure.¹⁸

In connection to political theory Cudworth rejects Hobbes and other atheistic thinkers' proposition that religion and Divinity is unacceptable for a political system – the ruler has to rule on the basis of fear which has to be the greatest possible. People must be afraid of punishment that can be imposed on them by the ruler and due to this fear they become obedient.¹⁹ Of course, it is sometimes convenient for the rulers to plead religion and to present their requirements as the requirements of God,²⁰ this, however, is not true religion.²¹ Some atheistic thinkers even declare that religion is an invention of politicians who fabricated it to keep the people in obedience.²² Cudworth, however, refutes this opinion by pointing out the universal content of religion and the fact that individual rulers could not have made an agreement about a unified system of religion. Therefore religion is something which springs out of human nature.²³ What plays an important role in true religion is conscience, personal judgement of good and evil, of justice and injustice. Political systems and state laws based on fear do not take these factors into

¹⁸ Ibid., Vol. III, p. 501–506.

¹⁹ "...the fraud and fiction of law-makers and civil-sovereigns, who, the better to keep men in peace and subjection under them, and in a kind of religious and superstitious observation of their laws, and devotion to the same, devised this notion of a God, and then possessed the minds of men with a belief of his existence, and an awe of him." Ibid., Vol. II, p. 625–626.

²⁰ "...the Atheists will superadd a third to them, from the fiction and imposture of civil sovereigns, crafty law-makers, and designing politicians, who, perceiving a great advantage to be made, from the belief of a God and religion, for the better keeping of men in obedience and subjection to themselves, and in peace and civil society with one another (when they are persuaded, that besides the punishments appointed by laws, which can only take place upon open and convicted transgressors, and are often eluded and avoided, there are other punishments, that will be inflicted even upon the secret violators of them, both in this life and after death, by a divine, invisible, and irresistible hand) have thereupon dexterously laid hold of men's fear and ignorance, and cherished those seeds of religion in them (being the infirmities of their nature) and further confirmed their belief of ghosts and spirits, miracles and prodigies, oracles and divinations, by tales or fables, publicly allowed and recommended..." Ibid., Vol. II, p. 563–564.

²¹ "Now, we deny not but that politicians may sometimes abuse religion, and make it serve for the promoting of their own private interests and designs..." Ibid., Vol. II, s. 626; "...the Atheists, who make religion and the belief a God to proceed from the imposture of fear, do first of all disguise the Deity, and put a monstrous, horrid, and affrightful vizard upon it, transforming it into such a thing as can only be feared and hated..." Ibid., Vol. II, p. 580.

²² "Lastly, that the ancient Atheists, as well as the modern, pretended the opinion of a God and religion to have been a political invention, is frequently declared in the writings of the Pagans; as in this of Cicero: '...They who affirmed the whole opinion of the gods to have been feigned by wise men for the sake of the commonwealth, that so religion might engage those to their duty whom reason could not, did they not utterly destroy all religion?'" Ibid., Vol. II, p. 565.

²³ "...that there is a natural prolepsis and anticipation of a God, in the minds of men ... religion being founded both upon the instincts of nature, and upon solid reason, cannot possibly be any fiction or imposture of politicians..." Ibid., Vol. II, p. 625.

account²⁴ and atheists, according to Cudworth, try to persuade the rulers to condemn religion completely.²⁵

Cudworth's state theory springs out of two premises – from the superiority of good over the will of God and from the natural justice. The superiority of good over the will of God is dealt with in *A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*. Everything is, according to Cudworth, determined by its own nature and no will can change this. Will, Divine as well as human, is only a *causa efficiens*, its activity is possible only in connection with entities that have the same nature. And because justice and injustice have such a nature, they cannot be arbitrary.²⁶ Therefore we encounter the existence of “natural justice”.²⁷

For Hobbes, however, morality has no authority, it has no impact on our behaviour if there is no political authority behind it. All human passions are the result of human desire for one's own good. In a natural stage every person does what he considers to be good for himself which necessarily leads to conflicts and wars. Therefore it is the interest of everybody to elude these wars, it is basic natural law that everybody should try to keep peace. This law of nature, however, is not a moral law, the concepts of good and evil, justice and injustice have no meaning in it. It is only a rational pursuit of self-preservation. It leads people to make a contract among themselves which limits their freedom but ensures peace. What is important about this theory is the fact that there does not exist any moral duty to follow this contract. That is why people must appoint a ruler who will force them to follow it. Political authority is therefore necessary to keep certain moral rules.²⁸

²⁴ “...it is perfectly inconsistent with the nature of a body politic, that there should be any private judgment of good or evil, lawful or unlawful, just or unjust allowed. But conscience (which theism and religion introduces) is private judgment concerning good and evil; and therefore the allowance of it, is contradictory to civil sovereignty and a commonwealth. There ought to be no other conscience (in a kingdom or commonwealth) besides the law of the country; the allowance of private conscience being, ipso facto, a dissolution of the body politic, and a return to the state of nature.” *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 137–138.

²⁵ “And now come we to the last atheistic argumentation, wherein they endeavour to recommend their doctrine to civil sovereigns, and to persuade them, that theism or religion is absolutely inconsistent with their interest; their reasons for which are these three following. First, because the civil sovereign reigns only in fear; and therefore, if there be any power and fear greater than the power and fear of the Leviathan, civil authority can signify little. Secondly, because sovereignty is in its own nature absolutely indivisible, and must be either infinite, or none at all; so that divine laws (natural and revealed) superior to it, circumscribing it, would consequently destroy it. Wherefore religion and theism must of necessity be displaced, and removed out of the way, to make room for the Leviathan to roll and tumble in... Thirdly and lastly, private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, is also contradictory to the very being of a body politic; which is one artificial man, made up of many natural men united under one head, having one common reason, judgment and will, ruling over the whole. But conscience, which religion introduces, is private judgment of good and evil, just and unjust, and therefore altogether inconsistent with true politics; that can admit of no private consciences, but only one public conscience of the law.” *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 495–496.

²⁶ “Justice and honesty are no factitious things, made by the will and command of the more powerful to the weaker, but they are nature and perfection, and descend downward to us from the Deity...” *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 315.

²⁷ J. H. Muirhead, *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*, p. 58.

²⁸ Hobbes, due to his experience with civil war, loved peace and was persuaded that man is naturally bad. That is why he believed that self-complacency is the only natural motive for activity. Civilization is dependent on following contracts and these contracts either suit them or they are forced to follow them. There is no altruism. Morality is just one kind of egoism. A strong state is necessary to forestall chaos and misery which would necessarily happen due to the fights of countless egos. “Justice is for the sake of everyone.” See G. P. H. Pawson, *The Cambridge Platonists and their Place in Religious Thought*, New York 1974³, p. 58; “And before Plato, Critias, one of the thirty tyrants of Athens, plainly declared religion at first to have been a political intrigue, in those verses of his recorded by Sextus the philosopher, beginning to this purpose: ‘That there was a time at first, when men's life was disorderly and brutish, and the will of the stronger was the only law: after which, they consented and

Another treatise directed against Hobbes was *The Treatise of Freewill* where Cudworth deals with the nature of justice, accusation, punishment, etc. Again, in Hobbes' concept of free-will and necessity Cudworth sees a threat from the justification of punishment, and a threat towards state order and also towards the Christian understanding of the relation between God and man.²⁹

Cudworth did not oppose Hobbes' theory only because of its consequences, his fundamental objections are turned to the principles on which Hobbes' theory lies. From Hobbes' understanding of man it is clear that absolutism threatens the very nature of morality – the differentiation of good and evil becomes unreal.³⁰ Conscience is paid no attention because it is contradictory to state authority and power. Cudworth revolted against this negative view of man as a miserable creature.³¹

We can find similar criticism of Hobbes in the works of Henry More *Antidote Against Atheism* (1653), *The Immortality of the Soul* (1659), *Divine Dialogues* (1668) and *Enchiridion Metaphysicum* (1671). The last two treatises also criticize René Descartes at the same time. Descartes proclaimed that spirit is unextended and is nowhere which for More was the same as if he said that spirit does not exist at all. The first impulse for More to defend spirituality came from Hobbes, however.³² More reacts to Hobbes' statement that every substance has to have dimensions – it has to be placed in space, it has to have a certain size and it has to be extended. Two substances cannot be at the same place at the same time. All substances are impenetrable, i. e. they are corporeal. Hobbes opposed the scholastic opinion that the human soul is wholly in all parts of the body,³³ and he regarded this opinion to be absurd. Among all Cambridge Platonists it was Henry More who reacted most to these Hobbes' declarations. More agreed that the basic characteristic of matter is its impenetrability but he stated that not only matter has dimensions.³⁴ He defined two substances: matter which is impenetrable and spirit which is penetrable but inseparable and imperishable.³⁵ He was persuaded that there are two substances in the universe, material and non-material, that the universe is an aggregate of bodies and souls, matter and spirit. Human reason understands spirit directly as well as indirectly and More parallels this view with mathematic truths – some of them are apriori and need no proofs and some of them are derived. Apart from the evidence of perfection and order in the universe More proves the existence of spirit also through the so called *consensus gentium*, i. e. the fact that people all around the world at all times agree on its existence, and also through witchcraft and apparitions (which, according

agreed together to make civil laws; that so the disorderly might be punished." R. Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, Vol. II, p. 566–567.

²⁹ G. A. J. Rogers, "The Other-worldly Philosophers and the Real World: the Cambridge Platonists, Theology and Politics", p. 11. On Hobbes' notion of free-will see also L. Damrosch, Jr., 'Hobbes as Reformation Theologian: Implications of Free-Will Controversy', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 40/3 (1979) 339–352; S. M. Fallon, "To Act or not: Milton's Conception of Divine Freedom", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 49/3 (1988), especially p. 429–430.

³⁰ "...their vice so far blinding them, as to make them think that the moral differences of good and evil have no foundation in nature, but only in law or arbitrary constitution, which law is contrary to nature, nature being liberty, but law restraint..." R. Cudworth, *The True Intellectual System of the Universe*, Vol. II, p. 576.

³¹ G. R. Cragg (ed.), *The Cambridge Platonists*, Lanham 1968, p. 349–350.

³² S. I. Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, p. 84.

³³ *Totum in toto ac totum in qualibet parte*.

³⁴ "The force of the fourth Argument is briefly this: Every Substance has dimensions; but a Spirit has no dimensions. Here I confidently deny the Assumption. For it is not the Characteristicall of a Body to have dimensions, but to be *Impenetrable*. All Substance has *Dimensions*, that is, Length, Breadth, and Depth: but all has not *Impenetrability*." Henry More, *The Immortality of the Soul*, A. Jacob (ed.), Dordrecht 1987, p. 55.

³⁵ S. I. Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, p. 88.

to Hobbes, are only fabrications of dreams, fear and superstitions).³⁶ According to More, however, these apparitions, spirits, or miracles are real because the most credible witnesses and also the Bible agrees with them.³⁷

Hobbes' affirmation on the non-existence of the spiritual world springs out of the opinion that extension is the fundamental and exclusive characteristic of matter. But why this should be so? More was persuaded that only impenetrability is the unique characteristic of matter. Why a spirit, or even God, should not have dimensions, why should it not be extended?, poses More to Hobbes. Incorporeal substance then is not *contradictio in adiecto*, but it can be defined as 'extended Substance with Activity and Indiscernibility'.³⁸

According to Hobbes the existence of spirits is impossible; More, however, poses that no fact is primarily impossible. Therefore, it is possible that spirits, such as apparitions, do exist.³⁹ This was the reason why More together with Joseph Glanville wrote *Saducismus Triumphatus* (1681) and *Lux Orientalis* (1682), where he gives empirical proofs about the existence of spirits and their activity in the world. The existence of spirits is very important for More because if we denied their existence then we might deny also the existence of good spiritual entities such as angels and also of God. More in this way emphasizes the importance of spiritual activity – if man is influenced by the power of God, then he speaks, acts and thinks that which is saintly, just and true. If, however, man only believes he is guided by God but in reality this is not true, then he is a fanatic and fanaticism is as dangerous as atheism.⁴⁰ In *Antidote against Atheisme* More cites many examples of the existence of spiritual entities in the form of apparitions, spirits, witches, etc. He concludes that a rational man who accepts reasonable proofs in the history and in the testaments must admit that spiritual entities do exist, that they are active and that they are either good, evil, or neutral. These spiritual entities show that at least some of them have existed since eternity and their existence therefore proves the existence of God.⁴¹

On questions of ethics Henry More was also in sharp opposition to Descartes as well as Hobbes who were, according to More, nominalists. More, similarly to Cudworth, was a realist in terms of ethics, wherefore Descartes' understanding of morality as dependent on the will of God and Hobbes' view of morality as dependent on the will of a ruler were unacceptable to him. According to More, the ideas of good and evil (that are confirmed but not created by reason) are immutable and in logical order they even stand before God. They became God's ideas and man recognizes them due to the participation of human reasoning in God's mind.⁴²

³⁶ More wrote *Antidote against Atheisme* as a reaction to Hobbes' *Leviathan* and he writes straightforwardly about Hobbes' natural explanation of spirits and miracles. Hobbes did not deny the existence of spiritual entities but he regarded them as a kind of diluted matter and their activity was therefore the result of the movement of matter. *Antidote against Atheisme* consists of three parts – the first two deal with the proofs of the existence of God and spiritual entities in general on the basis of metaphysics. In the third part More describes examples from real life to prove the existence of the supernatural. He considered this part to be the most important one as he regarded the stated examples neither natural nor accidental but miraculous due to which they clearly prove the existence of a subtle essence. See A. Coudert, "Henry More and Witchcraft", in: S. Hutton (ed.), *Henry More. Tercentenary Studies*, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1990, p. 115–136.

³⁷ S. I. Mintz, *The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes*, p. 86.

³⁸ "Extended substance which is active and indiscernible."

³⁹ R. H. Popkin, "The Spiritualistic Cosmologies of Henry More and Anne Conway", in: S. Hutton (ed.), *Henry More. Tercentenary Studies*, Dordrecht/Boston/London 1990, p. 97–114.

⁴⁰ More even regards fanaticism as an illness, namely maniodepression or at least melancholy.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 97–114.

⁴² G. P. H. Pawson, *The Cambridge Platonists and their Place in Religious Thought*, p. 57–58.

One of the most important common features of all the representatives of Cambridge Platonism is the recognition of the highest principle, the simple and most fundamental law of morality by which they understood real and sincere love for God.⁴³ This love towards God has its origin in the human soul which is the highest part of the human mind. There are two ways in which intellectual love for God unites moral truth. To follow God means to follow that which is absolutely the best, i. e. to adopt the highest virtue. Once one has acquired this highest virtue, he has acquired all the virtues – in terms of his relation towards himself, towards the others or towards God. All moral noemata can be reduced to love towards God. Those who love God, must necessarily live according to them.⁴⁴

Cambridge Platonism can be seen as an important opponent of contemporary Hobbesian naturalism as well as Cartesian spiritualism.⁴⁵ This attempt, however, remained isolated as the main stream of British philosophy headed towards empirism.⁴⁶ With a certain dose of hyperbole we might however say that this philosophical movement from the 17th century represents the opposite, Platonic, face of Europe.

⁴³ “Amor Dei lux Animae.” More’s illuministic theory is deterministic: God’s love is irresistible if the individual human soul manages to deprive itself from the identification with the body and self.

⁴⁴ G. N. Dolson, “The Ethical System of Henry More”, *The Philosophical Review* 6/6 (1897).

⁴⁵ W. Röd, *Die Philosophie der Neuzeit I: Von Francis Bacon bis Spinoza*, München 1999, 336p.

⁴⁶ J. H. Muirhead, *The Platonic Tradition in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy*, p. 69–70.

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Krause, Hegel y Kant en la España Decimonónica

Abstract | It is well known that Spain has been the Catholic country par excellence. At least since the 16th century, Spain lost its shine and its philosophical size. Since that time, up to Franco's time in the 20th century, political and religious power were very closely connected. A dogmatic scholasticism was the only possible "philosophy". The Reformation which released a spiritual movement in Europe left Spain in its isolation untouched. The 19th century began in Spain with two opposite mind postures whose collision characterize its history till now. It was the century of the fight between traditionalist and liberal in Spain. The traditionalist tried to keep away modern philosophy from Spain. They saw Catholic theology threatened by modern philosophy and so incompatible with it. For example, Balmes (the most significant representative of scholasticism) criticized all of modern philosophy, from Descartes up to German Idealism, as "fully from mistakes". He concentrates his criticism upon the philosophy of Kant because from this, as he writes, "pantheistic" system arise Fichtes and also the systems of Schelling and Hegel with inevitable consequence.

En el siglo XIX, la filosofía en España se dividió de acuerdo a los intereses ideológicos de conservadores y liberales. Por un lado, el ala conservadora del país, en la defensa de un proyecto imposible, buscaba seguir siendo la abanderada de un antimodernismo ejemplar; la consecuencia fue aislar a España del escenario europeo. Por el otro lado, los liberales buscaban acercar España a Europa, sienten fuertemente el atraso de la vida cultural española y la necesidad de europeización se impone como remedio para salir del aislamiento secular en que vivía el país. Pero, incapaces de una auténtica asunción de las filosofías vigentes en Europa, se concentran y se aíslan en una filosofía bastante al margen de las grandes corrientes de pensamiento. Me refiero a lo ocurrido con la filosofía que se llamaría «krausista», inspirada en el filósofo alemán Krause, un filósofo con poco eco, con razón o sin ella, en los círculos filosóficos europeos. Incluso hoy en día sigue siendo un gran desconocido. Por ejemplo, si tomamos el segundo volumen de la obra de Wolfgang Röd *Der Weg der Philosophie* (1966)¹, volumen que cubre el período desde el siglo 17 hasta el 20, no aparece ni una sola vez el nombre de Krause. Con todo, el krausismo supondrá la primera incursión importante de los filósofos españoles en la filosofía alemana.

En este artículo vamos a repasar algunos de los pormenores de esta aventura liberal española del siglo XIX.

1. Cuando muere Fernando VII², en 1833, acaba la llamada «década ominosa» (1824–1833) en la que se había reprimido brutalmente a los liberales, muchos de los cuales habían tenido que tomar el camino obligado del exilio. Se abre entonces un período de signo contrario, un período liberal con una gran dinámica intelectual, en el que surgen importantes periódicos, vuelven los exiliados y se acrecienta la necesidad de europeización de España, de abrirse hacia Europa. Se crea el *Ateneo Científico, Literario y Artístico* de Madrid (inaugurado en 1835). Se forma el

¹ W. Röd, *Der Weg der Philosophie*, Band II. 17. bis 20. Jahrhundert, München 1996.

² Este monarca acuñó el dicho: «la funesta manía de pensar».

Partido Progresista que defendió la soberanía popular y la libertad de imprenta, y que jugará un importante papel en los acontecimientos políticos del siglo XIX.

Aprovechando esta circunstancia política favorable, en 1841, el Ministerio de la Gobernación de Madrid proyecta crear una cátedra de Filosofía del Derecho. Ese mismo año un amigo y condiscípulo de Julián Sanz del Río (del que hablaremos enseguida) traducía al castellano el *Curso de Derecho Natural*, obra de un notable discípulo de Krause, llamado Ahrens y que éste mismo había escrito en francés en 1837. El Ministerio de la Gobernación se inclinó por esta cuando menos curiosa tendencia filosófica, inclinación sustentada en la hipótesis de que la filosofía de Krause completaba y culminaba la doctrina de Kant y de todo el Idealismo Alemán. Con ello por un lado esta filosofía situaría al liberalismo español de lleno en la modernidad, pero, a la vez, esta filosofía conservaba un regusto o trasfondo «religioso» que podría responder a los intereses de la burguesía liberal española y no ser, de entrada, rechazada por la España tradicionalmente «católica». Dice a este respecto Unamuno: «Si Krause echó aquí algunas raíces -más de lo que se cree, y no tan pasajeras como se supone- es porque Krause tenía raíces pietistas, y el pietismo [...] tiene raíces específicamente católicas y significa en gran parte la invasión o más bien la persistencia del misticismo católico en el seno del racionalismo protestante. Y así se explica que se krausizaran aquí hasta no pocos pensadores católicos».³

Así, una vez aceptado el proyecto por el Claustro universitario en 1842 y tras una demora debida a que la situación política se complicó de nuevo para los liberales, en 1843, al reorganizarse la Facultad de Filosofía, se nombra a Julián Sanz del Río catedrático interino de Historia de la Filosofía. Este se comprometía en contrapartida a completar su formación durante dos años (que era lo que tardaría en abrirse la matrícula para los nuevos estudios) en el extranjero. Tras consultar a Ahrens, Sanz del Río se dirige a Heidelberg, lugar donde enseñaban algunos de los más importantes discípulos de Krause (Leonhardi, Röder, Schiephake, Gervinus, Schlosser y Weber, en cuya casa incluso se hospedó). Krause mismo había muerto poco antes, en 1832 (ver más adelante el breve resumen de su vida). En este tiempo, Sanz del Río pudo familiarizarse con las doctrinas de Krause, llegando a convencerse de que su filosofía recogía y superaba las de Kant, Fichte, Schelling o Hegel. Era, por consiguiente, la filosofía de su tiempo, precisamente lo que necesitaba España.

Con esta idea volvía, un tiempo después, Sanz del Río a España. El motivo directo era la muerte de un tío suyo y, aunque no había transcurrido el tiempo acordado para su estancia en el extranjero, se quedó ya definitivamente en España, siendo nombrado en 1845, ahora en propiedad, para la cátedra de Ampliación de Filosofía. Poco después renunció a ella, pues no se consideraba aún bien preparado para asumirla, por lo cual se retiró a Illescas, una pequeña ciudad toledana, a completar su preparación filosófica. Allí preparó para su publicación algunas obras de Krause y sus discípulos: *Metafísica analítica*, sobre la primera parte del Sistema de Filosofía de Krause, *Historia universal* de Weber, *Psicología* de Ahrens, *Ideal de la Humanidad* de Krause mismo, *Historia de la literatura alemana* de Gervinus, *Compendio* de Weber.

Francisco de Paula Canalejas, un prestigioso discípulo de Sanz del Río, dibuja del siguiente modo la situación filosófica española en torno a los años cincuenta, que es cuando el krausismo va a comenzar a despegar en España: «Por los años en que comenzó en España a extenderse la noticia y el conocimiento de las doctrinas de Krause (1853-1856), no era fácil dibujarse el sesgo y el camino que seguían los estudios filosóficos. Dominaba en algunas universidades, por ejemplo en Barcelona, gracias a los esfuerzos del inolvidable Martí de Eixalá, y de su dignísimo sucesor el doctor Lloréns, la escuela escocesa, y Hamilton era su maestro, la autoridad, el faro. En Sevilla, una tendencia hegeliana, debida a un hombre reverenciado por la juventud sevillana, se

³ M. Unamuno, *El sentimiento trágico*, Madrid 1986, pp. 266-267.

indicaba y traslucía en los discursos y estudios de la juventud democrática; y en Madrid vagaba la atención pública entre las tradiciones espirituales de Tissot, debidas a Núñez de Arenas, las exposiciones de los eclécticos de García Luna en el Ateneo, y de Uribe en la Universidad. Fuera del nombre respetable de Balmes y de las excentricidades de Donoso, la cultura filosófica no recibía otro alimento».⁴

En 1854, Sanz del Río acepta definitivamente la cátedra de filosofía que se le ofrece, ahora llamada «Ampliación de Filosofía y su Historia». Se le encarga además «Historia crítica y filosófica de España». En 1857, presenta oficialmente la filosofía krausista en la academia en el discurso que pronunció con motivo de la inauguración del curso académico y que sería objeto de agrias controversias. En 1860, publica sus dos obras más importantes; la primera, el *Ideal de la Humanidad para la vida*, de la que él mismo llegaría a decir que se trata de adaptar a las condiciones culturales españolas una obra fundamental de Krause, *Das Urbild der Menschheit*. Y, en segundo lugar, publica la *Metafísica* (primera parte: *Análisis*) del mismo Krause. La primera de ellas fue muy estudiada y discutida en los círculos intelectuales de la época, que no dudaron en ningún momento de que se trataba efectivamente de una obra altamente original de Sanz del Río y que además fue considerada como la articulación coherente y definitiva del krausismo. Fernando de los Ríos dijo que llegó a ser «el libro de las horas de varias generaciones krausistas».⁵

El ambiente liberal que hizo posible la difusión de las nuevas ideas, duró sólo hasta 1857, año en que un militar llamado Narváez instaló un duro gobierno antiliberal. Narváez era un exponente de la reacción; una de sus primeras medidas fue la creación de la Guardia Civil. Él había sido además el encargado de reprimir en España los levantamientos de signo proletario en 1848, represión a la que José Donoso Cortés se encargaría de dar cobertura ideológica. Ahora de nuevo volvían las cosas a ponerse difíciles para los krausistas. Los reaccionarios volvían a la carga. Se suspendió la libertad de cátedra, la censura era total. En 1865 éstos lograron que el *Ideal de la Humanidad para la vida* fuera incluida en el *Índice* romano. Desde los círculos reaccionarios se pedía la expulsión de la universidad de Sanz del Río y de los profesores de su entorno, lo que sucedió realmente en 1867. A Sanz del Río se le formó un expediente y se le exigió una profesión de fe religiosa, política y, por si fuera poco, dinástica. Al negarse a ello, se le retiró de la cátedra. Y, aunque tras la muerte de Narváez (1868), el nuevo gobierno le repuso en su cátedra, ofreciéndolo incluso el Rectorado de la Universidad, él se negó a aceptarlo, muriendo en 1869.

Este nuevo período, abierto en 1868, tuvo lugar gracias a la congruencia de tres fuerzas que el krausista Gumersindo de Azcárate definió del siguiente modo: «El partido progresista, la democracia y la Unión Liberal, que fueron respectivamente el sentimiento, la inteligencia y la fuerza de aquel memorable movimiento nacional».⁶ Azcárate pone de relieve la presencia de krausistas en las tres fuerzas; aunque esta revolución, a la postre, habría de fracasar, porque, como vio muy bien Costa, se trataba de movimientos que venían de arriba y no acabaron de producir un auténtico cambio social. El poder seguía estando en las manos de los de siempre.

Ese sería asimismo el error de la primera república española, de breve pero intensa vida, proclamada el 11 de febrero de 1873 y que duró sólo hasta el 3 de enero de 1874 en que es liquidada; este mismo día la izquierda gana unas elecciones que suponen que el cuarto presidente de la República, Castelar, debería abandonar su puesto. Pero el capitán general de Madrid, Pavía, envía al Parlamento a la Guardia Civil, la cual se encargaría de disolverlo por la fuerza y acabar así con la República. Pues bien, en este breve período republicano, que conoce cuatro presidentes, el

⁴ P. Canalejas «El panenteísmo», *Revista Europea*, 4 (1875), p. 531.

⁵ F. de los Ríos, *La Filosofía del Derecho en Don Francisco Giner*, Madrid 1918, p. 29, nota 1.

⁶ G. de Azcárate, «El libre examen y nuestra literatura del presente», *Solos* (1881), p. 66. (reprint in Alianza Editorial, Madrid 1971)

tercero de ellos, Nicolás Salmerón, era krausista. Por cierto, dos de ellos, Pí y Margall y Castelar pretendían inspirarse en cierto modo en Hegel.

Tras un gobierno provisional, el 14 de enero de 1875 entra en Madrid el nuevo rey, Alfonso XII. Comienza la llamada Restauración, período que coincide más o menos con el del reinado de Alfonso XII, es decir, de 1875 a 1885. Se asienta en el poder la fracción más conservadora del país. Se implanta el catolicismo de Estado. Se emiten órdenes draconianas para depurar la universidad española de disidentes. A los krausistas se les arrebató definitivamente sus cátedras. Como respuesta a esta situación el krausista Francisco Giner de los Ríos crea en 1876 una institución que después jugará un papel muy importante en la vida cultural española, con el nombre de *Institución Libre de Enseñanza* y que sirvió de refugio para los liberales arrinconados por la purga de la Restauración. La Institución intentará mantener vivo el revulsivo liberal contra la reacción y el tradicionalismo integrista que luchará a muerte contra ellos. En relación más o menos con ella se hallarán, entre otros, intelectuales como Clarín, Galdós, Unamuno, Antonio Machado o Juan Ramón Jiménez, por citar sólo algunos de los más conocidos.

Con la Restauración vino también la crisis del krausismo. Los krausistas que habían dominado el panorama filosófico durante treinta años, se hallaban ahora replegados, tras ser destituidos de sus cátedras universitarias, en la Institución. Y será una nueva corriente filosófica que recorría entonces Europa, el positivismo, la que irrumpirá con fuerza también en España e introducirá lo que entonces se hallaba en auge en Alemania y que era un nuevo resurgir de la filosofía de Kant con el nombre de neokantianismo. Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo escribió con poco sentido, pero con mucha razón: «¡Qué distinta hubiera sido nuestra suerte si el primer explorador intelectual de Alemania, el primer viajero filosófico que nos trajo noticias directas de las Universidades del Rhin, hubiera sido don Jaime Balmes y no don Julián Sanz del Río!»

2. El *Ideal de la Humanidad para la vida* fue la obra fundamental del krausismo español, publicada por vez primera, como hemos dicho más arriba, en 1860 y de la que luego saldrían dos ediciones posteriores, en 1871 y en 1904 respectivamente. Ultimamente ha sido reeditada. Esta obra había sido considerada prácticamente hasta hoy como una acomodación y adaptación libres y originales que Sanz del Río hacía de una de las obras más significativas de Krause, *Das Urbild der Menschheit* (*El Ideal de la Humanidad*, de 1811). Sanz del Río habría adaptado y acomodado esta obra de Krause al espíritu de la cultura española. Algunos krausistas han llegado a otorgarle un grado de originalidad tan elevado que incluso se ha llegado a considerar como un texto original que haría del krausismo español algo ya independiente de sus fuentes alemanas. «No hay original alemán ni no alemán de donde se haya traducido», dice el mismo Sanz del Río en una carta a Francisco de Paula Canalejas. Francisco Giner de los Ríos y con él todos los krausistas creyeron que se trataba de «una exposición completamente libre, acomodada al espíritu de nuestro pueblo y a las más apremiantes necesidades de su cultura», como se dice en la Advertencia a la segunda edición del *Ideal*.

Aparte de otras innovaciones respecto a la obra de Krause, la más importante habría sido la que hace referencia a la reorientación de la obra de Krause a las «necesidades morales, circunstancias históricas, psicología cultural, apetencias intelectuales, etc., del pueblo español», lo cual supone una «reorientación del pensamiento abstracto de Krause hacia lo práctico, hacia su aplicación a la vida». Frente a la tendencia básicamente especulativa y abstracta de la doctrina de Krause, Sanz del Río habría hecho hincapié en la necesidad de reorientar esta filosofía hacia lo práctico, hacia la problemática moral en vistas a una reforma y renovación de la sociedad española. Francisco de Paula Canalejas dice de la obra que «es una importantísima aplicación de la filosofía a la esfera de la realidad sensible, al mundo histórico, y aún podríase añadir al

estado social y moral en que nos encontramos».⁷ Así pues, el carácter práctico es lo que atrajo a los krausistas españoles hacia esta obra, quedando otras de carácter teórico, como la *Analítica*, en claro segundo lugar. Ese carácter práctico es quizás la nota más característica del krausismo español: «No creemos necesario insistir en el carácter reformador y práctico de la filosofía de Krause. Los mismos krausistas y los historiadores del krausismo han puesto de relieve insistentemente que la doctrina de Krause, sobre todo en su modalidad española, fue una tendencia a la reforma práctica de la vida, de la cultura y del modo de ser español»⁸, dice la historiadora Gómez Molleda.

En los últimos años esta idea de la originalidad del krausismo español se ha venido abajo. Creemos importante insistir en ello. Enrique Martínez Ureña ha puesto en evidencia que la obra en cuestión, el *Ideal de la Humanidad para la vida*, es simplemente una traducción de algunos artículos de Krause, procedencia que Sanz del Río habría ocultado con la intención probablemente de favorecerse de los honores de la originalidad y creatividad, aunque este punto es una incógnita aun no del todo clara. Ureña apunta a que posiblemente la ocultación de la fuente original se debiera en principio al miedo a que el Consejo de Instrucción Pública no reconociera que con una simple traducción se pudiera dar por cumplida la tarea que se le encomendó en 1843 con su viaje a Alemania. Pero, con todo, una cosa es la ocultación de las fuentes originales y otra ya la información falsa de que se trata de un escrito original. Lo cierto es que Sanz del Río no sólo ocultó su fuente original, sino que además intentó presentar su obra como una acomodación original de la obra de Krause a las circunstancias españolas. Estamos ante un «fraude», concluye Ureña,⁹ de consecuencias importantes para la vida cultural española, que obliga a revisar gran parte de lo publicado hasta ahora.

La obra teórica más importante del krausismo español es simplemente una traducción de escritos de Krause y no una acomodación y adaptación de la filosofía de Krause a las circunstancias de la España decimonónica. No podemos hablar, pues, de originalidad alguna, ni fundamental ni de otro tipo, del krausismo español respecto a sus orígenes alemanes. Más en concreto, el artículo de Krause que constituye el «texto principal» del *Ideal* es un tratado «explícitamente filosófico-masónico».

La traducción de Sanz del Río procede de una pequeña revista que Krause editó, con el título de *Tagblatt des Menschheitbens* en la que casi todos los artículos estaban escritos por él mismo. En el número 19 de la revista, Krause comenzó a publicar, por entregas, un extenso artículo con el título *Entfaltung und urbildliche Darstellung der Idee des Menschheitsbundes, vom Standorte des Lebens aus* («Desarrollo y presentación ideal de la idea de la Alianza de la Humanidad, desde la perspectiva de la vida»). Al tener que suspenderse, por falta de dinero, la publicación de la revista al cabo de un trimestre de vida, el artículo quedó incompleto. Sanz del Río tradujo este artículo incompleto y lo usó como parte principal de su obra, en concreto en los apartados 1 al 135 de su obra (p. 33 hasta el final de la edición de 1860).

En el mismo número 19 del *Tagblatt* Krause publicó otro artículo con el título *Versuch, die Gebote der Menschlichkeit an den einzelnen Menschen, auszusprechen* («Ensayo de presentación de los mandamientos de la Humanidad a los individuos particulares»). La primera parte de este artículo de Krause constituye la primera nota de Sanz del Río al texto principal del *Ideal* (p. 99 a 102, de la edición de 1860), bien que Sanz del Río no tradujo directamente de la revista de

⁷ F. de Paula Canalejas, *Estudios críticos de Filosofía, política y literatura*, Madrid 1872, p. 146.

⁸ M. D. Gómez Molleda, *Los reformadores de la España contemporánea*, Madrid 1966, p. 30.

⁹ Todo ello podemos verlo con todo tipo de detalles en Enrique Menéndez Ureña, *El «Ideal de la humanidad» y su original alemán*, Madrid 1992. Aquí vamos a resumir la introducción que hace Ureña en su libro, en donde recoge y amplía lo que ya había dicho en otros artículos anteriores, por lo que prescindimos de ellos. No pretendemos con ello más que reconocer el trabajo de Ureña que es al único al que corresponde todo el mérito.

Krause, sino de una reimpresión que hizo Leonhardi del mismo con algunas variaciones basadas en anotaciones del mismo Krause, y que editó el propio Leonhardi en 1843 en la obra de Krause: *Die reine d. i. allgemeine Lebenslehre und Philosophie der Geschichte*. En el número 2 de la revista Krause publicó un artículo con el título *Menschheitsbund* («Alianza de la Humanidad») que Sanz del Río tradujo en su *Ideal*, haciéndolo preceder al texto principal. Se conserva una continuación del texto que Krause no pudo publicar por el cierre de su revista.

A Ureña, de quien tomamos casi al pie de la letra estas notas, se debe también el descubrimiento de la versión primera del *Ideal*, de 1851 y que publica en su obra junto al texto original de Krause y el de la versión de Sanz del Río de 1860. Veamos qué sucede con las reflexiones y los escritos de Krause.

En 1807 Krause había comenzado una obra de carácter político con el título *El Estado Mundial a través de Napoleón*. Se trataba de presentar la empresa napoleónica como la realización histórica del *Ideal* que había expuesto unos años antes en una obra suya titulada: *Grundlage des Naturrechts oder philosophischer Grundriss des Ideals des Rechts*¹⁰, (*Fundamentos del Derecho Natural o compendio filosófico del Ideal del Derecho*, 1803), siendo aún docente en la Universidad de Jena. Sin embargo este proyecto pronto quedó interrumpido. En 1808, cuando comenzaba a publicarse *El Estado Mundial* Krause cambiaba radicalmente su concepción político-social; una nueva figura, la *Alianza de la Humanidad (Menschheitsbund)* iba a ocupar el lugar que antes ocupaba el *Estado Mundial*. Y así como Napoleón era el brazo ejecutor del Estado Mundial, la Hermandad masónica constituía el germen y la institución apropiada de la Alianza de la Humanidad. A partir de entonces Krause se dedicó a este nuevo proyecto que llevó el título: *La Alianza de la Humanidad y la Hermandad masónica*.

El proyecto tenía dos partes, como indica el título mismo: una primera parte en la que «demuestro -dice Krause- la necesidad y el carácter esencial de la Alianza en la vida de esta Humanidad, desarrollo su idea, muestro su estructuración interna y me detengo ampliamente en la constitución, liturgia y actividad, así como en sus relaciones con todas las otras cosas humanas». Y una segunda parte en la que estudia «la relación de la Hermandad masónica con la Alianza de la Humanidad». Si de esta segunda parte Krause sólo dejó manuscritos incompletos, de la primera en cambio dejó terminada la parte correspondiente a «la necesidad y el carácter esencial de esta Alianza en la vida de la Humanidad». Es precisamente lo publicado en el artículo antes citado: «Desarrollo y presentación ideal de la idea de la Alianza de la Humanidad, desde la perspectiva de la vida», lo que representa la mitad de la primera parte del proyecto de Krause, es decir, de la «Alianza de la Humanidad» y que se completa (la primera parte) con lo que se conserva en los manuscritos inéditos de Dresden que hemos citado. En la parte inédita Krause dedica uno de los apartados más extensos a explicar la *educación de la Humanidad*. Esta educación es fundamental para Krause, es la *condición interna de subsistencia* de la Alianza de la Humanidad, lo cual por otro lado se corresponde con la idea general masónica.

La idea de Sanz del Río de publicar, en vez del *Urbild der Menschheit*, estos artículos de Krause es ciertamente acertada, pues servía para difundir la filosofía social de Krause mejor que la primera, mucho más extensa y compleja. Fue asimismo lo que hicieron los difusores de Krause, no sólo en España, sino incluso en Alemania mismo, y también en otros países europeos. Al krausismo se le ha solido calificar de «racionalismo armónico»; se caracteriza por un interés especial en que esa doctrina oriente la práctica. Pretende ser tanto un estilo de pensar, como un estilo de vida. Tiene un componente panenteísta que se encierra en la fórmula tan de su gusto: Todo en Dios, subrayando el «en», que conlleva un anhelo de armonía del Ser con el

¹⁰ K. Ch. F. Krause, *Grundlage des Naturrechts oder philosophischer Grundriss des Ideals des Rechts*. Jena/Leipzig, 1803.

Universo. La historia es la realización progresiva de la Humanidad y de los individuos particulares en y por ella, la realización de esta «idea» en el tiempo, que para realizarse necesita de una educación a todos los niveles. Esta realización progresiva cuenta con el instrumento de la «razón», y se opone con ello a quienes pretenden ahondar en el pretendido insalvable abismo entre lo racional y lo irracional. Los krausistas creen en un progresivo avance hacia el Absoluto por medio del conocimiento racional.

En general el krausismo se ha opuesto a las tendencias socialistas de su tiempo porque, a su entender, ahogan de algún modo la libertad inalienable del individuo; su parcialidad vendría de que olvidan que la libertad del individuo sólo puede realizarse por medio de una profunda reforma del individuo mismo. Gustavo Bueno dice claramente al respecto: «¿No se encuentra, de hecho, la socialdemocracia de nuestros días, acogida enteramente a los ideales krausistas, aunque éstos pretendan ser presentados muchas veces como idénticos a los ideales de la ilustración? Sobre todo en España, en donde la tradición krausista arraigó profundamente entre abogados y hombres de Estado, cabría decir que el krausismo ha terminado, sobre todo a partir de la Constitución de 1978, ganando la batalla ideológica al marxismo».¹¹

J. López Morillas ve ya lo esencial de la filosofía krausista en este párrafo inicial de *El Ideal de la Humanidad para la vida*: «El hombre, imagen viva de Dios, y capaz de progresiva perfección, debe vivir en la religión unido con Dios, y subordinado á Dios; debe realizar en su lugar y esfera limitada la armonía de la vida universal, y mostrar esta armonía en bella forma exterior; debe conocer en la ciencia á Dios y el mundo; debe en el claro conocimiento de su destino educarse á sí mismo». (Hemos respetado la grafía original).

El descubrimiento de Ureña tiene unas consecuencias fundamentales para la investigación sobre el krausismo español, de modo que se puede hablar de un antes y un después. Todo lo publicado hasta ahora sobre el krausismo queda anulado o debe ser revisado, despejando los errores de enfoque, fundamentalmente el que ponía el acento en la originalidad y *españolización* de la obra de Sanz del Río. La pregunta es cómo trabajar a partir de ahora.

Creo que Ureña tiene razón al hablar de una perspectiva «nueva y enriquecedora del krausismo español» (*Ideal* p. XLIII). Teniendo en cuenta que los escritos de Krause sobre los que se basa el *Ideal* de Sanz de Río son escritos explícitamente masónicos que se enmarcan en una tradición o corriente de pensamiento que va desde Lessing hasta Herder o Fichte pasando por otros muchos filósofos importantes, es preciso ubicar la empresa de Sanz del Río en esa tradición o corriente que desborda ampliamente los límites nacionales de un único país, sea éste Alemania o España. Ahí habría que situar no sólo la obra de Sanz del Río, sino también la realización institucional más importante del krausismo: la Institución Libre de Enseñanza. Se trataría de investigar tanto las peculiaridades del krausismo español en relación con la corriente general europea, como la relación del krausismo con la masonería, con todo lo que ello implica.

De todos modos Ureña sigue planteando «una originalidad española» a pesar del «fraude» de Sanz del Río. Se trataría más bien de una disfunción, pues difícilmente se puede ver qué puede haber de original en haber tomado algo por original español, cuando de lo que se trataba era ni más ni menos que de una simple, en el mejor de los casos, buena traducción de un desconocido filósofo alemán (para bien o para mal, en eso no entramos). En todo caso nunca ha servido para dialogar con las ideas filosóficas que circulaban por Europa. La pregunta es si ahora puede servir para ello. Yo creo que muy difícilmente. Seguirá siendo una pugna de eruditos. Parece que Ureña plantea algo así como intentar recuperar el tiempo perdido, en lo cual tiene razón a mi

¹¹ G. Bueno, «Krausismo y marxismo (en torno al *Krause* de Enrique M. Ureña)»; *El Basilisco*, Segunda Epoca, núm. 19 (otoño 1991), p. 98.

entender, pero la pregunta es si su propuesta no nos va a aislar aún más de las corrientes actuales de pensamiento en Europa, en vez de acercarnos al pensamiento vivo que circula por ella.

En resumen, el Krausismo fue una «invención» de los liberales españoles en el siglo XIX para combatir a los conservadores. Sin embargo su carácter fuertemente idealista, pues propugnaba la reforma interna del individuo como condición previa a una reforma social, olvidaba que los grandes males del siglo XIX español nacían sobre todo del carácter clasista de la sociedad, dominada por el caciquismo y la oligarquía. Con todo tuvo un importante papel renovador en la España del siglo XIX. Krause, un filósofo alemán de segunda fila, fue el mentor de este movimiento, habría que decir el alibí, pues bien poco interesó a sus divulgadores una confrontación crítica con sus ideas, ni con las de nadie. Lo que se buscaba era más bien una regeneración moral de un país moralmente corrompido sobre todo, se creía, por el influjo del pensamiento francés materialista.

3. ¿Quién era Krause, el directo inspirador del movimiento en cuestión? Karl Christian Friedrich Krause nació en Eisenberg (Alemania) en 1781 y murió en Múnich en 1832. A los dieciséis años, en septiembre de 1797 se fue a Jena para estudiar en la universidad filosofía, matemáticas y teología. En esta universidad, que era entonces la más importante de Alemania, Krause escuchó a los más importantes filósofos del momento, que eran Fichte y Schelling. (:::) Se doctoró en filosofía y matemáticas. Aunque comenzó a dar clases con notable éxito en esta misma universidad, al no obtener la plaza de «Professor», se fue un tanto decepcionado -después de algunas escaramuzas- a Dresden en abril de 1805, decidido a dedicarse exclusivamente a la investigación, sobre todo al arte y a desarrollar su propio sistema de la filosofía.

Sin embargo, su actividad masónica le fue llevando cada vez con más intensidad hacia temas de filosofía social e historia de la masonería; tenía la intención de reformar la masonería y formar, a partir de ella, una *Alianza de la humanidad*. Este plan fracasó estrepitosamente. Los masones no aceptaron el plan e incluso le expulsaron de la logia en diciembre de 1810. Completamente desilusionado y decepcionado se marcha de Dresden en 1813 y tras una breve estancia en Tharandt se dirige a Berlín con la intención de probar sus posibilidades de lograr un puesto en su universidad. Entró en contacto con su viejo profesor Fichte, animado por el cual, logró, tras habilitarse, la venia para la docencia en calidad de «Privatdozent» (docente privado). Sin embargo, Berlín tenía pocos alumnos, lo cual dificultaba que se formaran los cursos y con ello la posibilidad de mantenerse para los docentes privados, pues sus ingresos dependían sobre todo del número de matriculados en sus cursos. Krause albergaba la intención de lograr el puesto de Fichte tras su fallecimiento, el 29 de enero de 1814, unas seis semanas después de su llegada a Berlín. Sin embargo la plaza fue finalmente para Schleiermacher, hecho que Krause interpretó como un nuevo episodio de la persecución de que era objeto por parte de los masones.

Las pocas posibilidades de lograr trabajo en Berlín por fin le decidieron a volver a Dresden, donde permaneció ocho años, hasta 1823. Pero aquí y tras varios intentos tampoco logró nada y se fue a Gotinga donde logró permiso para impartir clases como docente privado. Sin embargo al cabo aquí tampoco lograría un puesto de «profesor», lo cual le iba sumiendo en un pesimismo creciente, debido tanto a las penurias económicas, como a su presunta persecución por parte de «gente importante», así como al deterioro de su salud.

En mayo de 1831 abandona Gotinga y se va a Múnich. Aquí intentaría de nuevo una plaza de catedrático. Cuando se disponía a solicitar oficialmente una cátedra honorífica, recibió una orden policial conminándole a abandonar Múnich. Tras lograr la gracia del rey de Baviera pudo quedarse finalmente en Múnich. Pero no lograría la venia para la enseñanza. Ahora sería su antiguo profesor Schelling el que iba a impedirlo. Tras unos últimos meses de extremas penurias materiales, moría el 19 de septiembre de 1832, dejando un puñado de discípulos empeñados en continuar su tarea filosófico-social.

4. Pero no fue Krause la única figura filosófica que jugó algún papel en la escena filosófica liberal española del siglo XIX. También la influencia de Hegel se dejó notar en España durante el siglo XIX. El centro cultural se formó en la Universidad de Sevilla. Pero también políticos de prestigio se hallaban más o menos adscritos al idealismo hegeliano. Castelar, Pí y Margall, Correa y Zafrilla, Roque Barcia fueron personajes políticos que jugaron un papel importante en el surgimiento de la primera República española y que habían adoptado posiciones más o menos inspiradas en la llamada izquierda hegeliana. Aquí también es preciso subrayar que se trata en primer lugar de políticos que buscan una base sólida para sus programas políticos. Por ello hacen una lectura exclusivamente política de Hegel. Los textos de Hegel les interesan sólo en cuanto les sirven para potenciar sus proyectos políticos. Ello lleva a una lectura muy sesgada de Hegel, que excluye muchos aspectos del filósofo alemán; en concreto el carácter sistemático y global de su filosofía es dejado de lado para acentuar el carácter dialéctico de la misma. Estando los hegelianos españoles muy vinculados a un proyecto político concreto cuyo epicentro se situó en la primera república, una vez fracasado este proyecto, el hegelianismo corrió pareja suerte.

Para ellos, como para toda la izquierda hegeliana, la *dialéctica* es el concepto fundamental del hegelianismo. La dialéctica es el motor de las transformaciones socio-políticas, es el único método capaz de explicar las contradicciones a través de las cuales evoluciona la historia hacia síntesis más acordes con lo que es el fin, a saber, la libertad.

El hegelianismo, combatido por los tradicionalistas como una «forma moderna de panteísmo»¹², como hemos visto en el capítulo dedicado a ellos, sólo en los años 50 comenzó a tener cierta influencia. El comienzo se halla ligado a un profesor de filosofía de la Universidad de Sevilla, *José Contero y Ramírez*. Con él surgió lo que después se llamaría, de un modo exagerado a nuestro entender, «la escuela de Sevilla».¹³ A partir de aquí fue acrecentándose el interés por Hegel en España, especialmente por algunos aspectos de su filosofía, especialmente por su Filosofía del Derecho.¹⁴ Igual que los krausistas respecto a Krause, también estos hegelianos se hallaban ocupados en mostrar que la filosofía de Hegel era compatible con la cristiana.

Además de este grupo, dos presidentes de la primera república española, Pí y Margall y Castelar, pretendían haberse inspirado para su programa político en la filosofía de Hegel. De todos modos su referencia a Hegel es más bien difusa y no se halla sustentada en ningún conocimiento profundo de su obra.¹⁵ Lo que realmente hacen es inclinar el pensamiento de Hegel para hacerlo compatible y acorde con sus propios intereses. Se puede preguntar por qué fue Krause y no Hegel quien dominó el panorama político del siglo XIX. Mariano Álvarez Gómez cree que «el carácter humanista de la filosofía de Krause se halla más cerca de la tradición española, mientras el carácter especulativo y sistemático de la filosofía de Hegel ciertamente despertó admiración y entusiasmo, pero al mismo tiempo hizo tanto más difícil su comprensión».¹⁶ Esto es realmente

¹² M. Menéndez y Pelayo, *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles*, Madrid 1932, cap. III, p. 358 afirma que la mediación entre catolicismo y hegelianismo muestra grandes e insuperables dificultades, pues la heterodoxia del hegelianismo no se basa tanto en los detalles, sino más bien en la base y en la esencia de su sistema, que es radicalmente incompatible con la persona y el estamento divino.

¹³ Por ejemplo, J. I. Lacasta Zabalza, *Hegel en España. Un estudio sobre la mentalidad social del hegelismo hispánico*, Madrid 1984. Cfr. también la opinión distinta de J. R. García Cue, *El hegelianismo en la Universidad de Sevilla*, Sevilla 1983.

¹⁴ Lacasta Zabalza ha llevado a cabo una investigación minuciosa sobre la recepción de la Filosofía del Derecho de Hegel en España durante el siglo XIX, en la obra citada en la nota anterior.

¹⁵ Cfr., J. I. Lacasta Zabalza, *Hegel en España. Un estudio sobre la mentalidad social del hegelismo hispánico*, p. 246. En relación a los dos políticos Lacasta habla de «un ensanchamiento excesivo del fenómeno hegeliano hispánico».

¹⁶ M. Álvarez Gómez, «Zur gegenwärtigen Hegel-Rezeption in Spanien», *Hegel-Studien* 14 (1979), p. 280.

cierto.¹⁷ Pero no debemos olvidar que el interés principal de esta recepción consistía en imponer sus propias ideas a las de otros grupos.

Bajo la presión cada vez más fuerte del positivismo en la última parte del siglo, además del fracaso político experimentado por los representantes del hegelianismo español, se fue esfumando este primer intento de una recepción de Hegel en España.¹⁸

5. Para terminar este recorrido por la filosofía liberal en España en el siglo XIX, es interesante tener en cuenta también, aunque sea brevemente, la recepción de la filosofía de Kant en la España decimonónica.¹⁹ Aunque ya desde principios de siglo se encuentra alguna alusión a Kant en España, «Balmes fue el primero en dar a conocer en España el pensamiento de Kant con algún detenimiento», dice Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín.²⁰ Con todo es preciso no olvidar que Balmes sólo consiguió leer a Kant en francés, no en el original alemán y además se limitó al Kant de la primera *Crítica*.

La primera obra de interés en que un autor español adopta posiciones claramente kantianas es la de José María Rey y Heredia, *Teoría trascendental de las cantidades*, publicada póstumamente en 1865. Posteriormente, en 1866, Nicolás Salmerón, entonces destituido por sus posiciones krausistas, escribirá una exposición bastante completa de la obra de Kant: *La Filosofía Novísima en Alemania* (recogida en: Antonio Llopis y Pérez, *Historia política y parlamentaria de D. Nicolás Salmerón y Alonso*, Madrid 1915, pp. 603–832).

Pero la época más interesante respecto a la recepción kantiana en España es la de la Restauración. Será José del Perojo y Figueras quien a la vuelta de sus estudios en Alemania, donde fue discípulo de Kuno Fischer, que será un precursor del neokantianismo, escribió una serie de artículos en los que explicaba -en un ensayo titulado «Kant y los filósofos contemporáneos» dentro de su obra *Ensayos sobre el movimiento intelectual en Alemania* aparecida en Madrid en 1875- que el denominador común de la filosofía alemana de entonces era la referencia a Kant. Por decreto de 24 de marzo de 1877 su libro fue incluido en el *Index librorum prohibitorum*. Fundó una *Revista Contemporánea* para difundir sus proclamas de necesidad de regeneración

¹⁷ Esta idea se corresponde en parte con la de Unamuno cuando escribe: «¿Por qué prendió aquí, en España, el krausismo y no el hegelianismo o el kantismo, siendo estos sistemas mucho más profundos, racionalmente y filosóficamente, que aquél? Porque el uno nos le trajeron con raíces. El pensamiento filosófico de un pueblo o de una época es como su flor, es aquello que está fuera y está encima; pero esa flor, o, si se quiere, fruto, toma sus jugos de las raíces de la planta, y las raíces, que están dentro y están debajo de la tierra, son el sentimiento religioso. El pensamiento filosófico de Kant, suprema flor de la evolución mental del pueblo germánico, tiene sus raíces en el sentimiento religioso de Lutero, y no es posible que el kantismo, sobre todo en su parte práctica, prendiese y diese flores y frutos en pueblos que ni habían pasado por la Reforma ni acaso podían pasar por ella. El kantismo es protestante, y nosotros, los españoles, somos fundamentalmente católicos. Y si Krause echó aquí algunas raíces -más que se cree, y no tan pasajeras como se supone- es porque Krause tenía raíces pietistas, y el pietismo, como lo demostró Ritschl en la historia de él (*Geschichte des Pietismus*), tiene raíces específicamente católicas y significa en gran parte la invasión o más bien la persistencia del misticismo católico en el seno del racionalismo protestante. Y así explica que se krausizaran aquí hasta no pocos pensadores católicos.» (*Del sentimiento trágico de la vida en los hombres y en los pueblos*, Obras Completas VII, Cap. XI).

¹⁸ Sobre el positivismo en España ver D. Núñez, *La mentalidad positiva en España. Desarrollo y crisis*, Madrid 1987. Núñez muestra hasta qué medida alcanzó el influjo del positivismo en la vida cultural de España. Escolásticos, pero también krausistas intentaron contrarrestar este influjo. También Unamuno, como más tarde veremos, fue impactado fuertemente por el positivismo.

¹⁹ Las ideas fundamentales de este apartado las he extraído del artículo de J. M. Palacios, «La filosofía de Kant en la España del siglo XIX», en J. Muguerza – R. Rodríguez Aramayo (ed.), *Kant después de Kant. En el bicentenario de la Crítica de la razón práctica*, Madrid 1989, pp. 673–707.

²⁰ En J. Balmes, *Filosofía fundamental*, nueva edición, conforme a la primera de 1846, con introducción y notas de Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín, Madrid 1922, p. XVI.

de la cultura española abriéndose a las de fuera. Menéndez y Pelayo escribirá de esta revista: «Como no sé alemán, ni he estudiado en Heidelberg, ni oído a Kuno Fischer, no me explico la razón de que en una revista (al parecer) en español y para españoles, sea extranjero todo: los artículos doctrinales, las novelas, las poesías y hasta los anuncios de la cubierta. Dios nos tenga de su mano».²¹

La revista supuso un interesante punto de encuentro de neokantianos y positivistas con filósofos europeos. Perojo publicó la primera traducción al español (aunque no logró completarla) y directamente del alemán de la *Crítica de la razón pura*, en 1883. Otras traducciones de Kant aparecerán en castellano, pero del francés. Y habrá que esperar otros treinta años para que aparezca otra nueva. Sin embargo, «el neokantianismo alemán retoñó tempranamente en el páramo español, pero fue como un árbol solitario de existencia efímera, pues vivió realmente en un solo hombre [se refiere a José del Perojo y Figueras], cuya efectiva influencia sobre sus contemporáneos resulta muy difícil de estimar», es la conclusión a la que llega Palacios.

En la última parte del siglo XIX, el panorama filosófico es desolador en España. Mientras en Europa se prepara el siglo XX, en España se da un paso hacia atrás y vuelven con fuerza los neoescolásticos y krausistas, que fueron los que encontró Unamuno cuando acudió a Madrid a estudiar filosofía. La única alternativa era un cientificismo positivista ya de sabor rancio y caduco. Palacios concluye su interesante investigación indicando que «su importancia [de Kant], [...] no parece desdeñable, si bien en nada puede compararse con la que en el mismo siglo cobró en otras naciones europeas, como Francia, Inglaterra o Italia. Examinar las causas de esta tenaz diferencia ha interesado siempre a los españoles, que no acabamos nunca de explicárnosla. No hubiera, desde luego, sorprendido al propio Kant, que en su *Antropología*, hablando del lado malo del carácter del pueblo español, escribe severamente: “er lernt nicht von Fremden, reiset nicht, um andere Völker kennen zu lernen; bleibt in Wissenschaften wohl Jahrhunderte zurück.” (No aprende de los extranjeros, no viaja para conocer otros pueblos; en las ciencias lleva siglos de retraso)».²²

La revista *Kant-Studien*, fundada en 1896 por Hans Vaihinger se propuso, entre otros cometidos, el de investigar la influencia de Kant fuera de Alemania. Para ello encargó al filósofo Wincenty Lutoslawski la parte referente a la influencia de Kant en España.²³ Lutoslawski, para realizar su cometido, visitó diversas bibliotecas públicas, entre otras la de la Universidad de Madrid y la del prestigioso Ateneo, pero no encontró ninguna obra de Kant. En la Biblioteca Nacional encontró una edición original de la *Crítica de la Razón Pura*, aunque fuera en su cuarta edición. Entonces se decidió a visitar a los catedráticos de filosofía más conocidos de la Universidad Central. Ortí y Lara, un escolástico, por cierto profesor también de Unamuno, le niega su ayuda aduciendo que la filosofía de Kant es totalmente rechazable, pues se halla basada, como por lo demás toda la filosofía moderna, en el error y en el pecado. Así que Lutoslawski se dirige a otro prestigioso profesor, Nicolás Salmerón, ex presidente de la República y krausista, como hemos citado más arriba, el cual le confiesa haber leído a Kant en francés y que no cree que haya nadie en España que lo haya leído en alemán.

Después Lutoslawski se dirigió a Marcelino Menéndez y Pelayo del que, como era de esperar, saca poco provecho para su empresa. Al cabo visitó al Dr. Matías Nieto Serrano, marqués de Guadaleras, presidente de la Real Academia de Medicina, el cual le expuso su curiosa

²¹ M. Menéndez y Pelayo, «Mr. Masson redivivo», *Revista Europea*, t. 8, Nº 127 (30 de julio de 1876), recogido en Menéndez y Pelayo, *La ciencia española*, C.S.I.C., Madrid 1953-54, 3 vols., I, p. 94.

²² I. Kant, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, Ak. VII, 316.; J. M. Palacios, «La filosofía de Kant en la España del siglo XIX», en o.c. 707.

²³ W. Lutoslawski, «Kant in Spanien», *Kant-Studien* 1 (1987), pp. 217-231.

interpretación de Kant. Lutoslawski, incapaz de traducir tan ridícula interpretación al alemán, la reproduce en castellano como apéndice de su artículo en el *Kant-Studien* (pp. 229–231), para concluir: «Kant ist in Spanien so gut wie gänzlich unbekannt» (p. 218) (Kant es totalmente desconocido en España). Mala base sin duda para poder siquiera entender a sus sucesores, incluido Krause.

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Theosophy as the highest science for Vladimir Solovyov

“Mystique is the only force capable of realizing the synthesis of knowledge which was aggregated by other forms of human activity.”
Teilhard de Chardin

Abstract | Vladimir Sergejevich Solovyov belongs to the greatest thinkers of not only his period, but all of Russian philosophy as such. He analyzed his greatest topics against the central idea of “sobornost” – togetherness and sophiology. Theosophy represents his attempt to synchronize primarily different aspects of human thinking. Rational, empirical and mystical (spiritual) parts have their expressions in philosophy, empirical science and theology. Only the synchronization of these three aspects will bring, according to Solovyov, an entire view of the truth which is only an abstract term when it investigates without one of the elements. And that cannot entirely express the nature of the truth. These opinions are all the more important, as he presented them right in the time when the disaffection of science, philosophy and religion was crucial. Solovyov’s opinions must be permanently confronted with his whole system where there mystique takes its specific place. This is the only way to understand his system and it may be an inspiration for theology, philosophy and also empirical science.

.....

Vladimir Solovyov (1853–1900) is the author regarded by many as the founder of Russian religious philosophy and perhaps the first Russian philosopher *par excellence*. He had a coherent system which derived from his extensive knowledge of science, religion and philosophy. His intuitions and mystical experience¹ also played an important role. Although they are ambivalent they still determine the character and orientation of his philosophical thinking which is religious in its essence.² Solovyov’s work is usually divided into three periods: 1. Theosophical period

¹ This refers mainly to his three “meetings” with Sophia which certainly influenced his sophiology. He describes these three meetings with supernatural revelation of the wisdom of God (Sophia) in a feminine form in his poem *Три свидания Москва – Лондон – Египет. 1862–1875–1876*. One can notice there a strong feminine aspect and the idea of all-unity: “Не веруя обманчивому миру,/ Под грубою корою вещества Я осязал нетленную порфиру/ И узнавал сиянье Божества.../ Что есть, что было, что грядет вовеки –/ Все обнял тут один недвижный взор.” (В. Соловьев, *Три свидания. Москва – Лондон – Египет. 1862–1875–1876*, Собрание сочинения. Т. XII. Брюсель: Жизнь с Богом, 1970, p. 80.)

² When young, Solovyov also engaged in spiritualism as he thought that spiritualistic phenomena could be useful for metaphysical goals. (Н. Лосский, *История русской философии*, Москва: Советский писатель, 1991, p. 105.) His friend, prince Evgeni Trubeckoi, remarked that his dreams were mantic and prophetic and also fantastical and weird. (Compare with: Й. Трубецкой, *Миросозерцание В. С. Соловьева*, Москва 1913, p. 19). Solovyov himself acknowledged the subjectivity of these visions but he believed in some cause of these states. (Н. Лосский, *История русской философии*, p. 104.)

(until 1881) – a quest to find the world religion which acknowledges the plurality in one God and at the same time a quest to find the internal synthesis between various areas of cognition. In philosophy, it is mainly the issue of metaphysics and logic. 2. Theocratic period (1882–1889) – practical realization and searching for unity (ecumenism), divinization of the society. 3. Theurgic period (1889–1900) – symbolizes the cooperation between “labourer”, “artist” and “mystic” who try to uplift themselves and others to God. This period is evidently influenced by apocalyptic and eschatological visions, ethics, aesthetics and eroticism.³

At the same time, Solovyov was the last great Russian thinker who worked freely in Russia before the emergence of the Soviet Union.⁴ In my article, I want to present two basic dimensions. Firstly, I want to show what is so unique and original about Solovyov’s thinking and then point out one aspect of his originality which is theosophy, in two expressions as all-unity and Godmanhood, which is the highest science that attempts to create wholeness and comprehensiveness on the level of cognition in the broadest sense of this term.⁵ Solovyov’s views and their diversity are significant not only in the Russian environment but there is also a great interest in his writings in the West. Let me mention at least two sources. Despite his critique of solovyovism, Masaryk is convinced that Solovyov can be compared to the early Christian Origen who belongs to the most important Christian authors in the first centuries.⁶ Hans Urs von Balthasar, a prominent theologian of 20th century, characterized Solovyov’s writings as the most speculative

³ On this subject see Altrichter, M. “Sofia zjednáva jednotu od ‘lidského’ k ‘boholidskému’”, in: P. Ambros – M. Altrichter, V. Solovyov, *Filosofické základy komplexního vědění*, Olomouc: Refugium, 2001, p. 12; J. Mastylák, “Predhovor”, in: J. Mastylák, *Rusko a Všeobecná církev*, Trnava 1947, p. 23.

⁴ There are many sources about the life and writings of V. Solovyov. I would like to mention at least some of the sources in Russian language that inspired me. However, this list is not exhausting. С. Соловьев, *Жизнь и творческая эволюция Владимира Соловьёва*, Брюссель 1977; А. Лосев, “Творческий путь Владимира Соловьёва”, in: А. Лосев, В. Соловьёв, *Сочинения*, Т. 1, Москва 1988, p. 3–32; Ё. Трубецкой, *Мирозозерцание В. С. Соловьёва*, I–II, Москва 1913. Already mentioned Lossky’s *History of Russian philosophy* and also Zenkovsky’s *History of Russian philosophy* are of critical importance for studying Solovyov in the context of Russian philosophy (not only the Silver Age): В. Зеньковский, *История русской философии*, Т I– II, Leningrad 1991, p. 481–506. As far as Slovak and Czech literature is concerned, we can mention the writings of Komorovsky who as one of the first Slovaks made Russian thinking accessible, especially the writings of Vladimir Solovyov. Out of many writings let me mention at least the following: J. Komorovský, “Vladimír Sergejevič Solovyov – zakladatel ruskej náboženskej filozofie”, *Verbum* 1 (2003) 7–19; J. Komorovský, *Una Sancta. Spisy o křesťanské jednotě*, Bratislava 2004. In the Czech environment, a couple of years after Solovyov’s death, a short essay was published by Jindřich: K. Jindřich, *Vladimír Sergejevič Solovjev. Jeho život a působení*, Praha 1918–1922. This essay was pioneering in Czech and Slovak environment in its times, however at present many views are outdated. For last substantial synthesis of thinking and work of Solovyov see K. Sládek, *Vladimír Solovyov: mystik prorok*, Olomouc 2009. From Western authors I would like to mention: W. Goerdts, *Russische Philosophie*, München 2002, p. 471–516; J. Sutton, *The religious philosophy of Vladimir Solovyov. Towards a reassessment*, London 1988. The dissertation of Dmitri Belkin is also very interesting because it tracks the influence of Solovyov on Balthasar, Przywara and the whole 20th century German thinking: D. Belkin, *Die Rezeption V. S. Solovjovs in Deutschland*, Dissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doktor der philosophiae in der Geschichtswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Eberhard-Karls-Universität zu Tübingen, Tom I, II, 2000; N. Bosco, *Vladimír Solovjev. Ripensare il cristianesimo*, Torino 1999; P. M. Allen, *Vladimir Soloviev. Russian Mystic*, Blauvelt, N.Y 2008. For a more comprehensive overview of the state of Solovyov’s research see: K. Sládek, *Vladimír Solovyov: mystik prorok*, p. 24–47.

⁵ Solovyov wasn’t the only one who was closely interested in integrating and creating the comprehensive view on religion, philosophy, science or mystique. For example, Pawel Florensky, who understood the truth antinomically, also engaged in this subject. In his system, it does not mean that both things are true but it means that each one is true in some way. Mutual harmony, ergo unity, is above rational thinking. (Porov. П. Флоренский, *Столпъ и утверждение Истины*. Москва 1914, p. 159–160.

⁶ T. G. Masaryk, *Rusko a Evropa. Studie o duchovních proudech v Rusku. K Ruské filosofii a dějin náboženství*, Sv. II, Praha 1921, p. 352.

work in the modern era and also as the most developed Christian philosophy. Balthasar claims that since the era of Thomas Aquinas there were no religious thinkers who would dominate with such a power of synthesis as Solovyov.⁷

Theosophy against the background of Solovyov's critique of positivism. Sophiology and the "creation" of theosophy, as an organic and comprehensive science which tries to grasp the truth in its integrity, are two of the most fundamental of Solovyov's theses with which he tried not only to revive philosophy but also to redefine it. In this comprehensive system, philosophy, science and religion are only the particularities which have to mutually correlate in order for the truth to be "revealed" in its entirety. Even his initial extensive writings, such as *Кризис западной философии* (*The Crisis of Western Philosophy. Against the Positivists*, 1874) and *Философские начала цельного знания* (*The Philosophical Foundations of Integral Cognition*, 1877), point out to the impossibility of remaining in the state of separation of the individual approaches to cognition and definition of the truth. According to Sergei Solovyov, the work *The Philosophical Foundations of Integral Cognition* is the key to understanding all the works of his uncle.⁸ This pursuit of integrity and comprehensiveness is evident in all of his work in which he tried to fuse philosophy, theology and empirical science. Therefore, the teachings about all-unity (всеединство)⁹ and Godmanhood (богочеловечество)¹⁰ belong to the primary spheres of his thinking which derives from the effort to create comprehensiveness in gnoseology. In these two fundamental concepts which determine his philosophy we can see a religious background which we must respect. Otherwise, it would be very hard, if not impossible, to justify Solovyov's philosophy.¹¹

According to Solovyov, only the possibility of integral cognition, which is the synthesis of theology, philosophy and science, enables deeper understanding of individual parts of cognition because when these parts are separated in their exclusivity they are just the *abstract principle*¹² which is unable to define the reality of this world in its entirety. Solovyov did not want to be a one-sided thinker and that is why he was looking for the synthesis which he tried to prove by argumentation against the abstract philosophy (which, in his opinion, is one-sided¹³) which he criticized on the basis of some expressions of the Western thinking, especially on the example of Compté's positivism.¹⁴ He considered Compté's positivism to be the opposite of the universal

⁷ H.U. von Balthasar, *Herrlichkeit. Eine Theologische Aestetik*. Bd. II, Einsiedlen 1962, p. 651.

⁸ Compare with: С. Соловьев, *Жизнь и творческая эволюция Владимира Соловьёва*, p. 25.

⁹ All-unity is a process of re-unification with the Absolute principle. At the very beginning, the original unity was divided by the original sin. In spite of this there is a divine element embraced in the world as the world cannot exist without God. Thus humanity embraces in itself all-unity in potency. Therefore for Solovyov, a gradual realization of the ideal all-unity is the purpose and aim of the cosmic process. In other words the return to the original unity of divine and human. (Compare with: В. Соловьёв, *Чтения о Богочеловечестве, Собранные сочинения*, Т. III, Брюссель 1966, p. 82–83.)

¹⁰ Despite Godmanhood being the subject of theological sciences, it is a particular expression of all-unity in time – history, return or unification of human with divine in the form of Logos – historical Christ and the second person of the Trinity.

¹¹ Russian philosophy is more religious than continental European philosophy. Berdayev argues that philosophy cannot even operate beyond the opinion of cognizing man since it is Man who cognizes and not an impersonal subject. In philosophy, a mystic is a mystic as well as an atheist is an atheist. (Compare with: N. Berdajev, *Sebazpoznanie. Pokus o filozofickú autobiografii*, Bratislava 2005, p. 79.)

¹² В. Соловьёв, *Критика отвлеченных начал, Собранные сочинения*. Т. II, Брюссель 1966.

¹³ One-sidedness must be understood in the sense of exclusivity. Thus focusing just on one aspect and neglecting the others.

¹⁴ В. Соловьёв, *Идея человечества у Августа Конта, Собранные сочинения*, Т. IX, Т. 1, Брюссель 1966, p. 172–193.

synthesis of theology, philosophical metaphysics and positive science which is according to him the only inevitable result of philosophical development.¹⁵ The synthesis itself is a complicated phenomenon because philosophy, theology and positive science have their own methodology. But the synthesis in Solovyovian style derives from the common starting point which is beyond the methodological framework of any science. Comte believes that religion and metaphysics are just steps towards final, scientific cognition (positivism). Solovyov argues against history which is understood in such way and opposes atomisation and evolutionisation of thinking. Such “separation” is an abstract principle which does not lead to Solovyovian synthesis. Solovyov’s arguments focus on the realm of disunity of investigated subjects between religion, metaphysics and science as there is no relating relation between them and therefore one could not substitute the other one as far as comprehensive opinion structures are concerned. To Comte’s disadvantage, he presents an argument that even in the very beginning of human evolution there are three realms in mutual synergy without being mutually in antimony.¹⁶ In his work *Кризис западной философии*, which was his dissertation, he already expresses his conviction about the necessity of organic cognition and that is the foundation for all of his future writings. In the interpretation of Solovyov, the organic synthesis does not represent eclecticism and forced fusion of phenomena. It is rather an integration and unification of the richness of Western rationalism and Eastern mystique or intuition into the new type of philosophy which comprehensively answers human needs and its relations to the Absolute.¹⁷ The Absolute, whether it is in the form of revelation in religion or as a philosophical concept, is fundamental and crucial for interpreting Solovyov who is a religious thinker *par excellence*.

Integral cognition is especially an attempt to find and define the truth which is antinomic¹⁸, but still comprehensive. If any part of the integral truth is absolutized then it is a lie. This reflection about the truth must be understood in its internal unity and multiplicity. For Solovyov, it is more than just the integration of emotionality and reason. He is searching for restoration of unity of multiplicity through the practice of philosophy, science, art or politics.¹⁹ As it was already

¹⁵ В. Соловьев, *Кризис западной философии*, Москва 1988, p. 182.

¹⁶ According to Solovyov, these three phases existed simultaneously from the very beginning of human intellectual evolution. He gives ancient India as an example where relatively developed philosophy and the roots of real science existed among the intellectual minority beside the traditional belief. Furthermore, “according to Solovyov, the same can be said about the Egyptians, not to mention the Greeks.” В. Соловьев, *Кризис западной философии*, p. 133.

¹⁷ Russian religious thinking understands cognition in the sense of values. Cognition is not only a category of reason but is connected to heart or intuition. Without it we would not be able to talk about cognition. Florensky and Lossky believe that mystique is also a part of cognition even though in modern or contemporary Western thinking it is rather on the periphery of philosophical (and partly theological) interest and psychology, or especially sociology of religion, focuses on this phenomenon. According to N. Lossky, to penetrate to substantial depths of things means to cross the boundaries of this world. It means to perceive super-cosmic principle as the Creator who created this world. Then individual self realizes his relation with God. (Compare with: N. O. Losskij, *O mystické intuícii*, Poprad 2004, p. 37–38.) Florensky considers mystical cognition (mystical intuition) to be such cognition which is not divided into object and subject but forms one whole. In his notes, Florensky writes that this principle of cognition is supported by many mystics of different periods. But in this concept he perceives mystique as mystique “from the bottom” or as he calls it mystique “without mercy”. It is mystique which is characterized by the human effort and not by supernatural intervention of God. (Compare with: П. Флоренский, *Столп и утверждение Истины*, Москва 2002, p. 25.)

¹⁸ For the historical development of the term “antinomy” see: P. Florenskij, *Sloup a opora pravdy*, Olomouc 2003, p. 482–483. Unity and antinomy are also explained in: M. Altrichter, *Duchovní a duševní. Příspěvek z pohledu teologie narativní*, Olomouc 2003, p. 31–33.

¹⁹ Compare with: N. Bosco, “Filosofie bez hranic u Vladimíra Solovjova”, in: P. Ambros, *Od Sofie k New Age*, Olomouc 2001, p. 71–89.

mentioned above, it is the process of separation and atomisation of ideas which is the abstract principle that cannot propel Man towards real cognition of the truth. Solovyov is looking for a science that would be the synthesis of comprehensive gnoseological truth. He named this science *free theosophy*.²⁰ Triple understanding of cognition precedes free theosophy. First of all it is empirical cognition (sciences), then cognition of general ideas (philosophy) and eventually theological cognition which is interested in the Absolute.²¹ Except of philosophy²², which he calls theosophy, all the other individual aspects of cognition in its independence are just abstract principles. Then according to Solovyov free theosophy is not a philosophic course but the highest state of the whole of philosophy, the highest science:

“Свободная теософия или цельное знание не есть одно из направлений или типов философии, а должна представлять высшее состояние всей философии как во внутреннем синтезе трех ее главных направлений – мистицизма, рационализма и эмпиризма, так равно и в более общей широкой связи с теологией и положительной наукой.”²³

Solovyov in his work *Философския начала цельного знания* states that free theosophy is a positive counterpart to scepticism. Whereas scepticism refutes all attempts to define philosophy, theosophy tries to fuse it as a whole.²⁴ Theosophy is a precondition for reaching or approaching all-unity.

The principle of all-unity in religion. Only through free theosophy, the synthesis of mystical (intuitive), rational (philosophical) and empirical (scientific) cognition, can one reach the possibility of metaphysical cognition since, according to Solovyov, there is some analogy between the phenomenal world and metaphysical world.²⁵ According to Solovyov, phenomenon and all the other realities, which appear to us, are the product of something (Someone), which (Who) wants to express itself (Reveal). And this is being itself. Even though we cannot cognize it in its internal reality, we can cognize certain forms of metaphysical essence.²⁶ All existence becomes one whole – being which incomparably exceeds every existence. Existence is only the surface of

²⁰ Free theosophy in Solovyovian understanding is the organic synthesis of theology, philosophy and empirical science. Only such synthesis can embrace comprehensive gnoseological truth. Science, philosophy and theology are all just fractions and thus aspects of the whole gnoseological organism. They are just pages torn out of its context which cannot be in accord with the comprehensive truth. Compare with: В. Соловьев, *Философския начала цельного знания*, *Собранные сочинения*, p. 178.

²¹ Compare with: M. Altrichter, “Sofia zjednáva jednotu od ‘lidského’ k ‘boholidskému’”, p. 11.

²² True philosophy must be theosophy, thus integral cognition. As far as the term theosophy is concerned, it is important to note that this term is used also by the movement New Age, especially in the writings of Rudolf Steiner. However, it is just a concordance in terms since Steiner’s starting points (esoteric) are not compatible with Solovyov’s starting points (spiritually-mystical).

²³ В. Соловьев, *Философския начала цельного знания*, p. 194.

²⁴ В. Соловьев, *Философския начала цельного знания*, p. 307.

²⁵ Bulgakov also distinguished three types of cognition: analytical, mystical and empirical. Bulgakov understands empirical cognition in the sense of Divine revelation. The first two types gain meaning only when connected with the third one: “Можно различить три пути религиозного сознания: богопознание more geometrico или analytico, more naturali или mystico и more historico или empirico, – отвлеченное мышление, мистическое самоуглубление и религиозное откровение, причем первые два пути получают надлежащее значение только в связи с третьим, но становятся ложны, как только утверждаются в своей обособленности.” (С. Булгаков, *Свет Невечерний. Первообраз и образ*, *Сочинения в двух томах*. Т. I, Москва 1999, p. 144.)

²⁶ Solovyov compares such cognition to a mirror image in which case one cannot know the internal essence of the image but only the external form. (В. Соловьев, *Философския начала цельного знания*, p. 222.)

this being. Such being is the absolute unity which forms even our essence. And through mystique, which is included in empiricism and abstract thinking, one can observe the absolute substance which is the absolute primordial principle (абсолютное первоначало).²⁷ And it is in this context in which Solovyov thinks about the world-wide religion which would join Western and Eastern philosophical heritage into one religion which would then internally join this mystical route, which is presented in empiricism but also in abstract thinking, and deprive it of exclusivity, separateness and absurdity so it could realize real *εν και παν*.²⁸

In understanding this primordial principle, we can see a dichotomy between occidental and oriental understanding.²⁹ The route of Eastern courses is to become aware of only one of the attributes – absolute uniqueness (singleness) which lies in the route which leads to fusion with this principle (Godhood) and eventually breaking from everything that is an expression of multiplicity.³⁰ On the other side, according to Solovyov the West is characteristic for sacrificing the internal unity for the multiplicity of forms. Therefore it becomes only something formal, external order based on some traditional authority.

“Постоянное стремление Запада, напротив, – жертвовать абсолютным внутренним единством множественности форм и индивидуальных характеров, так что там люди даже не могут иначе понять единство, как только внешний порядок, основанный на традиционном авторитете (будь то папа или библия) или на формальной силе закона.”³¹

Both realities which are understood in such ways are extreme elements and that is why in this period Solovyov reflects upon the question of world-wide religion which would be optimally discrepant and would fuse these extreme positions and deprive them of their exclusivity. It is this attempt where it is evident that he was looking for positions which are not exclusive and thus it is necessary that cognition is the internal synthesis of Western and Eastern antinomies.³²

Every single thing can be cognized in three ways on the basis of its relation to the absolute primordial principle.

²⁷ “Абсолютное первоначало не есть только *εν* – оно есть *εν και παν*.” (В. Соловьев, *Философския начала цельнаго знания*, р. 222.)

²⁸ Compare with: В. Соловьев, *Философския начала цельнаго знания*, р. 223.

²⁹ Solovyov is convinced that all deeper metaphysical systems, whether they are of religious or philosophical nature, acknowledge this primordial principle. (Compare with: В. Соловьев, *Философския начала цельнаго знания*, р. 222.)

³⁰ Buddhism is a route of separation from all desire (desire causes suffering and keeps one in the cycle of reincarnation) to nirvana which is the unification with this principle. In a similar way, Hinduism is looking for an escape from samsara which is not a real existence for human beings. As a matter of fact in many courses of Hinduism there is no reality and everything is just a delusion, illusion (*maya*), thus not even Plato's reflection of the ideal world is real.

³¹ В. Соловьев, *Философския начала цельнаго знания*, р. 222.

³² It is the internal synthesis (mystical cognition) which is a correct term for distinguishing the synthesis in Solovyovian sense from eclecticism (where one fades away in the other /hybridization of cognition/truth/ in some courses /New Age, Bahaim/). Solovyovian synthesis is a preservation and “adaptation” to the antinomic. On the one side, we cannot say anything about man and God (reality which is being cognized and discovered exceeds our abilities) – but this leads to separation. The effort to name, define and dogmatize is a way of simplification. To think antinomically means to define the unnameable, anthropomorphize the Divine and to be in relation with it despite the fact that the essence of divine itself remains unrevealed.

“во-1-х в субстанциальном, коренном и первоначальном единстве со сверхсущим, то есть в чистой потенциальности или положительном ничто (в ен софе или Боге Отце); во-2-х в различении от сверхсущего или в акте осуществления (в Логосе или Сыне) и, наконец, в-3-х в свободном, то есть опосредствованом, единстве со сверхсущим (в Духе Святом).”³³

In such way one can understand a correlation of unity and multiplicity and a return to unity.³⁴ This awareness of the relation between unity and multiplicity is also a cosmological process of Man and humanity maturing and evolving towards the fullness of cognition. Mystical perception of beauty (art) and a relation which is expressed as love is the basic criterion of Solovyovian gnoseology.³⁵

Comprehensive philosophy (theosophy) tries to achieve the logical perfection of Western thinking with the penetrated contentual entirety of contemplation (perceptions, intuitions) of the East. Integral cognition is penetrated by the idea of all-unity³⁶ which, according to Solovyov, represents the climax of pre-Christian religious wisdom.³⁷

To philosophically justify this term Solovyov had to solve the problem of all-unity in God and that is how to fuse multiplicity in God and at the same time his unity with himself. God cannot be “something” because this would refute his omnipotence and therefore it would be a limitation of God and his comparison to something. For Solovyov, God is everything and also he is the unity of the whole Creation. This unity is a substance and objective essence of God although God as a subject differs from it. Thus God creates multiplicity but he is not determined by this multiplicity since he is unity in its essence.³⁸

The world, which was created by God, embraces in itself a divine element since the world could not originate beyond God because this would refute his omnipotence. Because the world which embraces many phenomena and antinomies, the world which is atomized on many particulars (since the natural world lost its original unity – it was separated from the divine unity) at the same time has all-unity in potency at its disposal. This all-unity is the principle which

³³ В. Соловьев, *Философские начала цельного знания*, р. 259.

³⁴ Sergei Bulgakov understood this reality in a similar way. God himself is a self (unity) and at the same time he is the Creator of multiplicity. The Creation is God's self-realization but the Creator does not distinguish from his divine essence. Compare with: С. Булгаков, *Невеста Агнца. О Богочеловечестве*, Westmead 1971, р. 54. Similarly to Solovyov, the cause of the process of unification lies in Sophia which organizes and fuses multiplicity. Under any circumstances neither Bulgakov nor Solovyov understand Sophia as hypostasis of the Trinity: “Как энтелехия мира, в своем космическом лике София есть мировая душа, т. е. начало, связующее и организующее мировую множественность, – natura naturans по к natura naturata. Она есть та универсальная инстинктивно-бессознательная или сверхсознательная душа мира, anima mundi, которая обнаруживается в вызывающей изумление целесообразности строения организмов, бессознательных функциях, инстинктах родового начала.” (С. Булгаков, *Свет Невечерний. Первообраз и образ*, р. 203.)

³⁵ Solovyov analyzes these ideas in his aesthetic works: *Красота в природе* (1889), *Общий смысл искусства* (1890) а *Смысл любви* (1892–1894). For Czech translation see: V. Solovyov, *Krása v přírodě, Obecný smysl umění, Smysl lásky*, Olomouc: Refugium, 2000, р. 98–223.

³⁶ Unlike Solovyov, Berdaiev thought that the idea of all-unity is achievable only in religion and not in philosophy as Solovyov claimed. (Compare with: N. Berdajev, *Filosofie svobody. Filosofie a náboženství*, р. 17.) For the information about the term all-unity see В. Соловьев, *Стати из энциклопедического словаря. Собранные сочинения*, Т. X, р. 231.

³⁷ Compare with: В. Соловьев, *Чтения о Богочеловечестве, Собранные сочинения*. Т. III., р. 82–83.

³⁸ Some aspects of teachings about all-unity within Solovyov's sophiological conception were criticized by Lossky who pointed to Solovyov's inconsistent approach and also criticized him for not drawing from Christian theology. Compare with: Н. Лосский, *История русской философии*, Москва 1991, р. 150–153.

connects Man with God. Without this principle Man would not be able to achieve unification with the divine.

Every particular (not only Man) inclines to the unification with divine principle – all-unity and gradually approaches this mutual unity.

“Постепенное осуществление этого стремления, постепенная реализация идеального всеединства составляет смысл и цель мирового процесса. Как под божественным порядком все *вечно есть* абсолютный организм, так по закону природного бытия все постепенно *становится* таким организмом *во времени*.”³⁹

These are views which prove that Solovyov coped with multiplicity and unity and at the same time he tried to answer the question of the existence of many religions as they are also just gradual phases in order to reach all-unity.

Gradual creation of all-unity in the world is thus an evolution of the world towards its fullness and original state. In this way Solovyov reached the point of evolution of the world and cosmos.⁴⁰ Solovyov’s positive “relation” to matter relates to these views since every Man can self-realize thanks to matter. However, this interest in matter had never led him to materialism. For him, matter was the realization of the spirit which indispensably needs to be able to express itself externally. He attributed aesthetic and mystical meaning to matter.⁴¹

Since all-unity is embraced in the world as a potency, the world is heading towards it (ideal all-unity) and is attracted by it. The divine principle wants to self-realize in chaos and create the idea of absolute (integral – godman-like) organism.⁴²

“Итак, божественное начало является здесь (в мировом процессе) как действующая сила абсолютной идеи, стремящейся реализоваться или воплотиться в хаосе разрозненных элементов. Таким образом, здесь божественное начало стремится к тому же, к чему и мировая душа, – к воплощению божественной идеи или к обожествлению (theosis) всего существующего чрез введение его в форму абсолютного организма.”⁴³

The meaning of cosmic evolution is being conditioned by the unification of divine principle with the world soul (anima mundi, мировая душа).⁴⁴

But what, according to Solovyov, is the cause of the division of primordial unity between divine and human and the separation of the cosmos into a multiplicity of hostile elements? Why is the realization of this principle a process and not one single act? Solovyov answers that freedom is the cause. A unified world, separate from the world and fragmented into many atomisms. This phenomenon would not be possible without freedom.

³⁹ Compare with: В. Соловьев, *Чтения о Богочеловечестве*, p. 144.

⁴⁰ Solovyov was fully aware of Darwin’s points of view and he was familiar with his evolution theory. However, as a religious thinker he understood evolution in a broader religious framework in which really fundamental questions are of soteriology and the redemptive mission of Jesus Christ. (Compare with: K. Sládek, “Pohled na teorii evoluce očima Vladimíra Solovjova”, *Theologická revue* 76 (2005) 180–187.)

⁴¹ J. Komorovský, “Idea Kozmického Krista u Pierra Teilharda de Chardin a Vladimíra Sergejeviča Solovjova”, *Hieron* 3 (1998) 11.

⁴² Compare with: В. Соловьев, *Чтения о Богочеловечестве*, p. 201.

⁴³ В. Соловьев, *Чтения о Богочеловечестве*, p. 145.

⁴⁴ In this process the divine principle is influential, determinative and impregnating element. The world soul is a passive force, a sort of external protection, in which this principle can evolve and express itself.

“Свободным актом мировой души объединяемый ею мир отпал от Божества и распался сам в себе на множество враждующих элементов; длинным рядом свободных актов все это восставшее множество должно примириться с собою и с Богом и возродиться в форме абсолютного организма.”⁴⁵

And since the idea of all-unity is potentially embraced in the world, this effort cannot derive only from God but also from the nature.⁴⁶ For Solovyov, a cosmogonic process is completed by the creation of the perfect human organism – Man.

“В человеке мировая душа впервые внутренне соединяется с божественным Логосом в сознании как чистой форме всеединства. Будучи реально только одним из множества существ в природе, человек, в сознании своем имея способность постигать разум или внутреннюю связь и смысл (λόγος) всего существующего, является в идее как *все* и в этом смысле есть второе всеединое, образ и подобие Божие.”⁴⁷

Solovyov regards Man as the second all-unity since there is a sort of unity between him and divine principle (Man as *imago Dei*). At the same time Man is a liaison between the divine principle and the natural world. In this context he expresses the idea of Godmanhood personified by Christ and who is the absolute unification of divine and human (ideal Godmanhood). Therefore Solovyov in his periodization of religious thinking regards Christianity as the climax of revelation of the divine principle to the world.

All-unity is an important component of Solovyov's thinking. Almost all of his themes project against its background. The world is attracted towards unification and primordial unity. Anthropological dimension is included in the idea of humans as the second all-unity who should actively generate this unification. These are Solovyov's thoughts where the antinomy Man – God, multiplicity – unity is the most evident.

Conclusion

Solovyov attempted to outline the ideal school of thought (theosophy) which would be able to grasp (not understand) the truth in its entirety. Theosophy is bounded by a rational component, empirical experience and mystical intuition in their mutual interaction. The separation of one component from the others is the expression of abstract (particular) cognition which divides the truth into particular spheres. In his system, theosophy would not be possible without the concept of all-unity which, according to Tenace, is the central theme together with the idea of Godmanhood.⁴⁸ Heading towards all-unity is a basic principle (law) of evolution which explains the basic anthropological problems related to cognition, cosmology and theology. This article offered a basic and certainly not exhaustive view of theosophy in Solovyov's version. Solovyov's views evolved during different periods and he revised many of them. However, Solovyov's teaching about comprehensive cognition did not undergo any significant changes.

⁴⁵ Compare with: В. Соловьев, *Чтения о Богочеловечестве*, p. 147.

⁴⁶ Ibid p. 147.

⁴⁷ Ibid p. 149–150.

⁴⁸ Sophiology is a key to understand the life and writings of Solovyov. But at some moments it is only a subsidiary theme because it is not the only key. Two central thoughts, which are evident in the whole Solovyov's work, are all-unity and Godmanhood. M. Tenace, “Pravá a falešná Sofia”, in: P. Ambros, *Od Sofie k New Age*, Olomouc 2001, s. 37.

reviews|

Review of *Experimental Philosophy*

Filip Tvrđý

Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), *Experimental Philosophy*, Oxford University Press, 2008, 244 + x pp., \$24.95 (paperback), ISBN 978-0-19-532326-9

To define what philosophy is has been one of the discipline's main topics since antiquity. The method of its enquiry has also been put into question, but the situation here has been much clearer. Traditional philosophy is mainly based on logical arguments, dialectics, conceptual analysis, thought experiments and intuitive solutions of problems. It does not use empirical research, statistics, controlled or natural experiments and verification through observation. We can call it "armchair" philosophy, which is a completely satisfactory name for the discipline that is usually carried out in warm, comfy workrooms. At the beginning of the 21st century there was an attempt to change the philosophers' pursuit of truth and start using methods more common in natural sciences. This movement of mainly young philosophers has been named *experimental philosophy*, or simply X-phi, with a picture of an armchair on fire as its symbol. It is possible to trace the origin of the program back to the 1990s, when scholars started to deal with some classical problems of moral philosophy using the scientific apparatus of psychology and even neuroscience. Probably the first pioneers of this methodological stance were psychologists Jonathan Haidt and Joshua Greene. In 2002 the latter finished his dissertation thesis "The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth about Morality and What to Do About It" at Princeton University and later published a series of papers in which he analyzed the "trolley problem". The "trolley problem" was first proposed by Philippa Foot in the 1960s and it is frequently discussed by moral philosophers who examine the limits of utilitarian ethics. The problem in its original version is very simple:

A trolley is running out of control down a track. In its path are five people who have been tied to the track by a mad philosopher. Fortunately, you could flip a switch, which will lead the trolley down a different track to safety. Unfortunately, there is a single person tied to that track. Should you flip the switch or do nothing? (Foot, "The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect", *Oxford Review*, No. 5, 1967, pp. 5–15; reprinted in *Virtues and Vices*, U of California P, 1978, pp. 19–33)

Most people choose to switch the flip and cause the death of one person, but in different versions of the example they hesitate to voluntarily kill one person in favor of five survivors. Greene used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in order to find out how this ambivalence is possible in terms of neurology. He detected two neural areas that conduct our moral reasoning – a rational center, which uses consequentialist ethics, and an emotional centre, based on deontology. Thus, the experimental approach to philosophical problems was born.

The reviewed book is named simply *Experimental Philosophy* and its two editors could be described as superstars in the newly established field. Joshua Knobe works as an assistant professor in the Program in Cognitive Science at Yale University and Shaun Nichols is a professor of philosophy at the University of Arizona. In their book, they put together a representative anthology of papers on various forms of X-phi and also wrote the first chapter entitled "An Experimental Philosophy Manifesto", which serves as an introduction to the topic. Since the Vienna Circle manifesto "The Scientific Conception of the World", philosophy has probably not

experienced a proclamation so radical and ambitious. The authors argue in favor of more practical and empirical philosophy. They believe this claim to be in perfect accordance with older, pre-analytic philosophy which was much more interconnected with psychology, history and political science. Examples of thinkers who worked in this way include Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, Hume, Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche and many others. This tradition is dramatically distinct from conventional analytic philosophy which is mainly concerned with conceptual analysis. The main task of this approach is to describe and analyze human nature, to identify “truths about how human beings really are”. Philosophers should run systematic empirical studies instead of counting upon unsubstantiated intuitions. Knobe and Nichols write:

Hence, experimental philosophers proceed by conducting experimental investigations of the psychological processes underlying people’s intuitions about central philosophical issues. Again and again, these investigations have challenged familiar assumptions, showing that people do not actually think about these issues in anything like the way philosophers had assumed. (p. 3)

Experimental philosophers usually design statistical surveys to investigate intuitions about philosophical problems among non-professionals. Results often show that such intuitions vary greatly. However, this does not mean that truths underlying these beliefs should be justified simply by voting. Armchair philosophers consider their intuitions to be universal, which might not be the case. Thought experiments, in particular, are often contaminated by this epistemological error, i. e. Putnam’s Twin-Earth experiment is based only on its author’s intuition, and the analogous intuitive assumption underlies Searle’s belief that the Chinese room is not capable of thinking. The aim of the X-phi movement is to point out that intuitions are not epistemologically sufficient for the formulation of our theories about the world and about ourselves. It is necessary to re-examine our intuitions and find more information about the fundamental facts which constitute them.

The main body of the book consists of eleven essays; seven of them are reprints of older works (2–8), the other four are previously unpublished pieces (9–12). They were written by some of the foremost practitioners of the discipline: Jonathan Weinberg, Stephen P. Stich, Edouard Machery, Eddy Nahmias, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Alfred Mele, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, and others. The themes discussed cover many philosophical areas: epistemological status of intuitions, common-sense identification of the moral responsibility of agents, or intuitive conceptions of free will and intentional action. Critical opinions are represented too, in an essay by the famous analytical epistemologist Ernest Sosa, who expresses skepticism about the relevance of X-phi to mainstream philosophy. Most of the papers are well-written and thoroughly thought-out, and together they constitute a very important work in the methodology of epistemology and philosophy. I am not sure what the future of X-phi will be like, as I have doubts about the future of the whole discipline of philosophy as such, but we may regard the first decade of this century as the time of the rise of experimental philosophy.

Review of *Procitne Evropa?* *Myšlenky o programu jedné světové velmoci na sklonku věku její politické absence*

Marek Szilvasi

SLOTERDIJK Peter (1994), *Falls Europa erwacht: Gedanken zum Programm einer Weltmacht am Ende des Zeitalters ihrer politischen Absence*, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag

SLOTERDIJK Peter (1996), *Procitne Evropa? Myšlenky o programu jedné světové velmoci na sklonku věku její politické absence*. Olomouc, Votobia, trans. to Czech by Břetislav Horyna, Olomouc, Votobia, 96p. ISBN: 80-7198-095-1

Farewell to 'Translatio Imperii'

‘Europe will become a colloquium where people would learn to think beyond the framework of empire.’

In his book on the re-establishment of a European role in global politics, Peter Sloterdijk demonstrates that a quintessence of European heritage, the European constitutive element, lies in the mechanism of transmitting the idea of Empire. “Europe is a theatre of imperial metamorphosis. The guiding principle of its political imagination is *sui generis* a wandering of the soul of Roman Empire upon the authoritative and historically powerful European nations. Not a few of these nations confessed in their most successful eras that they were chosen to become a new incarnation of Roman ideas of a world dominion” (Sloterdijk 1996, 39). The actual and innermost connection between the European nation-states is explained as a kind of mimesis and practical engagement in imperial politics. In a sublime line of thought, Sloterdijk demonstrates that every “European is a person engaged in the transmission of Empire (Sloterdijk 1996, 40)”. Hence, the motive of Empire’s transmission stroke through various important European historical events. According to Sloterdijk, a perverted side of this historical process emerged in modernity when several translating actors occurred at the same time. A competition between various territorial or national self-appointed heirs made European unification impossible under the shared motive of an imperial legacy. Readers thus encounter a constant bifurcation of a European theme between an idealistic picture of inner imperialistic coherence and a historical fragmentation of the multi-imperial programs. Consequently, Sloterdijk blames the pluralization of European imperial programs for causing the political disasters of the twentieth-century. He terms nation-states as “monster novo-European empires which competition implied the catastrophe of Europe in the twentieth-century (Sloterdijk 1996, 43)”. Even more, there is a twofold political catastrophe of Europe to which Sloterdijk refers. On the one hand, as mentioned above, an internal collapse and degeneration of European regulative idea which drifted towards the mass destruction of World Wars and to the totalitarian political experiments. On the other hand, he points out that the essential socio-cultural and political principle of Europe, its imperial metamorphosis, was inevitably passed along to the other side of Atlantic Ocean. A constitutive European *mythos* was

transferred to and seized by another political agent – the USA. Hence, since 1945, Europe has been dominated by “*ideologies of vacuum* proposing to escape to the stage of non-assertivity” (Sloterdijk 1996, 47), and at the same time, it was left to play “a role of the colony of its own utopia” (Sloterdijk 1996, 48).

Following the outcomes of Sloterdijk’s analysis, I find the tendency to re-establish a European unity (and thus to position Europe as an influential global actor) on the basis of rethinking its imperial metamorphosis alarming. I agree by and large with his premise that a fragmentation of European continent into the battlefield of conflicting nation-states brought a wave of hatred, hostile demarcations and all kinds of exclusions and that this situation culminated in severe political frustrations as well as a huge number of personal tragedies of the twentieth-century. However, what strikes me in his account is his apparent silence about the consequences of European imperialism on the ‘Others’ of non-western territories; his confidence in Europe being chosen for an avant-garde role to provide the others with a universal formula of development and freedom. We should bear on mind, that although potentially with the best intensions of universal enlightenment, Europe managed to impose its particularistic perspective, in what is to be called Eurocentrism, and to sell it as universal norm. What I called Eurocentrism here is a unilateral social contract which does not give almost any voice to the ‘Other’; it considers ‘Western’ Europe and its particular history, politics, social system of stratification and cultural development as the measure of global civilization. Moreover, it is also a discourse on an exploitation of the world for the benefit of (Western) Europeans. Eurocentrism is a limited form of universalism based on the strategy of overlapping the particularities.

Counter to Sloterdijk’s book, I advocate for a clear-cut critique of a European ‘imperial project’ based on the recognition that any other project of universal applicability needs to reconcile the universal and particular in more multilateral terms. Apart from Sloterdijk’s conclusion, European imagination can no longer afford to distribute its own point of view to the whole of humanity. European universalism can no longer either simply be willed into being or willed away. Nevertheless, even if Europeans should abandon any further effort to imperial politics, the conclusions of Sloterdijk’s book are still highly relevant for recent European integration. He brings clearly into view the danger of a vacuum ideology in which the highest political virtues stand for the resignation and lack of attitudes towards global processes.

It is to note, that one may only wonder whether the recent rise of Europe is going to culminate in a self-abolishing leap to higher levels (higher than imperial) of social organization. Recent European integration as represented by the European Union might bring European identity to the deliberate decision to self-abolish itself in terms of imperial politics. Europe might then appear less as a dominant part of the world than as a vehicle of forces or principles that follow a global logic and find their most adequate expression on a global scale. Hence, *If Europe wakens up*, “a pluralism will no more signify a fancy and vogue word by which one can grasp everything up to ‘unity in diversity’, but reversely, an obligatory and active principle of organization which will guaranty a post-imperial European form” (Horyna’s epilogue in Sloterdijk 1996). This would be a truly European cosmopolitan agency. The ambitions of European world-supremacy thinking should be replaced by a discourse on cosmopolitan Europe whose ambition is to exclude virtually no one.

Even when Sloterdijk’s book was published more than 16 years ago, the time has changed very little in terms of the relevance of his analysis of the European self-positioning in global politics. To the reviewer’s knowledge, the book has not been translated into English yet, and therefore the number of its reviews stays rather limited (it is also very likely that this review is among the first ones). In conclusion, it is worth remarking that Sloterdijk’s book deserves an English translation and a consequent debate in the English speaking arena.

